

Jaap Mansfeld

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Studies in Later Greek Philosophy  
and Gnosticism

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This volume contains x + 324 pages.

## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The articles in this volume, as in all others in the Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible.

Each article has been given a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated on each page and quoted in the index entries.

References to the *Addenda* at the end of the volume are indicated by asterisks in the margin by the passages concerned.

## PREFACE

The earliest of the studies contained in the present volume was first published 1972; the last to appear, although ready for the press in 1985, was published as recently as 1988. Although the stimuli which caused them to be written were for the most part external, they do possess a degree of unity which, no doubt, is to be explained by the limitations of the author. Over the last ten years or so I have been working, on and off, on a new edition of the fragments and testimonia of the Early Stoics. I gradually discovered that this undertaking would only be feasible if, both as a preliminary and simultaneously, an inquiry into the ancient traditions concerned with the historiography of philosophy was attempted, and gradually realized that this entailed the difficult study of the various phases of the Rezeptionsgeschichte of philosophy in Antiquity (including that of the receptions of receptions). A sort of bonus turned out to be included, for the interpretation of the remains of the Presocratics to which I always have devoted part of my time received a considerable impetus from an unbiased approach through their reception in later times. Many of our sources for Presocratic and Stoic fragments are Christian authors who, at least in part, are dependent on previous philosophical interpretations and/or historiographical traditions, and one may even find an unexpected tralatitious echo of Parmenides in one of the Gnostic treatises discovered at Nag Hammadi. Consequently, most of the studies collected here have not been written as attempts to answer the question "wie es eigentlich gewesen", but have been conceived as parts of an ongoing effort to try to find out what, in an earlier philosopher, was of interest to a later one, e.g. what, in Plato's and Aristotle's cosmology, was important for Zeno of Citium, and what the learned and the not so learned, in their different ways, *assumed* to have been "*eigentlich gewesen*". In this way, for instance, the study of Philo's use of a selection of ideas and techniques borrowed (on occasion at one or more removes) from a plurality of Greek philosophers not only throws some light on Philo's own project, but also helps to understand to a certain extent the way in which some motifs rather than others have survived the loss of the original works, and which course the subterranean currents may have followed. Our notions of Plato and Aristotle, no doubt, would be rather different if our sources of information were limited to, say, Diogenes Laertius, the Didascalicus of Alcinous, the opuscula of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the references

in later ancient authors both Christian and pagan. As a systematical approach to philosophy, Middle Platonism is a fascinating subject, but it is equally rewarding to study the various receptions of Plato and, to a lesser degree, Aristotle which together constitute the bulk of what we are in the habit of calling by the name of Middle Platonism. Furthermore, the study of these receptions is a salutary exercise for those who try to uncover the thought of the Presocratics, or of the Stoics, from later quotes, reports, and discussions. It is, moreover, not infrequently the case that the later history of an idea furthers the understanding of this idea itself. In this way, for instance, a modest familiarity with the complexities of Gnosticism may further one's understanding of aspects of Early Greek thought even in cases where an actio in distans is lacking. History of philosophy as philosophy need not be modernistic; it can also be practised from the vantage-point of a much earlier doctrine. It of course remains one's first duty to study fragments and reports that are reasonably secure, but in many instances the relative reliability of the tradition still is a probandum.

Thanks are due to publishers and editors who generously gave their permission to reproduce the papers and reviews collected here; the original place of publication is each time indicated in the Contents, Leiden of course indicating E.J. Brill. Special thanks are due to Pieter Willem van der Horst, who permitted me to add his bibliography of literature concerned with Alexander of Lycopolis to the section of our original publication reproduced in the present volume. A paper, completed in 1987, which in view of its subject could have been included has regretfully been omitted because it has only just been published: *Compatible Alternatives: Middle Platonist Theology and the Xenophanes Reception*, in: R. van den Broek — T. Baarda — J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Knowledge of God in the Greco-Roman World*, EPRO 112, Leiden 1988, 92–117. A collection of papers dealing with the technicalities of the ancient historiographical traditions concerned with philosophy is due to appear elsewhere.

Nomina sunt odiosa, but it goes without saying that without the promptings, criticisms, and assistance of numerous friends and colleagues, both at home and abroad, I would not have been able to enjoy working in the fields of ancient philosophy the way I have. It was John Dillon who suggested that I assemble the pieces which form the present collection.

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August 1988

JAAP MANSFELD

## PROVIDENCE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNIVERSE IN EARLY STOIC THOUGHT

*With Some Remarks on the "Mysteries of Philosophy"*

*In memoriam M. van Straaten (ob. 29.9.77)*

1. The Stoics were convinced that the universe and all that it contains is ruled by a supreme power,<sup>1</sup> to which they gave titles such as God, World-Soul, Reason (*logos*), Nature (*physis*), Providence (*pronoia*), Active Cause, Necessity, Destiny, Fate, Common Law and Zeus.<sup>2</sup> The only piece of any length to have survived the wreck of Early Stoic literature is Cleanthes' famous hymn to this Zeus "called by many a name",<sup>3</sup> which has been preserved in Stobaeus' ample

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa I*, Göttingen 1943, 41970, 95, 108, and notes in II, 41972; F. Solmsen, 'Nature as Craftsman in Greek Thought' [*JHI* 1963, 473ff. =] *Kleine Schriften I*, Hildesheim 1968, [332ff.], 354-5; F. H. Sandbach, *The Stoics*, London 1975, 79f.

<sup>2</sup> E.g. *SVF* I, 85 (god is cause), 157 (god as fire or fiery intellect), 160 (reason = fate = god = mind of Zeus), 171 and 172 (nature as demiurgic fire), 176 (fate = providence = nature), 532 (god = world-soul), 536 (Zeus = fire), 537 (the hymn of Cleanthes, s. below); II, 913 (fate = reason = truth = nature = necessity, "to which he [sc. Chrysippus] also adds other titles"), 937, p. 269, 12f. (nature = reason = fate = providence = Zeus), 1024 (nature = god), 1027 (god as demiurgic fire containing all spermatik logoi, according to which everything occurs through destiny), 1077 (god = cosmos = destiny = fire = aether). Cf. especially Diog. Laert. VII, 135 = *SVF* I, 102, II, 580 ἐν τε εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία· πολλὰς τ' ἑτέρας ὀνομασίας προσονομάζεσθαι ("God, Intellect, Fate and Zeus are one; and they are called by many other titles as well"), i.e. said to be the doctrine of both Zeno and Chrysippus. Cf. also H. Schwabl, 'Weltschöpfung', *RE* Supp. Bd. IX Stuttgart 1962, [1433ff.], 1543-4. There is a most adequate collection of texts in C. J. de Vogel, *Greek Philosophy III, The Hellenistic-Roman Period*, Leiden 1959, 21964, Nr. 899-902b, 904a, 918-921, 927, 933, 995.

<sup>3</sup> πολῶνυμε, in the first line (cf. also Diog. Laert VII, 135, above n. 2). Wilamowitz' observations on the terminology of the hymn are still quite pertinent: "πολῶνυμος ist der stoische Zeus, weil er mit dem νόμος und λόγος, andererseits mit dem reinen

anthology (= *SVF* I, 537).<sup>4</sup> In his *Personal Religion among the Greeks*,<sup>5</sup> A.-J. Festugière with some justification calls this hymn a prayer, for it undoubtedly ends with one.<sup>6</sup> He finds in it "Stoic piety, or, if you will; Stoic mysticism", viz. a "mysticism of consent". Wisdom and piety not only consist in accepting, but also in understanding and praising the divine plan executed by all beings. Human wickedness (moral evil) and human foolishness, i.e. the actions and opinions of those people who do not understand and praise what has been ordained by Zeus, are, in the final reckoning, also part of the invariable rational order of things (*SVF* I, p. 122, 13f.). The great Wilamowitz even spotted "die wärmsten Töne hellenischer Frömmigkeit" in Cleanthes' hymn;<sup>7</sup> consequently, he appears to have believed that, at least to Cleanthes, the Stoic god is not a merely conceptual construction,<sup>8</sup> but a personal presence with whom a

Feuerelement zusammenfällt; als solches ist er φύσεως ἀρχηγός: aus dem Feuer ist alles geworden; [line] 32 ist er πάνδωρος: das ist er als ἀνάγκη oder πεπωμένη oder πρόνοια; κελαϊνεφες ἀρχικέραυνε ... ist der alte homerische Zeus, aber er bedeutet [sc. in Cleanthes] das Weltengesetz, das durch das Feuer alles beherrscht", *Hellenistische Dichtung II*, Berlin 1924, 258f. Cf. also J. Moreau's seminal study, *L'âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1939 = Hildesheim 1965, 182; Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 108; M. Lapidge, "Ἀρχαὶ und στοιχεῖα: A Problem in Stoic Cosmology", *Phronesis* 1973, [240ff.], 261, who aptly adduces *SVF* II, 1070; and already J. Adam, 'The Hymn of Cleanthes', in: *The Vitality of Platonism and Other Essays*, Cambridge 1911, [104ff.], 119f.

<sup>4</sup> For the transmission and emendation of the text [which is Nr. 943 in De Vogel, *Gr. Phil. III*, who aptly calls it a "compendium of Stoic theology"] s. G. Zuntz, 'Zum Kleanthes-Hymnos', *Harv. Stud. Class. Phil.* 1958, 288ff. For Cleanthes' motives in writing poetry cf. *SVF* I, 486, quoted below n. 22.

<sup>5</sup> Sather Class. Lect. XXVI, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1954, <sup>2</sup>1960, 105-112.

<sup>6</sup> In his *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, II, Le Dieu Cosmique*, Paris 1949, 310ff. Festugière translates the hymn and interprets it more fully, splendidly discussing both its traditional and its novel elements.

<sup>7</sup> *Der Glaube der Hellenen, II*, Berlin 1933, Darmstadt <sup>3</sup>1959, 288. M. Pohlenz, *o.c.* 27 speaks of his "gefühlsmässige Einstellung und ... persönliche Frömmigkeit"; Festugière, *Révé. II*, 311, calls him "un être profondément religieux"; M. P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion, II, Die hellenistische und römische Zeit*, München <sup>2</sup>1961, 261, refers to his "tief religiöse Natur"; V. Cilento, *Comprensione della religione antica*, Napoli 1967, <sup>2</sup>1972, 212, if I understand him correctly, ascribes to him an anticipation of the Christian God, "rivelato ... dallo stesso cuore dell'uomo".

<sup>8</sup> "Zu einem Begriffe betet kein Mensch", *Glaube I*, Berlin 1931, Darmstadt <sup>3</sup>1959, 11. Though Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht., l.c.*, says Cleanthes speaks not as a person but as a human being, he p. 260 calls the hymn a "Gebete". Cp. Festugière, *Révé. II*, 313: "cette prière s'adresse à un dieu, de qui l'on suppose à priori et qu'il a la puissance

personal relationship is possible. It cannot, indeed, be denied that there is an element of personal feeling in the hymn. The paradox, however, is that Cleanthes' relationship to "Zeus" remains a rational and intellectual one;<sup>9</sup> all he asks of his god is that man be given a share of the divine "insight" (γνώμη) which rules the universe (*ibid.*, p. 122, 30f.); he does not beg the kind of favours men usually ask for in selfish prayer. In another poem, a prayer to Zeus and Destiny<sup>10</sup> (*SVF* I, 527) in four lines, which survives in Epict., *Ench.* c. 53 and in a somewhat free Latin translation of five lines in Sen., *Ep.* 107, 10, all Cleanthes asks for is to be permitted to follow the divine plan of his own accord. Cleanthes' attitude toward Zeus — as that of Seneca in the letter containing the free quote — seems to contrast rather sharply with that of the older Stoics cited by the same Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* II, 35-36, where we are informed that god and destiny are not moved by prayer; here, however, Seneca refers to people who vainly ask for a change of fate.<sup>11</sup> We must conclude that the Stoic concept of god is tolerant of a theistic approach.

In the domain of ethics, the Stoic conception of god's fatal rule gave rise to famous perplexities regarding the evaluation of human responsibility.<sup>12</sup> If everything has been pre-ordained anywhere and

d'accorder la prière et qu'il est disposé à l'accorder. [Hence] ... le fidèle magnifiera la puissance du dieu et ses bonnes intentions à l'égard des hommes". Cf. also De Vogel, *Gr. Phil. III*, comment on Nr. 943. For interesting observations on the personal element in Cleanthes' hymn, s. M. Erren, *Die Phainomena des Aratos von Soloi, Untersuchungen zum Sach- und Sinnverständnis*, Hermes Einzelschr. 19, Wiesbaden 1967, 21.

<sup>9</sup> This is rather well brought out by Wilamowitz, *Hell. Dicht. II*, 260-1; s. further Festugière, *Révé. II*, 321f. and M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Piety*, Oxford 1948, 88 ("personal colouring" vs "rather icy coldness").

<sup>10</sup> See J. Dalfen, 'Das Gebet des Kleanthes an Zeus und das Schicksal', *Hermes* 1971, 174ff., and H. Dahlmann, 'Nochmals "Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt"', *ibid.* 1977, 342ff. — I do not know, by the way, that it is wise to make too much of the fact that the "I" speaking in this poem is a poet. Cleanthes, the philosopher-poet, speaks *ex officio*; the prayer can be repeated by each human being, *as a person*.

<sup>11</sup> For Seneca's evaluation of prayer cf. J. M. van Dijk, *Lucius Annaeus Seneca over de voorzienigheid en het kwaad*, thesis Nijmegen 1968, 71f., and on the Stoic view in general esp. E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, London 1911 = 1958, 235f.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. e.g. A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy*, London 1974, 163ff.; Sandbach, *o.c.* 101ff. Much of the evidence is assembled by W. C. Greene, *Moirai. Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought*, Cambridge, Mass. 1944, <sup>2</sup>1948, Ch. XI, 'Fate and Providence', 337ff. Cf. also De Vogel, *Gr. Phil. III*, Nr. 944 a-c; Pohlenz, *o.c.*, 101ff. Cf. Edelstein,



everywhere, no room appears to be left for autonomous decisions to be made by responsible human agents. As a matter of fact, the Stoics were constrained to either leave some openings for human freedom at the cost of a loss in consistency in so far their general theory was concerned [viz. by limiting the scope of god's power of intervention<sup>13</sup>] or to restrict human freedom to the sphere of our mental dispositions vis-a-vis the unavoidable: what counts in this respect are our attitudes and intentions. The power or propensity of giving assent — either correctly or incorrectly — to or withholding it from<sup>14</sup> sense-impressions, mental images, concepts and propositions is a crucial prerogative of the human being. A rather awkward ethics, however subtly it may have been defended, above all by Chrysippus, whose emphasizing of the detached dependence and peculiar character of human nature is noteworthy.<sup>15</sup> It is not my intention, however,

*o.c.* [below n. 18], 33: "the world necessarily includes physical and moral evil; God cannot help this".

<sup>13</sup> At Plut., *St. rep.* 1051Bf. = *SVF* II, 1178 Chrysippus argues that the gods do not bother about minor details and that 'Necessity' (ἀνάγκη) is to a large extent involved (cf. also *ibid.*, 1179). See below, n. 90, and Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 100, II, 57. I prefer to suspend judgement as to *SVF* II, 1183 = Philod., Π. Θεῶν col. 7, 28f. and 8, 1f.; Von Arnim prints the text of W. Scott, *Fragmenta Herculaniensia*, Oxford 1885, 156-7; Philodemus' text was re-edited by H. Diels, *Philodemus Über die Götter, Drittes Buch, I, Griech. Text, Abh. Preuss. Ak. Wiss.* 1916 Nr. 4, Berlin 1917 who has the fragments corresponding to *SVF* II, 1183 at p. 25-6. However, Diels' text is not based upon autopsy of the remains of the papyri and appears to be full of mistakes, s. K. Kleve, 'Zu einer Neuausgabe von Philodemus, Über die Götter, Buch I (PHerc. 26)', *Cronache Ercolanesi* 1972, 89f. In the text of Scott and Diels, which is, moreover, in crucial places conjectural, Chrysippus is quoted for the thesis that "the god is not omniscient, because he is incapable of ..." (*desunt cett.*), and (the Stoics) are criticized because, on the one hand, they ascribe all things to god, while on the other they absolve him, as he is not omnipotent, of concomitant effects. Diels' comment is interesting; he argues, *ibid.* Nr. 6, *Erläuterungen*, 19f., that god is incapable of the impossible, as e.g. of making the diagonal of a square commensurable with its side. — For Chrysippus' theory of concomitant causes and effects s. below, p. 158 and n. 90.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. H. von Arnim, 'Die Stoische Lehre vom Fatum und Willensfreiheit', in: *Wiss. Beilage z. 18. Jahresber. (1905) d. Philos. Gesellsch. a.d. Univ. Wien*, Leipzig 1905, [3ff.], 14f., who discusses the importance of ὁρμή; M. Reesor, 'Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy', *Phoenix* 1965, [285ff.], 287.

<sup>15</sup> See the excellent discussion by A. A. Long, 'The Stoic Concept of Evil', *Phil. Qu.* 1968, 329ff. Cf. also Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 104ff. and II, 59ff.; J. M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy*, Cambridge 1969 = 1977, 112ff.; Von Arnim's beautiful paper referred to above, n. 14; and G. L. Duprat, 'La Doctrine Stoïcienne du Monde, du Destin et de la Providence

to discuss these vexing and oft-studied questions in the present paper. Rather, I wish to concentrate upon another, admittedly related issue, which does not seem to me to have received the attention it deserves or even to have been formulated at all in the proper way,<sup>16</sup> viz. that of the evaluation of god's part in, and his responsibility for, the periodical destruction of the ordered universe. Perhaps this is a problem more of theology, and of philosophical theology at that, than of religion; to the extent, however, that Stoic religious feeling as expressed in e.g. the above-cited poems by Cleanthes is rooted in Stoic theology, a brief exploration of this issue is not, I hope, out of order in a volume devoted to religious phenomena in the Hellenistic era.<sup>17</sup> Cleanthes' religiosity, moreover, is not as exceptional in Early Stoic thought as has often been suggested; perhaps our everyday notion of what constitutes "religion" is, anachronistically, more applicable in Cleanthes' case.<sup>18</sup>

d'après Chrysippe', *AGPh* 1910, [473ff.], 494f. It should be considered, however, that human nature both general and individual is determined by destiny or god, cf. Plut., *Comm. not.* 1076E = *SVF* II, 937; furthermore, that each of us will make his come-back and will re-enact the same routine in each successive world-period (for Chrysippus' strong belief in eternal recurrence s. below, p. 178-9). On the contradictions in Chrysippus cf. also e.g. Greene, *o.c.* 345f., on those of Stoic theodicy generally E. Schröder, *Plotins Abhandlung ΠΟΘΕΝ ΤΑ ΚΑΚΑ*, Inaug. Diss. Rostock, Leipzig 1916, 39f.

<sup>16</sup> The best discussion known to me is that by my regretted collega proximus M. van Straaten, *Kerngedachten van de Stoa*, Roermond 1969, 21-30; s. further below, n. 69 and p. 180. His sudden death, which is a serious blow to the study of Ancient Philosophy in the Netherlands, deprived me of the opportunity of discussing the ideas of this paper with him.

<sup>17</sup> D. Babut, *La religion des philosophes grecs de Thalès aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1974, argues, in his solid chapter dealing with Stoic thought, p. 172ff., that this is more theological than religious. He fails to mention, however, Cleanthes' poems, and does not quote the Chrysippean parallel for *SVF* II, 42. — Perhaps I should add at this point that — apart from a few months in early youth — I have never been a believer in any God. But I accept the fact other people are. Experience has moreover taught me that people who believe in the existence of the divine do so in an apparently inexhaustible variety of ways, both intellectual and non-intellectual (a distinction, by the way, which it is not always very easy to make). At any rate, it would be sheer presumption, on the part of a historian of philosophy, not to take this human phenomenon very seriously indeed.

<sup>18</sup> Wilamowitz, *Glaube II*, 287, Nilsson, *o.c.* 261f., Cilento, *o.c.* 212f. and G. Reale, *I problemi del pensiero antico, II, Le Scuole Ellenistico-romane*, Milano 1973, 251f., for instance, take Cleanthes to be an exceptional case. The opinion of Festugière, *ll. cc.*, appears to be different, as is that of M. Spanneut, *Permanence du Stoïcisme, De Zénon à Malraux*, Gembloux 1973, who in a splendid passage, p. 31, states that

Chrysippus spoke of the *study* of theology in terms which, apparently, were destined to become popular with some of the Middle Platonists:<sup>19</sup> in a literal quote from the fourth book of his *On Lives*, ap. Plut.,

the hymn is representative of Stoicism in general. My reluctance to consider Cleanthes an exception is only enhanced by the setting in which this judgement occasionally occurs: both Wilamowitz and Nilsson, for instance, seriously speak of Cleanthes as being a pure Greek in the company of those ungodly and unpoetical Semites Zeno and Chrysippus. This racist evaluation was already questioned by J. Adam, *o.c.* 115ff., who refutes earlier supporters, some of whom, ironically, praised Zeno to the skies for showing a religious depth unparalleled in Greece before his time. Prejudice, however, is ineradicable: M. Pohlenz, in his fundamental monograph on Stoicism, published in the midst of World War II, did not abstain from commenting, p. 22-30, that Zeno and Chrysippus were of Semitic stock, and apparently thought he made up for this by suggesting, *ibid.* 99f., that Zeno's belief in Providence as caring for mankind — a rather serious religious conviction — derives from his Semitic environment. Adam's job was continued by L. Edelstein, *The Meaning of Stoicism*, Martin Class. Lect. XXI, Cambridge, Mass. 1966, 29ff.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Plut., *De Is.* 382D-E, on the ἐποπτικὸν μέρος: ... οἷον ἐν τελετῇ τέλος ἔχειν φιλοσοφίας; Clem. Alex., *Strom.* I, 28, 2 τέταρτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τὸ θεολογικὸν εἶδος, ἢ ἐπόπτεια, ἣν φησὶ ὁ Πλάτων τῶν μεγάλων ὄντων εἶναι μυστηρίων whereas Aristotle calls it 'metaphysics'; and, slightly different, Theo Smyrn., *Expos.* p. 14-15 Hiller τῇ δὲ τελετῇ ὅμοιον ἢ τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν θεωρημάτων παράδοσις, τῶν τε λογικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ φυσικῶν. ἐπόπτεια δ' ὀνόμαζται [sc. Plato] τὴν περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ ὄντως ὄντα κ.τ.λ. Such terminology could obviously be justified to some extent by a reference to Plato, *Symp.* 209E-210A (the speech of Diotima on Eros) and *Phaedr.* 250C (the myth). [Plutarch, *l.c.*, mentions both Plato and Aristotle; B. Effe, *Studien zur Theologie und Kosmologie der Aristotelischen Schrift 'Über die Philosophie'*, Zetemata 50, München 1970, 94-102, argues that Plutarch interprets Aristotle in a platonizing way; he further argues that the references to the Mysteries of Eleusis in Arist., *De phil.* fr. 14 and 15 Ross only pertain to the non-discursive acquisition of knowledge of the divine by means of the contemplation of the beauty of the cosmos]. The Middle Platonist view became important in Neoplatonist writers; see, in general, P. Hadot, 'La métaphysique de Porphyre', in: *Porphyre, Entret. Hardt XII*, Genève 1965, 127ff., who however does not mention the Stoic parallels. Cf. also Waszink on Calc., *In Tim.* c. 127, p. 170, 10. J. Dillon, in an excellent and much-needed book, *The Middle Platonists*, London 1977, 162, 300 (on the "mysteries of philosophy" in Philo Judaeus and Albinus) and 398 (on the passage in Theo Smyrn. quoted above), suggests that this is "just another Middle Platonic commonplace"; apparently, he is unaware of the Stoic parallels, whereas Hadot's and Boyancé's contributions have been missed. Again, discussing Atticus' division of philosophy (ap. Eus., *PE* XI, 2, 1 = Atticus, fr. 1 Baudry = fr. 1 des Places) into ethics — physics — logic, and his claim that the purpose of physics is "to conduct us to knowledge of things divine, the gods themselves, the first principles and all other such matters", he suggests, *o.c.* 251, that Atticus stamps a "religious tone upon his whole doctrine". From the parallels I have quoted (cf. also Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36, 33-35), it would seem that this "stamp" is neither exceptional nor insignificant.

*Stoic. rep.* 1035A-B = *SVF* II, 42 we read that young people should study in succession logic, ethics, and physics, and, as the final part of physics, theology, "as the transmission of theology has been called initiation in the mysteries".<sup>20</sup> This is confirmed by another fragment:<sup>21</sup> "Chrysippus says that the discourses about the things divine (περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγους)<sup>22</sup> are appropriately called initiations (τελετάς). For these should be the last to be taught, to crown all the others [ἐπὶ πᾶσιν;<sup>23</sup> he means the other *logoi*, i.e. parts, of philosophy], when the soul has found its stability and confirmation and is capable of keeping silent" [as is the duty of the initiated] "vis-a-vis the uninitiated (ἀμύητους). For it is a great reward to hear what is correct about the gods and to gain self-mastery". This reference to what, at the very least, rather resembles an esoteric Stoic doctrine is not what one expects of a purely rational philosopher. What is important is that Chrysippus in this respect to some extent follows Cleanthes,<sup>24</sup> who had said [Epiph., *Adv. her.* III 2, 9 = *SVF* I, 538]

<sup>20</sup> τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος, διὸ καὶ τελετάς ἡγόρευσαν τὰς τοῦτου παραδόσεις; for παραδόσεις cf. Theo Smyrn., above n. 19. C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus I*, Königsberg 1829 = Darmstadt 1968, 123ff. argues that Chrysippus' use of this vocabulary is mere metaphor; however, he gives *ibid.* a useful collection of parallel passages.

<sup>21</sup> *Etym. magn.* s.v. τελετή, = *SVF* II, 1008. Of the three fragments adduced in the present paper, this is the only one to be mentioned by O. Casel, *De philosophorum Graecorum silentio mystico*, Giessen 1919 = Berlin 1967, 48 n. 2, in his disappointing discussion of Stoic views 42ff.

<sup>22</sup> Cp. the Stoic definition of philosophy as "striving after wisdom" (ἐπιτήδευσις σοφίας) and that of wisdom as "knowledge of things divine and human" (θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμη, *SVF* II, 35; 36; cf. Cic., *Off.* I, 153; *Tusc.* IV, 57). This definition appears to be at least as old as Cleanthes (*SVF* I, 486 = Philod., *De mus.* col. 28,1ff.), who stated that, although philosophical discourse is adequate in dealing with divine and human things (τοῦ λόγου τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἱκανὸς μὲν ἐξαγγέλλειν δυνάμενός τὰ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα), it does not, in its unadorned, i.e. prosaic, form possess dictions suitable to divine greatness, whereas the instruments of poetry warrant the closest possible approach to the truth of the vision of things divine. Ph. De Lacey's comments on this passage, 'Stoic Views of Poetry', *AJPh* 1948 [241ff.], 270-1, though correct, are subtly disappointing. Edelstein's position, *o.c.* 34, that "Cleanthes' theistic language is mere metaphor" is, in view of the testimony of *SVF* I, 486, which he quotes incompletely, rather unfortunate.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. the quotation from Clement, above n. 19.

<sup>24</sup> Two of these fragments (that of Cleanthes and *SVF* II, 42) are splendidly discussed by P. Boyancé, *Études sur le Songe de Scipion*, Paris 1936 (thèse, complémentaire), 116ff. and again in 'Sur les mystères d'Éleusis', *REG* 1962, [460ff.], 466ff.,

that the gods are "mystical shapes", that the sun is the "torch-bearer", the cosmos a "mysterion" and that those people who are "filled with the divine" (κατόχους τῶν θείων) are the "initiated" (τελεστάς). Chrysippus' philosophical curriculum culminates in a sort of mysticism; Cleanthes' mysticism of consent, on the other hand, is, in the final analysis, of a rational nature.

We may safely conclude that theology is an immensely important topic in the Early Stoa and that the attitude of the Early Stoics toward the supreme creator and ruler of the universe is not purely rational, but also emotional. This makes the part played by god in the destruction of the universe a rather sensitive issue. The evaluation of this role is closely bound up with the general question of theodicy,<sup>25</sup> viz. of the rational vindication of god's administration of the universe and the explanation of both physical and moral evil. I suspect, moreover, that a further investigation of the relation between god and universe in Early Stoic cosmology offers, if not an explanation, at least some sort of genetical apology for the ethical perplexities referred to above. It might be the case that, to the Stoics, divine determinism as a cosmological necessity was more important than full human autonomy (cf. below, p. 168).

2. We all know the Stoics assumed a cosmic cycle, i.e. the periodical destruction of the ordered universe by "total conflagration" (which is how I prefer to translate *ekpyrosis*) and its periodical rebirth out of the liquid mass<sup>26</sup> into which the fire — though remaining

a fundamental contribution. All three are commented upon, but less well, by K. H. Rolke, *Die bildhaften Vergleiche in den Fragmenten der Stoiker von Zenon bis Panaitios*, Spudasmata XXXII, Hildesheim 1975, 222f. See further below, p. 174, 182ff.

<sup>25</sup> That the Stoics were the first to propose a formal theodicy is argued by e.g. P. Barth, 'Die stoische Theodizee bei Philo', *Philos. Abh. M. Heinze*, Berlin 1906, 13ff., W. Capelle, 'Zur antiken Theodizee', *AGPh* 1907, [173ff.], 176f. and C. J. de Vogel, 'Het probleem van het kwade in de antieke wijsbegeerte', in: *Theoria*, Assen 1967, [63ff.], 74f. There is an adequate collection of texts in the same author's *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 938-942. See also Moreau, *o.c.* 181-182; Greene, *o.c.* 344f.; Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 100-101. Cf. also below, p. 161f., 183 and n. 175.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Zeno's interpretation of Hesiod's Chaos, *SVF* I, 103-104; for Cleanthes cf. *SVF* I, 497, for Chrysippus *SVF* II, 413, 579-581. See in general D. E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, Ohio State Univ. Pr. 1977, Ch. III, "Cosmogony", 57ff., and my *Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract ΠΕΡΙ 'ΕΔΔΟΜΑΔΩΝ* Ch. 1-11 and *Greek Philosophy*, *Wijsg. text. en stud.* 20, Assen 1971, 108 and notes. Stoic cosmological texts in

present within it<sup>27</sup> — converts itself when all fuel has been burnt. Sufficient data — I shall presently go into some of the details — survive to enable us to affirm that god, the supreme ruler of the universe, is, for the Early Stoics, the agent both of its destruction and of its reconstruction. However, God is also Providence, i.e. a benevolent, beneficent, wholly good power caring for and watching over all beings.<sup>28</sup> In what way is the exercising of providence to be reconciled with such a grim event (*quod procul a nobis flectat fortuna gubernans*, Lucr. v. 107; cf. Aristotle's remarks ap. Phil., *Aet. mu.* 10-11 = *De phil.* fr. 18 Ross) as the destruction of heaven and earth and all the living beings found therein, outstanding among whom are lesser gods and men? In other words, in what way can god be the cause of destruction without becoming evil,<sup>29</sup> i.e. ungodly? Is not the physical evil consisting in the ruining of the beautiful universe,<sup>30</sup> the home of the gods, a moral evil to the extent that

De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III* are Nr. 904, 908. For the cosmic cycle s. Hahm, *o.c.* Ch. VI, 185ff.

<sup>27</sup> *SVF* I, 98, 102; II, 580. Cf. Hahm, *o.c.* 60-61 and below, n. 48.

<sup>28</sup> The translation of πρόνοια by "foresight" or "foreseeing" (e.g. Reesor, *o.c.* 288; Rist, *o.c.* 126-7; similarly Van Dijk, *o.c.* 86: *providentia* = "met inzicht vooruitzien") is not commendable, as my late colleague W. C. van Unnik once pointed out in public. In Cic., *ND* II, 76-80, divine knowledge is an argument in favour of the assumption that the universe is ruled by the providence of the gods; other arguments follow.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Sandbach's question, *o.c.* 105, in the context of a discussion of fate vs. free will and the explanation of physical and moral evil within the actual universe: "How can a good God be the cause of evil?". Cf. also Greene, *o.c.* 344, and De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, 77: "If the identity of God and Providence with Nature be admitted, the problem of the origin of evil presents certain obvious difficulties". Such was already the opinion of Plutarch, *Comm. not.* c. 34, 1076C = *SVF* II, 1168: the Stoics "make god, who is good, the origin of evil" (αὐτοὶ δὲ τῶν κακῶν ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα τὸν θεὸν ποιοῦσιν); the emphasis in Plutarch's chapter is, however, on moral evil.

<sup>30</sup> For the beauty of the universe cf. e.g. Cleanthes' fourth explanation of the genesis of the concept of the divine out of the admiration for the beauty and order of the heavens ap. Cic., *ND* II, 13-15 = *SVF* I, 528, which appears to be dependent upon Aristotle's second proof in *De phil.* fr. 12a-b, fr. 13 Ross (printed in De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. II*, Aristotle, *The Early Peripatetic School and the Early Academy*, Leiden 1953, 21960, Nr. 426-427; see further Effe, *o.c.* 72ff.). Cf. also Chrysippus ap. Cic., *ND* II, 17, and III, 26 = *SVF* II, 1011: a beautiful house is built for men, not mice; accordingly, the world is to be considered the house of the gods (De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 1118b). — For Cleanthes' adaptation of the 'argumentum ex gradibus' (*De phil.* fr. 16, below, p. 143) cf. Moreau, *o.c.* 183 n. 5.



it is the ruling divine power that is responsible? That these are not stupid or captious questions becomes evident at once upon considering that the Early Stoics, or at least Zeno, must have upheld the thesis of the periodical destruction of the universe against Plato and Aristotle (and their followers), who had argued impressively in favour of the opposite assumption, viz. that the universe is indestructible — Aristotle even arguing that hence it cannot have been generated either. Theophrastus, the last fifteen years of whose directorate of the Peripatos coincided with Zeno's first fifteen as head of the Stoa and who, apparently, was one of Athens' most famous teachers of philosophy at the time,<sup>31</sup> never abandoned the thesis of the eternity of the universe.<sup>32</sup>

It will be necessary to discuss the arguments of Plato and Aristotle concerning the creation and destruction of the universe in some detail.<sup>33</sup>

In what may have been, in Antiquity, his most influential dialogue, the *Timaeus*, containing his cosmology, physics etc., Plato explicitly

<sup>31</sup> *SVF* I, 280: "When Zeno saw how much Theophrastus was admired for his many followers, he said: 'his band is larger, mine is more harmonious'".

<sup>32</sup> Cf. the statement assigned to him by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 117: "Theophrastus says that those who attribute coming into being and destruction to the universe are wrong (ἀπαταθῆναι) on four very important points". No one has ever denied that at least this sentence, as distinct from what follows in Philo (*o.c.* 117-149 = Theophr., *Phys. op.* fr. 12 Diels and, in part, Theophr. fr. 30 Wimmer and *SVF* I, 106), represents Theophrastus' own position. Cf. also below, n. 43; for Theophrastus' theory of the eternal universe see further P. Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast*, Palingenesia I, Bad Homburg etc., 1964, 164f. Dicaearchus, fr. 47 and 48 Wehrli, is in favour of the eternity of the human race, which of course implies that of the universe, cf. the explicit argument of Critolaus, fr. 13 Wehrli. Censor., *De die nat.*, 4, mentions, besides Dicaearchus (= fr. 47 Wehrli) also Theophrastus and others. It should be added that Theophrastus followed Aristotle in holding, though perhaps expressing himself in a more cautious way, that Plato in the *Tim.* wrongly taught the coming into being of the universe (*Phys. op.* fr. 10 and 11 Diels; cf. Baltes, *o.c.* [below, n. 34], 22f.; also on Eudemus).

<sup>33</sup> It should, of course, be understood that the terms "creation" and "destruction" of the universe signify, in the context of Greek cosmology, the fashioning of the ordered structure out of a pre-existent something and its returning to this prior non-cosmic condition. — A collection of texts from the *Tim.* is in De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. I. Thales to Plato*, Leiden 1950, 1969, Nr. 349ff.; theological abstracts from *Rep.* II *ibid.*, Nr. 279. A piece of Arist., *De phil.* fr. 16 Ross is *Gr. Ph.* II, Nr. 429a; [fr. 14 and 18 Ross are *ibid.* Nr. 428a-b]; for Xenocr. fr. 54 Heinze s. *ibid.*, Nr. 764.

and with original arguments denied that the ordered universe will ever perish. It has been constructed out of chaos and after an eternal Model by a Divine Intelligence, the Demiurge or Craftsman, who takes special precautions in order to ensure that it will be as perfect as the circumstances in which he has to work allow it to be, and, moreover, that it will forever remain safe and sound. There is nothing at all left outside the universe, hence no *external* cause capable of exercising a lethal influence (33A), while *inside* harmony reigns among the elements (32C cf. also *Laws* X, 903B). In this way, the cosmos is a "whole" (ὅλον), 33A and 32B (ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ζῶον). The harmonious Soul of the universe as constructed by the Craftsman is an everlasting source of orderly motions (36Eff. and *passim*). No entity less powerful than the Demiurge himself is capable of undoing his handiwork. It is true that, theoretically, he could himself unmake what he has made, but this he will not, because to do so would be wholly out of harmony with his own nature: god is wholly good (29A and E) and has fashioned the best possible (29Aff.) cosmos [cf. the Demiurge's speech, 41Aff.; it should not be forgotten, by the way, that part of what is within the universe, viz. human bodies etc., is not made by the Demiurge, but by the other, less perfect gods. This absolves the Demiurge, though not the lesser gods, of being responsible for some forms of physical evil. Moreover, the Demiurge takes precautions of such a nature that he is not responsible for human wickedness, i.e. moral evil, 42D]. The definition of god as a wholly good being, incapable of being a source of evil and, moreover, incapable of any transmutation whatever, a novelty in Greek religious thought, is found *Rep.* II, 378E-383A. — The fact remains, however, that the *Tim.* describes the coming into being of the ordered universe (28B and *passim*). It is not necessary to enter here into the baffling question: "did Plato really mean this?"<sup>34</sup> [is the demiurgic intervention really compatible, for instance, with

<sup>34</sup> For a recent discussion, in favour of taking Plato upon his word, s. W. Scheffel, *Aspekte der platonischen Kosmologie*, Leiden 1976. For the discussion in antiquity see M. Baltes, *Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten*, I, Leiden 1976 (Aristotle 4ff., Speusippus-Xenocrates 18ff.).



god's immutability as stipulated *Rep.* II, I.c.<sup>35</sup>]. Suffice it to recall that there were already two schools of thought among Plato's immediate pupils, Aristotle (*Cael.* I, 10f.) holding that Plato meant what he said — which was accepted by Theophrastus<sup>32</sup>) —, Xenocrates (fr. 54 Heinze) and Speusippus (fr. 54b Lang) that he did not say what he meant, since what he really meant was that the universe can no more have a beginning than it can have an end. According to Xenocrates, the creation-story of the *Tim.* would only serve a didactical purpose, being a sort of translation, by Plato, of the eternal order of ontological and causal dependence into a chronological tale, just as mathematicians construct figures in order to demonstrate eternal truths.

Aristotle considers himself the first philosopher to uphold the eternity of the ordered universe; all the others, as he argues at *Cael.* I, 10, 279b12f., holding that it has been generated, whatever differences among their views may be capable of being pointed out.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> When his work constructing the Soul and body of the universe had been accomplished and lesser tasks had been delegated to the lesser gods, the Demiurge "continued to abide by the wont of his own nature" (tr. Cornford, *ἔμεινεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἦθει*, 42E). Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology*, London 1937, <sup>5</sup>1966, 147 n. 1. interprets this cryptic utterance as signifying that the Demiurge confines himself to his own proper activity, which on his reading of the dialogue in the sense of Xenocrates c.s. presents no difficulties. If, however, the literal interpretation is favoured, the phrase conveys the suggestion that the activity which came before perhaps implies a change of attitude. — At *Phaedr.* 245Cf., Plato proves that Soul as cause of motion is eternal; note, however, that he argues from the concept of "ungenerated" to that of "indestructible", not conversely.

<sup>36</sup> At *Cael.* I, 10, 279b14f. he says that both Empedocles and Heraclitus taught an eternal cosmic cycle. It is today generally agreed that Aristotle's interpretation of Heraclitus' cosmology is mistaken [cf. below, n. 52] and that the latter is, in a sense, his one and only predecessor. Cf. Heracl., *VS* 22B30, which denies cosmogony and proclaims that the actual cosmos [it is, for our purpose, irrelevant whether we translate "world" or "world-order"] "has always been, is, and shall always be", s. G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge 1954, <sup>2</sup>1962, 307ff. Cp. also *VS* 22B94, "the sun will not outstep its measures", quite significant when put against the theory of Cleanthes, for which see below, p. 155. It has to be admitted, however, that according to Aristotle himself "la doctrine des cycles n'est, en réalité, qu'une forme larvée de la croyance à l'éternité" (P. Moraux, *Aristote. Du Ciel*, Coll. Budé, Paris 1965, Intr. LXXIX; *ibid.*, n. 1. Moraux suggests that Aristotle is not only thinking of Heraclitus and, especially, Empedocles, but also of the myth in Plato, *Politic.* 269Cff., a point overlooked by Hahm, *o.c.* 191f.); for Empedocles, see also D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle*, Cambridge 1969, 170f.

The arguments in favour of his own thesis in *Cael.* are several; apart from the negative reasons suggested by the dialectical investigation of I, 10f., there is the positive argument from the eternal and unchanging nature of the celestial element [Aristotle had never observed or heard of a Nova] and the divine (I, 3; I, 9, 279a17f.). Ch. I, 12 contains a difficult and perhaps not wholly cogent conceptual argument.<sup>37</sup> It is now generally agreed, however, that the exposition of the *De Cael.* is somewhat incomplete and should be supplemented by arguments deriving from the lost work *On Philosophy*.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, the reference at *Cael.* I, 9, 279a30f., a *propos* the immutability of god, to "popular works" (*ἐγκυκλίους φιλοσοφήμασι*), applies, according to Simpl., to this very work. By virtually unanimous consent, three anonymous arguments preserved by Philo Judaeus in what is certainly not their original wording have to be attributed to the *De phil.*<sup>39</sup> The first of these, a physical argument, Phil., *Aet. mu.* 20-24 = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 19a Ross, points out that, in order to be destroyed, the universe has to be affected by either *external* or *internal* causes. The first kind is excluded, because there is nothing whatever outside the "whole" or universe [cf. Plat., *Tim.* 32C-33B — quoted by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 25-26 in support of *De phil.* fr. 19a! — and, on the fact there is no body, matter, space or time outside the universe but only, in some sense of the word "outside", the Divine from which all things depend, Arist., *Cael.* I, 9, 278b21f.]. The second kind of cause does not apply, because the "part" would, in this case, have to be greater and stronger than the "whole" (*τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος καὶ μείζον ἔσται καὶ κραταιότερον*), which is

<sup>37</sup> Partly indebted, I would say, to the *Phaedr.*-passage mentioned above, n. 35. For a pellucid analysis of the "logical" argument of Ch. 12 regarding the mutual implication of "ungenerated" and "undestructible" cf. C. J. F. Williams, 'Aristotle and Corruptibility', *Relig. Stud.* 1966, 95ff., 203ff.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. A.-H. Chroust, 'Some Observations on Aristotle's Doctrine of the Uncreatedness and Indestructibility of the Universe', *Riv. crit. di storia della filosofia* 1977, 127ff., which gives a rather full survey of the *status quaestionis*.

<sup>39</sup> The *contents* of the first and third correspond with those attributed to what must be a popular work of Aristotle by Cicero, *Ac. pr.* II, 119 = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 20 Ross, cf. Festugière, *Révé. II*, 239. Their dilemmatic *form* and, to a large extent, their *contents* correspond to *De phil.* fr. 16 Ross, for which s. below. For these (and some other) arguments in favour of the attribution cf. Effe, *o.c.* 13f. (fr. 19a), 16f. (fr. 19c), 106 and n. 148 (fr. 16).

absurd [for the section of the argument involved with the subordination of the parts of the universe to the whole cf. Plat., *Laws* X, 903Bf.] — The third argument preserved by Philo, a *theological* one, — I skip the second —, *Aet. mu.* 39-43 = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross, reasons from the assumption of a Demiurge. [Aristotle's cosmology, which only knows an everlasting god as ultimate cause of everlasting order, leaves no room for a full-blown Demiurge. It will not do, however, to hold Philo responsible for a terminological modification at this point, as this would make nonsense of the whole argument. Rather, Aristotle will have discussed the issue *ex hypothesi*, i.e. dialectically, as is his wont to do with theories relevant to his actual topic in the *pragmateiai*; apparently, he did so in the first book of *De phil.* as well].<sup>40</sup> The argument hinges upon a Demiurge's possible motives for a destruction of an ordered universe. He would destroy the present world in order (a) either to construct, or (b) to omit to construct, another one. The latter possibility (b), however, is foreign to god's nature as a cause of order. [This dilemma is a refinement of Plato's argument in the *Tim.*, that the Demiurge will not destroy his creation because he is himself good and a cause of order in the best possible universe]. But also (a), the fashioning of a new universe, would be contrary to his nature: the substitute would have to turn out either (x) worse than, or (y) equal to, or (z) better than, the actual universe. A change for the worse (x) would imply that god's nature will have changed for the worse and is accordingly impossible. The fashioning of an equal replacement (y) amounts to a childish and foolish action on god's part, *quod non*. The construction of a better universe (z) can only be accomplished by a god whose nature has improved; consequently, he was not as good as he should have been the first time, a sacrilegious thought.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> I agree with Effe, *o.c.* 17. For a synopsis of divergent views on this point s. H. J. Krämer, *Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie*, Berlin 1971, 128 n. 96 and, at greater length, J. Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur dieu*, Paris 1971, 323ff. Pépin's compromise, viz. that Aristotle in the *De phil.* argued in favour of a *creatio ab aeterno*, is not commendable.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. in general O. Dreyer, *Untersuchungen zum Begriff des Gottgeziemenden in der Antike*, Spudasmata XXIV, Hildesheim 1970, 38, who, however, 74 n. 234, 81, n. 254 and 126, n. 396 has failed to acknowledge that *Aet. mu.* 39-43 is to be attributed to Aristotle.

This argument is quite similar to the proof, from the same work, of the immutability of god summarized by Simplic., *In De cael.* p. 288,28-289,15 Heiberg [ad *Cael.* I, 9, 279a30f., s. above] = Arist., *De phil.* fr. 16 Ross. This starts with the famous *argumentum ex gradibus entium*: whenever and wherever there is a better, there is a best, which must be god. Now something which changes does so either under the impact of something else or of its own accord [cf. *De phil.* fr. 19a, on external and internal causes]. If something else is responsible, this has to be either stronger or weaker; if, on the other hand, what changes is changed by itself, the change will be either for the better or for the worse [cf. *De phil.* fr. 19c, on the motives for change attributable to a Demiurge]. Since, however, god is the best there is, there can be nothing stronger and better than god, whereas he cannot be affected by anything below his level. This eliminates the external cause. But he will not change of his own accord either: there simply is no better option open to him, since — being the best — he lacks nothing; a change for the worse, on the other hand, is contrary to his nature [Simpl., *l.c.*, in *fine*, correctly registers Aristotle's debt to Plat., *Rep.* II, 378E<sub>ff</sub>. Note that Aristotle's modification of Plato's argument in this case matches that of the argument concerning the Demiurge of the *Tim.*].

It should be added that the discussion about the interpretation of the *Tim.* and, generally, about the eternity of the universe, was still very much alive in Zeno's time. We have already noticed that Aristotle's interpretation of the *Tim.* was followed by Theophrastus and that the Peripatetics generally were in favour of the eternity of the universe.<sup>32</sup> The views of Xenocrates and Speusippus, too, were continued; especially important in this connection is the contribution of Zeno's Academic contemporary Crantor, who was, like Zeno, a pupil of Polemo and Crates, who, moreover, probably wrote the first monograph on the interpretation of the *Tim.*, and who advocated an interpretation much resembling that of Xenocrates (cf. Procl., *In Tim.* I, p. 277, 8f. Diehl and Plut., *An. procr.* 1012F-1013B).<sup>42</sup> Both Academy and Peripatos were, accordingly, in favour of the eternity of the universe, and the (reinterpreted) arguments of Plato

<sup>42</sup> Cf. Baltes, *o.c.* 83f.

and those of Aristotle must have retained their actuality. To support their own thesis in face of such arguments, the Stoics must have had rather cogent reasons. Unfortunately, our evidence is fragmentary and, at least in part, of a doubtful nature.<sup>43</sup> However, what we have is sufficient to fill in the overall picture.

3. Like Aristotle and Plato, but unlike Epicurus and his followers with their infinitely many universes,<sup>44</sup> the Stoics rejected causes of destruction outside the one universe. They held that beyond the cosmos there is only the incorporeal void,<sup>45</sup> whereas only body can be a cause.<sup>46</sup> So, if the world is to be destroyed, it must be possible to point out an immanent cause of its destruction. Aristotle, improving upon Plato's view of the harmony among the elements, had argued, *De phil.* fr. 19a, that no part of the *whole* which constitutes the ordered universe can be strong enough to destroy it. The Stoics countered this *physical* argument by precisely indicating

<sup>43</sup> I refer to the four arguments purportedly quoted and refuted by Theophrastus (s. above, n. 32). It is not certain if — and if, to which extent — these arguments are to be attributed to Zeno (or the Stoics generally) and/or Epicurus c.s. Presumptive Stoic elements were first pointed out by E. Zeller, 'Der Streit Theophrasts gegen Zenon über die Ewigkeit der Welt', *Hermes* 1876, 422ff. = *Kleine Schriften I*, Berlin 1910, 166ff. Epicurean parallels were already mentioned by J. Bernays in two letters of February 1880 addressed to Zeller and first printed in the latter's *Kl. Schr.* I, 225f. They were also discovered by E. Norden, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der antiken Philosophie', *Neue Jbb. f. Phil.*, Supp. Bd. 19, Leipzig 1893, [364ff.], 440ff. The recent attempt by A. Graeser, *Zenon von Kiton, Positionen und Probleme*, Berlin 1975, 187ff., to refute the scepticism of W. Wiersma, *Mnem.* 1940, 235ff. and of J. B. McDiarmid, *TAPA* 1940, 239ff., and to vindicate the attribution to Zeno (only) is, though interesting, in many ways unfortunate. The issue is still open, Hahm's terse and negative overview of the discussion previous to the publication of Graeser's study (o.c. 197 n. 14) being far from conclusive. — It will be clear from the sequel of this paper that I share Graeser's acceptance of the working hypothesis that the *De phil.* was important to Zeno; its rejection by H.-J. Krämer, o.c. 128 n. 96 seems inadequate.

<sup>44</sup> Epic., *Ep. Hdt.* 73-74; Phil. *Aet. mu.* 8 = Usener, *Epicurea* fr. 304; Lucr. V, 406-15 on extra-mundane fire and water as causes of the destruction of a universe. See, in general, F. Solmsen, 'Epicurus and Cosmological Heresies', *AJPh* 1951, 1ff. = *Kl. Schr.* I, [461ff.], 475.

<sup>45</sup> *SVF* I, 95; II, 331, 525.

<sup>46</sup> *SVF* I, 90; II, 140. Plut., *Comm. not.* 1073E = *SVF* II, 525, p. 166, 24f.: "they say that only bodies are existing things [or: "things that are"], since acting and being acted upon is the property of an existing thing (only)", ὄντα γὰρ μόνον τὰ σώματα λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴ ὄντος τὸ ποιεῖν τι καὶ πάσχειν (with Cherniss' note, 773 g). De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 901. Hahm, o.c. Ch. I, 'Corporealism', 3ff.

such a *part*, viz. the element of fire, and by arguing that it is exactly this which the whole cosmos comes to be at the moment of total conflagration. Fire, the "element par excellence",<sup>47</sup> so to speak represents the whole: during total conflagration the whole actually *is* afire, while everything within the ordered universe is informed by fire and nothing but a combination of elements ultimately deriving from fire. "Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus hold that the substance changes into *fire* as into a seed" [σπέρμα; cf. also Phil., *Aet. mu.* 94 = *SVF* II, 619; Plut., *Comm. not.* 1077B = *SVF* II, 618 and Cherniss' note *ad l.* Philo, *Aet. mu.* 94-103 argues *contra* at considerable length], "and that out of this (seed) the ordered universe is again constituted such as it was before. ... The oldest Stoics hold that everything will become *aether*" [another name for fire], "because after certain longest periods (κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰς μεγίστας) everything is resolved into an *aetherial fire*" [Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels = *SVF* I, 107, 512; II, 596]. "The element (στοιχεῖον) of all things is *fire*."<sup>48</sup> ... At certain fated times (κατὰ τινὰς εἰμαρμένους χρόνους) the whole universe will be converted into *fire*; next, it is again made into an ordered universe. The *primal fire* (πρῶτον πῦρ) is so to speak a kind of seed, containing the *logoi*" [informing principles] "of all things that have become, do become, and will become" [Aristocl. ap. Eus., *PE* XV 14, 1 = *SVF* I, 98]. To designate the period from one final conflagration to another Arius Didymus also uses the expression "greatest year" (ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον)<sup>49</sup> [fr. 37 Diels =

<sup>47</sup> The expression is attributed to Chrysippus, Ar. Did. fr. 21 Diels = *SVF* II, 413, p. 136, 11f., and 15f.

<sup>48</sup> For the generation of the elements out of fire according to Zeno cf. *SVF* I, 102 (Ar. Did. fr. 38 Diels, Diog. Laert. VII, 136, 142); for Cleanthes the same fr. of Ar. Did. = *SVF* I, 497; for Chrysippus Plut., *St. rep.* 1053A = *SVF* II, 579 and *ibid.* 1053B = *SVF* II, 605. Cf. also *SVF* II, 590 (Clem. Al., *Strom.* V 14, 104,1-105,2, whose Stoic source (c.q. the Stoic source of Clement's source) uses Heraclitus, *VS* 22B30 and 31): out of the fire comes air out of which comes sea out of which come heaven and earth and the beings encompassed thereby. On god remaining in the wet substance as spermatic *logos* of the cosmos-to-be see Diog. Laert. VII, 136 = *SVF* I, 102 and above, n. 26; on god as intelligent, and as craftsmanlike fire containing within itself all spermatic *logoi*, Aët. I 7, 33 = *SVF* II, 1027.

<sup>49</sup> This rare expression is, perhaps, an echo of Aristotle's *De phil.* It occurs Censor., *De die nat.* 18, 11 = Arist., *Protr.* fr. 19 Ross [first text], but I agree with Effe, o.c. 64ff., that the sentence about the *annus quem Aristoteles maximum potius quam magnum appellat* ("the year A. calls greatest rather than great") is on better grounds



SVF II, 599]. These terms, viz. "longest periods", "fated times" and "greatest year"<sup>50</sup> offer, however, only a partial description of the cyclical process, they do but indicate the bare fact that the conflagration is bound to occur or cannot fail to occur at a certain time. Though this terminology is physical to the extent that necessity and time are in a strict sense involved with an apparently lawlike physical process,<sup>51</sup> this process itself or rather its lawlike character is not thereby explained in physical terms.<sup>52</sup> Fortunately, the physical expla-

attributable to the *De phil.* Since, on the other hand, the sequel of the "Aristotelian" passage in Censorinus is contaminated with Stoic ideas and mentions *ekpyrosis* (and cataclysm, cf. below n. 52), it is also possible that the expression "greatest year" itself, which, because of its peculiarity, is often used in favour of the attribution to Aristotle, is a Stoic contamination. In that case, there would be not much left for Aristotle.

<sup>50</sup> In Arist. *Mete.* I, 14, similar expressions occur (351 a 24f., 351 b 9f., 352 a 28f.).

<sup>51</sup> The concepts of "necessity" (κατὰ τὸ χρεών) and of "the order of time" (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν) were for the first time connected with that of the lawlike physical process by the father of Greek scientific cosmology, Anaximander, VS 12B1. On the lawlike physical process as Anaximander's discovery s. my brief comments in *Lampas* 1975, 318f. In the forthcoming first volume of my *Vorsokratiker* (Reclam, Stuttgart) I have dwelt upon this subject at somewhat greater length. — Though time is, to the Stoics, an "incorporeal" (SVF II, 331, 520, 521), it is, in the strictest of senses, linked up with motion in general and with cosmic motion in particular (Ar. *Did.* fr. 26 Diels = SVF I, 93; cf. also SVF I, 497, p. 111, 21-25; II, 509, 511-514).

<sup>52</sup> That the Early Stoics in this connection attached any importance to the coming together of sun, moon and planets in one sign of the Zodiac at the end of a Great or Greatest Year (for the term s. SVF II, 599, ab.) is doubtful, but is perhaps suggested by the grand reunion described SVF I, 510: according to Cleanthes, the other heavenly bodies join the sun at the time of *ekpyrosis*; the Great Year or the Zodiac, however, are not mentioned in this context. Pohlenz, *o.c.* II, 44, is sceptical, as is Moreau, *o.c.* 169. [Nemesius, *NH* 38 = SVF II, 625, is the first explicit, but rather remote testimony]. Those who wish to explain Stoic *ekpyrosis* by deriving it from the East usually quote a fragment of the Babylonian priest Berossos, a contemporary of Zeno, who wrote a *History of Babylon* [Sen., *N.Qu.* III 29, 1 = Berossos fr. 27 Schnabel, cf. P. Schnabel, *Berosos und die babylonisch-hellenistische Literatur*, Leipzig 1923, 19 and 226-7]; cf. W. Wiersma, 'Die Physik des Stoikers Zenon', *Mnem.* 1943, [191 ff.], 206f. — Wiersma, however, prefers to derive *ekpyrosis* from the Pythagoreans — and B. L. van der Waerden, 'Das grosse Jahr und die ewige Wiederkehr', *Hermes* 1952, [129 ff.], 140f. However, F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Vol. III C 1, Leiden 1958, Nr. 680, collected such fragments of 'Berossos' as deal with astrological matters and with the destruction of the universe under the caption "Ps. Berossos von Kos" (fr. 37 Schn. = fr. 21 Jac.). Wiersma, *o.c.* 207 admits that Berossos' "Great Year" does not fit his historical chronology and that there is no Babylonian evidence for a series of Great Years. The rehabilitation of the fragments condemned by Jacoby attempted by R. Drews, 'The Babylonian Chronicles and Berossos', *Iraq* 1975,

nation of inevitable total conflagration given by Zeno himself survives, although, to the best of my knowledge, it has been utterly neglected. It is found, with Zeno's name attached, in the treatise against the Manichaeans written by Alexander of Lycopolis, a Platonist philosopher of the later years of the third Cent. A.D., who is not listed in Liddell and Scott though he is in Lampe's *Lexicon of Patristic Greek*, this in spite of the fact that the rumour which makes him

39ff. is not convincing (p. 52 he argues that "there is to-date no evidence that the Great Year originated in Greek philosophy, and so no reason why it should be denied to the scholars of Babylon", whereas we have evidence about conceptions of a Great World Year in Presocratic philosophy and none whatever about Babylon apart from the fragments of Berossos that are at issue).

It should be added that Ber. fr. 37 Schn. (21 Jac.) is hardly pertinent to the Stoic theory of total conflagration, because it mentions not only *ekpyrosis* whenever the heavenly bodies gather in Cancer, but also an equally devastating cataclysm whenever they do so in Capricorn; (Pohlenz, *o.c.* 47, following Schwartz, suggests "Berossos" connected Oriental cataclysm and Stoic *ekpyrosis*). No destruction of the universe by water is known to be valid for Early Stoic cosmology: the notion of alternate destructions by water and fire only later infiltrated Stoic thought, cf. Sen., *N.Qu.* III, c. 27-30 and *Cons. Marc.* 26, 6. SVF II, 608 is late too. Also Origen, *C. Cels.* IV, 64 = SVF II, 1174 mentions both cataclysms and conflagrations [sent by Providence!]; the attribution of this text to Chrysippus by Von Arnim, II p. 337, 14f. is, however, not sufficiently grounded. [Also note that the "hymns of the Magi" (see below, p. 182) in Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36, 47-49 describe in their more Platonizing part — based upon the imagery of the *Phaedrus*-myth — alternating *partial* destruction by fire and water, which are sharply distinguished from *total* conflagration (only!) in the more Stoicizing section 51-54. Cf. Pohlenz, *o.c.* II, 47]. Apparently, Platonic and Aristotelian ideas were later conflated with Stoic theories: Plato, *Tim.* 22Cf. — but not in the serious treatment of the Great Year at 39D, cf. Cornford and Taylor *ad l.* — loosely links up alternating cataclysms and conflagrations with the Great Year. These, however, are only *partial*, are as those cataclysms and dryings-up mentioned by Arist., *Mete.* I, 14, Aet. II 5, 3 = Philolaus, VS 44A18 (a garbled text) can be read as referring to either total or, more probably, only partial (cf. W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Early Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge, Mass. 1972, 315 n. 86) destructions of the cosmos by water and fire; there is, however, no evidence that this information does not derive from a pseudoepigraphon. There is, in any case, no reason to follow Wiersma, *l.c.*, in the attribution of a doctrine of *ekpyrosis* to "the Pythagoreans". It is, on the other hand, true that Aristotle (cf. above, n. 36) and Theophrastus (*Phys. op.* fr. 1 Diels = VS 22A5, cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 8) interpreted Heraclitus as subscribing to the destruction of the universe by fire (cf. Wiersma, *o.c.* 204f. Kirk, *o.c.* 318ff.; and especially J. Kerschensteiner, 'Der Bericht Theophrasts über Heraklit', *Hermes* 1955, [385ff.], 397f., 409). Accordingly, Oriental parallels can be dispensed with, the Greek philosophical tradition itself being suggestive enough. Plato (*Tim.* 22B, Phaeton) and Aristotle (*Mete.* I 14, 352a 33f., Deucalion) also refer, in this context, to myth; to a Stoic, myth is truth in a particular form.

a Christian Father has long proved unfounded. The treatise was edited as long ago as 1895 by Brinkmann for the Teubner series;<sup>53</sup> the Zeno-fragment, absent from *SVF*,<sup>54</sup> is in Ch. XII, p. 19,2f. Br. It has the form (*breves et acutulas conclusiones*, Cic. *ND* III, 18, not in *SVF*) characteristic of Zeno's arguments, and runs as follows: "The universe (τὸ πᾶν) will be totally destroyed. Everything which burns <something>, having <what> it burns, shall burn up the whole of it (ὅλον). The sun is fire — shall it not, then, burn up what it has?"; which entailed,<sup>55</sup> as he believed, that 'the universe would be totally destroyed by fire'.<sup>56</sup> This must come from Zeno's work *On the Whole*, i.e. the Universe (Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου), in which he treated the genesis and destruction of the universe.<sup>57</sup> It surely is not too far-fetched to posit that its underscoring of the being burnt of a "whole"

<sup>53</sup> *Alexandri Lycopolitani contra Manichaeorum opiniones disputatio*. A translation with introduction and notes by P. W. van der Horst and the present author, which first appeared in the defunct journal *Theta-Pi* for 1974, 1ff., was separately published in the same year with some corrections and additions: *An Alexandrian Platonist against Dualism: Alexander of Lycopolis' Treatise "Critique of the Doctrines of Manichaeus"*, Leiden 1974. At p. 74, n. 293-296 I have briefly discussed the Zeno-fragment.

<sup>54</sup> In the introduction to his edition Brinkmann already singled out this fragment for special mention; in vain. It was independently rediscovered by Pease, who, apparently unaware of Brinkmann's edition, reproduced the text from Migne, *Patr. gr.* 18, 428c (which is defective) and tersely commented: "The following passage ... merits addition on p. 32 of the first volume" [of *SVF*]; A. S. Pease, 'Paralipomena', *Class. Philol.* 1921, 200. Nobody seems to have noticed, cf. e.g. Sandbach, *o.c.* 79, whose guess, by the way, is excellent: "One can only guess at their reasons for holding it [sc. the *ekpyrosis*-doctrine]. Perhaps Zeno believed that fire would necessarily continue to convert other elements into itself as long as fuel remained"; later on, *ibid.* 120, he without qualification mentions the "orthodox view that fire will eat up all the other elements, until everything is fire". Pohlenz' similar suggestions, *o.c.* I 79, II 45, are based upon *SVF* I, 106 (cf. above, n. 32, n. 43).

<sup>55</sup> For a similar tagged-on conclusion cf. Sext., *M.* IX, 101 = *SVF* I, 113.

<sup>56</sup> ... τὸν Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως ... λόγον, ὅς "τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθήσεται" λέγων "πᾶν τὸ καὶ ἔχον (ὅτι) καύση ὅλον καύσει· καὶ ὁ ἥλιος πῦρ ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ ἔχει οὐ καύσει;" ἐξ οὗ συνήγετο, ὡς ᾔετο, "τὸ πᾶν ἐκπυρωθήσεσθαι".

<sup>57</sup> Diog. Laert. VII, 142 = *SVF* I, 102; cf. *ibid.* 135-6, *SVF ibid.*, where Zeno's cosmogony is attributed to Π. τ. ὅλου. In the same work, he also argued that the universe is "one" (*ibid.* VII, 143 = *SVF* I, 97). Two points of detail, traditionally belonging to the subject-matter of treatises *On Nature* (Περὶ φύσεως) are also attributed to the *On the 'Whole'*: an explanation of the eclipse of the sun (*ibid.* VII, 145f. = *SVF* I, 119) and one of the nature of thunder and lightning (*ibid.* VII, 153-4 = *SVF* I, 117). Subjects which had been treated by Aristotle in different works are accordingly reunited by Zeno.

and of, finally, the "all" or "universe"<sup>58</sup> is directed at the position of *De phil.* fr. 19a and, by implication, at that of Plato, *Tim.* 32c, *Laws* X, 903B.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, in his *De an.*, II, 4, 416a9-18,<sup>60</sup> Aristotle had argued that the vegetative soul cannot be fire, because it is the nature of fire to go on burning as long as fuel is available, without limit, whereas each of the living beings has a limit of growth. Cf. also *Mete.* I, 3, 340a1f.: "if the intervals" [sc. between the heavenly bodies] were filled with fire and the [heavenly] bodies themselves consisted of fire, each of the other elements would long since have been wiped out". On the face of it, therefore, it looks as if Zeno had made skilful use of an Aristotelian argument for definitely un-Aristotelian ends.<sup>61</sup> — The impeccable evidence of the

<sup>58</sup> Only later, the Stoics distinguished between τὸ ὅλον = "the universe" and τὸ πᾶν = the universe + the outside void" (*SVF* II, 522ff.).

<sup>59</sup> For "the whole" in the sense of "ordered universe" c.q. the universe inclusive of the cause of its order in Aristotle cf. also *GC* II, 10, 336b25f.; *Mete.* I, 9-10; *Met.* Λ, 10, 1075a11ff.

<sup>60</sup> Already referred to by Brinkmann, *ad l.* Hahm, who *o.c.* 146-8 discusses numerous passages on the relation between fire and the vegetative soul in Aristotle, concluding that, though "closely connected", they are "not identical", has missed this one. — Cf. also n. 70 in *fine*, for *GA* II, 3. In ps.Probus, *In Verg. Ecl.* p. 13, 1f. Keil — in the section, p. 10, 31ff. Keil, discussing with much doxographical learning (cf. Diels, *DG* 90f.) various theories of the elements (but note that ps.Probus' erudition is not merely doxographical) — I have found a notice concerning Aristotle which has been overlooked by Rose and others, although the contents of its second half do not exactly match any passage in the esoteric works (and are not paralleled in other doxographical accounts either): *Aristoteles quattuor esse elementa ait, aquam et terram ponderibus suis deorsum ferri, ignem et aera tenuitate sua sublevari, et his quattuor elementis quintum quasi proprium aethera addit privata mole discretum.* (13, 5f.) *Idem Aristoteles ait non esse idem ignem et aethera, diversitatemque eorum elementorum probari ex eo, quod ignis omnia consumat aether omnia conservet et nutriet.* (Transl.: "Aristotle says there are four elements, and that water and earth are carried downwards by their weights, and fire and air are elevated by their tenuity; and to these four elements he adds as a kind of special fifth the aether, distinguished by its particular mass. The same Aristotle says that fire and aether are not the same, and that the difference between these elements is proved by the fact that fire consumes all things, whereas aether sustains and feeds all things"). This text should be studied in connexion with the passage from Cicero quoted below, n. 66 and 67.

<sup>61</sup> That Zeno and his followers were diligent readers of virtually all of Aristotle's "esoteric", i.e. not yet published works is a presupposition fundamental to the whole of Hahm's reconstruction of the origins of Stoic cosmology (cf. below, n. 115). It is, of course, entirely possible that they were familiar with at least a number of them. In the case of Epicurus, such knowledge is successfully postulated by D. J. Furley, *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists*, Princeton 1967 (for other instances cf. Krämer,

neglected fragment is confirmed by other scraps of information: Zeno taught that the sun is an intelligent entity, kindled by exhalation from the sea (*Et. Gud.* s.v. ἥλιος = *SVF* I, 121).<sup>62</sup> The above-quoted fragment of Arius Didymus (*SVF* II, 599) informs us that "Common Nature becomes greater and more, and finally dries up everything and takes it back into itself"; here Nature is clearly identified with fire. Alex. Aphr., *In Mete.* p. 61, 34f. Hayduck = *SVF* II, 594 suggests that the Stoics spoke of a gradual drying-up of the sea.<sup>63</sup> A passage in Cicero, *ND* II, 118 = *SVF* II, 593 tells us that according to the Stoics the heavenly bodies are nourished by the vapours of the earth and sea;<sup>64</sup> they shed these vapours back again, with the loss of almost nothing or only a very small part of their matter; hence (n.b.: Panaetius disagreed) the cosmos will eventually become fire. In his *On Providence*, bk. I, ap. Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1052C = *SVF* II, 604 Chrysippus says that Zeus or the "Soul of the Universe ... continually goes on growing until it has completely absorbed matter" (my italics). We may infer that the balance of cosmic change is, however slightly, incomplete and imperfect, because a small but, in accumulation, sufficiently effective part of the moisture is not reconverted from fire. A fragment from Cleanthes confirms the circumstances of the sun's way of operating: "the sun consists of fire and is nurtured by the vapours from the Ocean, because no fire could continue to exist without some sort of food..." [Cic., *ND* II, 40 = *SVF* I, 504, the beginning]. Cf. also Cic. *ND* III, 37 =

*o.c.* 132 n. 109) and not totally rejected even by E. Bignone, for all his championing of the "lost Aristotle": cf. the paper 'La dottrina epicurea del clinamen', *Atene e Roma* 1940, 159ff., reprinted in the second edition of his *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, [Firenze 1936], 1973, vol. II, 409ff. — It is, on the other hand, also possible that arguments similar to that in *An.* II, 4 and *Mete.* I, 3 were used by Aristotle in the context of fr. 19a in the *De phil.*, especially because the account in *Mete.*, *I.c.* and *Cael.*, II, 7 is somewhat meagre.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. the explanation given by Cleanthes ap. Ar. Did. fr. 39 Diels (= *SVF* I, 141, 519) of Zeno's definition of the human soul [which, according to Galen, *Plac. Hipp. Plat.* p. 248 Müller (= *SVF* I, 140), is nourished from the blood] as "sentient exhalation" (αἰσθητικὴ ἀναθυμίασις): it is an exhalation, says Cleanthes, in the sense of Heracl., *VS* 22B12, which he quotes, and sentient *qua* cognitive, in the sense that its ruling part is capable of receiving and accepting the impressions from real objects.

<sup>63</sup> Likewise referred to by Brinkmann *ad l.*

<sup>64</sup> See e.g. Lapidge, *o.c.* 272, who finds it difficult to accept this doctrine; Boyancé, *o.c.* 90 and n. 3; Sandbach, *o.c.* 78; Hahm, *o.c.* 189.

*SVF* I, 501, where Cleanthes explains why the sun returns from the farthest points of its orbit: *ne longius discedat a cibo* ("in order not to stray too far from its food"). Chrysippus again, in the same book of his *On Providence*, ap. Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1053A = *SVF* II, 579 says that "the heavenly bodies along with the sun are kindled from the sea"; cf. also Plutarch's introduction to this quote.

There is a serious difficulty here, however. Zeno, probably influenced in this respect by Theophrastus,<sup>65</sup> had rejected Aristotle's theory of the aether as the primary element distinct from the ordinary elements (fire etc.) below the moon:<sup>66</sup> fire itself, Zeno says, is the supreme element; it is to be identified with nature (*SVF* I, 171, several passages) and god (*SVF* I, 157, two passages). It is also the element responsible for the cognitive functions of understanding and perception.<sup>67</sup> But the fragment of Cleanthes (*SVF* I, 504), the beginning of which was quoted above, goes on to stipulate a distinction between two kinds of fire: burning and destructive fire on the one hand, benevolent, sustaining and vital fire on the other. The sun and the other heavenly bodies, since they are causes of life on earth, are said to consist of this vital fire, which is also present within ordinary living beings. This distinction<sup>68</sup> is already attributed to Zeno, Ar.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. Steinmetz, *o.c.* 118ff. and already H. Siebeck, *Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen*, Freiburg 1888, 223f., and E. Grumach, *Physis und Agathon in der alten Stoa*, Berlin 1932 = Berlin etc., 1966, 53ff. See also my *Ps. Hipp. Tract.* 82ff., where I discuss Steinmetz' views. P. Moraux, 'Quinta Essentia', *RE* XXIV, Stuttgart 1963, [1171ff.], 1231-2, is more cautious, suggesting that Theophrastus "perhaps" gave up the aether-theory; in view of the explicit testimony of the *De ign.* [s. below, n. 68] this caution is unnecessary.

<sup>66</sup> Cic., *Ac. po.* I, 39 (not in *SVF*): *De naturis enim sic sentiebat* [sc. Zeno], *primum ut in quattuor initii rerum illis quintam hanc naturam ex qua superiores sensus et mentem effici rebantur non adhiberet*. Cf. Moraux' illuminating discussion, *RE* 1232: that Zeno is mentioned for his critique is truly remarkable; the position of his opponents, however, has been, in Cicero's account, doctored to suit Zeno's criticisms.

<sup>67</sup> Cicero continues: *statuebat enim ignem esse ipsam naturam quae quidque gigneret, etiam mentem atque sensus* (= *SVF* I, 134). In my *Ps. Hipp. Tract.* 86ff., I have discussed Stoic theories of fire at some length.

<sup>68</sup> Though the term "vital" seems to have been an addition by Cleanthes. I have discussed Cleanthes' vital fire in my *Ps. Hipp. Tract.* 86ff., 93ff., 103ff. Already Theophrastus distinguished two kinds of fire or rather "heat" (note that these two kinds do not constitute different elements), *De ign.* c. I 4-6; *ibid.*, VI, 44 p. 358, 21f. Wimmer, he speaks of a 'life-giving and productive heat' (θερμότης ... οἶονε ζῶσα καὶ γόνιμος) within living beings, to which the productive heat of the sun is even



Did. fr. 33 Diels = *SVF* I, 120: there are two kinds of fire, the one nontechnical (uncreative), converting its sustenance into itself, the other technical (craftsmanlike, creative); the latter variety is found within plants and animals, and is the substance of the heavenly bodies. Nature, too, is, according to Zeno (*SVF* I, 171), a craftsmanlike fire, the cause of rational coming into being.

We may ask, however, what becomes of this important distinction if the heavenly bodies, explicitly said to consist of the craftsmanlike kind, are simultaneously the cause of the destruction of the universe to the extent that they exactly behave like the uncraftsmanlike kind in that, however slowly, they convert their sustenance into themselves? "Zeno appears to have proposed no solution to this glaring contradiction", runs the verdict of a contemporary scholar.<sup>69</sup> The question,

prior. For precedent in Aristotle s. below, n. 70 *in fine*. Plato, *Tim.* 58C distinguishes three varieties of the element fire: flames, light and "what is left in glowing embers"; he does not speak of vital fire, and aether is a form of air (58D).

<sup>69</sup> Lapidge, *o.c.* 273. His solution, *ibid.* 270f. is to make the craftsmanlike fire into a "principle" (ἀρχή) distinct from the ordinary, destructive "element" (στοιχεῖον); he further suggests that it is Chrysippus who, having introduced the *pneuma*, is responsible for subsequent failures to account for the distinction, *ibid.* 273f. However, the stipulation of fire the principle does not explain the consumption of moisture by the heavenly bodies, which after all consist of the craftsmanlike variety. Furthermore, the introduction of the *pneuma* by Chrysippus (cf. below, n. 151) does not interfere with the latter's *ekpyrosis*-doctrine: the fact that god remains responsible is, at first sight, as difficult in Chrysippus' case as it is in the others'. On the other hand, Lapidge has correctly insisted on what is beyond doubt a genuine problem, although he is not as unanticipated as he thinks, cf. below, on Gilbert, Boyancé, Van Straaten and Krämer. As a rule, however, scholars have failed to acknowledge it: e.g. J. Baudry, *Le Problème de l'Origine et de l'Éternité du Monde dans la philosophie grecque de Platon à l'ère chrétienne*, Paris 1931, 243; Moraux, *RE* 1233; Rist, *o.c.* 176, 203; L. Bloos, *Probleme der stoischen Physik*, Hamb. Stud. z. Philosophie 4, Hamburg 1973, 124; Spanneut, *o.c.* 23-4; G. E. R. Lloyd, *Greek Science after Aristotle*, London 1973, 28; Hahm, *o.c.* 57ff., 185ff. All these authors say that fire is the agent both of the generation and the destruction of the universe; Moreau, *o.c.* 184, even speaking of craftsmanlike fire in this connexion; this is, of course, correct, but not correct enough. K. von Fritz, 'Zenon 2) von Kiton', *RE* Xa, Stuttgart 1972 [83ff.], 108 is inconclusive; he pertinently distinguishes the two fires, of which the craftsmanlike kind, he says, is responsible for cosmogony, but adds: "aber am Ende wird er [sc. the cosmos] in der ἐκπύρωσις vom Feuer verzehrt", without specifying by which "Feuer".

Van Straaten, *o.c.* 27ff., in an admirable discussion, anticipates, as a possibility, Lapidge's solution, though he does not make fire into a separate principle but identifies it with the Active Cause. He is careful to point out, however, that a duality of elemental fire is equally possible. The same view is already, *in nuce*, found in his

however, is if the contradiction is as glaring as that,<sup>70</sup> and if the palpable paradox is less palatable than are other *Stoicorum repugnantia*.

thesis, Panétius. *Sa vie, ses écrits et sa doctrine, avec une édition des fragments*, Amsterdam 1946, 66f. n. 1. See further below, p. 180. H. J. Krämer, *o.c.* 108-109, argues that fire qua principle, the "Urfeuer der Ekpyrosis", "streng genommen mit dem kosmischen Element Feuer (Äther) nicht identisch [ist]", but does not further discuss the problems this would entail.

<sup>70</sup> Lapidge's problem was explicitly discussed by O. Gilbert, *Die meteorologischen Theorien des griechischen Altertums*, Leipzig 1907 = Hildesheim 1967, 243 n. 1 and 248f. He argues that the distinction between the two fires does not preclude "ihren gemeinsamen Ursprung", because — as he, not wholly correctly, formulates — the sun, consisting of the one kind, is nourished by the other into which the vapours are converted. The distinction amounts to the fact that the "irdische Feuer" is uncraftsmanlike only, the heavenly apparently being both. Boyancé, *Ét.* 67ff. is somewhat inconclusive; he comments upon the distinction of two fires by Zeno and Cleanthes, and suggests that "brightness" (ἀύγη) was added by Chrysippus as a third fire, or fifth element beyond the traditional four. He states that it is into this "brightness", as it is into Cleanthes' "flame", that the universe dissolves at *ekpyrosis*, without commenting upon the fact that in this way the superior "brightness" assumes the distinctive property of uncraftsmanlike fire. Sandbach, *o.c.* 72, points out, without referring to a specific text, that each element exists in several forms; *ibid.* 74 he stipulates: "fire the artificer is a form of the element fire, distinguished by its constructive effects from destructive fire", a point of view which closely approaches that of Gilbert. However, *ibid.* 74 he refuses to identify "fire the artificer" with god the *logos*, whereas *ibid.* 79 he says that nature *qua* "fire the artificer" is "god, who methodically executes the plan according to which the world" and its contents "change and grow". This generates several confusions: why cannot the god who methodically executes the plan etc. be identified with *logos*? Again, at p. 79, he speaks of the "fire to which the world returns at *ekpyrosis*" as being "the kind of fire that had previously given it its qualities"; how does this match the remark that god *qua* craftsmanlike fire is only concerned with generation? The view of Long, *Hell. Phil.* 154f. that "Zeno and Cleanthes identified *logos* with fire" and that "'Fiery' is the one qualification which 'matter' is always endowed with by its association with *logos*", is more consistent than Sandbach's. On the other hand, Long restricts the notion of fire to that of the craftsmanlike kind, not entering into the difficulties this entails for *ekpyrosis*.

Ar. Did. fr. 21 Diels = *SVF* II, 413, p. 136, 24ff. attributes to Chrysippus — who is, at the beginning of the fragment, explicitly said to follow Zeno — the assumption that the elements exist in several forms: "fire is said of all that is fiery and air of all that is airy etc." (λέγεσθαι <δὲ> πῦρ τὸ πυρῶδες πᾶν καὶ ἀέρα τὸ ἀερῶδες καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ λοιπὰ). Seneca, *N. Qu.* III 14, 2 refers to an "Egyptian" theory, according to which each of the four elements exists in two forms, a masculine and a feminine form: male fire burns, female fire shines harmlessly — this theory is Stoic rather than Egyptian. It is interesting to compare a chapter in the Elder Pliny, *NH* XXXVI, c. 68, in which, commenting upon the effects of fire as used in technology, he somewhat naively concludes: "(fire) is an immense, unruly portion of the physical world, and one as to which it may be a matter of doubt whether there are more things it

The all-important rôle of the sun in bringing about total conflagration is anyhow undeniable: the evidence of the neglected Zeno-fragment in Alexander of Lycopolis, which has it that the sun's [slow but] complete consumption of its fuel brings about *ekpyrosis* is confirmed by a fragment of Cleanthes ap. Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075D = *SVF* I, 510: it is the sun which at the moment of *ekpyrosis* assimilates to itself the other heavenly bodies. Both Cleanthes and Chrysippus, moreover, are said to have held [*ibid.* 1075A-C = *SVF* I, 536; II, 1049] that Zeus (Cleanthes' benevolent Zeus!<sup>71</sup>) eventually consumes into himself all the elements and literally everything<sup>72</sup> and that all the other gods are destroyed by this fire. Consequently, there appears to be no difference of opinion upon this point among the Early Stoics, although Chrysippus (for reasons of his own, cf. below, p. 174f.) did not single out the sun for special mention. Plutarch, being a Platonist, understandably protests (*o.c.* 1075B) that this doctrine turns god into the great destroyer and makes him weak in that he is nourished by the destruction of others.<sup>73</sup> Cleanthes said

consumes or more it creates" (*immensa, improba rerum naturae portio et in quo dubium sit, plura absumat an pariat*).

The theory ascribed to Chrysippus to some extent recalls that of Plato, who, *Tim.* 57Cff., argued that each element exists in several forms: there are (58C) different sorts of fire, viz. flame, light and "what is left in glowing embers" when the flame is extinguished [for this reason, the theory of the three kinds of fire used by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 86-90, cf. *SVF* II, 612; — n.b. Philo argues contra *ekpyrosis* —, should not be immediately called Stoic, since it makes exactly the same distinction as the *Tim.* although the term αὐγή is Stoic]; similarly, there are several kinds of air: aether(!), "gloom" and nameless kinds (58D) as of water (58D-E) and earth (60Bf.). See further G. Vlastos, *Plato's Universe*, Oxford 1975, 72ff. In his *GA* II, 3, 736b35ff. Aristotle so to speak introduces another element besides his customary fire, viz. the vital heat (θερμόν or πνεῦμα) to be found in living beings, distinguished from ordinary, impro- ductive fire and more resembling the astral element (cf. e.g. P. Steinmetz, 'Ansatzpunkte der Elementenlehre Theophrasts im Werk des Aristoteles', in: *Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast*, Verh. 4. Symp. Arist. hrsg. I. Düring, Heidelberg 1969, [224ff.], 241 (see this paper generally for the intricacies of Aristotle's elemental theory, which, however, is less schematic than Plato's, which is based upon mathematical figures, whereas Aristotle's is on qualities). It is truly remarkable, that Aristotle *ibid.*, 736a36f., refers to *An.* II, 4, which contains the passage on fire as destructive quoted p. 149.

<sup>71</sup> S. above, p. 129f.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. D. Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, Paris 1969, 209-10.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 452-3 (the whole of *Comm. not.* c. 32-37 is a critique of Stoic theology). The same point is made by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 47.

that at the moment of *ekpyrosis* the cosmos changes into "flame" (φλόξ, Phil., *Aet. mu.* 90 = *SVF* I, 511; cf. the expression ἐκφλογίσθεντος τοῦ πάντος, "when the whole has completely turned into flame", Ar. Did. fr. 38 Diels = *SVF* I, 497). In his *On Providence*, bk. I, a treatise already quoted several times in the above, Chrysippus said the cosmos eventually becomes "fiery throughout" (διόλου ... ὁ κόσμος πυρώδης, ap. Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1053B = *SVF* II, 605), though it is reported elsewhere that he replaced Cleanthes' "flame" by the more refined notion of "light" or "brightness" (αὐγή, Phil., *l.c.* = *SVF* II, 611) [to the reason for this refinement I shall return below, p. 176]. What is important at the moment is that the stipulative distinction between the two kinds of fire postulated by Zeno and Cleanthes does not, apparently, preclude their fundamental unity.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, this becomes quite clear from the already twice-quoted Cleanthes-fragment (*SVF* I, 504), which, it will be recalled, argues in favour of the distinction; speaking of the sun, Cleanthes explicitly attributes to it properties of each distinct kind of fire, for he says: "the contact [of its rays] is of such a nature that it not only warms, but often actually burns".<sup>75</sup> Surprisingly, this dual attribution is made the foundation of the distinction of two kinds of fire in the sequel of the fragment, which is introduced by an *ergo* that must be among the most inconclusive in Latin literature. In *SVF* II, 599 (quoted above, p. 150) Nature, which is Zeno's craftsmanlike fire, is said to dry up all things. Furthermore, in Cleanthes' hymn (*SVF* I, p. 122, 5-10) we read of Zeus' "fiery lightning-rod" (πυρόεντα ... κεραυνόν),<sup>76</sup> described as the agent in the works of Nature, as giving

<sup>74</sup> S. above, n. 70.

<sup>75</sup> ... is eius tactus [the term *tactus* also occurs Sen., *N.Qu.* III, 14, 2, above n. 70] est, non ut tepesciat solum, sed etiam saepe comburat. Boyancé, *Ét.* 70-1 n. 4 aptly adduces Phil., *Conf. ling.* 156 = *SVF* II, 664: ὁ ἥλιος ... τῇ μὲν ἀλεαίνει τῇ δὲ καταφλέγει. It should be added, however, that Boyancé *ibid.* 89 does not enter into the fallaciousness of the argument in *SVF* I, 504.

<sup>76</sup> That the dual nature of fire is implicit in the image of the hymn was pointed out to me by my colleague J. M. Bremer in the discussion following a talk I gave to the Societas Philologica at Amsterdam, 29-10-77. — I should perhaps add that I am aware of the fact, invariably pointed out in the commentaries on the hymn, that Cleanthes' image is dependent upon Heracl., *VS* 22B64. True, but the distinction between ordinary and craftsmanlike fire is not in Heraclitus. The *ekpyrosis* isn't either,



the right direction to Common Law, as going through all things, as mingled with all heavenly bodies, in short as the instrument by which Zeus, everywhere, rules supreme. This is a poetic description of craftsmanlike fire.<sup>77</sup> It should not be forgotten, however, that in the context of Greek mythological tradition Zeus' lightning-rod is first and foremost an instrument of destruction. By its means, Zeus destroys and punishes his enemies and other evil-doers.<sup>78</sup> In the interest of justice, it might be objected. True; but the fact that it is an instrument of destruction which serves the ends of justice is exactly the point that is at issue here. If the fire of lightning is to destroy enemies, it must have other properties than those of conservation only, and conversely.

Accordingly, the solution to the "glaring contradiction" referred to above hinges upon the fact that the effective action of fire is, during cosmogony, wholly benevolent in the sense described; that, within the generated and ordered universe itself, its action is for the most part benevolent, but also to a slight extent apparently non-benevolent; and that, in the long run, the latter capacity comes to predominate throughout. We may infer that, at least for Zeno and Cleanthes, there is a double cycle of fire in its opposite aspects, in which the craftsmanlike fire and the destructive fire dominate at opposite ends of the cycle, whereas during the stretches in between each in turn slowly gains the upper hand.<sup>79</sup>

It is interesting to observe that this Early Stoic doctrine was changed by certain later Stoics precisely because they were, apparently, dissatisfied with the fundamental identity of craftsmanlike and destructive fire [I refer to such as did not, like Chrysippus' pupil Zeno of Tarsus<sup>80</sup> and the somewhat later Boethus of Sidon,<sup>81</sup> and Panae-

whatever Cleanthes' own views on this point may have been. So what we have here is dependence in the form of immediate *interpretatio Stoica*.

<sup>77</sup> Festugière, *Révl.* II, 318f. says lightning and "Feu-Logos" are not identified, but that it is inevitable that "le corps igné [of lightning] ne fasse songer à la nature, ignée aussi, du Logos qui circule à travers toutes choses, mêlé aux corps ignés des astres". N. Festa, *I frammenti degli Stoici antichi*, II, Bari 1935 = Hildesheim 1971, 81 n. i says the lightning-rod is the symbol of fire.

<sup>78</sup> Rolke, *o.c.* 227 admits that the traditional image evokes all sorts of associations.

<sup>79</sup> A noteworthy renaissance of the Presocratic notion of cosmic justice.

<sup>80</sup> *SVF* III, I Zeno Tars. 5 = Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels; this brief note tells us he

tius,<sup>82</sup> abandon the theory of *ekpyrosis* altogether]. According to the Stoics mentioned at Phil., *Aet. mu.* 8-9 = *SVF* II, 620 god is only the cause of the world's coming into being, whereas its destruction is the work of "the indefatigable force of fire".<sup>83</sup> The unanimous view of the Early Stoics (e.g. Diog. Laert. VII, 137 = *SVF* II, 526), on the other hand, is that it is god who not only generates all things, but, so Diog. L., also "after certain periods of time assimilates them to himself" (cf. also above, p. 154, on Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075A-C).<sup>84</sup> Suggestions similar to that in Philo are found in Seneca: at *De ira* II, 27 he argues that the gods are wholly good and that such natural phenomena as seem harmful to us "have their own laws" (*suas ista leges habent*); at *N.qu.* VI 3, 1 he states that the gods are not involved in natural disasters, which have — with only a slight change in terminology — "their own causes" (*suas ista causas habent*). Cf., for a similar view, Phil., *De prov.* II, 102: god is not responsible for physical evils, which are a mere consequence of elemental change.

suspended judgement. Philo, *Aet. mu.* 77 (= *SVF* III, II, Diog. Bab. 27) affirms that Diogenes [of Babylon] in old age suspended judgement too; *Aet.*, II 32, 4 = *ibid.*, 28 gives his computation of the Great Year.

<sup>81</sup> *SVF* III, VI Boethus Sid. 7 = Phil., *Aet. mu.* 76. In my *Ps. Hipp. Tract.*, 128-9 I have briefly discussed the lack of enthusiasm for *ekpyrosis* among some of Chrysippus' pupils and certain Middle Stoics. Cf. also Pohlenz, *o.c.* I 186, 190. Significantly, the Stoic doctrine defended in Cic., *ND* II, 85 has it that the union of the parts of the world must be either eternal [Panaetius' view] and continue in the same beautiful shape we actually see, "or at any rate extremely durable, continuing for a long and so to speak immeasurable time" (*aut certe perdiuturna, permanens ad longinquum et inensum paene tempus*). Cf. also Philo, *Aet. mu.* 75 = *SVF* II, 459 (in part).

<sup>82</sup> Fgt. 64-66, 68, 69 Van Straaten. See, for discussion of Panaetius' view, Van Straaten's *Panétius*, 67f.

<sup>83</sup> On this passage s. R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, II, Leipzig 1882 = Hildesheim 1964, 770-1. Hirzel also refers to the fragments of Posidonius (ap. Aët.) and Cleanthes and Chrysippus (ap. Calc.) cited below, and already aptly contrasts *SVF* II, 620 with the orthodox view of *SVF* II, 526. Capelle, too, *o.c.* 184, enlarges upon the distinctions in respect of theodicy between Early and Middle Stoa; his suggestion, *ibid.* 181f., that it is Posidonius who is responsible will today perhaps not be generally acceptable; indeed, he fails to account for the early (partial) parallels, whereas some of his arguments in favour of Posidonius' decisive contribution, e.g. that Ps.Arist. *De mundo* is "Posidonian", are out.

<sup>84</sup> In this context, the Stoic prepositional sequence ἐξ οὗ — ἐν ᾧ (or δι' οὗ) — εἰς ὃν discussed by H. Dörrie, 'Praepositionen und Metaphysik', *Mus. Helv.* 1969, 217ff. is important: the reference is to god.

Seneca is not very consistent,<sup>85</sup> however, in so far as elsewhere he makes god responsible for cosmic cataclysms and conflagrations.<sup>86</sup> It is by no means unlikely that such later Stoic corrections of the original doctrine are somehow connected with Posidonius' explicit distinction between Zeus, Nature and Fate, Aët. I 28, 5 = Posidonius fr. 103 Edelstein-Kidd,<sup>87</sup> although the interpretation of this fragment is rendered very difficult for lack of further information. It is certainly arguable that there is an element of Platonic influence in Posidonius' view.<sup>88</sup> It should also be pointed out, however, that according to Cleanthes (Calc. c. 144 = *SVF* I, 551) there is a certain amount of difference between Providence and Fate in that all things which are according to the former are also according to the latter, but not conversely [note, by the way, that the difference is only partial and that, unlike Posidonius, he does not mention Nature and speaks of Providence, not Zeus]. It is by no means sure that this statement applies to cosmology,<sup>89</sup> although a cosmological interpretation is possible, and was perhaps advocated by later Stoics. It should furthermore be pointed out that Chrysippus, discussing physical evil [with the significant exception of *ekpyrosis*] in the context of theodicy, among other things suggested the possibility that physical evil is caused indirectly, that what we have here is not fatality but "confatality", i.e. concomitant or accidental fatality, a notion which is perhaps best rendered in terms of a compromise made by god, as some things inevitably have to be taken into the bargain even by him.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>85</sup> At *N.Qu.* II 45, 2 he identifies god and nature. At *N.Qu.* II, 46 his point of view approaches that of Chrysippus' "confatality", cf. below, n. 90. A Platonizing touch is found *De prov.* 5, 9: "the Demiurge is incapable of changing matter" (*non potest artifex mutare materiam*; cf. also *Ep.* 58, 27). *Ep.* 65, 10 he quotes with complete approval Plato, *Tim.* 29Df. god makes the world as best he can. H. Steiner, *Theodizee bei Seneca*, thesis Erlangen 1914, pertinently comments on these and related passages.

<sup>86</sup> *N.Qu.* III, c. 27ff.

<sup>87</sup> I. Heinemann, *Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften*, II, Breslau 1928 = Hildesheim 1968, 82f. gives a commendable interpretation of the Posidonius-fragment and a related passage.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Hirzel, *o.c.* 771.

<sup>89</sup> Greene, for instance, *o.c.* 344-5 suggests it pertains to moral evil and human responsibility, adducing the prayer that ends the hymn, for which s. above, p. 130.

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Gellius, *NA* VII 1, 7-13 = *SVF* II, 1169 (It has not been, I believe, generally noticed that the example of the fragility of the skull, inevitable if higher, cognitive purposes are to be served, is already in Plato, *Tim.* 75Bf.); Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1050E =

However, Chrysippus definitely disagreed with Cleanthes by subscribing to the view already held by Zeno (*SVF* I, 160, several passages), viz. that Providence and Fate are the same [Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1056C = *SVF* II, 937; Calc., *l.c.* = *SVF* II, 933].<sup>91</sup> Finally, it is of some interest to note that the section *On Fate* in Calcidius (c. 142-190), which defends a (Middle) Platonist view of Fate and Providence against the Stoics, argues that Providence is above Fate, whereas the common Stoic mistake is to identify them.<sup>92</sup> Apparently, the orthodox and ancient view either regained the upper hand or was, for a Platonist, the easier one to refute.

We may conclude that, in Early Stoic thought, explicitly in Cleanthes, implicitly in Chrysippus' theodicy, there are in any case some hints regarding the difficulties of reconciling Fate and Providence which later (properly: Later Early and Early Middle) Stoics could make use of as underpinnings in order to formulate their own solutions.<sup>93</sup> This makes it all the more interesting that the Early Stoics, sharply differing in this respect from such later followers as are mentioned by Philo, were adamant in giving god and Providence full responsibility for total conflagration.

4. No evidence has survived, or perhaps I should say has yet been recognized, which is as obviously pertinent to the reconstruction of Zeno's opposition to the position represented by the theological argument at Arist., *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross, as is, in my opinion, the passage from Alexander of Lycopolis to that of his critical reaction to the physical argument of fr. 19a Ross. [It will be recalled that, in both fragments, Aristotle continues and improves upon earlier arguments of Plato, and that in Plato the physical and the theological aspects are not as seriously distinguished as in Aristotle]. It is, however, possible to reconstruct Zeno's point of view in this respect by starting from a, by no means fully original, hypothetical consideration of the form this opposition may conceivably have assumed,

*SVF* II, 1176; *ibid.* 1051C = *SVF* II, 1178, p. 338, 33: "he (sc. Chrysippus) says that Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) is to a large extent involved". S. above, n. 12.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. also above, n. 2.

<sup>92</sup> This is well brought out by J. den Boeft, *Calcidius on Fate*, thesis Leiden 1970.

<sup>93</sup> See further the final section of this paper, below p. 186f.

and by attempting to discover to which degree the extant evidence — to my regret, I have not this time stumbled across a neglected fragment by Zeno again — either supports or contradicts this hypothesis.

As will be recalled, Plato had argued that the Demiurge has made his creation proof against both inside and outside causes of destruction; furthermore, that he will never destroy his own handiwork. Aristotle had argued that (a) a Demiurge, if good, will never destroy the cosmos he has made and, *a fortiori* — should we nevertheless suppose him to have done so — will not abstain from constructing another one, because order is superior to chaos; furthermore, that (b) such another cosmos, if created, would have to be either better than, equal to, or worse than the actually existing one: a trilemma with three dead ends.

Presumably, Zeno's answer was worked out along the following lines. (a) Since the — for physical reasons already wholly inevitable — total conflagration, or conversion of the ordered universe, its parts, and all separate things, into one fiery condition means a return to what may be considered the by all means best possible state of affairs, in which only god and nothing else is present in matter or substance, the destruction of this ordered set of separate things does not result, as on Plato's view, in a contradiction in respect of god's nature or, as on Aristotle's view, in an equally contradictory state of chaos, but, on the contrary, in one of better and higher organization.<sup>94</sup> The best condition substance is able to acquire is evidently that in which divine unity has been most fully realized. This condition is not "cosmic" in the ordinary sense of the word but, if I may say so, "meta-cosmic". Accordingly and, to some extent, surprisingly, it is not so much the destruction of the universe which has to be vindicated as is its generation, since this, on what I suppose to have been Zeno's view, would be tantamount to a return to a state inferior to that at *ekpyrosis*.<sup>95</sup> I do not, of course, suggest that Zeno

<sup>94</sup> Cf. Moreau, *o.c.* 168: "L'Univers rentre ainsi, à intervalles périodiques, dans son état d'homogénéité primitive"; Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 79: "So steht am Ende unserer Weltperiode die Rückkehr in den feurigen Urzustand, die Ekpyrosis, die aus der Vielheit wieder die Einheit herstellt"; Arnold, *o.c.* 191.

<sup>95</sup> Cf. H. von Arnim, *Die europäische Philosophie des Altertums*, in: *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, T. 1 Abt. 5: *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Leipzig-Berlin 1913,

would have been obliged to defend a creation of the ordered universe against Plato and Aristotle: according to Plato, such a creation is a wholly good event, whereas Aristotle, for all his denying of its possibility, clearly rates creation higher than destruction (cf. *Phil. Aet. mu.* 10-11 = *De phil.* fr. 18 Ross, where those who let the universe be destroyed as well as generated are accused of "terrible atheism"; no such charge is levelled against those who merely generate it).<sup>96</sup> What I wish to say is, rather, that Zeno was obliged to submit an explanation of the rebirth of the universe on his own terms; the need arose in a situation of his own devising and exactly because he held the position he did. Furthermore, the explanation offered had better not be out of harmony with the theoretical presuppositions of his system.

Here his rejection of transcendentalism, in whatever form, proved a boon and a blessing. Zeno's god is a physical, corporeal entity, not something beyond matter, as in Plato and Aristotle, but inseparably bound up with it. We may say that if there are serious limits to this god's omnipotence, it is exactly here that they have to be situated.<sup>97</sup> God does not act *ad libitum* — indeed, no Greek philosophical god since Plato does — but, being corporeal, he is not exempt from the laws of physics. These laws can be said to be of his own devising,<sup>98</sup> i.e. they have been instituted as such as a result of god's being what he is *ab aeterno*. But the lawlike physical process, however much it be, as on Zeno's view, a self-directed one, remains a *physical* process. There is, accordingly, a limit to the duration of matter in its best possible, i.e. wholly fiery and divine, state, just as there is a limit to the duration of the ordered universe: when all the fuel has been consumed, i.e. turned into fire [as it

[94-263], 212: "Nun besteht aber die Entfaltung der einen Substanz [Von Arnim means substance *plus* god] zu einem Kosmos in ... einem teilweisen Hinabsinken der Substanz auf niedrigere Daseinsstufen".

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Effe, *o.c.* 14f.

<sup>97</sup> Edelstein, *o.c.* 33 links the limitation of god's power to the fact fire is its manifestation.

<sup>98</sup> Cf. Seneca's happy formula, *De prov.* 5, 8: *Semper paret, semel iussit* ("having once given the command, he always obeys"). — It should, of course, be added that in the Stoa — as with the majority of Greek philosophical schools or individuals — no fundamental distinction is made between moral and physical laws.



must be since substance is not quantitatively infinite],<sup>99</sup> a gradual quenching of the fire sets in and spreads until, according to an abstract from the "On the 'Whole'", only a "liquid mass" is left, in which the fiery god is "still present as spermatic *logos*", "just as the seed in the seminal fluid" (Diog. L. VII 135-136 = *SVF* I, 102).<sup>100</sup> I suppose that this watery state of the totality of substance is where the cosmic cycle is, so to speak, at its lowest ebb, and that the creation-in-phases of the ordered universe out of this humid "seed", slowly reverting to or developing into other elementary states is "good" in the sense required above precisely because it also is the first important step towards the next *ekpyrosis*.<sup>101</sup>

It will be recognized that in this way Aristotle's first dilemma in *De phil.* fr. 19c is neatly answered; his other dilemma, or rather trilemma, (b) regarding the position of a Demiurge as related to the sort of new world he is going to create, can also be answered. (b') No change, for better or for worse, of god's nature is involved, if the recreated universe is, both as to its structure and as to its history, the exact replica of its predecessor. The only point made by Aristotle which it is arguable was perhaps not answered, is his statement that the fashioning of an equal universe entails the notion of a Demiurge who is "someone labouring in vain" (*ματαιόπονος*), destroying and rebuilding at his pleasure like a child playing. It is not certain, however, that this point is not an interpolation, inserted by a later Peripatetic, a "heretical" Stoic [or even Philo himself], in order to make Aristotle's argument apply to orthodox Stoic cosmology as well.<sup>102</sup> But let us assume that the point was already made in the *De phil.*; if so, it could have been met by the argument that, surely, the creation of a universe that is in every detail indistinguishable from its predecessor is no child's play, and that a Demiurge, who saves appearances by the fashioning of a product which both accounts for the phenomena of transitoriness and satisfies

<sup>99</sup> Ar. *Did.* fr. 20 Diels = *SVF* I, 87: "the eternal substance of all things becomes neither more nor less", i.e. is finite.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. above, p. 145.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Moreau, *o.c.* 171: the cosmogony "aboutit à la conflagration".

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Plut., *De E* 393Ef. and Baltes, *o.c.* 206 ("Ammonius" uses the argument against the *ekpyrosis*).

the need for cognitively grounded statements (s. below), does not labour in vain.<sup>103</sup> What's more, the expression (sc. "equal") presumably used by Aristotle in this context does not suggest a repetition of same in the sense of eternal recurrence, but only in that of identity of general structure: the other world would be just like ours and contain the same species of living beings, but not necessarily the same individuals.

When, now, we turn to consider some of the other evidence — some points of a physical nature already having been mentioned —, we shall see that the information at our disposal not only does not contradict our hypothesis, but fits it rather well. According to Tatian, *Adv. Graec.* 5 = *SVF* I, 109, Zeno argued that Anytus and Meletus will again accuse (sc. Socrates);<sup>104</sup> the example beautifully fits Zeno, who was an admirer of Xenophon's *Memoir of Socrates* and was even, according to anecdote, won over to philosophy by hearing it recited.<sup>105</sup> Accordingly, the history of humanity will ever repeat itself (Zeno is credited with other examples as well). Tatian's testimony is fully confirmed by a notice in Aëtius, I 27, 5, purporting to be an abstract from Zeno's work *On Nature* (*Περὶ φύσεως*):<sup>106</sup> "Zeno said that Destiny is the power which moves matter in the same respect and in the same way and that it makes no difference to call it (sc. Destiny) Providence and Nature". In view of the fact that Zeno taught a cosmic cycle, this statement cannot apply to a static condition — actually Zeno says Destiny "moves" matter — but must pertain to eternal recurrence. Now, apart from its explicit identification of Destiny, Providence and Nature,<sup>107</sup> this abstract is fundamental for

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Sandbach, *o.c.* 79: "... it was necessary that if there were successive world-cycles, they should be identical, since Providence, which is responsible for everything, must order the world in the best way possible, and it is plausible that there cannot be two ways equally good". Similarly Pohlenz, *o.c.* I, 81.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. also *SVF* II, 625-626.

<sup>105</sup> Diog. Laert. VII, 1 = *SVF* I, 1; Them., *Or.* 23, 295D = *SVF* I, 9.

<sup>106</sup> This — in itself common — title is lacking in the "Schriftenverzeichnis" of Diog. Laert. VII, 4 = *SVF* I, 41. *Lectio faciliior* for Π. οὐσίας (Diog. Laert. VII 134 but not in the list of VII, 4) or even for the better attested Π. τοῦ ὅλου, listed Diog. Laert. VII, 4 and cited five times (s. above, n. 57)?

<sup>107</sup> Cf. also above, n. 2. On *Heimarmene* and *Ananke* as being, for Zeno, "durchaus identisch", cf. W. Gundel, *Beiträge zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der Begriffe Ananke und Heimarmene*, Hab.-Schrift Giessen 1914, 62; as being identical for Chrysippus *ibid.*, 64f.; and, as being, to some extent, distinct for Chrysippus *ibid.*, 67f.

its description of the *modus quo* of the providential, natural and necessary determination of matter qua being moved κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαυτῶς ("in the same respect and in the same way"). This is a formula with a history. It is prefigured in Parmenides,<sup>108</sup> and used by Plato to characterize the way of being of the transcendental Forms as "those things that are always, in the same respect and in the same way", τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσαυτῶς ἔχοντα: cf. the passage introducing the other-wordly Ideas, *Phaed.* 78C-D; *Rep.* V, 479A; *Soph.* 248A (the partly critical account of the theory of the "friends of the Ideas"); *Politic.* 269 (where it is denied of what is corporeal and only granted to what is most divine). Of especial importance, in our connexion, is that Plato, in the *Tim.*, uses it to qualify the Ideal Model imitated by the Demiurge for the creation of the Universe (29A; cf. also 27D-28A). In the same work, Plato uses a form of the expression to characterize the "everlastingly immutable motion of the fixed stars" (40B ἀπλανῆ τῶν ἄστρων ... κατὰ ταῦτά ἐν ταυτῷ στρεφόμενα ἀεὶ μένει); similarly, of their rational motion, *Laws* X, 898A-B. The influential ps.Platoic *Epinomis*, famous for its doctrine of astral religion, uses the expression of the heavenly bodies generally: the regular motion of these entities proves that they are intelligent living beings; the "necessity" (ἀνάγκη) of Soul and Intellect is the strongest there is (982B-D).<sup>109</sup> Aristotle continues this line of thought; speaking of the heavenly bodies in general, he says, *Met.* K 6, 1063a13f.: "those things which are always in the same condition" (τῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὸ ἐχόντων),<sup>110</sup> whereas the First Unmoved Mover "cannot", of course, "ever change its condition in whatever respect" (e.g. *Met.* Λ 7, 1072b8 οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς).

Zeno, in what is undoubtedly one of his major contributions to the history of thought, gave this Platonic-Aristotelian formula a

<sup>108</sup> *V/S* 28B8,29, of ungenerated, imperishable, motionless Being: "abiding as the same in the same and in itself it is at rest" (ταυτόν τ' ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτὸ τε κεῖται).

<sup>109</sup> Cf. L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis*, Mem. Am. Philos. Ass. 107, Philadelphia 1975, 269f. The "necessity" of this passage is not that of the *Tim.*, which is the cause of irregularity.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. H. Happ, 'Kosmologie und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles', in: *Parusia, Festgabe J. Hirschberger*, Frankfurt/M. 1965, [155ff.], 165f.

new sense. Rejecting the self-identical invariability of entities or motions that never change at all, he posits that of *what invariably changes in exactly the same way*. We may presume that he was familiar with the discussion concerning the correct interpretation of the creation-story of the *Tim.*;<sup>111</sup> we know that he rejected Plato's transcendental Ideal Model, as we also know that he rejected Aristotle's double physics, of two worlds, one below the moon and one above, each with its own laws, topped by a supra-physical Unmoved Mover who is in no way directly concerned with what is going on in the universe. Plato's theory of Ideas had been devastatingly criticized by Aristotle both in his popular and in his esoteric works, whereas Aristotle's own cosmological solution had been very severely criticized and in part abandoned by Theophrastus. The cosmological question could by no means be considered as having been solved; accordingly, the positions of all contributors to the discussion were still relevant. Zeno's theory is a *critical alternative* to both the Platonic and the Aristotelian position. In the *Tim.*, 29Df. Plato had distinguished between "being, which never becomes", which is eternal and the object of knowledge because it is always the same, and incessant becoming, which comes into being and vanishes, which is never the same and therefore the object of "opinion together with sensation". The visible world is, in a way, an amalgam of both; by Providence of the Demiurge, it is also a rational, ensouled, living being (30B-C). He had fashioned it after the Eternal Model by persuading Necessity (48Af., 56C) — the Receptacle (50C) or Mother of Becoming (50D) or Nurse (49A) or Place (52A) —, i.e. the other, independent principle, interpreted by Aristotle and Theophrastus as "matter", to tolerate the structures he imposes. Now this interpretation by Aristotle (e.g. *Phys.* IV, 2, 209b10ff.; *GC* II, 1, 329a9ff.; *Cael.* III, 8, 306b16f.) and the cautious Theophrastus (*Phys. op.* fr. 9 Diels, "Plato ... wishes to make the substrate a principle etc.") is a simplification which does no justice to the theoretical subtleties of Plato's account; the correctness of this reading is not, however, what is at issue here: what is important is that Zeno had at his disposal an authoritative

<sup>111</sup> Cf. above, p. 140, p. 143, and Hahm, *o.c.* 189.

Peripatetic interpretation of the *Tim.*<sup>112</sup> Theophrastus not only spoke of receptive matter in this context, but also of another principle, viz. god and the good as cause and mover (αἴτιον καὶ κινῶν).<sup>113</sup> Theophrastus, that is, already left out the Model *qua* principle, presumably subsuming it under "god and the good".

Plato himself had admitted that his cosmology cannot claim scientific status, since the discourse does not pertain to the ideal object of knowledge, but only to its approximation in the creation of the Demiurge. The whole of Timaeus' speech is only an "approximative" or "plausible account" (εἰκὼς λόγος,<sup>114</sup> 29B-D and *passim*), expressing the approximation, through the providential intervention of the Demiurge, by the visible world or "image", "copy" (εἰκὼν), of the Model. What Zeno, whose reading of Plato will have been influenced by Theophrastus', does, is to abolish the distinctions so carefully made by Plato: that between being and becoming as well as that between god or Providence, and Necessity or "matter";<sup>115</sup> he sub-

<sup>112</sup> This case (cf. also above, n. 33 *in fine*, for Theophrastus' contribution to the dispute on the eternity of the world) is exactly similar to that of the influence of the *interpretatio Peripatetica* of Presocratic philosophers, cf. above, n. 36, n. 52 *in fine*. The importance of Theophrastus' example is minimized by Hahm, *o.c.* 51 n. 23, and by Krämer, *o.c.* 120 n. 62. Krämer's interesting and admirably erudite discussion of the "Vorgeschichte der stoischen Prinzipienlehre", *ibid.* 108ff., which he finds in the tenets of the Early Academy, is rendered less useful because he tends to exclude other influences; the parallels he has collected, however, illustrate how much the points of discussion at issue were in the air towards the end of the 4th Cent. B.C.

<sup>113</sup> Diels *ad l.* already compares Arist., *Met.* A 6, 988a7ff., where Aristotle indeed ascribes a doctrine of two principles to Plato, viz. the final and the material cause. Aristotle, however, here identifies the final cause with the Ideas and the One, whereas the material cause is also the Dyad, sc. the "Great-and-Small". I cannot enter into the problems of interpretation connected with this second principle or into the theoretical, non-physical or idealist aspects of Aristotle's own concept of "matter". It is, for our purpose, sufficient to take notice of the fact that in Aristotle's physical and biological treatises (but by no means only there) "matter" tends to be used in a materialist sense, viz. that of the "stuff" of which things consist; cf. H. Happ, *Hyle. Studien zum aristotelischen Materie-Begriff*, Berlin 1971, 809f.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. B. Witte, 'Der Eikōs Logos in Platons Timaios', *AGPh* 1964, 1ff.

<sup>115</sup> Hahm, in an admirable chapter, *o.c.* 35-48, argues that the Stoics were primarily influenced by Aristotle [his argument, however, implies that they went through the whole of Aristotle's *œuvre* with a rather fine comb]. Stoic "matter" is that of Aristotle "universalized" (*ibid.* 39), whereas the Stoic active cause is dependent both upon Aristotle's Prime Mover or God (*ibid.* 41-42) and upon the theory of causality in, especially, the biological works, where formal, final and efficient cause tend to coalesce

stitutes eternal and invariant, i.e. cyclical, becoming through providential divine necessity.<sup>116</sup> In Plato, the "physical" principle is independent, so the incorporeal Intellect or god has no other option than trying to persuade it; in Zeno's theory, all things that are, and are causes, are corporeal and physical,<sup>117</sup> and Reason and substance or matter, though both distinguished in reality and distinguishable in thought, are actually always united and always work together.

In this context, Zeno also uses ideas developed by Aristotle, who had not only spoken of the eternal circular motion of the heavens

and to oppose the material cause (*ibid.* 45f.). These operative forms are immanent in nature (*ibid.*). He adds (*ibid.* 39f.) that the "universalization" of Aristotelian matter finds precedent in the *Tim.* and that the immanence of the moving cause is prefigured in that of Plato's World-Soul (*ibid.* 42), while the demiurgic operations of forms in nature find precedent in Plato's Demiurge. He concludes, *ibid.* 47-8: "The Stoic matter could be viewed as an adaptation of Plato's receptacle; the Stoic active principle could absorb both Plato's demiurge and his world soul". However, Hahm's argument, if I understand him correctly, suggests that the Stoic adaptation of the *Tim.* is only a sort of afterthought, whereas I would prefer to think that it is the Peripatetic interpretation of the *Tim.* which, first and foremost, is what is at issue here: if Aristotle and Theophrastus already interpreted the Receptacle as "matter", and if Zeno believed this interpretation to be correct, no difference between Plato and Aristotle would, on this account, ensue for Zeno. The same point can be made about Theophrastus' interpretation of Plato's Demiurge: if, as is likely, he subsumed the ideas under the active cause and the "good", the way would be open for an Aristotelizing interpretation which would to some extent make the *Tim.* look like an early, not yet wholly scientific form of Aristotelian cosmology (which, of course, it is, although today we would formulate the relation differently). Consequently, I find Hahm's final remark, *ibid.* 48, that in the Stoic "synthesis the original elements, drawn largely from Plato and Aristotle, are so tightly welded that they lost most of their Academic and Peripatetic character" wholly acceptable in that it puts Plato and Aristotle on a more equal footing.

For a point of view similar to Hahm's s. Solmsen, *Kl. Schr.* I, 345ff., where it is argued that the Stoic conception of nature as craftsman is unthinkable without Aristotle's example of purpose or *logos* in nature, since Plato had made the Craftsman an external factor (*ibid.* 344; this leaves out of account, however, the contribution of the lesser gods), but that the Stoics returned to Plato for their divinisation of this force (*ibid.* 354-5). Moreau, *o.c.* 160, argues that the Stoic "matter" is Aristotelian, their active cause Platonic, which is only partly correct; *ibid.* 174 he correctly states that the Stoic concept of nature is influenced by Aristotle's.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Moreau's formula in this context, *o.c.* 168: "Il s'agit donc d'une éternité qui n'est que l'absolu d'un ordre de succession dans le temps; l'absolu se trouve ainsi engagé dans le devenir; nous assistons à une transposition historique de la dialectique platonicienne", etc.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. above, n. 46 (*SVF* II, 525).



(*Met.* A 7-10; *Cael.* I, 3; 9; and elsewhere) but had also explained the cycle of sublunar elemental transformation (this "cycle" is also mentioned by Plato, *Tim.* 49C) and that of the reproduction of living beings (a similar motif is in Plato, *Symp.* 208A-B) in the chance-infested regions far below the moon as an approximation of the invariantly self-identical heavenly cycles.<sup>118</sup> For this approximation god, favouring "the best",<sup>119</sup> is responsible (*GC* II, 10, 336b25ff.; cf. also *GA* II, 1, esp. 731b31f.: "that which becomes is eternal in the way possible for it"). It is plausible that the theory of the dependence of these lower cycles upon the higher was also expounded in the *De phil.*,<sup>120</sup> but my argument does not depend on this assumption. Zeno appears to have modified this Aristotelian theory in an original way by so to speak telescoping the heavenly cycles and the cycles of becoming into one and the same cycle: Aristotle's "nature" is reunited. He was only able to do so, however, at the considerable cost of eliminating irregularity or chance or accident from nature — i.e., from nature below the moon, too — and of sacrificing man's autonomous responsibility for his behaviour.<sup>121</sup> The advantage of this solution, however, is that it satisfies the conditions, almost invariably stipulated in Greek philosophy, which objects of knowledge must satisfy in order to be dependable: epistemologically puritanical conditions of permanence and invariance.<sup>122</sup> The events caused by Zeno's Destiny-Providence-Nature are more reliable than those of Plato's "approximative" physics, and just as cognitively reliable as are, for instance, the eclipses of the moon discussed by Arist., *An. Po.* I, 8, 75b32f.: "it is clear that demonstrations and cases of knowledge of frequently happening events, as for instance an eclipse of the moon, are eternal in so far as they refer to events

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Happ, 'Kosm.' 169f. and F. Solmsen, *Aristotle's System of the Physical World*, Ithaca N.Y. 1960, 339f., 387f., 426.

<sup>119</sup> This recalls the mood of the *argumentum ex gradibus* (ab., p. 143).

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Effe, *o.c.* 42ff.

<sup>121</sup> Whereas Aristotle had made sublunar matter, in a sense, responsible, not in itself but *per accidens*, of physical evil (cf. Happ, *Hyle* 767, 772), and man for moral evil (cf. e.g. *EN* III, 5, 1113b2-1114b25).

<sup>122</sup> Cf. my remarks in *Lampas* 1975, 318f., and J. Hintikka, 'Time, Truth and Knowledge in Ancient Greek Philosophy', *APhQu* 1967, 1ff., repr. (with a slightly changed title) in *Time and Necessity*, Oxford 1973, 62ff.

of a specific sort, whereas they apply to particular events in so far as they are not eternal" (sc. because the state of affairs which is expressed in the proposition is not a continuous, but an intermittent one). Zeno's alternative to Aristotle's cosmology satisfies conditions which the latter would have found it difficult to refute without making an appeal to data of experience concerning indeterminated or accidental events<sup>123</sup> or without, of course, rejecting Zeno's system as a whole.

It will be clear that I assume that Zeno, in face of the theological arguments connected with the question of the generation and destruction of the universe as found in the *Tim.* as well as in the *De phil.* [and, presumably, other works by Aristotle], had no other choice. The doctrine of eternal recurrence (*SVF* I, 109) in its theoretical expression (*SVF* I, 176) is the only possible answer to the objection that to destroy (and remake) the world he has made would be contrary to the nature of god.

It is, of course, true that a doctrine of eternal recurrence including the return of individual persons is attributed by Eudemus (fr. 88 Wehrli = *VS* 58 B34) to certain Pythagoreans; this theory even affords a closer parallel to Zeno's doctrine than the cosmologies of Empedocles and Heraclitus as described by Aristotle,<sup>124</sup> which do not involve a repetition of history. It is also true that Zeno is said to have written a book called *Pythagorica*.<sup>125</sup> No testimony regarding its contents survives; it has been plausibly inferred, however, that it mentioned the Pythagorean theory discussed by Eudemus.<sup>126</sup> It is, indeed, plausible that theories of such Pythagoreans, the cosmological myth of Plato's *Politicus*, Empedocles' cosmic cycle, Heraclitus' supposed cosmic cycle and Aristotle's own cycles did inspire Zeno. However, we should be wary of believing this tracing of precedents to be a sufficient explanation of Zeno's theory; his system is not a mere summation of parallels, but an original view, originating in a well-defined problem-situation. The scholastic adage *quidquid recipitur*

<sup>123</sup> Cf. e.g. *Phys.* II, 5-6; for the in itself unsatisfactory discussion of this topic see W. D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London 1923, <sup>2</sup>1949, 77f. *De int.* 9 is more satisfactory.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. above, n. 36, n. 52 *in fine*.

<sup>125</sup> Diog. Laert. VII, 4 = *SVF* I, 41, cf. p. 72, Nr. XXI.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. e.g. W. Wiersma, *Mnem.* 1943, 104f.; Hahm, *o.c.* 186.

*recipitur ad modum recipientis* is also pertinent in Zeno's case.<sup>127</sup> If he borrowed a theory of eternal recurrence, he did so because, in face of the arguments of his Academic and Peripatetic opponents, he rather badly needed it; what's more, he firmly put it in the context of a well-balanced general physical and cosmological theory.

Explicit evidence concerning the returning of all things to god at *ekpyrosis* as being, according to Zeno, a positive event there is none. Such a qualification, however, seems to be entailed by the above-studied statement (*SVF* I, 176) that the cause of matter being moved in the sense of eternal recurrence of same is not only Destiny and Nature, but also Providence. At this point I should like to append a further suggestion as to the possible contents of the *Pythagorica*. A likely relation between Zeno and Empedocles has already been mentioned.<sup>128</sup> Now, if it is possible that Zeno discussed the Pythagoreans likewise referred to by Eudemus, it is also possible that in the *Pythagorica* he discussed Empedocles. The latter's physics is today generally and correctly interpreted as constituting a critical reaction to the theories of Parmenides; it is also recognized that his ethics, such as found in the *Katharmoi*, is largely Pythagorean (vegetarianism, the cycle of metempsychosis).<sup>129</sup> Ancient sources, too, point both at Parmenides and at the Pythagoreans. Theophrastus, *Phys. op.* fr. 3 Diels (= *VS* 31A7) says Empedocles was an admirer and follower of Parmenides, "and even more of the Pythagoreans" (καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν Πυθαγορείων). Zeno's somewhat younger contemporary Timaeus of Taormina, ap. Diog. Laert. VIII, 54 (*VS* 31A1, Tim. fr. 14 Jacoby 566) is reported to have told, in the ninth book of his

<sup>127</sup> Hahn, *o.c.* 48 [similarly elsewhere] says the Stoic system has a "soul of its own"; an acceptable, but not very cognitive statement.

<sup>128</sup> Above n. 36, n. 52 *in fine*. Van Straaten, *Kerngedachten* 27, pertinently compares the periodical supremacies of the immanent forces of Love and Strife, which are the moving causes in Empedocles' cosmic cycle, with *ekpyrosis* and cosmogony in the Stoic cycle.

<sup>129</sup> For Empedocles' reaction to Parmenides, see e.g. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy, II, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*, Cambridge 1965, 138ff., esp. 147-8, and my paper in *Phron.* (below, n. 132), 35f.; for his Pythagoreanism Guthrie, *o.c.* 250f. (but Guthrie tends to underplay the Pythagorean elements) and G. Zuntz, *Persephone, Three Essays on Religion and Thought in Magna Graecia*, Oxford 1971, 264ff.

*History of Magna Graecia*, that he was a pupil of "Pythagoras" and was banished from the Pythagorean community on account of plagiarism.<sup>130</sup> Timaeus, beyond doubt, is exaggerating; his testimony, however, combined with that of Theophrastus and others, anyhow reveals that, for whatever reason (correct or incorrect), Empedocles was at an early date regarded as a Pythagorean — a view which need not have limited itself, like our modern one, to Empedocles' psychology and vegetarianism. What is above all important is that Zeno's reading of Empedocles will have been conditioned by that of Theophrastus, just as his reading of Plato will have been. If he read Empedocles — no text of Empedocles, inclusive of scholia, survives as in the case of Hesiod<sup>131</sup> or other poets — he may have found

<sup>130</sup> Many other ancient authors who attribute Pythagorean leanings to Empedocles are mentioned by Diog. Laert., VIII 54ff. = *VS* 31A1.

<sup>131</sup> (Cf. above, n. 26). *SVF* I, 100 and 105 are from the Hesiodus-scholia; information similar to that in I, 105 is quoted in a scholion on Apoll. Rhod. (I, 104) and by ps. Probus, *In Verg. Ecl.* (*SVF* I, 103). Cic., *ND* I, 36 = *SVF* I, 167 mentions Zeno's interpretation of Hesiodus, cf. also *ND* II, 63 = *SVF* II, 1067; Diog. Laert. VIII, 48 = *SVF* I, 276 apparently quotes from it. An echo of Zeno's study of Empedocles is probably to be found in the same commentary of ps. Probus, *In Verg. Ecl.* p. 10, 31-11, 6 Keil, which, surprisingly, is only partially printed in the Zeno-section of *SVF* I at the end of 102 [or perhaps not so surprisingly: exactly the same piece is printed by A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London 1891, *ad* his Zeno fr. 52, p. 101], and more fully as *SVF* I, 496 [Cleanthes; here Von Arnim prints the text of Pearson, Cleanthes fr. 20, p. 249-50, which, starting at p. 10, 31 Keil, has more at the beginning than the fragment of *SVF* I, 102]. In *SVF* I Von Arnim omits both times ps. Probus' reference to Empedocles, which, however, he prints *SVF* II, at the end of 413, which text, accordingly, = *SVF* I, 102 *in fine* + the reference to Empedocles. I translate the text of *SVF* II, which starts at p. 10, 33 Keil: "That of these" [sc. the four elements] "all things are subsequently formed is taught by the Stoics Zeno of Citium and Chrysippus of Soli and Cleanthes of [Thasus, read:] Assus" (this is where *SVF* I, 102 and 496 stop), "who considered (*habuerunt*) Empedocles of Agrigento to be the originator" (sc. of this doctrine), "who wrote about these (sc. elements) in the following way...". A quotation follows in Greek, viz. Emp., *VS* 31B6 (three lines, the last with a corrupt ending, of which Von Arnim only gives the first), which identifies the four elements as gods: brilliant Zeus [= fire or aether], lifegiving Hera [= earth], Aidoneus [= air], and Nestis [= water]. [For the interpretation of this fr. see F. Buffière, *Les Mythes d'Homère et la Pensée Grecque*, Paris 1956, 96f.; Guthrie, *o.c.* 144f.; J. Bollack, *Empédocle*, 3, *Les Origines*, *Comm.* 1, Paris 1969, 169ff.; and W. Burkert, rev. Bollack, *Gnomon*, 1972, 434f. In ps. Probus, p. 11, 7-21, 26 (cf. above, n. 60 *in fine*), there is a very substantial discussion of the elements in philosophical thought and in poetry, ending with the Zeno-fragment *SVF* I, 103, p. 21, 21f. Keil; ps. Probus himself belongs to those who interpret Hera



in him what he needed for a further answer to the theological objections of Plato and Aristotle: a cosmic cycle ending in complete harmony and unity, since at the end of each cosmic period "all things come together in order to be one in Love" (ἅλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, *VS* 31B17, 7, cf. 16).<sup>132</sup> This same cosmic Love is responsible for the fashioning of living beings at the beginning of each cosmic period.<sup>133</sup> Though Love is, in Empedocles, not a teleological force, it otherwise performs the functions of Zeno's Providence. There are, naturally, major differences: in Zeno we do not have, as in Empedocles, elements which are irreducible substances, but elements reducible to the primary, fiery element which in its pure form is — as, again, not in Empedocles<sup>134</sup> — to be identified with nature and god. In Empedocles, moreover, an evil force, disruptive Strife, is responsible for the destruction of the harmonious divine sphere in which all things have become homogeneously mingled, and hence for the generation of the cosmic structure

in Empedocles as earth, but he also discusses the other interpretation]. If other information from scholia or commentaries on poetic works is accepted for Zeno, this testimony should be acceptable as well. That these lines may have appealed to Zeno is evident. I cannot, however, enter here into the Stoic physical allegoresis of the traditional gods; for its fine flowering in ps.Heraclitus' *Allegorical Interpretation of Homer* see e.g. J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie, Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-Christiennes*, Aubier 1958, 161f. Von Arnim's unhappy treatment of this important testimony on the Stoics' interest in Empedocles may have been responsible for the fact that it was missed by Pépin, who mentions Emp. B6 *o.c.* 406, n. 64, but adds that Empedocles "présentait, de ces quatre dieux, une interprétation physique assez éloignée de l'exégèse stoïcienne classique". Classic Stoic exegesis, however, was rather versatile (cf. e.g. *SVF* II, 1076-1077). Pythagorean echoes in Cleanthes (Sun = Apollo, harmony of spheres) are discussed by Boyancé, *o.c.* 91ff.

<sup>132</sup> The argument of Emp. B17 is complicated by the fact that he discusses individual beings and the universe at the same time, at least in the first lines (cf. my 'Ambiguity in Empedocles B 17, 3-5', *Phronesis* 1972, 17ff. and A. A. Long, 'Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in the Sixties', in: A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), *The Presocratics, A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York 1974, 397ff.); this, however, need not concern us here. For the "sphere of love" as god cf. *VS* 31B31, B27, B28, B29.

<sup>133</sup> *VS* 31B35, 4f., B73, B75, B86, B87, B95, B96, B98 and other texts, conveniently assembled by J. Bollack, *o.c.* 2. *Les Origines, édition critique*, Paris 1969, 129ff. ('L'Atelier d'Aphrodite'). Cf. also F. Solmsen, 'Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmogony', *Phronesis* 1965, 109ff. = *Kl. Schr. I*, [274ff.], 282f.

<sup>134</sup> Though fire is "Zeus" (*VS* 31B6, ab. n. 131) and plays an important role in zoogony (B62, B73).

of heaven and earth, sea and air, which we inhabit.<sup>135</sup> In Zeno, on the other hand, cosmogony is part of the same providential process.<sup>136</sup>

This relation to Empedocles must, however, remain conjectural. If my suggestion is not acceptable, we must fall back upon *SVF* I, 176 and say that if all things happen according to Providence, so does *ekpyrosis*. Furthermore, since the cosmic cycle is explicitly ascribed to "Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus" (*SVF* I, 107, 512; II, 596, all from Ar. Did. fr. 36 Diels),<sup>137</sup> we are in a position to adduce the more explicit evidence found among the remains of Cleanthes and, especially, Chrysippus, who are, moreover, nowhere accused of significantly deviating from Zeno on this point,<sup>138</sup> whereas the differences to be found or constructed between the doctrines of the individual Early Stoics were mercilessly exploited by later writers, be they merely critical or openly hostile.

5. Cleanthes attributed the leading rôle in *ekpyrosis* to the sun, who is in his system the ruling part (*hegemonikon*) of the universe, and who is to be identified with Apollo<sup>139</sup> and with the Zeus we know from the *Hymn*.<sup>140</sup> We have explicit testimony that the other heavenly bodies, when the end of a cosmic period draws near, of their own accord approach "Zeus" and allow themselves to be reunited

<sup>135</sup> *VS* 31B17,8 and B17,16-18, B31; A42 = Arist., *Cael.* III, 2, 301a12f.: Empedocles only gives the cosmogony of Strife, not one of Love; A37 = Arist., *Met.* A 4, 985a21f.; A49 = Aet. II 6, 3, the most explicit passage. See further Solmsen, *Kl. Schr. I*, 282f.

<sup>136</sup> More things in Empedocles may conceivably have pleased Zeno, e.g. the characterization of the divine in *VS* 31B134 [from bk. III of the physical poem and wrongly put among the fragments of the *Katharmoi* by Diels and Kranz] as a "holy mind... hurrying through the cosmos with swift cares". Cf. *SVF* I, 157, on god as "fiery intellect" and *SVF* I, 153, on the omnipresence of Providence. So may the fragment from the *Katharmoi* (*VS* 31B135) quoted by Arist., *Rhet.* I, 13, 1373b14f., on the "law binding for all stretched throughout the aether".

<sup>137</sup> Cf. above, p. 145.

<sup>138</sup> In principle, of course, i.e. as far as the interpretation of *ekpyrosis* as a positive event is concerned; the actual filling in of this notion could vary.

<sup>139</sup> *SVF* I, 540, 541. Cf. Boyancé, *Ét.* 90, and 'L'Apollon solaire', in: *Mélanges J. Carcopino*, Paris 1966, [148ff.], 166f.

<sup>140</sup> *SVF* I, 537, cf. above, p. 130, and *SVF* I, 536, cf. above, p. 154. Cf. Boyancé, *Ét.* 87: "Le soleil est au centre et de la physique et de la théologie de Cléanthe, et le fait le plus significatif est sans doute qu'il soit ainsi au centre de l'une et de l'autre".

with him; [so, eventually, also the other gods incorporated in the other elements];<sup>141</sup> “the stars, being gods, contribute to their own destruction, since they cooperate with the sun in view of *ekpyrosis*” (Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075D = *SVF* I, 510). It is, consequently, the “torch-bearer” (= the sun) of the cosmic mysterion who summons the “mystic shapes” (= the gods)<sup>142</sup> for the grand reunion, to which they come voluntarily, in which all things become “flame”.<sup>143</sup> Surely, this description of total conflagration is in terms of a final apotheosis, i.e. a positive event.

The evidence concerning Chrysippus is far more extensive than that about Cleanthes; the first thing to be noted is that the above-mentioned testimony ascribing to Cleanthes the assimilation of the other gods to “Zeus” joins Chrysippus’ name.<sup>144</sup>

Chrysippus speaks of total conflagration in wholly positive terms; we may say that he succeeds in successfully standing the arguments, of Plato and Aristotle, regarding the incompatibility of the destruction of the universe and the concept of god, on their head. Significantly, certain important verbal quotations are from the first book of his *On Providence*;<sup>145</sup> in itself, this is already expressive of his evaluation of total conflagration.

<sup>141</sup> Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075A-C = *SVF* I, 536 and II, 1049, i.e. both Chrysippus and Cleanthes (cf. above, p. 154). It should be noted that *SVF* I, 510 = *Comm. not.* 1075D belongs in the same chapter: Plutarch criticizes the theory of total conflagration both in Cleanthes and Chrysippus. For this chapter as a whole s. M. Pohlenz, ‘Plutarchs Schriften gegen die Stoiker’, *Hermes* 1939, [1 ff.], 27f. = *Kleine Schriften I*, hrsg. H. Dörrie, Hildesheim 1965, [448 ff.], 474f., who compares this section with Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 36, for which see below, p. 181f. and n. 172.

<sup>142</sup> *SVF* I, 538, cf. above, p. 135-6.

<sup>143</sup> *SVF* I, 511, cf. above, p. 155, Boyancé, *Ét.* 67, 89.

<sup>144</sup> *SVF* I, 536 = *SVF* II, 1049. Cf. above, n. 141.

<sup>145</sup> Von Arnim, *SVF* III, p. 203 XLVIII lists 12 fragments which mention the title; six of these contain verbatim quotations; of the latter, two from bk. I and another one from a not-numbered book, refer to *ekpyrosis*, while three are from bk. IV, and deal with Destiny, Providence and human responsibility. Of the doxographical references, two are to bk. I (*SVF* II, 633, the universe is a living being; 644, the ruling part of the universe is the purest part of the aether); four do not specify from which book they derive (*SVF* II, 623, on eternal recurrence; II, 634, the world is administrated by Intellect and Providence; II, 687, the stars are living beings; II, 1023, on the World-Soul and the names of the gods). A rather good impression of the contents of *On Providence* is to be culled from A. Gercke, *Chrysippea*, in: *Fleck. Jbb. Supp. Bd. XIV*, Leipzig 1885, 690-781 (also separatim), where p. 705ff. the fragments listed by Von Arnim and other fragments probably to be attributed to this work are printed; indeed, Von Arnim *l.c.* refers to this valuable book himself.

Chrysippus, using a mixture of physico-biological and religious language, explicitly denies that the universe is destroyed or, as he says, “dies”. “Zeus” goes on growing until he has assimilated all things to himself, “for, since death is the separation of soul from body, whereas the Soul of the cosmos not only is not separated, but continually goes on growing until it has completely absorbed into itself the matter, it should not be affirmed that the cosmos dies” [from *On Prov. I*, ap. Plut., *St. rep.* 1052C = *SVF* II, 604].<sup>146</sup> In the same book he said, in similar terms: “When the universe is fiery throughout, it consists *ipso facto* of its own soul and [that soul’s] leading faculty (*hegemonikon*); when, however, having changed into the moisture and the soul left within [that moisture], it has changed, in a way, into body and soul with the result that it is a composition of these, it has to be explained in different terms” [Plut., *St. rep.* 1053B = *SVF* II, 605]. Both Chrysippus and Cleanthes are said (several book-titles being mentioned, among which the *On Providence*) to have held that only Zeus is immortal and draws everything else into himself at *ekpyrosis* [Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075A-C = *SVF* I, 536; II, 1049]. Summarizing Chrysippus’ views, Plutarch, without referring to a specific work—in view of the context, provenance from *On Providence I* (cf. above, *SVF* II, 605) is likely—, affirms [*Comm. not.* 1077D-E = *SVF* II, 1064] that Zeus and the ordered universe resemble the composite human being, Providence resembling the soul, and quotes verbatim: “when total conflagration has occurred, Zeus, the only among the gods to be indestructible, retires into Providence; then, having become united, both continue to exist in the single substance of the aether”. Here the language is still physico-biological, but the religious terminology is more predominant: this is no longer a purely physical theory—for what, in physical terms, is “Providence”? Cf. also a similar summary, *ibid.* 1065B (not in *SVF*): “Zeus, having dissolved all matter into himself, becomes one and abolishes all further differences”. The identification of World-Soul and Providence is confirmed for Chrysippus by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 47-48 = *SVF* II, 613, that of Zeus and World-Soul (if the text is to be trusted) by Philod., *De piet.* col. 11 = *SVF* II, 1076, cf. also Cic., *ND* I, 39-41. For

<sup>146</sup> For the physical aspects of these and other fragments s. above, p. 150f.

the importance of Providence in Chrysippus' system we may refer to his polemics against Epicurus and others who eliminated Providence, Plut. *St. rep.* 1051D-E = *SVF* II, 1115 (cf. also *Comm. not.* c. 32, which discusses the Stoics' continuing debate with the Epicureans; 1075E = *SVF* II, 1126 and Usener, *Epicurea* fr. 368). Finally, a question of Chrysippus, quoted by Alex. Aphr., *Quaest.* II, 28 = *SVF* II, 1118 from a not-specified work, rhetorically asks what is left of god if the exercising of providence is abstracted (and what of snow, if whiteness and cold, of fire, if heat, etc.).

It is, furthermore, reported — without identification of the work in which this theory occurred — that, according to Chrysippus, the cosmos, at *ekpyrosis*, turns into "light" or "brightness" (αὐγή, Phil., *Aet. mu.* 90 = *SVF* II, 611).<sup>147</sup> It is, however, plausible that this information goes back to *On Prov. I*. We have already noticed that, according to Chrysippus in this same work, the cosmos in its fiery state consists of the *hegemonikon* of the World-Soul. We know, from Diog. Laert. VII, 139 = *SVF* II, 644, that Chrysippus in *On Prov. I* stated the *hegemonikon* to be the heavens or, more precisely, "the purest part of the aether", viz. the αὐγή. Arius Didymus confirms this, fr. 29 Diels = *SVF* II, 642: according to Chrysippus, the *hegemonikon* is the purest and finest aether, because this is what is most moveable and what makes the whole movement of the cosmos (sc. the heavens) turn round. So, if the ruling part of the universe consists of purest aether or "brightness", and if it is said, in *On Prov. I*, that the universe at *ekpyrosis* wholly becomes its ruling part, the remark in Philo concerning the brightness into which the universe changes at total conflagration may safely be attributed to *On Prov. I*,

<sup>147</sup> Cf. Boyancé, *Ét.* 65ff., esp. 67f., 76f., and my *Ps.Hipp. Tract.*, 112 and n. 242 [today, I would no longer follow Boyancé in calling the αὐγή a "fifth element"]. Cf. also Sandbach, *o.c.* 78; he suggests that Chrysippus may have chosen αὐγή because "light is associated with knowledge" (for which association I know no Stoic parallel. Is it, perhaps, permissible to think of the *epopteia*?) J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*, Leiden 1970, 123 states that Chrysippus considered *ekpyrosis* not a destruction of the world, but only a "change" into fire. Cf. also Hahm, *o.c.* 194 and *ibid.* 198 n. 18 (on αὐγή), who, correctly, as I believe, points out that Chrysippus' introduction of αὐγή does not represent "any significant change in doctrine" (correctly, that is to say, if "doctrine" is replaced by "evaluation").

too. Chrysippus here improves upon Cleanthes, who had made the sun the ruling part, and had said everything became "flame".<sup>148</sup>

From such statements by, and testimonies concerning, Chrysippus, it follows beyond doubt that in his view the state of affairs during total conflagration is far superior to that of the familiar, ordered universe. Only Zeus or the ruling part of the World-Soul and Providence are left in a substance that is fiery throughout, or rather in the purest kind of fire or aether ("aether" is mentioned as the "single substance" at *SVF* II, 1064).<sup>149</sup> All things have become reunited into this one pure god: the unity or "sympathy" of things is far better realized during *ekpyrosis* than either before or after. Simultaneously, whatever vestiges of grimness total conflagration might still have possessed in the theories of Zeno (who has all things return to "fire", though, of course, this notion carries, as we have seen, important qualifications) and Cleanthes (who has all things return to "flame", undoubtedly qualified in a similar way), is abolished when this event is spoken of in terms of "brightness"; the absorption of all things into light is hardly to be regarded as something even imaginatively to be feared.<sup>150</sup> So the apparent difficulties inherent to the "two fires doctrine", viz. that of the destructive vs. the craftsmanlike variety, are to a large extent surmounted by the introduction of this most subtle and wholly innocuous third kind of fire. "Brightness" is a sort of culmination of the other kinds of fire, a synthesis, of especial importance in cosmology, which resolves the earlier antithesis.<sup>151</sup> Hence Chrysippus' explicit emphasis upon the position of Providence at *ekpyrosis*: Zeus retires into and unites with Providence, a Providence which, perhaps paradoxically, no longer cares for indi-

<sup>148</sup> Cf. above, p. 155; Boyancé, *Ét.* 67.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. above, p. 175.

<sup>150</sup> In a wholly different context, viz. a discussion of the end of Boethius' *Consolatio*, C. S. Lewis, *The Discarded Image, An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature*, Cambridge 1964 = 1970, 90 uses a simile which is not inappropriate in our context: "we are made to feel as if we had seen a heap of common materials so completely burnt up that there remains neither ash nor smoke nor even flame, only a quivering of invisible heat".

<sup>151</sup> Note that the universe at *ekpyrosis* does not, according to Chrysippus, turn into *pneuma*; the latter, introduced by Chrysippus as a sort of successor to craftsmanlike fire, plays its rôle in cosmogony and especially in the established cosmos. Cf. e.g. Long, *Hell. Phil.* 155f.; Hahm, *o.c.* 158ff.



vidual things and phenomena, but only for itself — though we must immediately add that this “itself” is simultaneously the whole of things in the best possible condition: surely the best performance Providence can be credited with. A passage in Seneca (*Ep.* 9, 16 = *SVF* II, 1065), which does not mention Chrysippus’ name but may be assumed to echo his position, says, commenting upon the life of the Stoic Sage: “it will be like that of Jupiter, who, when the world has been dissolved, the gods have been indistinguishably reunited, and nature [sc. the craftsmanlike fire in its informing capacity] is inactive for a while, finds a resting-place within himself, given over to his own thoughts”.<sup>152</sup> I agree with Long that this description recalls that of Aristotle’s god, the Unmoved Mover, having himself as the everlasting object of his own thought.<sup>153</sup> But the Unmoved Mover, being only the separately existing, unextended Form that is the remote final cause of order in the universe, is definitely not to be identified with Providence, whereas Chrysippus’ god, being extended and forever remaining united with matter, takes care of it both during total unification at *ekpyrosis* and, in innumerable ways, when it is organized within the created world. “Destiny”, Chrysippus stipulated in his *On Destiny* and other works, “is the rational ground (*logos*) of the things in the cosmos which are administrated through Providence”.<sup>154</sup> We have already taken into account that he even identified Destiny and Providence.<sup>155</sup> It is the “Reason (*logos*) according to which the things that have happened have happened, the things that happen happen, and the things that will happen will happen”.<sup>156</sup>

In this context it is important to notice that, like Zeno, Chrysippus was a staunch defender of the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Significantly, we have again a quotation from *On Providence* (no book-

<sup>152</sup> Cf. Arnold, *o.c.* 192-3.

<sup>153</sup> *Hell. Phil.* 155 n. 2. Note, however, that Seneca, unlike the verbatim fragment from Chrysippus, does not mention Providence and that the Aristotelian reminiscence may be a later intrusion; the ‘inactivity’ can, however, be paralleled from Boethius’ argument *contra* at *Phil., Act. mu.* 83-84, cf. below, p. 187 and n. 197.

<sup>154</sup> *Aet.* I 28, 3 = *SVF* II, 913, p. 264, 18-19.

<sup>155</sup> Above, p. 159. Cf. also Festugière, *Révé. II*, 334; Greene, *o.c.* 342: “Fate or Providence, two faces of a single reality”; E. Bréhier, *Chrysippe et l’ancien Stoïcisme*, Paris 1910, <sup>2</sup>1951, 203f. Cf. also above, n. 2.

<sup>156</sup> Again *SVF* II, 913, p. 264, 20-21.

number given; not, I suppose, from bk. I), which reveals to which extent these things, for Chrysippus, hang together. It has been preserved by Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* VII, 23 = *SVF* II, 623: in the new world, we shall again be present in our actual shape. Alex. Aphr., *In An. Pr.* p. 180, 31f. Wallies = *SVF* II, 624 gives an abstract from Chrysippus’ *On the Cosmos*: everything shall be individually the same again. Origen points out, by the way, that this is epistemologically difficult, since individual *a* in period *b* would be indistinguishable from *a*’ in *b*’ (*SVF* II, 626, 628). Since no one will ever be in a position to actually compare *a*’ and *a*, this objection is not valid;<sup>157</sup> it illustrates, however, how far Chrysippus went with eternal recurrence. Only epistemologically irrelevant, minor details, such as a mole (pigmentation) of the facial skin, could be different (cf. *SVF* II, 624, p. 190, 7).

Eternal recurrence is not only compatible with Providence, it is, as we have already pointed out, absolutely indispensable if the cosmic cycle and the agency responsible for it are to be considered “good”.<sup>158</sup>

The Stoic concept of Providence has, as a rule, been a favourite butt of critical comment. Edelstein argued that the world, to the Stoics, is only a “brute fact”,<sup>159</sup> and that, if they speak of “God’s providence, one must not forget that this providence is identical with nature and necessity”.<sup>160</sup> However, also the converse is true: whenever they speak of nature and necessity, they also mean Providence, which is, I suppose, their way of saying that the world is *not* a brute fact.<sup>161</sup> It has also been argued that the Stoics perhaps did not need Providence for physical reasons, but stuck to it because they “wanted to believe in it”; thus Festugière,<sup>162</sup> who is certainly correct

<sup>157</sup> Stoic epistemology needs the postulate that there are no two different individuals which are indistinguishable. Presumably, we have to add: within one and the same cosmic period.

<sup>158</sup> Above, p. 162f.

<sup>159</sup> *O.c.* 33; Long, *Evil* 333, objects. Pearson, *o.c.* 88 finds the Stoic concept of Providence strange. Capelle, *o.c.* 178f. suggested that the Early Stoics restricted the scope of Providence to the ethical sphere and explained physical evil not in terms of Providence, but “mechanistically”.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.* 34.

<sup>161</sup> Gould, *o.c.* 125 even suggests that Cleanthes and Chrysippus follow Plato, viz. Plato’s theory of the good Demiurge — a statement which, as we have seen, needs considerable qualification.

<sup>162</sup> *Révé. II*, 334-5; this is one better than Moreau, *o.c.* 173, who says Providence

in bringing the religious factor into play. I think, however, that this explanation does not go far enough, and that it is arguable that the Early Stoics needed Providence not only to accomodate evil in the actual world, but also because it helped them to both understand and argue that the so-called destruction by total conflagration of this world is not an evil contrary to god's nature, but a boon and a blessing.

Van Straaten argues that the fire to which all things return at *ekpyrosis* — though an explanation in physical terms is, in his opinion, possible — should more properly be called “meta-physical”.<sup>163</sup> Although it is, perhaps, not permissible to use the term “meta-physical” in connection with the monistic and materialist Stoic system, Van Straaten is surely right in pointing out that the fire which eventually absorbs and dominates all things is of a very peculiar kind. Though this is most explicit in Chrysippus — who, as will be recalled, on the other hand maintained that all types of fire are forms of one and the same element<sup>164</sup> — it is, as we have noticed, implicit in the theories of his predecessors. Total conflagration is a form of apotheosis.

As is occasionally the case with language of a theological or even mystical bent, however, there is also an erotic or sexual image involved; notions such as that of *ekpyrosis*, and that of the production of a fiery seed which becomes a watery mass in which fire is still present just as sperm in the seminal fluid, can also be understood in a biological sense.<sup>165</sup> The suggestion is that of orgasm and its consequences. Perhaps I am perverse in suspecting a sexual metaphor when Chrysippus (*SVF* II, 1064) speaks of the “becoming united” (ὁμοῦ γενομένου) <sup>166</sup> of Zeus and Pronoia and in thinking of a *Hieros Gamos* at top level. It should be admitted that Zeus and

“ne peut trouver dans leur empirisme un fondement suffisant”. Hahm, *o.c.* XV, says he will inquire into Stoic cosmology without discussing in detail god, providence and fate; it is in itself significant that such an inquiry is to a large extent possible.

<sup>163</sup> *Kerngedachten* 27; cf. *ibid.* 28f., on the “metaphysical interpretation of Stoic *ekpyrosis*”.

<sup>164</sup> Above, n. 70 in *fine*.

<sup>165</sup> Hahm, *o.c.* 75ff. excellently discusses the biological imagery in Stoic cosmogony and even mentions (*ibid.* 71-2) the Zeus-Hera painting [s. below], but refrains from linking up *ekpyrosis* with orgasm.

<sup>166</sup> Cf. terms such as μιγῆναι, συγγίγνεσθαι.

Pronoia (Providence) are, in a sense, always united; during *ekpyrosis*, however, they become more united than ever. The religious overtones of this ultimate copulation are perhaps less easy to detect for modern ears than those of the almost protestant *Hymn* of Cleanthes. The bisexuality of Zeus-cum-Pronoia can, however, be paralleled from that of the gods generally in Serv., *In Aen.* IV, 638 = *SVF* II, 1070. Zeno and, *pluris verbis*, Cleanthes and Chrysippus interpreted the myth of the castration of Uranus as meaning that the “heavenly element, which is highest and aethereal, i.e. fiery, which creates all things by itself, is devoid of that part of the body which requires conjunction with that of someone else in order to procreate” (Cic., *ND* II, 63-64 = *SVF* II, 1067). Chrysippus scandalized quite a few good and pious people by his interpretation of a pornographic painting representing Hera practicing fellatio on Zeus;<sup>167</sup> according to Origenes, he drily said that it dealt with the reception of spermatik *logoi* by matter. Finally, there is a passage in the famous *Borysthenic Oration* of Dion Chrysostomos [first cent. A.D.] (*Or.* 36, 55-57 = *SVF* II, 622). Pohlenz believed this passage is derived from a Stoic source;<sup>168</sup> the whole cosmological setting is certainly Stoic, and Dion even uses the rare term “brightness” (αὐγή),<sup>169</sup> which directly points at Chrysip-

<sup>167</sup> Diog. Laert. VII, 187 = *SVF* II, 1071; Theoph., *Ad Aut.* III, 8 = *SVF* II, 1073; Orig., *C. Cels.* IV, 48 = *SVF* II, 1074. Hahm, *o.c.* 71-2, 75 refuses to be shocked and omits the revolting details; J. Bidez-F. Cumont, *Les Mages Hellénisés, Zoroastre, Ostanès et Hystaspe d'après la tradition grecque, I, Introduction*, Paris 1938, 95-6 say: “Chrysippe s'était livré à ce propos à des spéculations scabreuses, dignes d'un freudiste”. Exactly.

<sup>168</sup> In the *Hermes*-paper, *l.c.* (above, n. 141) and *Die Stoa* II, 45f., esp. 46. Pohlenz also points out that the *Hieros Gamos* is a typically Greek, not a Persian, motif. [On the *Hieros Gamos* in Philo, cf. Festugière, *Révé.* II, 549]. Earlier scholars, among whom I. Bruns, *De Dione Chrysostomo et Aristotele critica et exegetica*, Kiel 1892, attributed the cosmology of Dion's “Magi” to Chrysippus; L. François, *Essai sur Dion Chrysostome*, Thèse Paris 1921, pointed at Posidonius as chief source (*o.c.* 33ff.), but on insufficient grounds.

<sup>169</sup> Dion 36, 55, cf. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* II, 47 and above, p. 176. Chrysippean are also the identification of the superior horse [cf. n. 158] at conflagration with the “soul” (of the charioteer) or rather with the “thinking and leading part of it”, 36, 54 and the comparison of the liquid mass throughout which god is present as sperm within the seminal fluid with the living being which is a composite of soul and body, 36, 57 (above p. 175).

pus. Describing what happens immediately after <sup>170</sup> *ekpyrosis* with a wealth of cosmological and sexuological detail, Dion adds: "this is the blessed marriage of Zeus and Hera, which the sons of the wise sing in secret mystery-rites" <sup>171</sup> (II, p. 189, 19f.). It is true that this tale is part of a larger story which Dion, rather fancifully, attributes to "Magi"; <sup>172</sup> this particular Stoic section, however, to a certain extent fits Chrysippus. <sup>173</sup> And even if Dion's story is discounted,

<sup>170</sup> Total conflagration itself is described 36, 51-55 [an abstract at *SVF* II, 602] in a setting also derived from the *Phaedrus*-myth: it is the superior horse of the team of four that converts all the others into itself. As Pohlenz (*ll. cc.*) points out, the imagery used (melting of wax figures) is paralleled in Plut., *Comm. not.* 1075C = *SVF* II, 1049.

<sup>171</sup> Τοῦτον ὑμνοῦσι παῖδες σοφῶν ἐν ἀρρήτοις τελεταῖς Ἥρας καὶ Διὸς εὐδαίμονα γάμον. Hahm, who discusses *SVF* II, 622 *o.c.* 61, leaves out the "blessed marriage".

<sup>172</sup> I think Pohlenz, *Die Stoa II, l.c.* has successfully refuted the claims of Bidez and Cumont, *o.c.* I, 91f. and II, *Les Textes*, 142ff., who argue that the "hymns" are Persian or at least Mithraic, and that the Hellenized Magi themselves are to be credited with the Platonic and Stoic elements which also the learned authors acknowledge. To support this claim, they significantly leave out a very technical paragraph in Dion 36, 54, *o.c.* 150. However, what we have here is *interpretatio graeca*: Greek cosmology in partly Oriental trappings, "philosophes persifiés" rather than "mages hellénisés". When I accuse Dion of being fanciful, I do not mean he is an exception in his time. *Mithras Platonius* has now been studied by R. Turcan, Leiden 1975, who also discusses the "hymns" in Dion (9f.) (he appears to be right in being sceptical about the Mithraic interpretation of Bidez-Cumont); however, he has not consulted Pohlenz. R. Merkelbach, 'Die Kosmogonie der Mythras-Mysterien', *Erano-Jahrbuch* 34, 1965, 218ff. argues that the cosmogonical significance he wishes to attribute to the representations of Mithras slaying the bull derives from Plato's *Tim.* I am in no position to judge this interpretation of the Mithraic mysteries; the reference to the *Tim.*, however, is not enough: also the Stoa should be taken into account in such contexts, and especially the Platonizing Stoics and Stoicizing Platonists of the first centuries B.C. and A.D.

<sup>173</sup> It is not, however, certain that Dion knew much more about the contents of Chrysippus' "mysteries of philosophy" than we do; he may have filled in the details by himself, using the materials from *On Providence I* and the interpretation of the pornographic painting; cf. also Pohlenz, *ll. cc.*, on the possibility that Dion used a source similar to that of Plutarch. A somewhat free treatment of Stoic materials on Dion's part would tally with his equally free handling of Platonic and Persian motifs.

Dion further suggests, 36, 58ff., that the new-begotten universe, a thing of beauty, is "much more splendid than it appears today" because it is "fresh from the hand of its maker", and works this out in some detail. This can be paralleled from Sen., *N. Qu.* III, 28, 7: god destroys the universe by either cataclysm or conflagration (for this pair s. above, n. 52) because he "decides to start better things and finish with what is old" (*cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finire*); cf. also *Cons. ad Marc.* 26, 6. If the new universe is to be better than its predecessor in an absolute sense,

the other parallels enumerated show that the *ekpyrosis* and generation of the universe were referred to by Chrysippus in terms that are, also, religious. <sup>174</sup> Accordingly, his remarks about the theological discourses to be taught at the end of the philosophical curriculum as being the "mysteries of philosophy" can hardly be explained away as mere verbiage. The Stoics were as capable of interpreting "myth" allegorically, i.e. in physical terms, as they were of giving their physics and cosmology a theological colouring.

As a last remark, I wish to add that Chrysippus' final solution to the theological problems of *ekpyrosis* is not, of course, wholly satisfactory. It might be even described as a sort of trick, which converts evil into good in a purely stipulative way. Chrysippus is consistent, however, in that his explanation of physical evil in the actual universe as being, when viewed from the proper perspective, good in the sense of being indispensable for the good of the whole etc., <sup>175</sup> is, all things considered, not much more plausible than his pious vindication of total conflagration.

6. A, to a certain extent legitimate, objection to the above-attempted reconstruction of the Early Stoic evaluation of total conflagration would be that we have no information as to theological arguments *contra* this positive evaluation. This is correct as far as Zeno and

difficulties arise in face of the arguments of Aristotle in the *De phil.*, which I suppose to have been answered by Zeno and his followers. (cf. above, p. 141f., p. 160f.). The parallel in Dion, however, helps us to explain Seneca correctly: the new world is better than the old only in the sense of being young in its youth, whereas our present world is perhaps already past middle age. Such a theory of eternal rejuvenation is not impossible for the Early Stoics, too: the new world will become old in its turn, etc. In this way, eternal recurrence of same is saved and Aristotle's theological argument circumvented.

<sup>174</sup> "Diese Lehre vom Weltbrand und der Wiederer neuerung, der Palingenesie, war für die Stoa viel mehr als eine rationale Hypothese" (Pohlenz, *Die Stoa I*, 79).

<sup>175</sup> Cf. e.g. *SVF* II, 1176; and II, 1177 = Plut., *St. rep.* 1049A-B, from *On Gods III*: wars are useful as a remedy against overpopulation, interesting as an example of an apparent evil for which providence is responsible; the argument itself is as old as the *Cypria*, fr. I Allen; indeed, Plutarch *l.c.* adds that Chrysippus called Euripides and others to witness for this evaluation of the Trojan war. Cf. also Sen., *Ep.* 74, 20; these three texts are in De Vogel, *Gr. Ph. III*, Nr. 940a, b. Cf. further Chrys., *On Nature II* ap. Plut., *St. rep.* 1050F = *SVF* II, 1181 (De Vogel, *o.c.* Nr. 941b). See further above, n. 12, 13, 15, 25, 90.



Cleanthes are concerned;<sup>176</sup> it is, of course, true that the Peripatetics contemporary to the two first Stoic scholarchs stuck to the position of their school;<sup>177</sup> perhaps they did not bother to refute the Stoic doctrine in every detail. The last Early Academic to be interested in the interpretation of the *Tim.*, Crantor, was in favour of the eternity of the universe.<sup>178</sup> The Early Sceptic Academy does not seem to have bothered about cosmology. A possible echo of Early Peripatetic controversy against Zeno is perhaps contained in the disputed<sup>179</sup> final section of Phil., *Aet. mu.* According to Philo, Theophrastus argued, on *empirical* grounds, against those who destroy and generate the universe. It is anyhow remarkable that Alex. Lyc. Ch. XII, which contains the neglected Zeno-fragment on *ekpyrosis*,<sup>180</sup> also preserves a refutation ascribed to a serious philosopher<sup>181</sup> who does not belong to the Platonist persuasion, and that this argument *contra*<sup>182</sup> is an empirical argument, just as those preserved under Theophrastus' name by Philo.<sup>183</sup> If it is possible to refute one's opponent's physical premiss, there is perhaps no need to bother about his theological conclusion. A similar position is possible when — as in the case of the Megarian philosopher Alexinus<sup>184</sup> — the Stoic proof that the

<sup>176</sup> We have, however, an argument by Zeno's contemporary Alexinus of Elis against Zeno's proof that the universe is an intelligent and ensouled being (*SVF* I, 111 = Sext., *M.* IX, 104 and, in a slightly different version, Cic., *ND* II, 21 and III, 22). Alexinus' refutation is preserved nominatim by Sextus, *M.* IX, 108 (= Alexinus, fr. 94, in K. Döring, *Die Megariker, Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien*, Amsterdam 1972) and, in a slightly different anonymous version, by Cic., *ND* III, 23 (= fr. 95 Döring). This shows, by the way, that the refutation in Cic., *ND* III, 23 should not immediately be attributed to Carneades (so De Vogel, *Gr. Ph.* III, Nr. 1117a), though he may of course have used it.

<sup>177</sup> Cf. above, p. 138 and n. 32.

<sup>178</sup> Above, p. 143 and n. 43.

<sup>179</sup> Cf. above, n. 32, n. 43.

<sup>180</sup> Cf. above, p. 148.

<sup>181</sup> τῆς τῶν χαριέστερων; in Aristotle, at least, χαρ. is standard designation of philosophers whose point of view has something to commend itself, e.g. *Met.* K 2, 1060a25, A 10, 1075a26, *De resp.* 27, 480b29.

<sup>182</sup> "What I for one have seen yesterday and a year ago and a long time ago, and what I similarly see today, I do not see to have suffered at all through the fire of the sun. But in the course of time some little damage should have been done if we are to believe that the whole universe will ever be destroyed by fire".

<sup>183</sup> Cf. our translation [above, n. 53], 74 n. 295.

<sup>184</sup> Cf. above, n. 176.

universe is an ensouled and rational being can be refuted by *reductio ad absurdum*. We know, however that Alexinus wrote much against Zeno without being informed as to the further contents of his polemics.<sup>185</sup>

The case of Carneades is difficult. This great opponent of Chrysippus not only attacked Stoic ethics and epistemology, but also Stoic theology. As far as we can judge, his polemics were directed more at the premisses of the Stoics than at their conclusions. Unfortunately, the section of Cic., *ND* III, dealing with the Sceptic arguments against the Stoic doctrine of the providential administration of the universe by the gods is lost: there is a large lacuna at III, 65.<sup>186</sup> We know, however, that Carneades by means of a *sorites* proved that Zeus and the sun cannot be gods.<sup>187</sup> He also proved that god cannot be finite, for whatever is finite is part of the infinite and the part is of necessity weaker than the whole.<sup>188</sup> He further proved that god cannot be corporeal, for whatever is corporeal is capable of change, i.e. also of a change for the worse, and eventually perishable.<sup>189</sup> Furthermore, god cannot, if corporeal, consist of a single substance, such as fire.<sup>190</sup> I may be over-sensitive in detecting in these arguments, which all depend upon a concept of god as an eternal being incapable of change, an echo of the theology of Plato and Aristotle, but I do not see how the argument that god cannot change for the worse and that he cannot be conceived as the weaker part of a larger whole can be otherwise explained than as a reminiscence of Aristotle's *argumentum ex gradibus* (*De phil.* fr. 16 Ross) and of the argument of the part being weaker than the whole (*ibid.* fr. 19a) and of the argument that god cannot change for the worse (*ibid.* fr. 16 and fr. 19c).<sup>191</sup> We also

<sup>185</sup> Diog. Laert. II, 109 and 110 (fr. 92 and 93 Döring); cf. Dörings comments, o.c. 123.

<sup>186</sup> Cf. Pease *ad l.*

<sup>187</sup> Sextus, *M.* IX, 182-4; Cic., *ND* III, 43ff. Cf. B. Wisniewski, *Carneades, Fragmente, Text und Kommentar*, Wrocław etc. 1970, fr. 93 and 94.

<sup>188</sup> Sextus, *M.* IX, 148-50, cf. 176-7.

<sup>189</sup> Sextus, *M.* IX, 141, 143, 145, 146-7, 151, 157, 160, 166, 170, 180-81; Cic., *ND* III, 29-34 (fr. 93 and 94 Wisniewski; De Vogel, *Gr. Ph.* III, Nr. 1120).

<sup>190</sup> Sextus, *M.* IX, 181; Cic., *ND* III, 35f. (text of Cicero not in Wisniewski).

<sup>191</sup> Cf. above, p. 143f., p. 141f., where I have also argued that Aristotle's arguments are a continuation of Plato's. A parallel for Carneades' use of earlier arguments is

know that Carneades argued against Stoic determinism<sup>192</sup> and against the theory of Providence as exercised in the actual universe.<sup>193</sup> Without any doubt, we would have better information regarding Carneades' arguments against the Stoic concept of Providence if a pious person had not torn out the now missing section in the archetype of our manuscripts of the *ND*. As it is, a separate argument against the rôle of god and Providence at *ekpyrosis* is not, to the best of my knowledge, attested in Carneades' name. We may, however, presume that if the exercising of Providence in the existing universe is capable of refutation, that of it at *ekpyrosis* is a necessary corollary.

Thanks to Philo, we can at least pick up the thread about the mid-second century B.C. A version of Aristotle's argument from internal and external causes developed by Carneades' contemporary — he went with him to Rome in the famous embassy of 155 B.C. —, the Peripatetic Critolaus, is preserved *Aet. mu.* 74.<sup>194</sup> Philo, *o.c.* 76, also informs us about the Stoic renegade Boethus, a pupil of Diogenes of Babylon, who likewise used a version of the argument from external and internal causes<sup>195</sup> against *ekpyrosis* (*Aet. mu.* 78 =

perhaps that of the argument of Alexinus (ab., n. 176), which anyhow has reached us through Sceptic channels. It is, of course, well-known that Sceptics generally used all the arguments available.

<sup>192</sup> E.g. Cic., *De Fato* 31-33 (fr. 103 Wisniewski; De Vogel, *Gr. Ph.* III, Nr. 1124).

<sup>193</sup> Porph., *De abst.* III, 20 (fr. 99 Wisniewski, *SVF* II, 1152); Cic., *Ac. pr.* II, 120 (fr. 98 Wisniewski, De Vogel, *Gr. Ph.* III, Nr. 1119b, *SVF* II, 1161). Perhaps the argument against the gift of reason to man as proof of divine providence at Cic., *ND* III, 77f. (De Vogel, *Gr. Ph.* III, Nr. 1119a) is also attributable to Carneades. For information (and speculation) as to Carneades' arguments against the Stoic theory of Providence see further V. Brochard, *Les Sceptiques Grecs*, Paris 1887 = 1959, 138ff., J. Baudry, *o.c.* 266f., and L. Robin, *Pyrrhon et le Scepticisme Grec*, Paris 1944, 110f.

<sup>194</sup> Philo certainly attributes this argument to Critolaus ("φησι"). F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles, X, Hieronymos von Rhodos, Kritolaos und seine Schüler etc.*, Basel/Stuttgart 1969, 65f. is right in pointing out that *Aet. mu.* 55-90 as a whole cannot belong to Critolaus: the "Weitschweifigkeit ihrer Umgebung" in his opinion sharply contrasts with the "knappe Syllogismus" of the two sections he accepts as fragments. This argument is not valid, however, against *Aet. mu.* 74, for, although Philo's hand is visible, this passage is not that prolix. Effe, *o.c.* 12 n. 29 and *ibid.* 19 acknowledges that the fragment at *Aet. mu.* 74 is a version of the argument of *De phil.* fr. 19a Ross, but, following Wehrli, is hesitant in pronouncing it authentic.

<sup>195</sup> Cf. Effe, *o.c.* 11-12 (he *ibid.* points out that Boeth. at *Aet. mu.* 78-82 uses *De phil.* fr. 19b Ross, and at 82-84 uses *De phil.* fr. 19c).

*SVF* III, VI, Boeth. Sid. 7), and mentions the scepticism of Diogenes of Babylon (*Aet. mu.* 77 = *SVF* III, II, Diog. Bab. 27), also a member of the embassy. Now Philo, *o.c.* 47, after his quotation of the three arguments from the *De phil.*, argues that the Stoics, by having the cosmos burn up and be reborn again, "destroy Providence, i.e. the World-Soul"<sup>196</sup> and proves this, surely at second or even third hand, by turning an argument of Chrysippus (*SVF* II, 397) against that illustrious author (*o.c.* 48-52). Boethus argues in a similar vein (*Aet. mu.* 83-84 = *SVF* III, VI, Boeth. Sid. 7): *ekpyrosis* is impossible because god or the World-Soul would be "inactive"<sup>197</sup> during it, whereas he exercises Providence in the actual world.<sup>198</sup> We may conclude that Chrysippus' explicitness about the role of God and Providence at *ekpyrosis* attracted toward itself the sort of criticism echoes of which are preserved by Philo.

At *Aet. mu.* 85, continuing on his own the argument of Boethus, Philo adds that the destruction of the universe is not only blasphemy (ἀσεβημα), but that, moreover, a rebirth is impossible if the agent of destruction is fire, so that the blasphemy is "double". He also refutes, certainly echoing the arguments of Peripatetics<sup>199</sup> and/or renegade Stoics, the Stoic counter-argument that fire remains present in the moisture as a seed (*ibid.*, 94-103). *Ibid.* 118 summarizes the previous arguments, from the fragments of *De phil.* up to, I think,

<sup>196</sup> Chrysippean terminology, cf. above, p. 175.

<sup>197</sup> Effe, *o.c.* 29-30 proves that the argument from inactivity used by Boethus is ultimately Aristotelian (at p. 30 he gives parallels from the *pragmateiai*, at p. 25f. he argues that it already figured in the *De phil.*). This further illustrates the penetration of Peripatetic arguments in Stoic circles. See also above, p. 150f.

<sup>198</sup> Cf. Arnold, *o.c.* 95: "Ingenious controversialists now pressed the Stoics to explain how their deity exercised providence during the periodic intervals in which the universe had no separate existence. This and like arguments had an immediate effect. Boethus of Sidon" etc.; cf. also *ibid.*, 192: after Chrysippus, "owing to the positive influence of Plato and Aristotle and the critical acumen of Carneades, many leading Stoics abandoned" *ekpyrosis* (my italics). For the echoes of this critique in Plutarch, cf. above, p. 154 and n. 73.

<sup>199</sup> Von Arnim's thesis that Philo used Peripatetic sources ('Über die pseudo-philonische Schrift *Περὶ ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου*', in: *Quellenstudien zu Philon von Alexandria*, Berlin 1888, 1-52) is still — though not without modifications — generally accepted, cf. e.g. Wehrli, *l.c.* [above, n. 194], Effe, *o.c.* 9ff., Baltes, *o.c.* 33f. I do not know, however, that this excludes the use of Middle Stoic sources.



the specific arguments against *ekpyrosis*: a destruction of the universe is theoretically possible (a) either by other, viz. external and/or internal, causes (cf. *De phil.* fr. 19a Ross, Critolaus, Boethus), or (b) by god himself (cf. *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross and the orthodox Stoic doctrine) — “but to say it is destroyed by god is by far the most impious thing one can say”.<sup>200</sup> We may conclude that, among the Stoics after Chrysippus, the old Platonic and Aristotelian arguments *contra* the perishability of the world finally made converts and that, as far as the discussion with the Stoics was concerned, the Sceptics apparently claimed the epistemological, ethical and theological field and left cosmology proper to the Peripatetics.<sup>201</sup> In itself, this setting lends further probability to the general hypothesis of this paper. Chrysippus’ revival of Stoicism apparently occasioned a revival of traditional arguments, which could be used *contra* — a revival, precisely, to which we owe e.g. Philo’s preservation of the abstracts from *De phil.* If Zeno himself argued against Plato and Aristotle, this counter-revival is more understandable that if he did not.

<sup>200</sup> Baltes, *o.c.* 191f., esp. 201ff. interestingly discusses the after-life of the argument of *De phil.* fr. 19c Ross in Neoplatonist authors.

<sup>201</sup> Cic., *Ac. pr.* II, 122-128 eloquently gives the Sceptic position: natural philosophy is fascinating, but certainty is by no means to be obtained. It is not, however, certain that this section is to be ascribed to, ultimately, Carneades (as is argued by Baudry, *o.c.* 266).

## RESURRECTION ADDED: THE INTERPRETATIO CHRISTIANA OF A STOIC DOCTRINE

### 1. Hippolytus

Von Arnim's scissors have cut up the chapter on the Stoics in Hippolytus' doxography (*Ref.* I 21) into several pieces, distributed rather haphazardly over *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* II. In the present paper, I am concerned with the second part of this chapter, *Ref.* I 21, 3-5 = *SVF* II 807 + 598 + 469; pp. 25, 22-26, 9 of Wendland's edition of the *Refutatio*:

[*Ref.* I 21, 3 = *SVF* II 807] τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν λέγουσιν ἀθάνατον, εἶναι δὲ σῶμα καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς περιψύξεως τοῦ ἀέρος τοῦ περιέχοντος, διὸ καὶ καλεῖσθαι ψυχὴν. ὁμολογοῦσι δὲ καὶ μετενσωμάτωσιν γίνεσθαι ὠρισμένων οὐσῶν τῶν ψυχῶν. [I 21, 4 = *SVF* II 598] προσδέχονται δὲ ἐκπύρωσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ κάθαρσιν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, οἱ μὲν παντός, οἱ δὲ μέρους, καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αὐτὸν καθαίρεσθαι λέγουσιν· καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν φθορὰν καὶ τὴν ἐτέρου ἐξ αὐτῆς γένεσιν κάθαρσιν ὀνομάζουσιν. [I 21, 5 = *SVF* II 469] σώματα δὲ πάντα ὑπέθεντο, καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος μὲν χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι καὶ πεπληρωθῆαι πάντα καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν. [*omis.* Arn.] ταῦτα καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοί.

In the first section, Hippolytus speaks of the Stoic doctrine of the soul. He states that the soul is a body (cf., e.g., *SVF* I 137, II 790), refers to the explanatory etymology of ψυχή (cf. *SVF* II 806), but combines this impeccable information with the attribution, to the Stoics, of the theory of the immortality of the soul and of its transmigration, which goes rather oddly with its *genesis* through refrigeration. The Stoics, of course, believed that the cosmic cycle must repeat itself *in infinitum*, down to the details: our own lives will be repeated infinitely many times.<sup>1</sup> The first—and, I believe, only known—Stoic to speak of the transmigration of the soul in favourable terms is Seneca, *Ep.* 75, 20; 76, 10-11; 78, 34; 108, 17-22. Seneca, however, tells us this sympathy is due to the influence of his Pythagorean teacher Sotion. In Seneca's case,

therefore, the idea of the transmigration is a Pythagorean plant, only marginally present in his Stoicism. There may have been other Stoics after Seneca who embraced the Pythagorean theory more wholeheartedly; however, Hoven's thesis<sup>2</sup> that the attribution, to the Stoics in general, of the theory of *metempsychosis* as found in Hippolytus and other late sources more probably amounts to an *interpretatio pythagorica*<sup>3</sup> of the theory of the cosmic cycle must be right. It is not, at any rate, an *interpretatio christiana*, although its corollary, *viz.*, that the soul is immortal, may have had its appeal for Christian authors.

In the second section, Hippolytus mentions the Stoic theory of total conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις), which, he says, is a "purification". Although he is not explicit about the cosmic cycle, it is clear that this is what he has in mind: "they call this destruction and the generation of another [sc., world] out of this [destruction] a purification". It is interesting to note that he states that some Stoics believed this purification ~ conflagration to be total, and that others assumed that it was only partial. If I am not mistaken, the idea—in a Stoic context—that cosmic catastrophes are only partial cannot be paralleled before the first cent. CE: Dion Chrysost., *Or.* 36, 47-9. This may represent a conflation of Stoic ideas with notions derived from Plato and Aristotle.<sup>4</sup> Possibly, also an *interpretatio stoica* of Heraclitus' theory of the Great Year is involved,<sup>5</sup> about which we have some meagre information, not only in Aetius II 32, 3 (*Vorsokr.* 22 A 13), but also in Censorinus, *De die nat.* 18, 11 (partly at *Vorsokr.* 22 A 13). The chapter in Aetius and the paragraph in Censorinus both list the computations by various persons of the Great Year. Censorinus' information is fuller (although not about Heraclitus); the passage as a whole is Stoicizing,<sup>6</sup> but ambiguous in as far as it is not clear that a distinction between partial and total cosmic catastrophes is made. The *De die nat.* was written 238 CE, 10 to 15 years later than the date of the *Ref.*, but Censorinus of course used older sources, in part doxographic.<sup>7</sup> Aet., II 32, 4 (= *SVF* III, Diog. Bab. 28) tells us that Diogenes said—this information is not found in Censorinus—that the Great Year is Heraclitus' Great Year multiplied by 365—so Diogenes' Great Year must represent a cosmic period. It cannot be excluded, therefore, that each of what we may call his Great Days (= Heraclitean Great Years) began or ended with a partial catastrophe, but there is no evidence to prove this. Phil., *Inc. mu.* 15 (= *SVF* III, Diog. Bab. 27) tells us that Diogenes accepted the *ekpyrosis* in his youth, but had his doubts about it in his old age and suspended judgement.<sup>8</sup> We do not

know to which period of his life his computation of the Great Year belongs, but if it belongs to (or was not rejected in) his old age, the possibility that he thought in terms of partial catastrophes is slightly greater. Other heterodox Early Stoics rejected the *ekpyrosis* (Zeno of Tarsus, *SVF* III 5; Boethus of Sidon, *SVF* III 7), but we do not know anything about their views concerning cosmic catastrophes. The Middle Stoic Panaetius (frr. 64-69 van Straaten) is both said to have rejected and to have doubted the *ekpyrosis*; nothing more is known. It is, of course, difficult to gauge what our second-hand reports in these cases mean by "doubt". Marcus Aurelius, who wrote about half a century before the date of the *Ref.* and may be taken to be representative of the Stoicism of his time, may also be said to be in doubt, for his work contains both passages which presuppose the cosmic cycle and passages which do not presuppose it; there is even a passage which explicitly leaves the matter undecided.<sup>9</sup> I have not found a reference to partial catastrophes in the *Meditations*.

Hippolytus' report about a diversity of opinion among 'the' Stoics as to the extent of *ekpyrosis* may be assumed to reflect a discussion which has scarcely left any traces in our other sources, and the heterodox Stoics, who believed that catastrophes were partial only, must for us remain anonymous. If, that is, one assumes that Hippolytus here reports what he found in a doxography. I can see no reason, however, why he would add this reference to the difference of opinion on his own authority, for elsewhere in the *Ref.* only total *ekpyrosis* is at issue.

Another, more important, element of Hippolytus' account is the assumption that the destruction of the universe *by fire* amounts to a *purification*. This idea is comparable to (but far from identical with) the suggestion of Sen., *N.Q.* III 28, 7 (cf. *Cons. ad Marc.* 26, 6) that God destroys the world because he wants to replace the old with a better one—but things will go wrong again soon enough; cf. also Plut., *Comm. not.* 1067 A = *SVF* II 606; and Dion Chrysost., *o.c.*, 58f., partly printed at *SVF* II 662.<sup>10</sup> I have argued elsewhere that, even to the Early Stoics, *ekpyrosis* is a positive event.<sup>11</sup> Yet I think that the assumption that the final conflagration is a *κάθαρσις* is Christian (Paul, *I Cor.* 3, 13), not Stoic; cf. Clem., *Strom.* V I 9, 4 (a text to which I shall return below<sup>12</sup>): οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος [sc., Heraclitus, just as we, Christians, do] ... τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, ἣν ὕστερον ἐκπύρωσιν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ Στωϊκοί ...<sup>13</sup> One should add, of course, that the idea of *ἐκπύρωσις*, or at least the term itself, was popular among early Christian

authors, who incorporated it into their own eschatology—rejecting, naturally, the cyclical aspect.<sup>14</sup> Hippolytus is no exception.<sup>15</sup> Justin, *Ap.* 20, 3 (= *SVF* II 614, second text) already points out that it is a common assumption that the Christian doctrine of *ἐκπύρωσις* is Stoic.

Thus, it is clear that the Stoic theories as expounded by Hippolytus in the first two sections are by no means unadulterated. This also holds for what is reported in the concluding section, *Ref.* I 21, 5 = *SVF* II 469; here, an unimpeachable statement concerned with corporealism and its implications, viz., the theory of total blending<sup>16</sup> and its corollary that there is no vacuum, has been combined with the attribution, to the Stoics, of the doctrine of the *resurrection of the body*: καὶ σῶμα διὰ σώματος μὲν χωρεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι ...

Without any exception known to the present writer, scholars have argued that because the Stoics did *not* believe in the resurrection of the body the word ἀνάστασιν *must* be corrupt. In his edition of *Ref.* I in the *Doxographi graeci*, p. 570, 24, Diels daggered the word, cited several conjectures in his apparatus, and added a splendid one of his own: ἀντιπαρέκτασιν. Von Arnim, in *SVF* II, did not dagger the word, but stated, in his apparatus *ad* II 469, that it is corrupt, and proposed ἀποκατάστασιν, "ut de restitutione corporum mixtione"<sup>17</sup> absumptorum cogitaverit". Wendland, in his edition of the whole *Refutatio*, GCS Bd. 26, p. 26, 8, borrowed Diels' dagger and said, in his apparatus, that Diels' emendation is "wohl richtig". But emendation here can only be *Schlimmbesserung*. Beyond any reasonable doubt, ἀνάστασιν is what Hippolytus really wrote,<sup>18</sup> and there are only two possibilities: (1) that the text he copied out or excerpted already attributed the resurrection of the body to the Stoics, or (2) that he interpolated this idea himself. A possible combination of these two possibilities would be that the source mentioned the resurrection somewhere else in this context, and that Hippolytus saw fit to insert it here.

Now *Ref.* I 21, 3-5 as a whole is not just a report on Stoic doctrines, or a list of such doctrines; as we have noticed, there is some system in this section of the chapter in that a version of Stoicism is given which brings out its affinities with Christian dogma: the soul is immortal, the *ekpyrosis* is a purification. In this way, a statement of the Stoic doctrine of *body* going through *body* may easily come to be associated with the idea of the resurrection of *the* body, an idea which itself is associated with those of the immortality of the soul and of the final consummation through fire.



In other words, μέν + ἀλλά ἀνάστασιν εἶναι are an *interpolatio christiana* in a Stoic doctrine, comparable to the *interpolatio* (deriving from an *interpretatio*) *pythagorica* of the *metensomatosis* in the same chapter, at *Ref.* I 21, 3. I assume that the point of connexion is the same in both cases. The theory of the cosmic cycle, which entails that Socrates will confront his accusers infinitely many times, is believed to imply that not only the soul, but also the individual body of Socrates will be here again. Christian thinkers were in a position to interpret the Stoic theory as a bastard form of the true doctrine.

The pattern of the *Ref.* has been excellently described by Koschorke.<sup>19</sup> The Gnostics and Christian heretics attacked by Hippolytus are said to have derived their views from the Greek philosophers, who, through the mediation of the Egyptians, are said to have derived theirs from the Jews.<sup>20</sup> Koschorke has also shown that Hippolytus doctors the documents he uses whenever this suits his argument, and has briefly discussed his fraudulent handling of Josephus' account of the Jewish sects (*B.J.* II VIII 2-14) at *Ref.* IX 18-29.<sup>21</sup> Without acknowledgement, of course, Hippolytus copies out the entire section of Josephus, but makes several changes and additions, some of which it is worthwhile to consider in some detail.

Josephus tells us that the Essenes said that the body is corruptible, but the soul immortal; after death, virtuous souls depart to an abode beyond the ocean, which may be compared to the Greek isles of the blessed, whereas base souls are sent to a murky dungeon, comparable to the Greek Hades. In *Ref.* IX 27, p. 260, 28-261, 4 this is 'reported' as follows: ἔρρωται δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγος· ὁμολογοῦσι γὰρ καὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀναστήσεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ἀθάνατον, ὃν τρόπον ἦδη ἀθάνατος ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ. But Josephus had written, *B.J.* II VIII 11 (154): καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἡδὲ ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθανάτους αἰεὶ διαμένειν. Thus, the resurrection of the body is brazenly ascribed to the Essenes, whose views preclude its acceptance. The same fraud is perpetrated in relation to the Pharisees, who according to Jos., *B.J.* II VIII 14 (162-6) held that "every soul is imperishable, but the soul of the good alone passes into another body, while the souls of the wicked suffer eternal punishment". Not a word about the resurrection; yet Hippolytus writes, IX 29, p. 262, 9f. W.: οὗτοι καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ὁμολογοῦσιν καὶ ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ... Finally, the Sadducees, according to Jos., *B.J.* II VIII 14 (165), deny that the soul persists after death. Hippolytus does not hesitate to write, IX 29, p. 262,

16f. W.: ἀνάστασιν δὲ ἀρνοῦνται οὐ μόνον σαρκὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχὴν μὴ διαμένειν νομίζουσι ...

There is system in this sleight-of-hand. Those sects who, according to Josephus, hold that the soul is immortal and who believe that it is either rewarded or punished after death, are credited with the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh. The one sect which, according to Josephus, denies the immortality of the soul is said to deny the resurrection of the flesh.

Furthermore, it should be observed that a doctrine of ἀνάστασις is attributed to the Jews in general at *Ref.* IX 30, p. 264, 10f. W. The Jews in general are also said there to believe in the ἐκπύρωσις, p. 264, 16 W.; for the importance Hippolytus attached to the "judgement through fire" cf. *Ref.* X 34, p. 292, 15 W. Although nothing of the sort is to be found in Josephus, Hippolytus' Essenes (p. 261, 12 W.) and Pharisees (p. 262, 10 W.) are said to believe in the ἐκπύρωσις. In Hippolytus' version of Josephus, the idea of the immortality of the soul (which is in Josephus) is closely bound up with the ideas of the final conflagration and of the resurrection (which are not in Josephus). This concatenation of ideas is the same as that to be found in the second part of the chapter on the Stoics, *Ref.* I 21, 3-5. What is more, Hippolytus is explicit that the Stoics (and Pythagoras), through the mediation of the Egyptians, derived their theories from the Essenes, i.e., from the Jews, *Ref.* IX 27, p. 261, 10f. W.: ὧν μάλιστα Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις τοῦτοις μαθητευθέντες παρέλαβον.<sup>22</sup>

So the words ἀλλά ἀνάστασιν εἶναι in *Ref.* I 21, 5, the concluding section of the chapter on the Stoics, are not there by accident. They are indispensable in the context of the grand design of the *Ref.*, viz., the proof that the heretics depend on the Greeks who got their own views, ultimately, from the Jews. It is difficult to imagine a body of 'philosophical' ideas more important to an Early Christian writer than those concerned with the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, and the final purification through fire.

There is another instance in Hippolytus of the attribution of the resurrection to a Greek philosopher—again in connection with the simultaneous attribution of the idea of the final judgement through fire. This is in the chapter on Heraclitus, who is, of course, represented as a proto-Stoic.<sup>23</sup> G. S. Kirk has argued that the section at issue, to be quoted below, sits awkwardly in its context, which would be about the Heraclitean doctrine of the opposites, and suggests that Hippolytus may

have thrown in this block of text as an afterthought.<sup>24</sup> I do not think this suggestion is tenable,<sup>25</sup> and may refer to Marcovich's interpretation of this section. Also Marcovich, however, argues that this particular piece forms a *unity*; at any rate, he points out—and I entirely agree—that Hippolytus here quotes Heraclitean fragments to be connected with his own views about *resurrection* and *fire*.<sup>26</sup> I quote *Ref.* IX 10, 6-7 (= *Vorsokr.* 22 B 63 + B 64 + B 65), omitting part of the exegesis of B 65; Marcovich's suggestion—following Fränkel—that the order of quotations should be B 66-B 64-B 65, though not implausible, is irrelevant to the present argument;<sup>27</sup> moreover, his contention that the reversed order would better fit Hippolytus' exegesis is somewhat doubtful in view of Hippolytus' amazing powers of reading things in texts which are not there. The Heraclitean fragments, at any rate, are firmly embedded in an *interpretatio christiana*,<sup>28</sup> pp. 243, 19-244, 1 W.:

λέγει [sc., Heracl.] δὲ καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ταύτης <τῆς> φανεῖρας ἐν τῇ γεγενήμεθα, καὶ τὸν θεὸν οἶδε ταύτης τῆς ἀναστάσεως αἴτιον οὕτως λέγων. [*Vorsokr.* 22 B 63] “ἐνθα δ' ἐόντι” ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας γίνεσθαι ἐγερτὶ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν”. λέγει δὲ καὶ τοῦ κόσμου κρίσιν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ πυρὸς γίνεσθαι λέγων οὕτως. [*Vorsokr.* 22 B 64] “τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίξει κέρανος” ... καλεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ [sc., τὸ πῦρ: *Vorsokr.* 22 B 65] “χρημοσύνην καὶ κόρον” ..., ἡ δὲ ἐκπύρωσις [sc., ἐστὶν] κόρος. [*Vorsokr.* 22 B 66] “πάντα γάρ”, φησι, “τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν χρινεῖ καὶ καταλήφεται”.

It is important to note that the second of the Heraclitean texts quoted in the above section contains the word ἐπανίστασθαι, thus affording a natural point of departure for the *interpretatio christiana* in the sense of the resurrection of the flesh; perhaps νεκρῶν, “corpses”, is also involved. This may have coincided with the *interpretatio christiana* of the Stoic cosmic cycle. I assume that a person like Hippolytus had two arguments in favour of the attribution of the resurrection to the Stoics, viz., (1) the implications of the cosmic cycle; (2) the precedent in Heraclitus, seen as a proto-Stoic.

The fact that Hippolytus *interpolated* the ἀνάστασις in his account of the Jewish sects may seem to favour the hypothesis that, in order to be consistent, he also interpolated it into his account of the Stoics in his doxography. It must be admitted that the words ἀλλὰ ἀνάστασιν εἶναι impress one as if they had been rather forcefully inserted into the account of the Stoic theory of total blending. However, I have pointed out

above<sup>30</sup> that the source followed in *Ref.* I 21 could have contained a reference to the resurrection. It is at any rate certain that, if Hippolytus put in the resurrection himself, he did so because he knew that this idea had been fathered on the Stoics: the attribution is already found in Christian authors earlier than Hippolytus.

## 2. Clement

Confirmation for the above interpretation of Stoic ἀνάστασις in Hippolytus is provided by a passage in Clement<sup>31</sup>—subsequent to Clement's quotation of a Heraclitean fragment (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 28), viz., *Strom.* V I 9, 4:

οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος [sc., Heracl.] ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, ἣν ὕστερον ἐκπύρωσιν ἐκάλεσαν οἱ Στωικοί· καθ' ὃν καὶ τὸν ἰδίως ποιὸν ἀναστήσεσθαι δογματίζουσι, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο τὴν ἀνάστασιν περιέποντες.

Vorn Arnim, at *SVF* II 630, quotes this text, not only omitting ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας and τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, but also the important final clause: τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο τὴν ἀνάστασιν περιέποντες.

Clement tells us that the Stoics, like Heraclitus, believed in a final purification by fire, which they, not Heraclitus, had called ἐκπύρωσις. According to him, Heraclitus' insight derives from the barbarian, i.e., Jewish, philosophy. He also tells us that they *followed* Heraclitus (καθ' ὃν) in declaring that the *individual person* (ἰδίως ποιός, a Stoic technical term; cf. e.g., Chrysippus *ap. Alex.*, *In A.Pr.* p. 180, 31f. Wallies = *SVF* II 624) will *rise again*. Clement, of course, thinks of the Stoic cosmic cycle, which he also attributes to Heraclitus, see *Strom* V XIV, 104, 1-105, 1, with its quotation and interpretation of *Vorsokr.* 22 B 30 and B 31.<sup>32</sup> In Clement, as in Hippolytus, the ideas of the final conflagration ~ purification and of the resurrection are closely bound up with one another. He is explicit about the connection between the Stoics and Heraclitus as to the doctrine of the resurrection, which Hippolytus was not. What is even more important, however, is that Clement gives us the *argument* which made the *interpretatio christiana* feasible: (a) the Stoics believe that the individual person will rise again, entailing (b) their honouring of the doctrine of the resurrection. What, in relation to Hippolytus' account, could only be surmized, is found here in the form of an explicit statement. It is the Stoic doctrine of eternal recurrence, in-

cluding that of individual persons, which is interpreted as an adumbration of the true Christian doctrine.

Later on in the same book of *Strom.* (I have already referred to part of this passage *supra*<sup>33</sup>), Clement returns to these doctrines, combining—like Hippolytus<sup>34</sup>—Empedocles, Heraclitus, and the Stoics, *Strom.* V XIV 103, 6-105, 1 = *SVF* II 590 (where 103, 6 is omitted): Empedocles said all things will return to fire; Heraclitus [a Stoicized Heraclitus] agreed; [105, 1:] παραπλήσια τούτῳ [sc., Heracl.] καὶ οἱ ἐλλογμώτατοι τῶν Στωϊκῶν δογματίζουσι περὶ τε ἐκπύρωσεως καὶ κόσμου διοικήσεως καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου ποιοῦ κόσμου τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου<sup>35</sup> καὶ τῆς τῶν ἡμετέρων ψυχῶν ἐπιδιαμονῆς.

K. Reinhardt, whose interpretation of both passages from Clement is exemplary,<sup>36</sup> has missed the significance of ἀνάστασις, which he believes to be synonymous with ἐκπύρωσις;<sup>37</sup> *quod non*.

The *Strom.* can be dated to ca. 20-25 years before the *Ref.* One need not suppose, however, that Hippolytus' views had been derived from Clement, because Clement is not the first Christian author to profess this interpretation of Stoic thought.

### 3. Athenagoras and Tatian

Ch. 36 of Athenagoras' *Legatio*<sup>38</sup> (a pamphlet published ca. 20 years before Clement's *Strom.*) briefly defends the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the human body against its pagan critics. Two of his arguments are of special interest. The first is that not only the Christians, but many (Greek) philosophers have taught the resurrection of the body. The second argument is that there is nothing in the teachings of "Pythagoras and Plato" which stands in the way of bodies' being reconstituted from the same elements once their dissolution to that from which they arose has taken place.

To take the second argument first: Athenagoras does not ascribe a theory of the resurrection of the body to Pythagoras and Plato; he only claims that their view of the origin of the body from, and its dissolution into, the elements does not preclude its reconstitution. J. Geffcken has plausibly argued that Athenagoras found his information about the elemental theories of Pythagoras and Plato in a handbook such as Aetius.<sup>39</sup> I assume that Athenagoras had another reason as well to refer to Pythagoras and Plato: he may have been thinking of *metempsychosis*, the transmigration of souls, which, as we have noticed, is

closely associated with the resurrection of the body in another Christian author, Hippolytus.<sup>40</sup> It should be noted that, in this context, Athenagoras spins out a somewhat intricate argument concerned with the priority of the incorporeal over the corporeal.

Since the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is not attributed to Plato and Pythagoras, the "many philosophers" mentioned in Athenagoras' first argument cannot include these two. Athenagoras writes: οἱ μέντοι οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς μόνον ἀναστήσεται τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ πολλοὺς τῶν φιλοσόφων, περιέρχον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος δεικνύειν. I submit that he thinks of the more famous Stoics and, perhaps, of Heraclitus, who are cited in this context by later writers such as Clement and Hippolytus. Or rather, I assume that these are the only philosophers to which his statement can pertain, for Athenagoras' silence is puzzling. Christian apologists, as a rule, are very pleased when they are in a position to adduce Greek precedents *nominatim*. Athenagoras may have thought that the addressees of his pamphlet, the philosophers<sup>41</sup> Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, would be able to take up his hint; Marcus, after all, was a Stoic. Another possibility, of course, is that Athenagoras, whose learning is not too impressive, had heard or read about the Greek philosophical antecedents of the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, but simply did not remember names and hid his ignorance behind a grandiloquent "many".

That the *interpretatio christiana* of the Stoic doctrine existed before Athenagoras' days is, at any rate, proved by two references in Tatian, whose *Oratio ad Graecos* may be somewhat earlier than Athenagoras' little work. Tatian speaks of what he believes to be the Stoic doctrine of the resurrection in very critical terms—which entails that he did not construct this interpretation of the Stoic view of eternal recurrence himself, but had read or heard about it elsewhere. Tatian, too, couples the notion of resurrection with that of final conflagration. Of the two texts I shall quote, the second is not in *SVF*, the first only partly, which is why I quote it in full:

*Or.* 3, 1-2, p. 270, 15-24 Goodspeed = p. 6, 22-31 Whittaker: τὸν γὰρ Ζήνωνα διὰ τῆς ἐκπύρωσεως ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνίστασθαι πάλιν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, λέγω δὲ Ἄνυτον καὶ Μέλητον ἐπὶ τῷ κατηγορεῖν, Βούσιριν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ξενοκτονεῖν καὶ Ἡρακλέα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀθλεῖν, παραιτητέον [this is where *SVF* I 109, first text, ends.] ὅστις ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν λόγῳ πλείονας τοὺς μοχθηροὺς τῶν δικαίων



εἰσηγεῖται, Σωκράτους ἐνὸς καὶ Ἡρακλέους καὶ τινῶν ἄλλων τοιούτων, γεγονότων ὀλίγων καὶ οὐ πολλῶν. οἱ γὰρ κακοὶ πάνυ πλείους εὗρεθήσονται τῶν ἀγαθῶν, [what follows is printed at *SVF* I 159] καὶ ὁ θεὸς κακῶν ἀποδειχθήσεται κατ' αὐτὸν ποιητής, ἐν ἀμάραις τε καὶ σκώληξι καὶ ἀρρητουργοῖς καταγινόμενος.

It is to be regretted that von Arnim did not print this 'fragment' as a whole;<sup>42</sup> clearly, it presents us with one consistent argument. Socrates' name only appears in the part omitted by Pearson and von Arnim, the names of his accusers only in the part found in *SVF* I 109. Heracles' name is found in both parts, that of one of his evil opponents only in the first part. It is also essential to note that, in the second part, Tatian speaks of Zeno's "argument" or "theory", "exposition" (*logos*), "concerned with the *ekpyrosis*"; at first blush, this strikes one as a reference to a book, or a portion of a book, by Zeno.<sup>43</sup> Both Socrates and Heracles were Stoic heroes.<sup>44</sup> The argument that something is wrong with the *Stoic* theodicee because of the fate of *Socrates* is found, e.g., in Cic., *N.D.* III 83, and in Plut., *Stoic. rep.* 1051 C and *Not. comm.* 1065 C (where Meletus' name occurs as well.<sup>45</sup> One cannot, of course, be certain that the doctrine referred to by Tatian really goes back to Zeno, for 'Zeno' here, as so often, may represent the Stoics in general; for the present argument, this is irrelevant. On the other hand, there is no reason why Zeno himself, in his argument concerned with *ekpyrosis*, could not have said that there will be another—or rather the same—Socrates all over again, just as there will be another, or rather the same, Heracles. Tatian argues that this entails God's responsibility for a predominance of evil over good; as we have noticed, a similar argument (not involving *ekpyrosis*) is used by Cicero and Plutarch.<sup>46</sup> I therefore infer that Tatian's argument, inclusive of its reference to Zeno, is not based upon a pure fancy, but attempts to stand a thought actually expressed by Zeno, or at least 'the' Stoics, on its head. Marcus Aurelius, VII 19, says: πόσους ἤδη ὁ αἰὼν Χρυσίπους, πόσους Σωκράτεις, πόσους Ἐπικτήτους καταπέπωκεν.<sup>47</sup>

For our present discussion, the most important aspect of this passage from the *Or.* is that Tatian uses the word ἀνίστασθαι quite naturally, and in a close connection with ἐκπύρωσις. That this is not an accident follows from a critical passage a few pages further down, in which he draws a sharp and definite boundary line between the Christian linear view and the Stoic, cyclical view:

*Or.* 6, 1, p. 272, 28-31 G. = p. 10, 15-18 Whitt. (not in *SVF*): καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ σωμάτων ἀνάστασιν ἔσεσθαι πεπιστεύκαμεν μετὰ τὴν τῶν ὄλων συντέλειαν, οὐχ ὥς οἱ Στωϊκοὶ δογματίζουσι κατὰ τινὰς κύκλων περιόδους γινομένων αἰεὶ καὶ ἀπογινόμενων τῶν αὐτῶν ...

I think that it is not an accident that the majority of Stoic 'fragments', or texts dealing with the come-back of individual persons in each successive cosmic period, are derived from Christian authors. The Stoic doctrine could be linked up with the Christian dogma of the resurrection of the flesh, so often ridiculed (or just not understood: already *Act.* 17, 18) by pagan thinkers.

#### Appendix: Eusebius

The word ἀνάστασις also occurs in Arius Didymus fr. 37 Diels *ap. Eus.*, *PE* XV 19, 1 (*DG* p. 469, 14-5; *SVF* II 599, p. 184, 34). The fragment describes the cosmic cycle, and begins at the end of a period: the common *Logos* and common Nature grow "more and bigger"; Nature dries up everything and takes back all things unto herself, unites with substance as a whole, and so reverts to the *Logos*. The text continues, *DG* p. 469, 14-16:

... καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐκείνην τὴν ποιῶσαν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ' ὃν ἀπ' αὐτῆς μόνῃς εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις.

"... (Nature returns to the ... *Logos*) and to that resurrection which produces the Greatest Year, in the course of which the restoration from herself alone unto herself takes place again".

There is something wrong here. The returning to the *Logos* at the time of conflagration can hardly be said to be tantamount to a "resurrection" which can only begin *after* the grand unification. It is, moreover, odd that the "resurrection", which occurs during a cosmic period *before* there is another conflagration, could be said to "produce" such a period as a whole, a 'Greatest Year'. Years, even Greatest Years, are computed from one moment of time to another such moment, not by means of a process which only partly fills up such a period. Both Diels and von Arnim, in their apparatus, refer to Zeller's suggestion κατάστασις for ἀνάστασις, Mras does not. I, for my part, have no doubt that it was Eusebius (rather than a copyist anticipating the subsequent word ἀποκατάστασις) who wrote ἀνάστασις; I have argued in the previous pages that, to a Christian writer, the Stoic cosmic cycle

could suggest the Christian doctrine of resurrection. Reinhardt<sup>48</sup> suggested that ἀνάστασις here is another word for ἐκπύρωσις, but this just is not true. Now, if we assume that Eusebius wrote ἀνάστασιν, does it also follow that Arius Didymus did? We should note that Arius begins, in this fragment, by telling us that *Logos* and Nature grow *more and bigger* in the process of *ekpyrosis* (ἐπὶ τοσούτον δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ <ή> κοινή φύσις μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη). I therefore suggest that we read ἀνά[σ]τασιν: Nature returns to the maximum “extension”, and it is this moment of maximal extension which is the point at which the Greatest Year begins, and ends. For the expansion of the cosmos at *ekpyrosis* see, e.g., *SVF* II 615, 618, 619.<sup>49</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *SVF* I 109 (cf. *infra*, pp. 227f.); II 623-628; see R. Hoven, *Stoïcisme et Stoïciens face au problème de l'au-delà* (Paris 1971) 29ff.; D. E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Columbus, Oh. 1977) 185f.; J. Barnes, La doctrine du retour éternel, in: J. Brunschwig (ed.), *Les Stoïciens et leur logique* (Paris 1978) 3ff.; J. Mansfeld, Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought, in: M. J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Studies in Hellenistic Religions*, *EPRO* 78 (Leiden 1979) 163ff., 179.

<sup>2</sup> *O.c.*, 91, 158; on Seneca, 122f.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. also Eudemus fr. 88 Wehrli = *Vorsokr.* 58 B 34, for a Pythagorean cycle inclusive of the return of the individual. On the topic in Middle Platonism see H. Dörrie, Kontroversen um die Seelenwanderung im kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus, in: *Hermes* 85 (1957) 414ff.—It should, moreover, be noted that, in Hippolytus, Empedocles and Heraclitus are *Pythagoreans* and the Stoics followers of Pythagoras and Heraclitus; see *Ref.* I 3, I 4, IX 27, and *infra*, n. 23.

<sup>4</sup> *Tim.* 22 c f.; *Mete.* I 14. Cf. *EPRO* 78, 147 n. 52 (also for *SVF* II 1174). Note that Clem. *Strom.* V I 9, 5, quotes *Tim.* 22 c 1-3 in order to prove that Plato knew that τὴν γῆν χρόνους τισὶ διὰ πυρὸς καθαίρεισθαι καὶ ὕδατος ... In the passage quoted by Clement, Plato indeed mentions both water and fire; but he uses the verb “to purify” only in connection with water (see *infra*, n. 13).

<sup>5</sup> For the Stoic interpretation of the Heraclitean Great Year and its possible link with Diogenes of Babylon see G. S. Kirk's version of an argument originally propounded by K. Reinhardt: G.S.K., *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments* (Cambridge 1962), 300f., who however does not discuss the possibility that Diogenes used Heraclitus in order to account for partial conflagrations.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Kirk, *o.c.*, 300. Some comments on the passage may be found in G. Rocca-Serra, Censorinus: *Le jour natal* (Paris 1980) 63f. Cf. also Hahm, *o.c.*, 196 n. 2; and *EPRO* 78, 145f. n. 49.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Rocca-Serra, *o.c.*, VIII-IX; some references at J. Mansfeld, *The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract Περὶ ἐβδομάδων Ch. I-11* (Assen 1971) 185f.

<sup>8</sup> On Diogenes and Boethus cf. also *EPRO* 78, 186f.

<sup>9</sup> *Ekpyrosis*—eternity of the world an open matter: X 7, 2. Cycle presupposed: VII 19 cf. *infra*, text to n. 47; XI 1, 2. No suggestion of personal survival: XII 5; survival as another sort of being: VIII 58; both these passages presuppose that there is no cosmic cycle, and taken together represent the two views discussed in Cic., *Tusc.* I.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *EPRO* 78, 182f., n. 173. On *N.Q.* III 28, 7, see also F. P. Waiblinger, *Senecas Naturales Quaestiones: Griechische Wissenschaft und römische Form* (München 1977) 46, 48.

<sup>11</sup> *EPRO* 78, 173ff.

<sup>12</sup> Pp. 225f. For the Christian background see K. Reinhardt, Heraklits Lehre vom Feuer, in: K. R., *Vermächtnis der Antike* (Göttingen 1966), 45, 47f.

<sup>13</sup> This text is cited by D.-K. *ad Vorsokr.* 22 B 28 (Clem., *Strom.* V I 9, 3), I p. 157, in *app. crit.* Cf. *supra*, n. 4. Plato, *Tim.* 22 d 6-7, says: ὅταν δ' αὖ θεοὶ τὴν γῆν ὕδασιν καθαίροντες κατακλύσωσιν ... This purification by water also at Phil., *Quod det.* 170.

<sup>14</sup> See M. Spanneut, *Le Stoïcisme des Pères d'Église* (Paris 1957) 358f. Cf. *infra*, p. 229, *Tat. Or.* 6, I, and, e.g., Orig., *C. Cels.* IV 12 = *SVF* II 628. Cf. also R. M. Grant, *After the New Testament* (Philadelphia 1967) 154. Dr. P. W. van der Horst reminds me of 2 *Petrus* 3:10.

<sup>15</sup> See D. G. Dunbar, *The Eschatology of Hippolytus*, diss. Drew Univ. 1979 (facs. ed. Ann Arbor-London 1981) 131f.

<sup>16</sup> I do not agree with the view of R. B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics* (Leiden 1976) 29ff., 73ff., according to whom there was no such general Early Stoic theory; see *Mnem.* 1982, 388f.

<sup>17</sup> Note that he prints the fragment in *SVF* II, Pars II, Cap. I, § 11: *De mixtione*.

<sup>18</sup> On the place of *anastasis* in Hippolytus' eschatology see Dunbar, *o.c.*, 128f., and already M. Marcovich, Hippolytus and Heraclitus, in: F. L. Cross (ed.), *Studia patristica* VII (Berlin 1966) 262, on several passages from Hipp., *De universo*. See also the article 'Auferstehung' in *RAC* I, 933f., on the theme in Jewish and in Early Christian thought; and 930f., on the evidence that, as a general notion, *anastasis* is foreign to Greek thought.—Cf. also the argument of the “younger Stoics” at Sext., *M.* VII 256: ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι ἀνίσταται καὶ λ.

<sup>19</sup> K. Koschorke, *Hippolyt's Ketzerbekämpfung und Polemik gegen die Gnostiker: Eine tendenzkritische Untersuchung seiner "Refutatio omnium haeresium"* (Wiesbaden 1975).

<sup>20</sup> Koschorke, *o.c.*, 22f., 76f., 80f. (81 on the rôle of the Egyptians). For this Greek ‘theft’ as a favourite theme of Philo, Justin, and Clement, see S. R. C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford 1971) 9ff.; cf. also A. le Boulluec, in: Clément d'Alexandrie, *Les Stromates: Stromate V*, t. I, SC 278 (Paris 1981) 13f. For Numenius' contribution see J. H. Waszink, Some Observations on the Appreciation of the ‘Philosophy of the Barbarians’ in Early Christian Literature, in: *Mélanges Chr. Mohrmann* (Utrecht-Antwerpen 1963) 52ff.

<sup>21</sup> Koschorke, *o.c.*, 22-4. I cannot enter here into the general problem of Hippolytus' reliability in the use of his sources, and can only say that I believe his ‘method’ varied: he *both* copied out things faithfully *and* made arbitrary changes.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Koschorke, *o.c.*, 24.—M. Marcovich, One hundred Hippolytean Emendations, in: K. Bosl (ed.), *Gesellschaft. Kultur. Literatur. Beitr. L. Wallach gew.* (Stuttgart 1975) 127, suggests an emendation through interpolation: τοῦτοις μαθητευθέντες, <τὰς ἀρχὰς> παρέλαβον; not implausibly: he confers p. 261, 9.

<sup>23</sup> By Hippolytus, this is taken for granted rather than stated. *Ref.* I 4, p. 9, 19f. W., it is said that Heraclitus agreed with Empedocles; I 3, p. 9, 6f. W., that Empedocles held that συνεστάναι ἐκ πυρὸς τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυθῆσθαι [cf. Clem., *Strom.*, V XIV 103, 6] ὃ σχεδὸν καὶ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ συντίθενται δόγματι, ἐκπύρῳσιν προσδοκῶντες. See further H. Diels, *DG*, 145; J. P. Herschbell, Hippolytus' Elenchus as a Source for Empedocles Reconsidered, I, in: *Phronesis* 18 (1972) 100f.; W. Burkert, Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles, in: J. Mansfeld-L. M. de Rijk (eds.), *Kephalaion: Studies ... de Vogel* (Assen 1975), 137ff. For Hippolytus' Stoicized Heraclitus see also Kirk, *o.c.*, 349ff.

<sup>24</sup> *O.c.*, 349-50.

<sup>25</sup> The theme of the resurrection links up well with the immediately preceding *Vorsokr.* 22 B 62: "immortals mortal, mortals immortal, living the death of those, dying the life of those". And the passage at issue is a sort of *finale*.

<sup>26</sup> Marcovich, *o.c.*, 261f.

<sup>27</sup> Hippolytus' (or his source's) order need not, of course, be Heraclitus'. In his *Heraclitus: Editio Maior* (Merida, Ven. 1967), Marcovich prints B 63 as fr. 73, B 64 as fr. 79, B 65 as fr. 55, B 66 as fr. 82. Ch. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge 1979), prints B 63 as fr. CX, but sticks to Hippolytus' order for B 64-B 65-B 66 = fr. CXIX-CXX-CXXI. C. Diano, in: C. Diano-G. Serra, *Eraclito: I frammenti e le Testimonianze* (Milano 1980), prints a Hippolytic cluster with a change of order: B 63 = fr. 115, B 65 + B 66 = fr. 116, B 64 = fr. 117. In my own little edition with comments in Dutch, *Heraclitus: Fragmenten* (Amsterdam 1979), the order is: B 63 = fr. 117, B 64 = fr. 74, B 65 = fr. 71, B 66 = fr. 73; i.e., I have separated what I assumed to be an eschatological fragment from what I supposed to be cosmological, or rather 'physical', fragments.

<sup>28</sup> See Reinhardt, *o.c.*, 63f., who however has missed the point about the *anastasis*; cf. *infra*, n. 37.

<sup>29</sup> I agree with Kahn, *o.c.*, 254, that the beginning of the fragment, or at least the word *ἰόντι*, must be corrupt, and shall publish an emendation in *Elenchos* 4, (1983), 197ff.

<sup>30</sup> P. 221.

<sup>31</sup> Partly quoted *supra*, p. 220. Cf. also *supra*, n. 13.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Kirk, *o.c.*, 307ff., 325ff.; *infra*, p. 226.

<sup>33</sup> P. 225.

<sup>34</sup> See *supra*, n. 23.

<sup>35</sup> One misses a substantive here (there are substantives going with the other genitives, viz., *διοικήσεως* and *ἐπιδιαμονῆς*). Possibly, *ἀναστάσεως* has dropped out.

<sup>36</sup> *O.c.*, 47f.

<sup>37</sup> *O.c.*, 47: "... die stoische Bedeutung der ἀνάστασις als Weltbrand ..."; cf. *ibid.*, 48 n. 9, on Ar. Did. fr. 37 Diels = *SVF* II 599, for which see *infra*, p. 230.

<sup>38</sup> I exclude the *De resurrectione*, whose authenticity is in doubt; see R. M. Grant, Athenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras, *Harv. Theol. Rev.* 47 (1954) 121ff. M. Pohlenz, Die griechische Philosophie im Dienste der christlichen Auferstehungslehre, in: *Zt. wiss. Theol.* 47, N.F. 12 (1904) 241ff., deals with *Res.* only. Pohlenz claims that the Greek philosophical idea alluded to by the author of *Res.* is the Peripatetic theory of the *συναμφοτέρον* of soul and body.

<sup>39</sup> J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig-Berlin 1907) 235-7; he quotes Aet. I 17, 4; 24, 3; IV 8, 3. See also Grant, *After the N.T.*, 159, on Athenagoras' learning.—The same idea is expounded, at greater length, at ps. Justin, *De resurr.* c. 6.

<sup>40</sup> See *supra*, p. 218.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. the first sentence of the *Leg.*, the dedication to the emperors: τὸ δὲ μέγιστον φιλοσόφους. See further *supra*, n. 9 and text thereto; *infra*, text to n. 47.

<sup>42</sup> The only reason for von Arnim's negligence seems to be that Pearson (A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes*, London 1891), prints the same texts as Zeno fr. 55 and 47. Note that Hoven, *o.c.*, 32, only quotes and translates the portion which = *SVF* I 109.

<sup>43</sup> Presumably, the *Περὶ τοῦ ὅλου* (Diog. Laert. VII 4 = *SVF* I 41, p. 14, 35); see Diog. Laert. VII 135-6 and 142, printed at *SVF* I 102, and cf. EPRO 78, 147ff., 148 n. 57 (also for the argument attributed to Zeno at Alex. Lyc. XII, p. 19, 2f. Brinkmann (not in *SVF*)).—Note that Tatian's εἰσηγείται suggests that Zeno himself "introduced" Socrates and Heracles.

<sup>44</sup> I see no reason to reject the anecdote about Zeno's liking for Xenophon's *Mem.*, Diog. Laert. VII 2 (*SVF* I 1); for other Stoics see H. Cherniss' note *e* to Plut., *Not. comm.* 1065 C, and esp. K. Döring, *Exemplum Socratis: Studien zur Sokratesnachwirkung in der kynisch-stoischen Popularphilosophie der frühen Kaiserzeit und im frühen Christentum* (Wiesbaden 1979), 5f., 45f., 49, 145. Döring does not discuss the passage in Tatian and its parallels. For Heracles see Cherniss' note *b* to *Not. comm.* 1065 c.

<sup>45</sup> Cic., *loc. cit.*, and Plut., *Not. comm.* 1065 C, share a number of *exempla*; the argument will be traditional. Cf. also Döring, *o.c.*, 145.

<sup>46</sup> Plutarch is concerned with the balance of good and evil.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 9 and text thereto; Marcus thinks of the cosmic cycle.

<sup>48</sup> *O.c.*, 48 n. 9.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Hahn, *o.c.*, 244f.—The corruption occurs in one *ms* at Sext., *M.* IX 197: for ἀνάτασιν ἄερος (in a Stoic context) *L* has ἀνάστασιν ἄερ.



## Techne: A New Fragment of Chrysippus

FRAGMENTS I call 'new' when they satisfy two conditions: (1) they are not found in existing collections of fragments; (2) they are not discussed, or mentioned, in the secondary literature. The present new fragment is to be found in a passage of Olympiodorus which is the source for two well-known Stoic fragments, viz. the definitions of *techne* attributed to Zeno and Cleanthes, *SVF* I 73 (Zeno 12 Pearson) and I 490 (Cleanthes 5 Pearson).

Olympiodorus, interpreting *Gorgias*, wants to find out whether or not rhetoric is a *techne*; he sets out definitions of *techne* and looks to see if they fit rhetoric. The first definition quoted is Cleanthes':<sup>1</sup> Κλεάνθης τοίνυν λέγει ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ πάντα ἀνύουσα." Olympiodorus rejects this, because, so he argues, also φύσις ἕξις τις ἐστὶν ὁδῶ πάντα ποιούσα. He tells us that Chrysippus realized that Cleanthes' definition is too wide (70.1–3 W.): ὅθεν ὁ Χρύσιππος προσθεῖς τὸ "μετὰ φαντασιῶν" εἶπεν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ προϊούσα μετὰ φαντασιῶν." According to Olympiodorus, Chrysippus' definition fits rhetoric, but there is also another one that is good, viz. Zeno's:<sup>2</sup> Ζήνων δέ φησιν ὅτι "τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων<sup>3</sup> πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ." For Chrysippus' definition, Westerink (following Norvin) refers to *SVF* II 56, viz. to Sextus *Math.* 7.373, which does not quote Chrysippus' definition in Olympiodorus, but reports Chrysippus' argument against the view of Zeno and especially Cleanthes that "presentation" is an "impression of the soul"; if this is assumed, ἀναιρέ-

ται μὲν μνήμη θησαυρισμὸς οὔσα φαντασιῶν (cf. *SVF* I 64), ἀναιρείται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη· σύστημα γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἄθροισμα καταλήψεων ... In other words, according to Chrysippus the presence of presentations in the soul is a necessary condition for the acquisition and practice of *techne*. Chrysippus here clearly alludes to the idea of *techne* as a "system of comprehensions" attributed, by Olympiodorus, to Zeno. For his reference to soul compare the definition of *techne* at schol. Dion. Thr. p.161.28f Hilgard: σύστημα περὶ ψυχὴν γεγόμενον ἐκ καταλήψεων κτλ., a text printed in part at *SVF* I 73.<sup>4</sup>

Fuller philological discussion of some of the sources in which the Early Stoic definitions of *techne* have been transmitted must be postponed; nor can I enter into the further interpretation of the definitions themselves.<sup>5</sup> For the present, I should like to adduce a text (not in *SVF*) where the definition attributed to Chrysippus by Olympiodorus is quoted anonymously and in slightly different form. Here too the context is a discussion of the concept of *techne*; the different form in which Chrysippus' definition is given precludes that the author's source is Olympiodorus, or Olympiodorus only.<sup>6</sup> David, *Prol. philos.* (CommAristGr XVIII.2) p.43.30–44.5 Busse:

τέχνη δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν καθόλου γνώσις μετὰ λόγου, ἢ "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ βαδίζουσα μετὰ φαντασίας"· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τέχνη ἕξις τις καὶ γνώσις ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁδῶ βαδίζει· πάντα γὰρ κατὰ τάξιν ποιεῖ. "μετὰ φαντασίας" δὲ προσκεῖται διὰ τὴν φύσιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἕξις ἐστὶν (ἔχει γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, οἷον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐν λίθῳ, ἐν ξύλῳ) καὶ ὁδῶ βαδίζει (κατὰ γὰρ τάξιν προέρχεται), ἀλλ' οὐ μετὰ φαντασίας ὥσπερ ἡ τέχνη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης κεχρημένος τῷ λόγῳ, ἡνίκα βούλεται τι ποιῆσαι, πρότερον διατυποῖ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁ βούλεται ποιῆσαι καὶ εἶθ' οὕτως ἀποτελεῖ αὐτό, ἡ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖ· οὐδὲ γὰρ προδιατυποῖ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὁ βούλεται κατασκευάσαι.

Next (44.5f Busse) David quotes—anonously—the definition Olympiodorus attributed to Zeno, with an important variation that cannot

<sup>1</sup> In *Gorg.* p.69.26f Westerink = *SVF* I 490 (context omitted).

<sup>2</sup> 70.7–10 W. = *SVF* I 73 (the first text; context omitted). The many parallels for this text printed at *SVF* I 73 have been lifted whole—and even without a change of order—from A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes* (London 1891) 65f; this material is far from complete. For the late Alexandrians as sources of Stoic 'fragments' see B. Keil, "Chrysippeum," *Hermes* 40 (1905) 155–58.

<sup>3</sup> -ον Olymp.; questioned by Pearson p.65, corrected by von Arnim without acknowledgement of this minor problem. The corruption occurs also in other texts containing (versions of) the definition (see e.g. *infra* n.8); Norvin and Westerink should have emended theirs accordingly. A parallel for the context in Olympiodorus and Quintilian (see *infra* 60 for the latter) is provided by Hermogenes' elegant use of it without revealing that he does so, *Περὶ τῶν στασέων* p.28.3–6 Rabe; cf. Sopater *ad loc.*, Walz V pp.9.1f, 17.27f.

<sup>4</sup> Note that Hilgard, following one MS., brackets *περὶ ... γεγόμενον*, and that Pearson and von Arnim, quoting Bekker's text, do not. I think Hilgard's excision is wrong.

<sup>5</sup> F. E. Sparshott, "Zeno on Art: Anatomy of a Definition," in J. M. Rist, ed., *The Stoics* (Berkeley 1978) 273ff, is useful, but in so far as the Stoics are concerned the author does not stray beyond von Arnim's texts (or von Arnim's comments on these texts). The chapter on Stoicism in M. Isnardi Parente, *Techne: Momenti del pensiero greco da Platone a Epicuro* (Florence 1966) 287ff, is very informative, but Isnardi Parente too does not go beyond von Arnim.

<sup>6</sup> Note that the (anonymous) version of Chrysippus' definition at p.17.6f W., which has *φαντασίας*, is different both from that at 70.7f and from David's. [Zeno's] at 17.20f—as at 70.7f—is without *ἐμπειρία*.

have been derived from Olympiodorus, viz. the word ἐμπειρία added after καταλήψεων. Note that David does not quote Cleanthes' definition. In other respects, the more wordy passage in the *Prol. philos.* is strictly parallel to that in *In Gorg.* Olympiodorus glosses ὁδῶ with τάξει, David with κατὰ τάξιν. David's explanation of μετὰ φαντασίας is the same as Olympiodorus' of μετὰ φαντασιῶν: both authors hold that this expression serves to distinguish *techne* from *physis*. Both authors finally quote the definition of *techne* as σύστημα καταλήψεων κτλ. But David's—anonymous—definition of *techne* as ἡ τῶν καθόλου γνώσις μετὰ λόγου is lacking in Olympiodorus;<sup>7</sup> this other one is a form of Aristotle's well-known definition of *techne* at *Eth. Nic.* VI 4 (1140a10, 20), conflated with one of *episteme* (cf. VI 3).

Now Aspasius, in the first pages of his commentary on the *Eth. Nic.*, explaining Aristotle's opening words πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος (1094a1), adduces the definition from VI 4 in a more scholastic form: "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική," omitting ἀληθοῦς before λόγου (*In Eth. Nic.* p.2.24f Heylbut). He also discusses (part of) another definition of *techne* which is a variation of the last definition adduced by Olympiodorus and David: "σύστημα ἐκ θεωρημάτων εἰς ἓν τέλος φερόντων."<sup>8</sup> What is more, he explains λόγος in Aristotle's definition in the following way (p.2.25–3.1 Heylb.):

λόγον δὲ λαμβάνει οὔτε τὸν ἐπαγωγικὸν οὔτε τὸν συλλογιστικόν, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀπλοῦν καὶ τεχνικόν, ᾧ χρῶνται οἱ δημιουργοὶ τῶν τεχνῶν· ποιήματα μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἀλόγων, οἷον τῶν μὲν μελισσῶν τὰ κηρία, ἀραχνῶν δὲ τὰ ἀράχνια καλούμενα· ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων μετὰ λόγου ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ὁρμῇ φυσικῇ χρώμενα τὰ ζῷα.

Aspasius, like Olympiodorus, wants to distinguish *techne* from *physis*; the argument against Cleanthes' definition attributed by Olympiodorus to Chrysippus, and used by David, may have some connection with what looks like a Peripatetic criticism of the definitions of Zeno (see *infra*) and Cleanthes. Aspasius' testimony, in any case, is several

<sup>7</sup> That is to say, it has not, as in David, been woven into the argument concerned with the Stoic definitions. But at p.70.15ff W., Olympiodorus discusses the claim of rhetoric to possession of knowledge.

<sup>8</sup> Aspas. p.2.19 Heylb. Occasionally the [Stoic] definition is quoted with θεωρημάτων in place of καταλήψεων, e.g. *SVF* III 214. Ps.-Gal. *Def. med.* XIX p.350.8–10 K. (*SVF* II 93) provides the following addition to a version of *SVF* I 73: ἡ οὕτως· τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένον [sic: read -ων, cf. *supra* n.3; no correction in von Arnim] ἐφ' ἓν τέλος τὴν ἀνάφοραν ἐχόντων. Isnardi Parente (*supra* n.5) 295f argues that Galen [sic: in fact Ps.-Gal.] introduces a Platonizing element, after *Philb.* 15D–16C. The parallel in Aspasius shows that this form of the [Stoic] definition contains a Peripatetic element; the idea derives from the introductory pages of the *Eth. Nic.*

centuries earlier than Olympiodorus', and already found in a scholastic setting.<sup>9</sup>

Cleanthes' definition is also quoted by Quintilian (2.17.41), printed at *SVF* I 490 in the following form: *nam sive, ut Cleanthes voluit, ars est potestas<sup>10</sup> viam, id est ordinem efficiens*. But we should follow the recent editions of Quintilian in reading *via* (ὁδῶ) and *ordine* (τάξει).<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the words *id est ordine* are clearly intended as an explanation of *viam*: compare Olympiodorus and David, who gloss ὁδῶ with τάξει and κατὰ τάξιν. The context in Quintilian, who speaks of the status of rhetoric as a *techne*, is the same as in Olympiodorus. Unlike Olympiodorus, Quintilian accepts Cleanthes' definition, but his reason for accepting it is the same as Olympiodorus' more explicitly formulated reason for accepting Chrysippus' definition: Quintilian continued (omitted by von Arnim), *esse certe viam et ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit*, compare Olymp. *In Gorg.* p.70.3–7 W.:

ἡ τοίνυν ῥητορικὴ ὑποπίπτει τῷ ὄρω τοῦτω [sc. Chrysippus'], ἕξις γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁδῶ καὶ τάξει προϊούσα· οὕτω γοῦν ὁ ῥήτωρ προοιμίους πρότερον κέχρηται, εἴτα προκαταστήσει καὶ καταστήσει καὶ τοῖς ἐξῆς τάξιν ἀσπαζόμενος.

Finally, in Quintilian exactly as in Olympiodorus, the definition of *techne* as a σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων then follows:<sup>12</sup>

*sive ille ab omnibus fere probatus finis observatur, artem constare ex perceptionibus consentientibus [= σύστημα] et coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitae, iam ostendemus nihil horum non in rhetorice inesse.*

This definition is also approved as pertinent to rhetoric by Olympiodorus, *In Gorg.* p.70.9 W.

These samples (Quintilian's text being the earliest) suffice to show that the context in which these definitions were cited is traditional, viz. a discussion of *techne* in general in relation to a specific discipline (Aspasius' exposition is clearly dependent on discussions of this sort). It is also clear that these definitions tend to appear in clusters. This is not the case, however, for another definition of *techne*, attributed to Zeno in a *prolegomenon* to the *Ars* attributed to Dionysius Thrax, which does not appear in such a cluster and is not found in a discussion of *techne* in general. Rather, it appears in a discussion of the

<sup>9</sup> Aspasius is also dependent on Stoic sources, cf. Philo *De animal.* 77–78 (*SVF* II 731–32) and 92 (730).

<sup>10</sup> The substitution of *potestas* (δύναμις) for *habitus* (ἕξις) will be due to the fact that Quintilian knew the definition by heart.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. also Pearson (*supra* n.2) 239.

<sup>12</sup> Printed, without *sive* and *observatur*, up to *iam*, at *SVF* I 73.

concept of 'definition' associated with that of the definition of [a] *techne* (schol. Vat. in Dion. Thr. p.118.14–16 Hilg.): the proximate genus should appear in a definition, ὡς δηλοῖ καὶ ὁ Ζήνων, λέγων "τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδοποιητική," τουτέστι δι' ὁδοῦ καὶ μεθόδου ποιούσα τε.<sup>13</sup> Pearson and von Arnim were unwilling to accept this attribution,<sup>14</sup> because the text itself (so they believed)<sup>15</sup> inclusive of the attribution occurs only once and because a very similar definition is attributed to Cleanthes (the one cited *supra*). Instead they preferred to accept Olympiodorus' attribution to Zeno of the σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων definition; that this attribution, of a very familiar text, itself occurs only once apparently did not trouble them. Max Pohlenz, however, adducing<sup>16</sup> Cicero *Nat.D.* 2.57 (*SVF* I 171)—Zeno . . . *naturam ita definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum ad gignendum progredientem via*—argued that this safe parallel proves von Arnim [and Pearson] wrong. We know now, moreover, that a quite similar definition was attributed not to Cleanthes only, but to Chrysippus as well.

The Greek for Cicero's Latin survives in at least five places, viz. Diog. Laert. 7.156 (*SVF* I 171), Ps.-Gal. *Def. med.* XIX p.371.4 K. (*SVF* II 1133),<sup>17</sup> Clem. Al. *Strom.* 5.14.99.4 (*SVF* II 1134), Aet. 1.7.33, and Athenag. *Leg.* 6 (*SVF* II 1027): φύσις is a πῦρ τεχνικὸν ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν. What is in Cicero and these Greek parallels recalls the objection to Cleanthes' definition, which was the justification for Chrysippus' rider found in Olympiodorus and David: Chrysippus added μετὰ φαντασιῶν (or -ας) in order to distinguish *techne* from *physis*; others, it seems, had failed to do this. Furthermore, David, as we have seen, quoted Chrysippus' definition not, as did Olympiodorus, with προϊούσα, but with βαδίζον, the word found in the Greek parallels to Cicero just cited. Cicero's *progredientem via*, on the other hand, is closer to Olympiodorus' Chrysippean ὁδῶ προϊούσα than to the ὁδῶ βαδίζον of the Greek parallels printed in *SVF*.

<sup>13</sup> = *SVF* I 72. Von Arnim quotes this text from Bekker's edition, through Pearson, although he knew Hilgard's, cf. *SVF* II 226. The same work is thus cited under different headings in Adler's *Index*.

<sup>14</sup> Pearson (*supra* n.2) 67, von Arnim *ad SVF* I 72. Cf. also N. Festa, *I frammenti degli Stoichi antichi* I (Bari 1932) 41; Isnardi Parente (*supra* n.5) 288.

<sup>15</sup> See however schol. Dion. Thr. p.2.22f, anonymous quotation; 108.29–31 = 157.18f, where a modified form of the definition is attributed to Aristotle.

<sup>16</sup> Unfortunately he hid this observation in a footnote, *Die Stoa* II (Gottingen 1947, 1972) 36, and added to the camouflage by failing to detect a typographical error: *SVF* I 62 for 72 (not corrected in the new *Stellenverzeichnis* 248).

<sup>17</sup> At *SVF* II p.328.20 the words καὶ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργητικῶς κινούμενον, added by Chartier on his own authority, must be deleted; see J. Kollesch, *Untersuchungen zu den pseudogalenischen Definitiones medicae* (Berlin 1973) 96 n.94.

The word ὁδοποιητικός, found in Zeno's definition (τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδοποιητική, *SVF* I 72), is very late Greek; the instance I have found<sup>18</sup> and those cited in LSJ s.v. are all concerned with this definition. Festa, arguing from the explanation of the definition in schol. Dion. Thr. (cited above), guessed that ὁδῶ ποιητική should be read.<sup>19</sup> Although Hilgard's text should not, I believe, be emended, I think that Festa must be right in so far as the definition itself is concerned.<sup>20</sup> I hope to return to the schol. Dion. Thr. on another occasion, and so restrict the present argument to the parallels in Cicero and in the definitions of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Cicero's *via* translates Zeno's ὁδῶ, just as Quintilian's *via* translated Cleanthes' ὁδῶ. Zeno defined *techne* as follows: τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ ποιητική. Cleanthes altered ποιητική to the more grandiloquent πάντα ἀνύουσα. Chrysippus, presumably because he wanted to avoid a confusion with nature and had moreover a strict rule for definitions (that the ἴδιον of a thing should be properly expressed: Diog. Laert. 7.60 = *SVF* II 226), changed ποιητική to προϊούσα μετὰ φαντασιῶν. What happened here also happened in other cases. According to Arius Didymus *apud* Stobaeus, Zeno defined the τέλος as ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν (*SVF* I 179), Cleanthes as ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν (*SVF* I 552), whereas Chrysippus, σαφέστερον βουλόμενος ποιῆσαι, changed the definition to ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαίνοντων (*SVF* III 12 and 4).<sup>21</sup>

It is arguable that Zeno's definition was intended as an improvement of Aristotle's at *Eth.Nic.* VI 4, τέχνη ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική ἐστὶν ~ Zeno, τέχνη ἐστὶν ἕξις ὁδῶ ποιητική. Zeno's ὁδῶ replaces Aristotle's μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς. Aspasius, as we have seen, omitted Aristotle's ἀληθοῦς and hastened to add that *logos* should not be taken in a scientific sense. To Zeno, μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς must have been unacceptable, for truth is only granted the Sage (cf.

<sup>18</sup> Schol. Dion. Thr. p.2.23 Hilg. The verb ὁδοποιεῖσθαι (but see n.20 *infra*) is found at Ps.-Andronicus *Περὶ μαθῶν* p.243.40f Glibert-Thierry = *SVF* III 267 (p.65.29f), in a definition of human πρόνοια.

<sup>19</sup> Festa (*supra* n.14) II 110. Cf. also the definition of virtue, *SVF* III 66.

<sup>20</sup> Isnardi Parente (*supra* n.5) 288 n.2 argued against Festa, adducing parallels from Aristotle with ὁδοποιεῖν and ὁδοποιεῖσθαι, but these verbs (apart from not being, in a strict sense, parallels for the adjective) mean something other than what would be needed here. The only seemingly valid parallel for the required sense is the verb ὁδοποιεῖν at Arist. *Rh.* 1354a8, where R. Kassel, however, now accepts Bywater's conjecture ὁδῶ ποιεῖν: *Der Text der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Berlin/New York 1971) 117f, where, apparently unaware that Festa anticipated him, he also proposed to correct the text of *SVF* I 72. For parallels to ὁδῶ see Cope's note *ad loc.* and Pease's *ad Cic. Nat.D.* 2.57.

<sup>21</sup> Many other Stoics produced their own version of the *telos*-formula, see Clem. Al. *Strom.* 2.21.129.1–5, conveniently printed at Posidonius fr.186 E.-K.



SVF I 52, 216), not always the craftsman or professional. On the other hand, the idea expressed by the word *ποιητική* must have been fully acceptable to Zeno, who said that nature is a craftsman, that nature is a fire, and that this divine craftsmanlike fire is the active, or creative, principle: for God as the *ποιούν* see Diog. Laert. 7.134 (SVF I 85), for God = fire as the *ποιούν* see Aristocles *apud* Eus. in SVF I 98. What holds for the divine fire holds for *techne*: according to Cicero *Nat.D.* 2.57ff (SVF I 171f), and the Greek parallels (SVF I 171, II 1027, 1133f), nature creates in the manner of art, *ad gignendum progredientem* via ~ *ὁδῶ βαδίζον εἰς γένεσιν*. According to Cicero, Zeno called nature a craftsman: *plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur*, the *ignem artificosum* being *magistrum artium reliquarum*. The operational parallel between nature and art is, of course, familiar from Aristotle;<sup>22</sup> but Aristotle always (e.g. already *Protr.* fr.11 Ross) distinguished art from nature, whereas Zeno said that nature itself is a craftsman. We have already noticed that Chrysippus is said to have objected to this identification in so far as art is concerned; consequently his argument, as cited by Olympiodorus, is as pertinent to Zeno's definition (SVF I 72, not cited by Olympiodorus) as it is to Cleanthes'. The fact that Chrysippus criticized and amended the definitions printed as SVF I 72 and 490, but did not criticize that at SVF I 73, helps explain why the *σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων* definition became the authoritative one, why the other three survived only marginally, and why Zeno's even came to be attributed to Aristotle.

The case for the correctness of the attribution to Zeno of the definition at SVF I 72, then, is stronger than that for the attribution to him of the canonical definition at SVF I 73. However, Pearson already pointed out<sup>23</sup> that I 73 has much in common with another description of *techne* in Aristotle (*Metaph.* 981a5f): *γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις*. We have seen that in the version of SVF I 73 found in David the word *ἐμπειρία* occurs. This fuller form of the definition is also found in another prolegomenon to the *Ars* of Dionysius Thrax, which Di Benedetto has proved to be dependent on David:<sup>24</sup> οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ λέγουσι κτλ., printed at SVF II 94 from Bek-

<sup>22</sup> See W. Fiedler, *Analogiemodelle in Aristoteles* (Stud.ant.Philos. 9 [1978]) 168ff, 260ff, and especially the excellent pages of Isnardi Parente (*supra* n.5) 77ff. Good remarks on the text of SVF I 171 and on the antecedents as well as the originality of Zeno's view are made by D. E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Columbus 1977) 200ff.

<sup>23</sup> Pearson (*supra* n.2) 66.

<sup>24</sup> Schol. Dion. Thr. p.108.31–33 Hilg. V. Di Benedetto, "Dionisio Trace e la *techne* a lui attribuita," *AnnPisa* 27 (1958) 171–78. I do not agree with his analysis completely,

ker. Now in a prolegomenon to the schol. in Hermog., which is also indebted to David,<sup>25</sup> the definition is cited—anonymously—with *ἐμπειρία*; the author, however, knows that it also exists without this word: ἡ ὡς ἄλλοι ἐξηγούνται, ἄνευ τοῦ "ἐμπειρία" ἐκτιθέμενοι τὸν ὅρον. For *ἐμπειρία* in another important definition (or version of this definition), see Chrysippus' *telos*-formula, *ζῆν κατ' ἐμπειρίαν τῶν φύσει συμβαινόντων* (SVF III 12, and 4). A common Stoic definition of *ἐμπειρία* (Aet. 4.11 = SVF II 83) is *ἐμπειρία ... ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν ὁμοειδῶν φαντασιῶν πλῆθος*—which is close to Aristotle's *ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου ... ὑπόληψις*, and recalls Chrysippus' argument<sup>26</sup> against Zeno and Cleanthes about memory as the *θησανρισμός φαντασιῶν* which, just like *techne* (i.e. the *σύστημα ... καταλήψεων*), would be destroyed if *φαντασία* were to be interpreted in a crudely material sense. These scraps of testimony are consistent; yet, whether or not *ἐμπειρία* is read in the definition at SVF I 73,<sup>27</sup> the parallel in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle shores up the likelihood of its attribution to Zeno, as does the fact that Chrysippus (SVF II 56) apparently takes this definition for granted: *σύστημα γὰρ ἦν ...*, i.e. "... is supposed to be." Also the final clause, *πρὸς τι τέλος εὔχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ*, can be paralleled from Aristotle: compare *Metaph.* 981b15f on the *χρήσιμον*<sup>28</sup> and *Eth. Nic.* I 1 on the *τέλος* of *techne*.<sup>29</sup> What the correct form of the definition at SVF I 73 should resemble I find hard to say. Presumably, the variations found in the sources represent rival versions which may derive from individual Stoics. Perhaps the version with *ἐμπειρία* is Chrysippus'.<sup>30</sup>

I conclude with a comment on Zeno's definition of *techne* as an active or creative condition. The word *ποιητική* does not, in Zeno, have the same significance as in the Aristotelian definition that is

but it is in any event clear that David's version and exegesis of the anonymous definition is one of the sources of the author of the prolegomenon.

<sup>25</sup> Walz IV p.4.9f = Rabe 17: <Marcellini?> prologue at *Prol.syll.* p.262.1f. This discussion of definition, of *techne*, etc., owes much to David; the definition of definition (Walz p.17.14f = p.275.16–19 Rabe) is David's (p.11.17f Busse).

<sup>26</sup> At Sext. *Math.* 7.372 (SVF II 56); see *supra* 57f.

<sup>27</sup> Note that von Arnim, at SVF II 94, giving the scholium text, retains *ἐμπειρία*.

<sup>28</sup> Aristotle distinguishes the useful aspect of the arts and sciences from the cognitive, 'free' aspect. The topos of the *χρήσιμον* dates back to Sophistic times, see F. Heinemann, "Eine vorplatonische Theorie der τέχνη," *MusHelv* 18 (1961) 105–30 [C. J. Classen, ed., *Sophistik* (Darmstadt 1976) 127–69].

<sup>29</sup> Cf. M.-P. Lerner, *Recherches sur la notion de finalité chez Aristote* (Paris 1969) 137ff. That a *techne* should be useful is, of course, also Plato's view (e.g. *Grg.* 465A); see Heinemann (*supra* n.28) *passim*.

<sup>30</sup> For *ἐμπειρία* in relation to τέχνη esp. in the Hellenistic period see E. Siebenborn, *Die Lehre von der Sprachrichtigkeit und ihren Kriterien* (Stud.ant.Philos. 5 [1976]) 119ff.

repeated verbatim. It will be recalled that, to Zeno, Nature itself is a craftsman. In order to understand what he meant by ποιητική, we should think of the Stoic principles, viz. the ποιοῦν and the πάσχον, first formulated by Zeno (*SVF* I 85). Zeno's *technē* is ποιητική, active or creative, in the same way that his God, or Nature, or *Logos*, are active or creative. *Technē* informs matter—it belongs with the creative *logos* which is part of human nature.

# THE CLEANTHES FRAGMENT IN CICERO, DE NATURA DEORUM II 24

K. Reinhardt first distinguished a continuous physical argument, a 'Wärmelehre', in Cic., *ND* II 23-28 + 30b-32 + 39-41<sup>1)</sup>. He attributed this doctrine to Posidonius. The two quotations from Cleanthes found in this argument (at 24, cf. *SVF* I, 513, and at 40-41, *SVF* I, 504) would be due to Posidonius. Reinhardt's textual analysis of the portion of Cicero's text at issue was accepted by A.-J. Festugière<sup>2)</sup> and A.J. Kleywegt<sup>3)</sup>, who, however, both affirmed that they could see no reason to attribute the 'Wärmelehre' to Posidonius rather than Cleanthes<sup>4)</sup>. Actually, Kleywegt dubbed *ND* II 23-28 + 30b-32 + 39-41 "Cleanthean material". P. Boyancé, who rejected Reinhardt's analysis, nevertheless stated that the 'Wärmelehre' is by Cleanthes, not Posidonius<sup>5)</sup>. F. Solmsen, who did accept Reinhardt's analysis, argued in detail in favour of Cleanthes as the author of the physical argument<sup>6)</sup>. Solmsen was followed by D.E. Hahm<sup>7)</sup>, who went two steps further by arguing that 29-30 is a very compressed argument by Cleanthes<sup>8)</sup> and, furthermore, that also 42-44 are by Cleanthes, who would be Cicero's source for the quotes from Aristotle to be found there<sup>9)</sup>, just as he would be the source for the reference to Plato at II 32<sup>10)</sup>.

Consequently, there appears to be a *consensus* that Reinhardt's attribution of this section to Posidonius is wrong. I feel unhappy about this, not merely because I have argued in the past that he could be right<sup>11)</sup>, but also because, re-reading both Cicero's *ND* and the secondary literature for a course given last winter, I found (or believed) that both the analysis of Cicero's study and the 'Quellen-Frage' were capable of some advancement. In the present paper, I shall concentrate on what, in II 23-28, is *certainly* by Cleanthes, without attempting to identify Cicero's source for what is not Cleanthes. I much regret that at the time of writing (Sept. 1981) W. Theiler's *Posidonios* is not yet available; I would not, however, be surprised if it turned out that, in as far as the present Ciceronian passage is concerned, Theiler supports Reinhardt.

The minimum one should attribute to Cleanthes is, in II 24:

*quod quidem Cleanthes his etiam argumentis docet, quanta vis insit caloris in omni corpore: [1] negat enim esse ullum cibum tam gravem quin is nocte et die concoquatur; cuius etiam in reliquiis inest calor iis quas natura respuerit. [2] iam vero venae et arteriae micare non desinunt quasi quodam igneo motu, animadversumque saepe est cum cor animantis alicuius evolsum ita mobiliter palpitaret ut imitaretur igneam celeritatem.*

Von Arnim, SVF I, 513, stops at the end of [1], *respuerit*.

This is most unfortunate. What is stated *sub* [1] is *one* argument, dealing with the role of *calor* in digestion. Cicero, however, says that Cleanthes used *argumenta*, not just one. These arguments, according to Cicero, prove *quanta vis caloris insit in omni corpore*. Rackham, in the Loeb ND, translates these words "how great is the supply of heat in every living body". This is both weak and false: "supply", as a translation of *vis* (δύναμις, "power") is weak, and *in omni corpore* should be translated as "in the body as a whole". The digestive faculty does not belong to the body as a whole. What is said *sub* [2], however, when added to what is *sub* [1], shows that the body as a whole is at issue. The veins and arteries<sup>12)</sup> are found throughout the body. Heat is operative everywhere in the body, both in the digestive apparatus and in the veins, arteries and heart. Furthermore, there is a distinction between [1] and [2]: [1] is about the effects [*vim*] of heat in digestion, still to be discerned in excrement; [2] is about the effects of heat as to be noticed in the rapid *motions* of veins, arteries and heart, which *resemble* that of fire [*micare non desinunt quasi quodam igneo motu; ita mobiliter palpitaret ut imitaretur igneam celeritatem*]. - It should already be noted that [2] does not refer to self-motion, a point to which I shall return shortly.

Cleanthes' arguments are preceded by a brief passage (in ND II 23) about the *vis caloris* of which Cleanthes speaks. Von Arnim suggested that "perhaps" this also came from Cleanthes "via Posidonius" and therefore prints it at SVF I, 513. Solmsen argues at some length that it actually does come from Cleanthes and that we need not think of Posidonius at all<sup>13)</sup>.

I shall transcribe it:

*sic enim res se habet ut omnia quae alantur et quae crescant contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possunt nec crescere. nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. quod autem alitur et crescit, motu quodam utitur certo et aequabili, qui quam diu remanet in nobis tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et extinguimur.*

Solmsen compared this passage with the long quotation of Cleanthes at ND II 40-41 (SVF I, 504) and argued that each key concept of 23 recurs at 40-41<sup>14)</sup>. "In both passages, the *calor* or fire is the vital principle"<sup>15)</sup>; on both occasions, it is the cause of growth and conservation and of *sensus*, and things cannot be nourished without the agency of fire. I quite agree, but have to insist that the concept of self-motion, which is 'vital' to II 23, is absent from II 40-41, just as it is absent from the Cleanthes-section at II 24. Solmsen acknowledges that, in II 23, it is "a very important point made in this context ... that the θερμόν (or the fire) moves itself and acts *motu suo*. It is an αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν"<sup>16)</sup>. Yet he fails to comment upon the absence of this important point in II 40-41.

I have been unable to trace any reference to the concept of self-motion in Stoicism prior to Chrysippus<sup>17)</sup>. Consequently, though I agree that what is found in ND II 23 prepares the Cleanthes passage in 24 and is to a large extent based on the Cleanthean ideas found at 40-41 and 24, I cannot accept that, as such, it is *by* Cleanthes.

But there is more. The final section of ND II 24, immediately subsequent to the piece from Cleanthes, runs as follows:

*omne igitur quod vivit, sive animal sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. ex quo intellegi debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem.*

A moment's reflexion shows that these sentences do not link up well with the preceding quotation from Cleanthes, II 24 *quod quidem - celeritatem*, cited *supra*, p. 204. The Cleanthes passage is about the effects of heat in living animals only, as visible where digestion and the veins, arteries and heart are concerned. The *igitur* of the first sentence of the final section of II 24



(which first sentence, through *ex quo*, is rigorously connected with the final sentence) has no relation with II 24 *quod quidem - celeritatem*. ND II 24, *sub fine*, adds plants and states that every living being, whether animal or plant, "owes its life to the heat contained in it", and goes on to affirm that "this elemental heat possesses in itself a vital force that pervades the whole world" - presumably because there are living beings everywhere.

However, if we skip II 24 *quod quidem - celeritatem* and link up the final section of 24 with the passage on vital heat in 23, everything becomes clear. The words (24) *omne igitur quod vivit, ..., id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem* link up with the final sentence of 24, *qui [sc. motus certus et aequabilis] quam diu remanet in nobis tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et extinguimur*<sup>18</sup>). The statement (in 24) that every living being owes its life to the heat it contains within itself resumes the point made at 23, *sub fine*, that we perish and are extinguished when our heat is cooled and quenched. - For the sake of clarity, I shall copy out II 23 + 24, *sub fine*, skipping both Cleanthean *argumenta*:

*sic enim res se habet ut omnia quae alantur et quae crescant contineant in se vim caloris, sine qua neque ali possunt nec crescere. nam omne quod est calidum et igneum cietur et agitur motu suo. quod autem alitur et crescit, motu quodam utitur certo et aequabili, qui quam diu remanet in nobis tam diu sensus et vita remanet, refrigerato autem et extincto calore occidimus ipsi et extinguimur. omne igitur quod vivit, sive animal sive terra editum, id vivit propter inclusum in eo calorem. ex quo intellegi debet eam caloris naturam vim habere in se vitalem per omnem mundum pertinentem.*

This argument runs smoothly without the Cleanthes section; it does not collapse when this is removed<sup>19</sup>), but is definitely improved when we try out this experiment. On the other hand, the reference to Cleanthes is not inappropriate: his proof that the *vis caloris* (discussed in II 23 and attributed there to all living beings, including plants) is effective in the animal body as a whole shores up what has been said immediately before. I

therefore believe that Cicero copied out the "Wärmelehre" as a whole, inclusive of references. The Cleanthes section in II 24 is an apposite ancient footnote, and these, as we know, were incorporated into the text.

If I have argued correctly, there is no argument either in favour of the attribution to Cleanthes of ND II 25-28 (about the heat in the elements in the cosmos). For this section can only be attributed to Cleanthes if II 23-24 as a whole is by him<sup>20</sup>). I cannot pursue this here. There are two other points, however, which I want to mention in order to conclude.

First: the important concept of self-motion, first stated II 23, is only resumed at II 31-32, where Plato is explicitly referred to for the distinction between it and that of derived motion. I have pointed out *supra* that the self-motion found at II 23 is absent from the undeniably Cleanthean passages in 24 and 40-41. The fact that, at 32, it is explicitly derived from "Plato, that divine philosopher", cannot be a coincidence. ND II 30b-32a continue the "Wärmelehre" begun at 23-28. I submit that the author (*nomina sunt odiosa*) who composed the "Wärmelehre" copied out (and abridged) by Cicero quoted Plato at II 32, just as he quoted Cleanthes at II 24 and II 40-41, and, presumably, Aristotle at II 42-44<sup>21</sup>).

Secondly: if the "Wärmelehre" as a whole is attributed to Cleanthes and the notion of a heat fused with the body is considered to be a specifically Cleanthean idea here, then ND II 18 *calorem qui est fusus in corpore* (the context shows that the human body is meant) is Cleanthean. But at II 18, the words just quoted are part of a quotation from Xenophon (*Mem. I 4, 8*). I believe that it would be going too far to have Cleanthes quoting Xenophon; anyway, no one, as far as I know, either attributed the quotation in II 18 to Cleanthes or linked it up with the "Wärmelehre"<sup>22</sup>). On the other hand, Cicero did not quote Xenophon from the *Memorabilia*<sup>23</sup>). Xenophon, *loc. cit.*, refers to the elements but only specifies earth and the wet element. Cicero is explicit about air and fire as well. Sextus, *M. IX*, 92-94, quotes a larger section from Xenophon, viz., *Mem. I 4, 2-8*, and pretends that he gives it verbatim (δὲ ὅν κατὰ λέξιν φησιν), which he does not: the dialogue between Socrates and Aristodemus has been both abridged and rephrased. Sextus, *op. cit.*, 94, has what Cicero has at ND II 18: like Cicero, he also mentions each of the

four elements. Both Cicero's and Sextus' quotation of Xenophon beyond doubt derives from the same ultimate source intermediate between Xenophon and their own exposition<sup>24</sup>). Sextus, however, does not say fire is "fused with the body". Whether or not Cicero added this bit in order to anticipate the subsequent sections on the 'Wärmelehre' I do not know.

# NOTES

1. *Poseidonios* (Munich 1921), 224 ff. Cf. also Pauly-Wissowa XXII (1954), 697 ff.
2. *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste. II, Le Dieu Cosmique* (Paris 1949), 384 ff., 388 f.
3. *Ciceros Arbeitsweise im zweiten und dritten Buch der Schrift De Natura Deorum*, diss. Leiden 1961 (Groningen 1961), 40 ff., 48, 122 f. Note that, *ibid.*, 122, Kleywegt does not exclude that Cicero got his Cleanthes from Posidonius; Festugière did not either, see next note.
4. Festugière, *o.c.*, 388 n. 1; Kleywegt, *o.c.*, 122 f.
5. *Les preuves stoïciennes de l'existence des dieux d'après Cicéron (De natura deorum, livre II)*, REG 1970 [301 ff.], 311 ff. Festugière replied to Boyancé: *Sur Le De Natura Deorum, II de Cicéron*, R.Sc.philos.th. 1979, 593 ff. A German translation of Boyancé's paper is in K. Büchner (ed.), *Das neue Cicero-Bild* (WdF XXVII, Darmstadt 1971), 446 ff.; see esp. 459 ff.
6. Cleanthes or Posidonius? *The Basis of Stoic Physics*, Med. Kon. Ned. Ak., Afd. Lett., N.R. vol. XXIV, 1961, 266 ff. (also separately, Amsterdam 1961), repr. in: *Kleine Schriften I* (Hildesheim 1968), 436 ff. I shall quote from Med. Kon. Ned. Ak., the pagination of which is preserved in *Kl. Schr.*
7. *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology* (Ohio State U.P. 1977), 140 ff.
8. *O.c.*, 267 ff.
9. *O.c.*, 144.
10. *O.c.*, 144.
11. J. Mansfeld, *The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract ΠΕΡΙ 'ΕΒΔΟΜΙΑΝ and Greek Philo-sophy* (Assen 1971), 93 ff.
12. Since the nerves are not mentioned, there is no anachronism involved in attributing a distinction between veins and arteries to Cleanthes.
13. *O.c.*, 268 ff.
14. *O.c.*, 268 f.
15. *Ibid.*, 269.
16. *Ibid.*, 268.
17. See *o.c.* (*supra*, n. 11), 38-40.
18. This sounds like a variation of a Stoic *locus communis*, for which see, e.g., SVF I, 137.
19. Reinhardt, *Pos.*, 228, argued that Cleanthes as in II 40-41 cannot be removed: "man versuche, das Zitat zu streichen, und die ganze Beweisführung fällt über den Haufen". Significantly, he did not argue in this way - at least as far as I am aware - about Cleanthes as in II 24.
20. Cf. Solmsen, *o.c.*, 269.
21. For the extent to which Cicero's Aristotle has been Stoicized here see B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der aristotelischen Schrift "Über die Philosophie"* (Munich 1970), 127 ff., whom, however, I do not follow all the way.
22. In the early decades of the present century, the teleological sections in the *Mem.* were generally considered to be interpolations, containing, among other things, Stoic ideas. See e.g. P. Klimek, *Die Gespräche über die Götter in Xenophons Memorabilien. Auf ihre Echtheit untersucht* (Breslau 1918). Klimek, *o.c.*, 41 f., detected Cleanthes in *Mem.* I 4, 13-14.

I mention this for curiosity's sake; see W. Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles* (Zürich-Leipzig 1925, Berlin 1965), 14 ff.

23. This is often overlooked, e.g. by Pease, *ad loc.*

24. A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusammenhange* (Berlin 1892), 85 ff., argued that the many arguments Cicero and Sextus have in common derive from a common source, which he called Posidonius. For an analysis of Sextus ~ Cicero see Festugière, *o.c.*, 406 ff. Reinhardt, *Pos.*, 208 ff., argued against Schmekel and others that what Cicero and Sextus share derives from a handbook, not from Posidonius (see *ibid.*, 209 for Xenophon).

## SOME STOICS ON THE SOUL (SVF I 136)

In his chapter *περὶ ψυχῆς*, ps. Galen has a brief reference to Zeno (*H. Ph.* c. 24, *Dox. Gr.* p. 613, 12-4), printed by von Arnim (SVF I 136) as follows: τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς (scil. τῆς ψυχῆς) οἱ μὲν ἀσώματον ἔφασαν, ὡς Πλάτων, οἱ δὲ σώματα κινεῖν, ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ. πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὗτοι. Diels' two manuscripts offer *varias lectiones*; A has what is printed by von Arnim, B σῶμα συγκινοῦν, which is what Diels prints, daggering συγκινοῦν. The Latin translation of Nicolaus Reginus has *corpus simul secum movens*, so his Greek text had what is in B. Von Arnim's decision to plump for A is unfortunate; οὐσίαν ... ἔφασαν ... σώματα κινεῖν (? "they said her essence was to move bodies") is awkward Greek, and σώματα κινεῖν does not stand in opposition to Plato's ἀσώματον. Diels rightly daggered συγκινοῦν; what Nicolaus managed to get out of it (*simul secum*) is more than is in the Greek. I suggest that we read σωματικόν, or rather σωματικὸν κινεῖν. The opposition between Plato's incorporealism and Zeno's corporealism occurs elsewhere in ps. Galen, viz. c. 26, *Dox. Gr.* p. 608, 16-19 = SVF I 153 (b): Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ Ζήνων περὶ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ θεοῦ διεληλυθότες οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ταύτης διανοήθησαν, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Πλάτων θεὸν ἀσώματον, Ζήνων δὲ σῶμα. For the opposition ἀσώματον—σωματικόν (not: σῶμα) cf. the abstract from Chrysippus *ap. Ar.* Did. fr. 25, *Dox. Gr.* p. 460, 26-7 = SVF II 503, p. 163, 7-8: καθάπερ δὲ τὸ σωματικὸν πεπερασμένον εἶναι, οὕτως τὸ ἀσώματον ἄπειρον. Aet. I 5, 1 = SVF II 530 reports the Stoics said that there is one cosmos, which, they said, was the "all" and τὸ σωματικόν. Note that ps. Galen, c. 24, speaks of Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, i.e., includes Zeno's successors.

If we read οὐσίαν (*sc.* ψυχῆς), ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, σωματικόν· πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὗτοι, we get an inference that makes sense and can be paralleled. In ps. Galen, the argument that the soul is cor-



poreal because it is *pneuma* is given in abbreviated form. It is fully stated (and attributed to Zeno) by Tert., *An.* 5 = SVF I 137; here the assumption that the soul is *consitus spiritus* (σύμφυτον πνεῦμα) and the further assumption, or fact, that this *pneuma* is a body prove that soul is a body. [The assumption that the soul is such a *pneuma* was proved by Zeno as follows: that which, by its leaving the body, is the cause of the living being's death must be the soul; now the living being dies when the natural spirit—*naturalis spiritus* ~ πνεῦμα—leaves; so the soul is natural spirit. Calc. c. 220 = SVF I 138].

SVF I 136 (ps. Gal. c. 24), I suggest, is to be read and understood as follows: τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν αὐτῆς [*sc.* τῆς ψυχῆς] οἱ μὲν ἀσώματον (*sc.* κινουῖν) ἔφασαν, ὡς Πλάτων, οἱ δὲ σωματικὸν κινουῖν, ὡς Ζήνων καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐτοῦ· πνεῦμα γὰρ εἶναι ταύτην ὑπενόησαν καὶ οὗτοι. Both Plato and Zeno and his followers said the soul was a mover; Plato, however, said this mover was incorporeal, the Stoics that it was corporeal. The opposition itself turns on that between corporeal and incorporeal. That the soul is a *pneuma* containing heat (πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον) because we are alive—cf. SVF I 138, cited *supra*—through this *pneuma* and are moved by it (τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἔμπνους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κινεῖσθαι) was a view shared, according to Diog. Laert. VII 157, by Zeno (SVF I 135), Antipater (SVF III Antip. 49), and Posidonius (fr. 139 E.-K. = 390 Theil.). In the previous sentence (VII 156 = SVF II 774), Diog. Laert. briefly cites the argument of SVF I 137: ταύτην (*sc.* τὴν ψυχὴν) τὸ σὺμφυτὸν ἡμῖν πνεῦμα· διὸ καὶ σῶμα εἶναι ... This abbreviated argument resembles what I want to read into SVF I 136. Note that Diog. Laert. VII 156-7 states both that the soul is a body because it is a *pneuma* and that this *pneuma* is what we are moved by. Diog. Laert. also says (VII 156 = SVF II 774, continuing καὶ σῶμα εἶναι, cited *supra*) that the soul survives death (καὶ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον ὑπομένειν), and he goes on to list the different views of Cleanthes (VII 157 = SVF II 522) and Chrysippus (*ibid.*, = SVF II 811) as to whether or not all souls survive until total conflagration. Also ps. Galen, c. 24, p. 613, 15-19 (not in SVF) speaks of 'the' Stoic view of the soul's survival after death for one cosmic period; the doxographies, in ps. Galen c. 24 and Diog. Laert. VII 156-7, reward comparison. Now ps. Galen, *loc. cit.*, again compares the views of Plato and the Stoics: both say the soul is immortal (ἀθάνατον δὲ Πλάτων καὶ οἱ Στωικοί)—but with a difference, Plato holding that it would never perish, the Stoics that it would perish at the moment of total conflagration. This scheme is the same as what I have assumed for SVF I 136 in ps. Galen c. 24: both say the soul is a mover, but with a difference, viz. the one that it is incorporeal, the others that it is corporeal.

It will be clear that SVF I 136 would make sense if only σωματικόν, not σωματικὸν κινουῖν were to be read. The latter, however, explains the corruptions in A and B. Although it is perhaps idle to speculate, corruption could have occurred in the following way: σωματικονκινουῖν became σωματακονκινουῖν, i.e., a copyist wrote σωματα instead of σωματι. But κωνι-

νουῖν does not make sense; it was emended to κινεῖν, and κων—assumed to be a sort of dittography of the subsequent κιν—eliminated. This gives what is now in B. What is now in A may also be a *Verschlimmbesserung*: originating in a false division of σωματακονκινουῖν, thus: σωματα κωνκινουῖν, with emendation of κωνκινουῖν to συγκινουῖν and of σωματα to σῶμα. This is also possible if σωματι κωνκινουῖν was the text emended. Ligatures, or abbreviations, may also have played a part; on the assumption that the words at issue were not spelled out, the two corruptions are even easier to explain.

### THREE NOTES ON ALBINUS\*

#### I. *Problems of Transcendence*

One of the crucial passages in Albinus' *Didascalicus* is Ch. X, p. 164, \* 16-20 Hermann,<sup>1</sup> on the deduction of highest ἀρχή of reality : ἐπεὶ δὲ ψυχῆς νοῦς ἀμείνων, νοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν πάντα νόων καὶ ἅμα καὶ αἰεί, τούτου δὲ καλλίων ὁ αἷτιος τούτου καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων ὑφέστηκεν, οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος θεός, αἷτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ αἰεὶ ἐνεργεῖν τῷ νῷ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. The problem is whether or not the words καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων are capable of an interpretation according to which Albinus would admit the possibility of a principle even higher than the Cause of the intellect of the universe. In his fundamental article on the relations between first intellect, second intellect and world-soul J.H. Loenen<sup>2</sup> argued against H. Dörrie's<sup>3</sup> affirmation of this possibility. However, it is doubtful whether Loenen correctly summed up Dörrie's position; cf. also [9] p. 309, where the relevant passage is quoted as far as αἷτιος τούτου, the words καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ... ὑφέστηκεν being omitted. One understands Ph. Merlan's criticism<sup>4</sup> of Loenen's arguments, though, as I will try to show presently, his complete rejection of Loenen's interpretation is not very helpful. Merlan paraphrases : "Better than the actual intelligence is its cause (αἷτιος). And if there is something still better than any of the preceeding ones (i.e. than soul, intelligence and the cause

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\* Notes I and III have in part been inspired by the recent discussions of Merlan [16] and Dörrie [17]. See the bibliography, below, p. 80.

<sup>1</sup> Hermann [1].

<sup>2</sup> Loenen [9], I, p. 305-6 n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Dörrie [8], p. 339-40. Cf. also Dörrie [10], p. 212 n. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Merlan [14], p. 62 ff.

of intelligence) — it would be the first god".<sup>1</sup> One also understands that Dörrie saw no reason to correct his earlier interpretation; in his recent article in Pauly-Wissowa, he writes: "seine Anschauung ist an die δύναμις des himmlischen und an die ἐνέργεια des überhimmlischen Gottes gebunden. Er lässt die Möglichkeit offen, es könne darüber ein noch höheres Prinzip geben, das menschlicher Denkfähigkeit entrückt sei".<sup>2</sup>

The problem is partly a problem of method in philosophical interpretation, partly of the philological interpretation of a text. Quite possibly, Albinus' conception of the first god is not wholly consistent, as is argued at some length by Merlan.<sup>3</sup> Albinus would be guilty of contaminating a god above intellect (as in the triad god : intellect : soul) and a god which is liable of being identified with intellect (as in the triad god : ideas : matter). For the god above intellect Merlan refers<sup>4</sup> to the passage from Ch. X, quoted above, and to the fact that at the beginning of this same chapter the highest ἀρχή is said to be ineffable<sup>5</sup> (p. 164,7 H.). To be critical of the conception of a philosopher is a quite legitimate attitude in philosophical interpretation, but to incorporate into Albinus' philosophical position what this criticism reveals is rather questionable. Philological support for Albinus' supposed admission of a god above the first intellect is lacking, or so I think. Merlan's paraphrase of the sentence from Ch. X quoted above is revealing: he puts a full stop after αἴτιος τούτου and begins a new sentence corresponding to καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ... οὐρανοῦ.<sup>6</sup> But in this fashion Albinus' sentence is broken up in an impossible way: the protasis beginning with ἐπεὶ goes as far as ὑφέστηκεν, the apodosis being οὗτος ἂν ... οὐρανοῦ; on Merlan's division, the protasis is left high and dry. Moreover, at the beginning of Ch. X the highest ἀρχή is described not as

<sup>1</sup> Merlan [14], p. 62-3.

<sup>2</sup> Dörrie [17], Sp. 20. He goes on: "Er lässt also als Hypothese ein noch höheres Göttliches zu — seine Nachfolger werden, knapp 50 Jahre später, von der Existenz des Höchsten Einen wie von einer gesicherten Position ausgehen".

<sup>3</sup> Merlan [14], p. 64 ff. Cf. below, p. 66.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. also Merlan [16], p. 66-7. Though Merlan's position here is more satisfying than in [14], the difference from his earlier point of view is not striking.

<sup>5</sup> ἄρρητος. Cf. also p. 164, 28 H., p. 165, 4 H.

<sup>6</sup> Merlan [14], p. 62-3.

wholly ineffable, but as almost ineffable (ἦν μικροῦ δεῖν καὶ ἄρρητον ἡγείται ὁ Πλάτων).<sup>1</sup> I would say that these arguments are also valid against Dörrie's position, which, as we saw, is similar to that of Merlan. Though Dörrie's caesura is not as strong as that brought about by Merlan, he also appears to assume that ὁ αἴτιος τούτου refers to an entity other than that referred to by ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτου. Though this interpretation is not absolutely impossible, I do believe that it is mistaken. For the sentence runs τούτου (sc. the intellect κατ' ἐνέργειαν)<sup>2</sup> δὲ καλλίων ὁ αἴτιος τούτου καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων ὑφέστημεν, οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος θεός, αἴτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ αἰὲν ἐνεργεῖν τῷ νῷ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. It is easier to have οὗτος refer to both ὁ αἴτιος and ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων. Albinus first argues *in abstracto*: intellect is better than soul, intellect κατ' ἐνέργειαν than intellect ἐν δυνάμει; he goes on *in concreto*: while even more beautiful than intellect κατ' ἐνέργειαν<sup>3</sup> is what is the cause of intellect in this condition, *that is to say*<sup>4</sup> what exists as even higher than these (sc. soul, intellect ἐν δυνάμει, intellect κατ' ἐνέργειαν).<sup>4</sup> Albinus says of the αἴτιος that it is more beautiful (καλλίων), not that it is better (ἀμείνων) than the intellect in act. Though I may be oversensitive here, I somehow feel that the use of καλλίων is significant; it is not the first attribute which one would think of in connection with a cause. The words καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων ὑφέστηκεν are best explained as being the expression of some hesitation, on Albinus' part, in using the word αἴτιος at all in speaking of what is even more beautiful than an active intellect. The nature of the superior principle is not adequately expressed by the word αἴτιος, which only reveals its relation to the active intellect. But in itself, the highest principle is almost ineffable (Ch. X, the beginning, quoted above): the difficulties of circumscribing its nature are adequately demonstrated by the

<sup>1</sup> While the unqualified ineffability (cf. above, p. 62 n. 5) attributed to it is part of the attempts at description which take up most of Ch. X.

<sup>2</sup> I shall argue presently (below, p. 64-5) that this refers to the intellect of the world-soul.

<sup>3</sup> καί.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Festugière's translation, [7] p. 96: "et plus belle que l'Intellect en acte est la Cause de celui-ci et quoi que ce soit qui existe au-dessus encore de ces trois choses" (my italics).



attempts at description by means of the *viae* of negation etc. to which most of Ch. X is devoted.

It is, moreover, also incorrect to distinguish between the *νοῦς ἐν δυνάμει* and the *νοῦς κατ' ἐνέργειαν*. Dörrie speaks of the *δύναμις* of the celestial and the *ἐνέργεια* of the transestelial god. He appears to mean that *δύναμις* applies to the demiurgic power of the celestial god, while *ἐνέργεια* would refer to the paradigmatic impact of the ideas in the mind of the transestelial god.<sup>1</sup> However, it is far more simple to assume that the difference between *νοῦ τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει* and *ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν* (p. 164,17 H.) is an echo of a familiar Aristotelian distinction.<sup>2</sup> Albinus also uses an Aristotelian theme when p. 164,26-7 H. he makes the first intellect "think of himself" (*ἐαυτὸν ... νοοῦν*).<sup>3</sup> At p. 164,17 H. therefore Albinus speaks of potential and actual intellect. Now it is of course true that Albinus attributes *ἐνέργεια* to the highest intellect; its thinking of itself and of its own thoughts is an activity which constitutes an idea (*καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ἰδέα ὑπάρχει*, p. 164,27 H.). But also the celestial intellect is capable of *ἐνέργεια*; as a matter of fact, its *everlasting ἐνέργεια* is caused by the transestelial god (... *ὁ πρῶτος θεός, αἴτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ αἰὲ ἐνεργεῖν τῷ νῷ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ*). The difference between the *ἐνέργεια* of the transestelial god and that of the celestial god is that that of the former is a self-caused activity, while that of the latter is a derived activity. This immediately explains why Albinus speaks of an intellect *ἐν δυνάμει*: this intellect is a potential one in so far as it can only be actualized under the influence of the superior Cause. Because this causation is an eternal causation, the intellect of the universe is eternally active and never only potential; but it is potential in so far as this activity is not its own doing. Cosmic intellect is the eternally actualized potentiality of the cosmic soul. In this respect, I

<sup>1</sup> Dörrie [8], p. 339-40; [11], p. 212; [17], Sp. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Cherniss [3], p. 79.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. e.g. Armstrong [12], p. 404; Rist [15], p. 65-6, Merlan [14], p. 64, p. 65 notices the reminiscence of Aristotle's unmoved mover (p. 164, 20-1 H. *ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἀκίνητος*; 22-3 H. *καὶ ὡς τὸ ὁρεκτὸν κινεῖ τὴν ὁρεξιν ἀκίνητον ὑπάρχον*). Merlan points out that in Albinus the celestial intelligence performs some of the cosmic duties of Aristotle's unmoved mover, but he has to admit that the predicate *ἀκίνητος* is attributed to the transestelial intellect only.

completely agree with Loenen's interpretation which makes the cosmic intellect a function of the world-soul.<sup>1</sup> I may add that the argument in favour of considering the active world-*νοῦς* as a function of the world-soul<sup>1</sup> is further supported by the fact that the first god wakes up this intellect and soul from as it were a deep coma or deep sleep (Ch. X, p. 165,1-3 H. *τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ κόσμου ἐπεγείρας καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέψας, τοῦ νοῦ αὐτῆς αἴτιος ὑπάρχων*; Ch. XIV, p. 169,31 ff. H. *ἐγείρων καὶ ἐπιστρέφων πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν τε νοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἐκ κάρου τινος βάθεος ἢ ὕπνου*), in order that by contemplating his thoughts it may receive *τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰς μόρφας*. Witt suggests that the conception of a comatose soul (his parallels are only valid for the human soul) is a common-place among the Middle Platonists.<sup>2</sup> But there is more to it than this. I think this is another instance in this chapter of the impact of Aristotelian theology. According to Aristotle, a god who does not think would be a god asleep,<sup>3</sup> but god being pure *ἐνέργεια*<sup>4</sup> cannot be asleep. Sleep, on the other hand, is defined as *ἀργία ψυχῆς*, *ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνέργεια*.<sup>5</sup> The argument at Aët., *Plac.* I, 7, p. 300,22-30 Diels against the absurd idea of a sleeping god probably is influenced by Aristotelian ideas<sup>6</sup> (*ἄδεκτος ὕπνου ὁ θεός...*; *ὁ θεὸς ἐγρηγορώς...*). In Albinus, the absurdity of a sleeping god is so to speak transposed into the caused dependence of the world-soul (which by itself is asleep = inactive) upon the first god, who eternally awakens the world-soul and energizes its intellect.

<sup>1</sup> Loenen [9] I, p. 305 ff. interprets the relevant passages. Cf. also Armstrong [12], p. 403, and Milhaven [13], p. 132 ff., who however strangely argues that the celestial intellect is "letztlich materieller Natur" (ibid. p. 135). Merlan's belief ([14], p. 62 n. 1) in the hypostasis of an intellect mediating between the first intellect and soul, based upon his rejection of Loenen's position, is unfounded.

<sup>2</sup> Witt [2], p. 132. Loenen [9] II, p. 51-2 adds a parallel from Plutarch concerning the world-soul, but refuses to accept Witt's thesis that the idea was common-place in Middle Platonism.

<sup>3</sup> *Met. A*, 1074b 17.

<sup>4</sup> *Met. A*, 1072b 26 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *EE* 1209b 19 ff.

<sup>6</sup> So Effe [18], p. 24 ff., who argues that the passage in the *Plac.* is influenced by *Π. φιλοσοφίας*. For the Aristotelian parallels quoted in the text cf. ibid., p. 30. Effe also studies parallel passages in Cicero and Philo (Boethus *ap. Philo, Aet. mund.* 83 ff.) as possible echoes of the views expressed in Aristotle's lost work.

In view of the above arguments, we may assume that Albinus did not admit the possibility of a principle superior to the transcelestial intellect which eternally activates the potential intellect of the world-soul. We have to admit, however, that Albinus' conception of the highest entity in the order of being is not wholly satisfactory. It is (a) intellect and qualifiable as well as (b) ineffable. In this respect Merlan's criticisms are wholly justified.<sup>1</sup> But it is false to impute to Albinus not only this lack of clarity, but also a certain consciousness of this lack of clarity which occasionally made him admit that above the transcelestial divinity which selfconsciously thinks the ideas, its own thoughts, is an even higher and even more ineffable entity. Nothing is more beautiful than the first intellect (οὐδὲν δὲ αὐτοῦ καλλίον, p. 164, 25-6 H.). The difficulties in which Albinus got himself involved are inherent in the conception of νοῦς itself. As A.-J. Festugière has shown,<sup>2</sup> in the language of pre-neoplatonic Platonism νοῦς is both the faculty cognizing the νοητόν and the supra-cognitive faculty reaching out to what is above thought. God as cause can be reached by reason (λόγος), while god as indefinable is to be reached by what is above λόγος, i.e. νοῦς. But νοῦς at the same time is the faculty directed at what is νοητόν ... "La langue philosophique platonicienne manquait d'un terme pour désigner ce qui est *seulement* organe de l'intuition mystique".<sup>3</sup> One may add that it also lacked a special term to designate what is the unique object of such an intuition. God as a supreme νοητόν, "avec glissement de ce νοητόν à un νοῦς", is a phenomenon not only in Albinus, but also elsewhere in pre-neoplatonic thought.<sup>4</sup> We understand how Albinus' first intellect comes to serve as what is ineffable as well. A correct evaluation of this wavering conception, which is perhaps not what one would expect to find in an important and original philosopher, once again reveals the measure of Plotinus' greatness. And such a look ahead at the achievement of Plotinus also reveals to which extent all of Albinus' highest principles are not completely differentiated from one another. Both the transcelestial god and

<sup>1</sup> Merlan [14], p. 64 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Festugière [7], p. 136-9.

<sup>3</sup> Festugière [7], p. 138.

<sup>4</sup> Festugière [7], p. 136.

the celestial god are called νοῦς, i.e. they are in some respects similar. Cosmic soul, on the other hand, contains the eternally realized possibility of the celestial intellect. Consequently, soul, though only by proxy, i.e. in so far as it becomes intellect, also approaches the Supreme, which, however, forever remains exterior to it as its object of contemplation and desire.

## II. Forms and Qualities

The theory of ideas as expounded in the *Didascalicus* is not without difficulties. As is quite well-known, Albinus distinguishes between ἰδέαι, transcendental ideas separate from matter which are identified with the thoughts of the transcelestial and first intellect, and immanent εἶδη, forms which are inseparable from matter (though conceivable by our mind). A blend, of course, of Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions. The distinction between separate ideas and immanent forms is already found in Seneca, who also locates the former in the mind of god,<sup>1</sup> though not in that of a transcendental God. The elevation of the god who thinks of the ideas to the level of transcendence appears to be an innovation either by Albinus himself<sup>2</sup> or by the author of a lost source to be dated between the *Didasc.* and (the source of) Seneca.

In relation to human cognition, these two kinds of ideas are p. 155, 34-6 H. referred to as respectively first and second intelligibles (νοητά), the objects of our first and second cognition (νόησις). At Ch. IX, p. 163, 21 ff. H. Albinus mentions, apparently approvingly, the view of "most of Plato's followers" according to which there are no ἰδέαι of the products of art, of things contrary to nature, of individuals ("Socrates, Plato"), of vulgar things and of relative concepts; these are *infra dignitatem*, for ἰδέαι are the perfect and eternal thoughts of god.

In Ch. IV Albinus not only distinguishes between two kinds of intelligibles, but also between two kinds of sensibles (p. 155,37-156,4 and p. 156,7-9 H.). You have first αἰσθητά, such as αἱ ποιότητες,

<sup>1</sup> Seneca, *Ep.* 65,7 (cf. also *Ep.* 58, 19-20) See Theiler [5], p. 3 ff.; Witt [2], p. 70 ff.

<sup>2</sup> So Loenen [9] II, p. 46, followed by Armstrong [12], p. 402.

οἷον χρῶμα, λευκότης, and second αἰσθητά: that which is κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, τὸ κεχρωσμένον. The examples given appear to entail that the first sensibles are qualities *per se*,<sup>1</sup> second αἰσθητά qualities as immanent in things.<sup>2</sup> The public physical object is distinguished from both first and second sensibles and cognized in a different

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ch. IX, p. 164,1-5 H.: πρῶτα αἰσθητά cognized by true opinion are analogous to πρῶτα νοητά, i.e. transcendental ἰδέαι, cognized by νοῦς (cf. below, p. 71, n. 4). Ch. X, p. 164, 10-11 H.: ἔστι πρῶτα νοητά ἀπλᾶ, ὡς καὶ πρῶτα αἰσθητά.

<sup>2</sup> Witt [3], p. 59 correctly points out that a distinction between ποιότητες and ποιά τὰ κατὰ ταύτας παρονύμως λεγόμενα is found in Ch. 8 of Aristotle's *Categories*, 10a27 ff. Aristotle's distinction is that between merely naming a quality (~ ποιότης) and predicating it (~ ποιόν). Aristotle, of course, also distinguishes between quality and substance (both in the sense of individual thing and in the sense of εἶδος). Witt's claim (ibid.) that Antiochus *ap. Cic., Acad. Post.* 7, 26 interpreted this Aristotelian quality in a Stoic sense is unfounded (the 'first qualities' in his quotation do not correspond to those in the *Cat.*, but refer to the four simple elements from which e.g. living things originate). I would like to refer also to *Met. Δ* 14, 1020a33-b25, where Aristotle speaks of πρώτη ποιότης, which he defines as the *differentia* of substance, a view not found in *Cat.* Ch. 8. From quality as the *differentia* of a substance to substance (Aristotelian δευτέρη οὐσία) as a — corporeal — quality (the Stoics) is not a very difficult step. For the theory of certain Stoics on the three kinds of quality κατὰ διαφορὰν cf. Simplic., *in Categ.* p. 212, 7-213, 1 Kälbfleisch = *SVF* II, 390; for ποιότης as διαφορὰ οὐσίας cf. Simplic., ibid. p. 222,30 ff. = *SVF* II, 378. — Albinus' conception differs from that of Aristotle among other things in that his first sensibles are cognized by true opinion (cf. above, p. 1; below, p. 71, n. 4). It should be noted, however, that the Stoics, presumably reacting against Aristotle's views, explicitly held that all of the several types of qualities mentioned in *Cat.* Ch. 8 are bodies (e.g. the virtues, cf. *Cat.*, 8b33 ff. and *SVF* II, 797, 848, quoted by De Vogel, [10] 913a and b). For Albinus' opposition against the Stoic theory cf. below, p. 69 ff. — Milhaven [13], p. 68 states that there is an analogy between first and second sensibles and first and second intelligibles, in the sense that both 'seconds' postulate their 'firsts', though in a different way. Second intelligibles participate in first intelligibles. Second sensibles presuppose first sensibles (ibid. p. 68-70) because "was eine konkrete Realität zusammensetzt, für sich selbst genommen, einfacher und daher primär" is, He refers to Ch. X, p. 165, 31-2 H. τὸ γὰρ μέρος καὶ τὸ ἐξ οὗ πρότερον ὑπάρχει τούτου, οὗ μέρος (cf. also Milhaven, ibid. p. 61). But it is doubtful if this reference applies to things, and if qualities may be considered as parts of things. However this may be, applied to the physical object this would only imply that the immanent quality as a part of the complex is prior with regard to the complex itself, not that a separate quality is prior to an immanent quality. Moreover, the ontological status of a first quality as different from its possible epistemological status cannot be explained in this way. Also elsewhere, Milhaven did not recognize this ontological difficulty, cf. below, p. 73, n. 1.

mode: τὸ δὲ ἄθροισμα (the physical object, e.g. πῦρ, μέλι) ὁ δοξαστικός λόγος (κρίνει) οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. Perception is the necessary condition of the doxastic act of judgement which judges the physical object.

First and second sensibles, on the other hand, are cognized by perception having doxastic judgement as its necessary condition (τὰ δὲ πρῶτα αἰσθητά καὶ τὰ δεύτερα ἢ αἰσθησις κρίνει οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ λόγου).<sup>1</sup> Consequently, in Ch. IV qualities are excluded from the realm of ἰδέαι and even from (if I may say so) that of εἶδη. Qualities could doubtlessly be added to the list of not-ἰδέαι in Ch. IX, quoted above, p. 67. However, this view appears not to be maintained throughout. For the theory of ideas (and sensibles) is not only a combination of Platonic and Aristotelian views, but influenced by Stoic thought as well.

At Ch. XI, p. 166, 14-6 H. Albinus declares that qualities are incorporeal (ποιότητες ... ἀσώματοι). The use of the term ποιότητες recalls the first sensibles described in Ch. IV. But though he uses ποιότης instead of ποιόν, Albinus seems to have in mind the second sensibles (which were κατὰ συμβεβηκός) as instanced in Ch. IV, for in Ch. XI he says of ποιότης that it is συμβεβηκός (p. 166, 16 H.), and he points out that πᾶσα ποιότης is ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ (p. 166, 17 H.). Body (σῶμα) itself has just been defined as a combination of matter and immanent form (Ch. X, p. 166, 3 ff. H. πᾶν σῶμα συνδυασμὰ τι ... ἐκ τε ὕλης καὶ τοῦ σὺν αὐτῇ εἶδους; cf. also Ch. VIII, p. 163, 6-7 H., ὕλη οὐτε σῶμα οὐτε ἀσώματον, δυνάμει δὲ σῶμα). The argument in Ch. IV, as we recall, was epistemological; in Ch. XI, on the contrary, Albinus' point of view is ontological. It is also polemical, that is to say directed against the familiar Stoic view that qualities are bodies.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Albinus (or his source) appears to have studied the theory of sense-data in Plato's *Theaetetus*. I intend to return to the relations between *Didasc.* Ch. VI and the *Theaetetus* elsewhere, as Louis' references to this dialogue are by no means exhaustive (Louis [3], p. 10-18).

<sup>2</sup> Strangely, Louis [3], p. 64-6 fails to point this out; Witt [3], p. 59-60 is aware of the difference between Albinus and the Stoics, but does not devote much attention to it. For the Stoic theory of ποιότητες cf. e.g. *SVF* II, 467, 797, 848, and above, p. 68 n. 2. The pseudo-Galenic treatise *De qualitibus incorporeis* (ed. Westenberger, thesis Marburg 1906) has been attributed to Albinus by E. Orth, *Les Œuvres d'Albinos le Platonicien*,



According to the Stoics, qualities have to be corporeal because only body acts upon body.<sup>1</sup> Chrysippus had argued that such corporeal qualities shape and inform matter : τὰς δὲ ποιότητας πνεύματα οὐσας καὶ τόνους ἀερώδεις, οἷς ἂν ἐγγένωνται μέρεσι τῆς ὕλης, εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν.<sup>2</sup> Albinus, however, affirms as against the position that only body can act upon body that it is only the incorporeal which acts (τὰ ποιοῦντα οὐκ ἄλλα ἂν εἴη ἢ τὰ ἀσώματα, p. 166, 26-7 H.). There is, however, a difficulty here : the words just quoted almost immediately follow upon the sentence εἰ δὲ αἱ ποιότητες ἀσώματοι, καὶ τὸ δημιουργικὸν τούτων ἀσώματον (p. 166, 25-6 H.). What is the meaning of τούτων? Louis<sup>3</sup> thinks that the genitive is objective :<sup>4</sup> "that which produces the qualities". On this assumption Albinus probably is thinking mainly of his direct opponents, the Stoics, who assumed that the demiurge<sup>5</sup> of the properties of things, god, is material.<sup>6</sup> He would imply that the ultimate cause of the qualification of matter, the transcelestial god containing the ἰδέαι which, in a manner difficult to express, are the example of the forms immanent in matter,<sup>7</sup> is the demiurge (through a proxy, for it is the celestial god which performs the task) of what comes about in reality. One should recall that the Stoic god is to a certain extent the same as all the qualities of matter taken

Ant. Class. 15 (1947), p. 113-4. However, until a thorough investigation has thrown more light upon this problem the treatise cannot be used as evidence for Albinus' thought.

<sup>1</sup> SVF II, 146 = Diog. Laert. VII, 55; SVF I, 90 = Cic., *Ac. Po.* I, 11, 39 (quoted by De Vogel, [10], 901 a and b).

<sup>2</sup> SVF II, 449 = Plut., *Stoic. rep.*, 1054a.

<sup>3</sup> Louis [3], p. 64 : "Si les qualités sont incorporelles, ce qui les produit doit, lui aussi, être incorporel".

<sup>4</sup> Though my research has not been extensive (I have only checked the references in Liddell and Scott s.v.), I have been unable to find examples of δημιουργικός + obj. gen. The only examples given there of the substantiated τὸ δημιουργικόν are late. It appears in Proclus, *Elem. Theol.*, 157 as what presides over the bestowal of form upon things composite and their numerical distinction as individuals.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Diog. Laert. VII, 134 = SVF I, 85 (Zeno), 443 (Cleanthes): distinction between god as ποιοῦν and τὴν ἀποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην, as πᾶσιν. Of god it is said here that he δημιουργεῖ ἕκαστα.

<sup>6</sup> E.g. SVF I, 87 = Calc., in *Tim.* 294; SVF II, 1035 = Clem. Alex., *Strom.* V, 14, p. 384 Stählin.

<sup>7</sup> Ch. X, p. 166, 3 ff. H. πᾶν σῶμα συνδύασμά τι εἶναι ἐκ τε ὕλης καὶ τοῦ σὺν αὐτῇ εἶδους, ὅπερ ἐξομοιοῦται ταῖς ἰδέαις καὶ μετέχει αὐτῶν δύσφραστόν τινα τρόπον.

together.<sup>1</sup> — However, the genitive τούτων in τὸ δημιουργικὸν τούτων can also be explained as a possessive genitive. Albinus could be thinking of the demiurgic power of the (incorporeal) qualities themselves, which is not as strange as it may seem, since the Stoics in fact attributed such demiurgic powers to their own (corporeal) qualities : cf. Chrysippus, SVF II, 449, quoted above<sup>2</sup> : the qualities εἰδοποιεῖν<sup>3</sup> ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν. It should also be recalled that appellations denote the common qualities, SVF III, II, 22 = Diog. Laert. VII, 58 ἔστι δὲ προσηγορία μὲν κατὰ τὸν Διογένην μέρος λόγου σημαίνον κοινὴν ποιότητα, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος. Such a common quality is the product of a *logos spermatikos*, which itself is a part of the divine *logos* which shapes all things. Moreover, the active power of ποιότης appears to be implied at *Didasc.* Ch. X, p. 165, 9-10 H. : God is not a ποίον · οὐ γὰρ π ο ι ω θ έ ν έ σ τ ι καὶ υ π ο ποιότητος τοιοῦτον ἀποτετελεσμένον.

Consequently, I find it difficult to choose : both the possessive and the objective genitive τούτων give excellent sense in the polemical context of this chapter.

What follows from this, however, constitutes the main difficulty of Ch. XI as a whole. For the concept of ποιότης as found here is not far from that of εἶδος. In Ch. IV, however, ποιότης and εἶδος are located on different levels of being, for they are cognized by different means, viz., δόξα, and νόσις, which are sharply distinguished.<sup>4</sup> The polemical bent of the argument in Ch. XI tends to obliterate this epistemological distinction between εἶδος and ποιότης. This is understandable in so far as Albinus' thought is influenced by the Stoic theory

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the passages collected by De Vogel, [10] 919a-d and the author's comment, *ibid.* p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> See also the immediately preceding passage, Plut., *Stoic. rep.*, 1053 f = SVF II, 449.

<sup>3</sup> For εἰδοποιεῖν cf. also SVF II, 378 = Simplic., in *Cat.* p. 222, 30 ff. Kalbfleisch and SVF II, 1044 = Alex., *De mixt.* p. 225, 18 ff. Bruns.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. the distinction between νοῦς and δόξα ἀληθής at Ch. IX, p. 164, 1-5 H. : νοῦς cognizes the πρῶτα νοητά (= ἰδέαι), true opinion the πρῶτα αἰσθητά. See further Ch. IV, p. 156, 4-13 H. Cf. above, p. 67 ff. and p. 68 n. 1; also Witt [3], p. 53, who insists that in Albinus knowledge and opinion have no common starting-point. His statement *ibid.* p. 55 that a 'transition' from sense-perception to knowledge is found in the *Didasc.* is unjustified (at least in so far as the epistemology of the *Didasc.* is concerned), for Albinus sticks to the Platonic theory of anamnesis, Ch. XXV, p. 178, 1 ff. H.

which he tries to disprove — the Stoics could call both that which is designated by a word such as 'man' and that which is designated by a word such as 'white' a quality. In other words, while on the epistemological level qualities (both first and second αἰσθητά) are sharply distinguished from intelligibles both transcendental and immanent, on the ontological level at least the second sensibles immanent in things slide over into the εἶδη immanent in things. The blend of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions is not wholly perfect. What distinction between first and second sensibles Albinus may have thought he would be capable of upholding even within the context of *Didasc.*, Ch. XI is not clear. This especially concerns, of course, the position of the first sensibles: are they perhaps analogous to ἰδέαι, just as second sensibles appear to blend into εἶδη? In view of the relation between first and second sensibles themselves this is not very likely. We are left without an answer to this question.

That the ποιότητες are somehow connected with or derived from εἶδη is confirmed by other passages, several of which are to be found in Ch. VIII: p. 162, 30 ff. H. ἀναδέχεσθαι μὲν αὐτὴν (sc. ὕλη) πάντα τὰ εἶδη, αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀμορφὸν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἄποιον καὶ ἀνείδεον, ἀναματτομένην δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐκτυπουμενὴν καθάπερ ἔκμαγειον καὶ σχηματίζομένην ὑπὸ τούτων, μηδὲν ἴδιον σχῆμα ἔχουσαν μηδὲ ποιότητα. Further p. 162, 35-6 H. ἄποιόν ... καὶ ἀμέτοχον ἐκείνων τῶν εἰδῶν ἃ δεῖ αὐτὸ δέξασθαι, and p. 163, 5-6 ἄποιόν ... τε καὶ ἀνείδεον πρὸς ὑποδοχὴν τῶν εἰδῶν. The Stoic passages quoted above (e.g. *SVF* II, 449) should be compared, which speak of the εἰδοποιεῖν and σχηματίζειν by ποιότητες. At Ch. XIII, p. 168, 10 ff. H. the demiurge of the cosmos forms (διεσχημάτισε) the elements out of matter and mathematics. Albinus describes the result as the acquisition of σχῆμα or ποιότης, n.b. without distinguishing between shape and quality.<sup>1</sup> And again, to return to Ch. XI, at p. 166, 19-21

<sup>1</sup> p. 168, 13 ff. H. καθὸ μὲν πυραμίδος σχῆμα ἔλαβεν ἡ ὕλη, πῦρ ἐγένετο..., καθὸ δὲ ὀκταέδρου, τὴν ἀέρος ποιότητα ἀπέλαβε, καθὸ δὲ εἰκοσαέδρου τύπον, τὴν ὕδατος ποιότητα ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ τοῦ κύβου σχῆμα ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆ γῆ. (Cf. also Ch. VI, p. 159, 3 H. τὸ μετέχον σχήματος ποῖόν ἐστι). Physical qualities are derived from formal characteristics, as is the case already, of course, in the *Timaeus*, which Albinus is closely following in this section of the *Didasc.*

H. Albinus says that body *qua* body does not differ from body, but differs only in as far as it is qualified (σῶμά τε σώματος καθόσον σῶμα οὐδέν διαφέρει, ποιότητι δὲ διαφέρει καὶ οὐ μὰ Δία σώμασιν). Since Albinus can hardly mean that bodies cannot be different from each other as to their εἶδη, it would follow that also here εἶδος and ποιότης are not sharply distinguished.

The difficulties concerning the epistemological and ontological status of (first and second) qualities also present themselves *à propos* a passage in Ch. XXVII, p. 179, 34-180, 4 H., esp. p. 180, 1-4 H. There it is said of the human good that it is so named τῷ ὅπως οὖν μετέχειν ἐκείνου τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τιμιωτάτου (sc. god. i.e. the first intellect), ὅνπερ τρόπον καὶ τὰ γλυκέα καὶ τὰ θερμὰ κατὰ μετουσίαν τῶν πρώτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν. That which is sweet or hot (τὰ γλυκέα καὶ τὰ θερμὰ) may be interpreted as meaning second sensibles as in Ch. IV, or immanent qualities in general as in Ch. XI. However, Albinus (in view of the analogy with the relation between our good and the first intellect) appears to imply that there are ἰδέαι (cf. κατὰ μετουσίαν τῶν πρώτων) of sensible qualities, which would be quite odd in view of his point of view in Ch. IV and of the fastidiousness characterizing the list of what is not an ἰδέα in Ch. IX.<sup>1</sup> At first sight, a possible way out is to interpret this statement by leaning upon the analysis given above. It is not likely that Albinus means that γλυκέα and θερμὰ as second sensibles participate of first sensibles.<sup>2</sup> But it is quite likely

<sup>1</sup> Quoted p. 67. Milhaven [13], p. 117-8 points out the contradiction between p. 180, 1-4 and p. 163, 22 ff. H. He holds that the πρώτα at p. 180, 4 represent ἰδέαι (cf. also ibid., p. 99, where he speaks of τὸ πρώτων ἀγαθόν, τὸ πρώτων γλυκύ, τὸ πρώτων θερμόν).

<sup>2</sup> The term 'participation' is significant, while the words τὰ πρώτα in this context (proof is given for the participation of the human good in that of the transestelial god) must refer to the ἰδέαι. It is, of course, true that Aristotle held (cf. above, p. 68 n. 2) that ποιά are παρωνύμως λεγόμενα in regard to ποιότητες, but this derivation is not a question of participation. Note that Albinus speaks of ἐπωνυμία ... κατὰ μετουσίαν. However, if Aristotle's treatment of qualities in *Cat.* Ch. 8 is somehow remotely connected with the theories in the *Didasc.* (perhaps through Stoic discussions of this problem, cf. above p. 68, n. 2), then this connection is of some help in understanding how the confusion in Albinus came about. However, an *interpretatio platonica* of the Aristotelian view of the connection between ποιότητες and ποιά results in the same sort of inconsistency as that argued in the text. For on this account, Albinus would elevate the ποιότητες to the rank of quasi-ἰδέαι, of which a kind of participation is possible. But this quasi-

that he means that things sweet or warm or even these immanent qualities themselves are brought about by the immanent *εἶδη* by which things are shaped (cf. above, p. 72-3, on the qualities of fire etc.). These *εἶδη* themselves again participate in transcendental *ιδέαι*, cf. Ch. X, p. 166, 3 ff. H. : each body is a combination of matter and *τοῦ σὺν αὐτῇ εἶδους, ὅπερ ἐξομοιοῦται ταῖς ιδέαις καὶ μετέχει αὐτῶν δύσφραστόν τινα τρόπον*. In this way, sensible qualities *through* *εἶδη* would participate in *τὰ πρῶτα*. However, this explanation does not clear away all confusion. For if such participation is a participation through a proxy, the *name* of a quality cannot be derived from that of an *ιδέα*, while Albinus says that it is (*κατὰ μετουσίαν τῶν πρῶτων τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν*)—this is indeed impossible, even when such participation comes about *ὁπωσοῦν* (p. 180, 2 H.). However, it should be conceded that already in Plato the idea as universal is not always easily identifiable with the idea considered as a perfect type.

Difficult when compared with the passages studied so far is the argument against induction, Ch. XXV, p. 178, 1-10 H. Albinus defends the Platonic thesis that learning is nothing but recollection. It is impossible to derive our thinking of *κοινότητες* from our individual cognitive experiences. Complete induction is impossible, incomplete induction not infallible. We could e.g. make the mistake of believing that only what is breathing is a living being (*τὸ ἀναπνοῇ χρώμενον μόνον ζῶον εἶναι*, p. 178, 6-7 H.).<sup>1</sup> Merlan<sup>2</sup> assumes that the *κοινότητες* stand for ideas. However, both *ζῶον* and *ἀναπνοῇ χρώμενον* are 'common' to a plurality of individuals. *Ζῶον* is of the nature of a genus copying an *ιδέα*, *ἀναπνοῇ χρώμενον* perhaps more of the nature of a concomitant quality. Probably Albinus means that the inductive observation of individual living and breathing things never teaches us what it is to be 'alive', since we may single out the wrong quality as representative of the *εἶδος* and may construe a necessary relation where there is

ideal status of *ποιότητες*, which is not wholly consistent with the epistemological view of Ch. IV, cannot easily be reconciled with the treatment of quality in Ch. XI either.

<sup>1</sup> The mistake would be that on this account, soul and intellect would be excluded. Ch. XXV proves that soul is alive and immortal (e.g. p. 178, 18 H. *σύμφυτον ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν αἰεὶ ἐνέργουσαν καθ' αὐτήν*).

<sup>2</sup> Merlan [16], p. 65; cf. Milhaven [13], p. 88.

only an accidental one. Perhaps also he is thinking of *τὸ ἀναπνοῇ χρώμενον* as a sub-class of *τὸ ζῶον*. However this may be, induction would only make us cognize the *εἶδη* of things — and our impression might still be mistaken, for how can we be sure that what we consider to be the *εἶδος* of a thing is in fact *common* to all such things? Albinus has his answer ready : we can be sure because of anamnesis. The fact, however, that he uses the term *κοινότης* of the *εἶδος* (representative of the *ιδέα*) once more reveals his indebtedness to the Stoics : for "man" or "horse", in Stoic language, may be termed *κοινὴν ποιότητα*.<sup>1</sup>

By calling attention to these difficulties, I at least hope to have shown that the influence of Stoicism upon the theory of ideas as found in the *Didasc.* is not restricted to Albinus' identification of ideas in the soul and as used in cognition with Stoic *ἐννοιαί*,<sup>2</sup> but may also be discerned elsewhere.

### III. The Descent of Soul

The last of these *Notes* concerns some problems in the theory of the human soul in Albinus : *viz.*, a problem connected with its incarnation, and certain aspects of its relation to what is above it in the scale of being.

H. Dörrie *à propos* a passage in Iamblichus, *Π. ψυχῆς*, ap. Stob. I, p. 374, 21 ff. W. speaks of the descent of the human soul from the realm of *νοῦς*.<sup>3</sup> However, the problem discussed by Iamblichus ap. Stob. is not that of the descent of the soul from the realm of *νοῦς*, but a different question : *viz.*, what is the origin of evil, i.e. what makes the rational faculties of the soul incline towards its irrational faculties? This question in its turn is reduced to the question : for which reason does the rational intellect enter into a body?<sup>4</sup> Iamblichus sums up various answers. Albinus, he tells us, held that the activities which

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the report about Diogenes of Babylon, above, p. 71.

<sup>2</sup> For this identification cf. e.g. Merlan [16], p. 68; Milhaven [13], p. 59.

<sup>3</sup> Dörrie [17], Sp. 18 : "Iamblichos ... berichtet ... zur Frage, warum die Seele aus dem Reich des *νοῦς* zur Erde herabsteigt, von folgender Entscheidung des Albinos" ; ibd., Sp. 20 : "die Seele, dem *νοῦς* entstammend ...". One thinks of emanation.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Festugière [6], p. 69.



make the soul descend have as their cause a wrong decision of the soul's free will.<sup>1</sup>

In the *Didasc.* at Ch. XVI, p. 172, 4-6 H. it is the Father (the Demiurge) who sends down the souls. This appears to contradict the testimony of Iamblichus. But this same testimony is confirmed by other passages in the *Didasc.* At Ch. XXV, p. 178, 26-31 H. it is said that souls travel from body to body either because of the will of the gods or because of their wickedness or because of their inclination for the body.<sup>2</sup> At Ch. XXVI, p. 179, 6-10 H. the freedom of the soul in choosing its own life is strongly affirmed. At a closer look, Ch. XXV, p. 178, 26 ff. H. even combines both views: souls descend either (a) βουλήσει θεῶν (cf. Ch. XVI) or (b) δι' ἀκολασίαν<sup>3</sup> ἢ δι' φιλοσωματίαν. Festugière attempts to solve the still remaining contradiction by arguing, that the freedom of the soul in opting for a descent is only valid for souls during transmigration and does not refer to the cause for its first descent.<sup>4</sup> Dörrie, on the other hand, assumes that the wrong decision of the soul (Iamblichus, *Stob.*) refers to its first descent only.<sup>5</sup>

A further complication arises from the problem of the parts of the

<sup>1</sup> αἴτια of the καταγωγὰ ἐνεργήματα is κατ' Ἀλβίνον τοῦ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου διημαρτημένη κρίσις. Wrongly translated by Witt [2], p. 139, as "a completely mistaken judgement respecting freedom" (my italics). For the correct translation (and for the correct punctuation and grammatical interpretation of the passage in *Stob.* as a whole) cf. Festugière [6], p. 69, p. 77, p. 209-10 ("décision fautive du libre arbitre"; "les activités qui font descendre l'âme ayant pour cause ... selon Albinus le jugement erroné du libre arbitre").

<sup>2</sup> I propose to read: τὰς ψυχὰς ... διαμεῖβειν πολλὰ σώματα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπινα [ἢ] ἀριθμοὺς μενούσας, ἢ βούλησει θεῶν ἢ δι' ἀκολασίαν ἢ διὰ φιλοσωματίαν. The words ἀριθμοὺς μενούσας, have caused difficulties; Merlan, who also refers to other solutions, suggests ἀριθμοὺς μὲν οὐσας, "being numbers", [16] p. 67 n. 2. But the concept of the soul as a number does not occur elsewhere in the *Didasc.*; moreover, it is not easy to understand why this topic should be brought up in connection with and as a reason for transmigration. The excision of the first ἢ (anticipated from the sequel of the sentence) solves our problem. Cf. Ch. XVI, p. 172, 1 H., where the gods borrow the matter out of which bodies (in which souls are to be set) are made πρὸς ὀρισμένους χρόνους. Soul only temporarily resides in a body. Ἀριθμοὺς μενούσας either applies to the span of life in the body or to the time of waiting between each successive incarnation.

<sup>3</sup> The wickedness having been freely chosen.

<sup>4</sup> Festugière [6], p. 210 n. 3; p. 79. He admits, however, that a reference to the first 'fall' is not excluded.

<sup>5</sup> Dörrie [17], Sp. 28 "jenen einen folgenschweren Fehler in ihrer Entscheidung".

soul: should the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν be considered immortal or mortal?<sup>1</sup> Ch. XXIV distinguishes between λογιστικόν and παθητικόν (which is divided into θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν at Ch. V, p. 156, 31-2 H.). Dörrie's problem appears to be that he counts the will (the cause of the soul's descent) among the lower and (on his view) mortal parts of the soul, for according to Procl., in *Tim.* III, 234, 8-18 Diehl, Albinus declared that only the highest part of the soul is immortal.<sup>2</sup> But Proclus *l.c.* speaks of both Atticus and Albinus, to whom he also attributes the theory of the ὄχημα of the soul. This makes his testimony highly doubtful. The more so, since Albinus at Ch. XXV, p. 178, 32-37 H. attributes the faculties of κριτικόν (or γνωστικόν), ὀρμητικόν (or παραστατικόν) and οἰκειωτικόν to both the souls of gods and the disembodied souls of men. In man, the latter two faculties undergo some sort of transformation after embodiment, the ὀρμητικόν becoming θυμοειδές, the οἰκειωτικόν becoming ἐπιθυμητικόν. Even if volition is to be counted among "das Affektische", it still must be immortal. It should be noticed, however, that Iamblichus speaks of a wrong judgement (κρίσις) of the soul according to Albinus, while at p. 178, 33 H. τὸ κριτικόν is the highest faculty of the soul. The mistake of the soul is a rational mistake.

This still leaves unsolved the problem of the contradiction between the soul's freedom of decision when descending *versus* that descent as willed by the gods. I do not know if Albinus was aware of this contradiction. It is god's wish that matter should be ensouled. When going down, the soul acts according to the god's wish. As individual soul,<sup>3</sup> on the other hand, it is free either to descend or not. When descending, it unavoidably runs certain risks accompanying embodiment, which may for a longer or shorter period chain it to the cycle of transmigration. The question concerning its first descent as distinguished from successive descents as raised by Festugière is immaterial, for Albinus, when

<sup>1</sup> But the mortal ἄλογοι ψυχαί of Ch. XXV, p. 178, 20 ff. H., to which Dörrie refers [17], Sp. 21, will be not of men but of animals.

<sup>2</sup> Dörrie [17], Sp. 18. For Albinus, the theory of the first descent caused by the free will is "sehr sonderbar, weil er" (*Didasc.* Ch. XXV; *ap.* Procl., in *Tim.*) "das Affektische der Seele gar nicht zurechnete". For Dörrie's reference to Ch. XXV cf. above, n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> It should be noted that Albinus attributes no freedom to the world-soul.

speaking (Ch. XVI) of the first descent, is for the sake of explication following the chronological story of the *Timaeus*.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact, soul, matter and god are co-eternal, and neither matter in itself nor soul in itself is caused by god.

This is why I believe that Dörrie's idea of the 'Entstammung' of the human soul from the realm of *νοῦς* is, at the least, misleading. Our first question should be: from the realm of which *νοῦς*? Not from that of the first *νοῦς*, the transcelestial god — since even the (*νοῦς* of) the world-soul forever remains external to the transcelestial *νοῦς*. But Dörrie's suggestion is also confusing when one thinks of the celestial *νοῦς* — for this *νοῦς* is a *νοῦς within a soul*, i.e. in that of the world.<sup>2</sup> The most which one could say is that the human soul leaves a situation in which it is comparable to the world-soul, i.e. more *νοῦς*-like. It is not by accident that the *ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν* only brings the human soul as far as the level of the celestial god<sup>3</sup> — a higher ascent is impossible.<sup>4</sup> The *νόησεις* of the first god cannot be more than objects of thought and contemplation for both celestial and human intellect. But the human soul is free to ascend, i.e. — during life on earth — to philosophize (cf. Ch. III, Ch. VII and *passim*). Consequently Albinus' theory of the freedom of the descending soul is not so strange, after all. Also the human intellect is placed *within a soul*. This is already clearly expressed at the beginning of the *Didasc.*, Ch. II, p. 153, 9 ff. H.: ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ θεωρία ἐνέργεια τοῦ νοῦ νοοῦντος τὰ νοητά ... Ἡ ψυχὴ (the human soul) δὴ θεωροῦσα μὲν τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὰς νοήσεις τοῦ θεοῦ<sup>5</sup> εὐπαθεῖν τε λέγεται καὶ τοῦτο τὸ πάθημα αὐτῆς φρόνησις

<sup>1</sup> According to Albinus, the story of the *Timaeus* should not be interpreted in a literal fashion, Cf. Loenen [9] I, p. 302 ff. and Dörrie [17], Sp. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. above, p. 64-5 and p. 65 n. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Ch. XXVIII, p. 181, 16-7 and 35-7 H. Cf. Loenen [9] I, p. 310; Dörrie [17], Sp. 19.

<sup>4</sup> Strangely, Rist [15], p. 168 assumes that the *κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν* "had probably little meaning for (Albinus) except in terms of man's being unable immediately to surmount the obstacle of physical death". Strangely, because his book is an excellent study of, among other things, the intelligibles as objects of contemplation in pre-Plotinian philosophy. The interrelation between ethical and cognitive means of *ὁμοίωσις* is exhaustively studied by Milhaven, [13], *passim*.

<sup>5</sup> The trans-celestial god. (Cf. Milhaven [13], p. 16, p. 51).

ὠνόμασται, ὅπερ οὐχ' ἕτερον εἶποι ἂν τις εἶναι τῆς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον<sup>1</sup> ὁμοιώσεως. It is the *soul* which, by or when contemplating the ideas, i.e. the thoughts, of the transcelestial intellect, becomes the equal of the soul of the universe. For our turning towards the highest god can only give us an equality, of a kind, with the second-highest god. Consequently, the human soul, in going down and entering a body, leaves its position of advantage where it shares in the privileges of the world-soul. But it descends from its own position, not from that of a divine intellect. As far as the theory of soul in Albinus is concerned, this association with a theory of emanation should be avoided, though it is, of course, true that the awakening of the world-soul and its intellect and its being turned towards the supreme Cause<sup>2</sup> may be compared to the principle of *ἐπιστροφή* in Plotinus.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The celestial god, cf. the passage from Ch. XXVIII, cited above, p. 78 and p. 78 n. 3.

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## HERACLITUS, EMPEDOCLES, AND OTHERS IN A MIDDLE PLATONIST CENTO IN PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

No systematical investigation of the thematic (as distinguished from the formal) relations between Philo's *Quaestiones* and his other treatises has as yet been undertaken. In the present paper, I shall be concerned with the manner in which one important theme is treated in both groups of writings. With the indispensable support of the *Bible de Philon* and of the *Index Philoneus*, I have attempted to let myself be guided by Philo's own selection of—in his view—interrelated scriptural passages, which he attempts to interpret in what turns out to be a surprisingly consistent way, and by his own use of doctrines and notions derived from Greek philosophy which are adduced for this purpose. This, it seems to me, is a reasonable procedure for the study of Philo, since one is able in this way to avoid the pitfalls both of superimposed systematization and parallelomegalomania. The theme at issue is concerned with the vicissitudes and condition of the human soul, which entails that in as far as Philo is concerned the exegesis is carried out on the allegorical level. It is important to keep this point in mind, for Philo's line of demarcation between the *literal* and the *allegorical* interpretation does not correspond to ours. Often enough, his literal interpretations look quite allegorical to us, as for instance that dealing with the Platonic cosmology and theory of Forms which he believes is to be found by interpreting the first chapters of Genesis. For Philo, however, the allegorical mode of exegesis pertains not to the outer world, but to the inner one, viz. to the domain of the soul, although the creation of the soul at the beginning of things can also be interpreted in the literal way\*.

In the *Quaestiones in Genesim*, the sections I 67-76, explaining Gen 4:8-15, which deal with the murder of Abel and Cain's punishment, form a sort of mini treatise corresponding to *Quod deterius potiori insidiari solet*, which comments on the same pericope. The sections con-



stituting the second part of this mini treatise, viz. 70-6, form a smaller whole within the larger whole, which provides an apposite starting-point for an investigation of what is one of Philo's major philosophical and exegetical themes.<sup>1</sup>

*QG* I 70 has fortunately been preserved in Greek. Abel has been murdered, and God, addressing Cain, says: "the voice of thy brother calls to me from the earth" (Gen 4:10). How would a dead man be able to speak? Philo explains: "the Deity hears the pious even though they are dead, knowing that they live the incorporeal life. But from the prayers of evil men He turns away His face even though they enjoy the prime of life, considering that they are dead to true life (αὐτοὺς τὸν ἀληθῆ βίον τεθνάναι) and bear their body with them like a tomb (τύμβον), in which they have buried their wholly unhappy soul".

What we have here is a cento of allusions. The oxymoron βίον τεθνάναι here occurs for the first time in *QG*; much later viz. at *QG* IV 152 (a passage to which we shall return) Philo points out that this is an idea Heraclitus has stolen from Moses (= Heracl. fr. 47(d<sup>2</sup>) Marc).<sup>2</sup> That the body is the tomb of the soul is a (Pythagorean) doctrine quoted by Plato at *Crat.* 400 c and *Gorg.* 493 a (cf. also Philolaus, *Vorsokr.* 44 B 14 ap. Clem., *Strom* III 17, possibly spurious). That the immortal soul outside the body really lives can be illustrated from Platonic passages such as *Phaed.* 80 e-81 e and *Phaedr.* 248 c-d. It should be noted that the word τύμβος is exceedingly rare in Philo; it occurs *Deus* 150 and *Somn.* I 139, in cento's similar to that at *QG* I 70. The term for tomb used by Plato himself, σῆμα, equally rare in Philo, is found in precisely similar contexts, viz. at *Leg. all.* I 108,<sup>3</sup> and *Spec. leg.* IV 188, the mind is ἐντετυμβευμένον θνητῷ σώματι, ὃ κυρίως ἂν τις σῆμα καλέσειε.<sup>4</sup> It should, by the way, be noted that at *Gorg.* 492 e f., where Plato discusses the notion that our body is our tomb, the Heraclitean oxymoron is *not* found. Plato quotes Eur. fr. 639<sup>2</sup> Nauck: "who knows if being alive is really being dead, and being dead being alive?", and adds: "Perhaps we too are really dead"; the Pythagorean reference then follows. But the paradoxical formula "to die the life" (and "to live the death") is absent.

The Heraclitean oxymoron is also quite prominent in *Deter.* Here Abel is the pious man, Cain the evil man; but Abel is also what is good in our own soul, as Cain is what is evil in our own soul. Explaining Gen 4:8 ("Cain ... slew him"), Philo comments, *Deter.* 48, that Cain really "slew himself", for "the soul that has extirpated from itself the principle of love of virtue and love of God has died to the life of virtue" (τὸν

ἀρετῆς τέθνηκε βίον), whereas Abel "has both been put to death and lives". Philo cites Gen 4:10 in order to confirm this, for Abel could only "cry" when alive. He continues, this time citing the oxymoron in a more symmetrical form: ὁ μὲν δὴ σοφὸς τεθνηκέναι δοκῶν τὸν φθαρτὸν βίον ζῆ τὸν ἀφθαρτον, ὁ δὲ φαῦλος ζῶν τὸν ἐν κακίᾳ τέθνηκε τὸν εὐδαίμονα (*Deter.* 49). This passage is explicitly referred to at *Deter.* 70 (exegesis of Gen 4:10): ζῆ μὲν γάρ, ὡς καὶ πρότερον ἔφην, ὁ τεθνάναι δοκῶν κτλ.

Unfortunately, *QG* I 71, the exegesis of Gen 4:11 (καὶ νῦν ἐπικατάρατος σὺ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, wrongly rendered by the Armenian translator as "accursed upon the earth", cf. *Deter.* 98), is not preserved in Greek; yet its general purport seems clear. Philo comments as follows: "the earth is the last of the *parts* of the universe [cf. *QG* IV 87]. Accordingly, if this curses him, it is understandable that appropriate curses will be laid upon him by the *other elements* as well, viz. by springs rivers sea; air, winds; fire, light, the sun, the moon and the whole heaven together. For if inanimate and terrestrial nature opposes and revolts against wrongdoing, will not purer natures do so still more? *But he with whom the parts of the universe wage war*—what hope of salvation will he any longer have? I do not know" (my italics). Cain's further life will be one of unabating misery (*QG* I 72-3). For his statement "everyone who finds me will kill me" (Gen 4:14b) several explanations are suggested (which in Philo may mean that he combines tralaticious bits of exegesis) at *QG* I 74, the first of which, partly preserved in Greek, is that Cain feared (τὴν) ἐκ τῶν μερῶν τοῦ κόσμου (ἐπίθεσιν), ἅπερ ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ (of the good) γενόμενα οὐδὲν ἥττον (ἀμύνεται τοὺς πονήρους). This proves that, for the elements or "parts of the universe" mentioned at *QG* I 70, Philo, as he often does, used the expression μέρη τοῦ κόσμου (cf., e.g., *Deter.* 154, *Mos.* II 37, and similar expressions at *Abrah.* 43; *Mos.* I 96, 143, where we also have the verbal forms ἐπιτίθενται and ἐπιθεμένων; and 201, 206). *QG* I 75 is difficult; possibly, what is forbidden here is suicide. At *QG* I 76, commenting on the 'sign' of Cain mentioned Gen 4:15, Philo, in one of his explanations, returns to the Platonic-Heraclitean theme of I 70: Cain will not be killed and forever live a most unhappy life. One should study p. 45 Marcus as a whole; it speaks of the other kind of death which consists of the life of the body and of the other life enjoyed by incorporeal souls. "For that which was said by the poet about Scylla [*Od.* 12, 118]: 'She is not a mortal but an immortal evil' was said more appropriately about him who lives evilly and enjoys many years of life". Cain is "destroyed in another manner": "he is *proscribed* by ... the whole human race, ...

like one driven out and a fugitive ...” (my italics). Cain’s exile is not further spoken of in *QG*. Possibly, a section dealing with Gen 4:16 (“Cain went out from the face of God”) is lost, for after I 76 (Gen 4:15) the exegesis continues with 4:23-4 at I 77, thus leaving a gap of several important verses. Cain’s exile (Gen 4:16) is the subject of the first part of the *De posteritate et fuga Caini*, so we are presumably justified in considering *QG* I 76 the concluding piece of our mini treatise.

Hopefully, enough has been quoted from *QG* I 70-6 to show that the individual sections are linked by common themes (*unus sensus protractus per multos versus*), concerned with the topic of evil: Cain’s life is nothing but a living death, and a perpetual exile. In the biblical pericope at issue there is some support for the theme of exile (Gen 4:14 εἰ ἐκβάλλεις με; cf. 4:16, ἐξῆλθεν, not quoted in *QG*), but none for the living dead (the exegesis of the “crying blood” of 4:10 at I 70 appears to us to be far-fetched). We shall see presently<sup>5</sup> that the oxymoron of the living dead, a dominating theme in Philo, is explicitly said by him to be of philosophical provenance. The present verse is only one among the many cases where this exegesis is given, and does not, as we shall see, constitute its scriptural basis. The exegetic theme of the “attack of the elements” (I 71 and 74), however, is far less common; its scriptural support (4:11, “you will be accursed by the earth”) is minimal, but Philo nowhere cites anything better. Also this interpretation is therefore rather far-fetched. I submit that this idea, too, is not of Philo’s invention but derives from Greek philosophy. It is not a common idea in Greek philosophy; the only parallel that comes to mind is a famous Empedoclean fragment about the fate of the fallen daimon (or soul), *Vorsokr.* 31 B 115, 3-13: “whenever one of the daimons to whom life long-lasting is apportioned sinfully defiles his limbs with blood,<sup>6</sup> (and) makes false the oath he swore, he wanders for ten thousand years away from the blessed ones, being born during this time as all kinds of mortal forms exchanging one miserable path of life for another. For the force of air pursues him into sea, and sea spits him out unto earth’s surface, earth casts him into the rays of the blazing sun, and sun into the eddies of air; one takes him from another, and all abhor him. Along this path I now also go, an exile from god and a wanderer ...” (tr. Wright, with due corrections; italics mine). The parallel between *QG* I 71 and Emp. B 115 is most apposite, for, just as the daimon (soul) has shed blood, so has Cain—who is the first man to have done so; the pericope commented on at *QG* I 70ff. is the first where it is possible to adduce the

Empedoclean fragment. The daimon (soul) is an exile “from god” (θεόθεν; a Jewish exegete would interpret this his own way, cf. Gen 4:14 ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου), and enters various bodies; similarly Cain, a soul forever buried in the body, is made a fugitive. Empedocles’ daimon is driven from element to element, all loathing him; according to Philo, Cain is attacked by one part of the world after another. It is clear that the source of this idea is Empedocles rather than Gen 4:11.<sup>7</sup> However there is one aspect of Empedocles’ doctrine that is *not* found in Philo’s exegesis, viz. the cycle of reincarnation, the transmigration of the soul into the bodies of the various animals that inhabit each of the elements. In other words, Philo (or perhaps his Jewish source) not only ‘interprets’ Gen 4:11, but also Emp. B 115, by transforming the exile’s transmigration into the living forms to be found in each of the elements, all of which abhor him, into a perpetual exile or living death in the human body persecuted by each of the elements.<sup>8</sup>

If this piece of *Quellenforschung* is correct (and I shall argue on the assumption that it is), Philo’s cento at *QG* I 70-1 would not only include echoes of Plato and Heraclitus, but also of Empedocles. One may definitely exclude the possibility that this string of quotes is the product of Philo’s own research, for precisely similar concatenations are found in Middle Platonist and Neoplatonist authors, most of whom have certainly not read Philo, and in Clement, whose quotations are not the same as Philo’s. This tradition has been investigated in Walter Burkert’s pioneering paper *Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles*.<sup>9</sup> Burkert compares Plot., IV 8 [6], 11-23; Hierocles, *In carm. aur.* 24, 1-4 (ff.); Plut., *Soll. anim.* 964 D (also *Isid.* 370 D-E, a related text); and Clem., *Strom.* III 12, 1-21, 1. He proves that these passages, in which one often finds the name of Pythagoras, and in which themes and quotations from various works of Plato, from Heraclitus, from Empedocles’ *Katharmoi* (and, in Clement, a number of others) have been woven into a cento dealing with the descent and ascent of the soul and with the fact that to be born is misery, must derive from a common source, because the actual quotations given in these authors, although overlapping to some extent, vary to a considerable degree. He argues that this common source should be dated not much before Plutarch and states that Philo was unaware of this concatenation of derived ideas. One understands that Burkert should have missed the (anonymous) echo of Emp. B 115 at *QG* I 71, but it is regrettable that he did not notice the explicit quote (*QG* I 70 is implicit) of (a

bastard form of) Heracl. B 62 at *QG* IV 152 and *Leg. All.* I 107 (fr. 47(d<sup>2</sup>) and (d<sup>1</sup>) Marc.),<sup>10</sup> which is the same as the Heraclitean quote in Hierocl., *loc. cit.* Recognition of the fact that the *platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles* was already familiar to Philo enables one to date this Platonist theme considerably earlier, viz. to the days of Philo's somewhat earlier Middle Platonist contemporaries. Presumably, it cannot be earlier, because in the cento of reminiscences from Plato's *Phaed.* and *Gorg.* at Cic., *Tusc.* I 71-5 (75, *quo cum venerimus, tum denique vivemus, nam haec quidem vita mors est*; cf. *Somn. Scip.* 14, *hi vivunt qui e corporum vinculis tamquam e carcere evolaverunt, vestra vero quae dicitur vita mors est*) there are no echoes of the Heraclitean oxymoron "to live the death ...", but merely of the after all more feeble Platonic cento at *Gorg.* 492 e f.<sup>11</sup> There are certainly, in Cicero, no echoes of Empedocles. The most plausible assumption is that Heraclitus and Empedocles were added to the Platonic cento also adduced by Cicero by an Alexandrian who must for us remain anonymous but who, ultimately, is the source of Plutarch, Clement, Plotinus, and Hierocles (and Philo).

At *Ref.* I 2-4, Hippolytus deals with Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Heraclitus (in this order), and puts them in a sort of succession, because their doctrines (as reported) are largely similar. Burkert has suggested that he may already have known the "Dreierschema".<sup>12</sup> I cannot enter here into Hippolytus' fascinating treatment of Pythagoras Plato Empedocles Heraclitus as a whole. In our present context, however, a little studied passage (*Ref.* VI 25, 4-26, 3) is of some importance. At VI 25, 1-3 Pythagoras' cosmology is described in Empedoclean terms, *Vorsokr.* 31 B 16 even being quoted anonymously; in what follows, Hippolytus gives us what he calls Pythagoras' doctrine of the soul. Actually, however, what we have here is a medley of doctrines, put into a reinterpretive perspective, and ultimately deriving from Plato, Early Pythagoreanism, Empedocles, and Heraclitus. The souls of the living beings come down from the stars (Plat., *Tim.* 41 d); εἶναι δὲ αὐτὰς θνητὰς μὲν, ὅταν ὦσιν ἐν τῷ σώματι, οἷον ἐγκατορωρυγμένας ὡς ἐν τάφῳ, ἀνίστασθαι δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀθανάτους, ὅταν τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολυθῶμεν (p. 152, 17-19 Wendland). The body as our tomb; θνητὰς-ἀθανάτους, presumably, echoes the *first* part of Heracl., *Vorsokr.* 22 B 62 (note that the correct form of this complete fragment is only found Hipp., *Ref.* IX 10, 6, p. 243, 17-9 W.), for the interpretive link of which with *Vorsokr.* 22 B 36 see below.<sup>13</sup>—Therefore, Hippolytus continues, Plato said death is the

separation of the soul from the body (*Phaed.* 64 c). Pythagoras is Plato's teacher; in one of his riddles he said: ἐκ τῆς ἰδίης ἐὰν ἀποδημῆς, μὴ ἐπιστρέφου. εἰ δὲ μή, Ἑρινύες Δίχης ἐπίκουροί σε μετελεύσονται (p. 157, 1-2 W.). The word ἰδίη, according to the interpretation provided by Hippolytus, means the 'body', and the Erinyes mean the passions (πάθη). The risk one runs when "turning round" is that the passions reimprison one in a body.<sup>14</sup> "For these men assume the *metensomatosi*s of the souls, as Empedocles in his Pythagorean way also says. He says that the souls that are in love with pleasure, as Plato says, [...], διὰ πάντων ζώων ἐλθεῖν καὶ φυτῶν πάλιν εἰς ἀνθρώπινον σῶμα" (p. 153, 8-9 W.); what follows derives, mainly, from Plat., *Phaedr.* 248 e ff., but at its beginning this Platonic doctrine has been fused with Empedocles', for Plato never suggested that the soul before returning to a human body would have to go through "all the beast and plants". Precisely this doctrine, however, is attributed to Empedocles (said to be Pythagoras' pupil) at *Ref.* I 3, where *Vorsokr.* 31 B 117 is quoted and Hippolytus adds: οὗτος πάσας εἰς πάντα τὰ ζῶα μεταλλάττειν εἶπε τὰς ψυχὰς (p. 9, 12 W. Cf. Justin, *Dial.* 4, 2, where Plato is credited with the view that "all souls go through all animals"). Many scholars have noted that the Pythagorean *akousma* has been interpolated from Heracl., *Vorsokr.* 22 B 94 Ἑρινύες ... Δίχης ἐπίκουροι (Marcovich's protest *ad* fr. 52 Marc. is whimsical). Another Pythagorean doctrine, viz. that the body is our tomb is, as we have noticed, contaminated with a notion deriving from another Heraclitean fragment (22 B 62). This medley of ideas, as will be clear, much resembles that analyzed by Burkert elsewhere.<sup>15</sup>

It is possible, although not certain, that this cento was already an element of Alexandrian *Jewish* exegesis before Philo, for in *Deter.*, where, as we have seen, he continues to adduce its Platonic-Heraclitean part, he appears to be critical of its Empedoclean part. The exegesis of Gen 4:11 ("thou art accursed from the earth") is found at *Deter.* 96-99. Now here the idea that Cain (allegorized as mind; cf. *QG.* I 75) is persecuted by all the elements (as at *QG* I 71 and 74) is implicitly rejected: κατάρατον δὲ φησι τὸν νοῦν οὐκ ἀπ' ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἔσεσθαι (98). 'Earth' here is said to represent the body, the senses, the passions: a familiar Philonic allegory. However echoes of Emp. B 115 crop up elsewhere in *Deter.*, viz. in arguments which would remain enigmatic if one would reject that such echoes are at issue. The theme of the transmigration of the soul into non-human forms appears at *Deter.* 149ff., where Gen 4:14b is explained ("if Thou casteth me out today from the face of the



earth, from Thy face also shall I be hidden"—which is not quoted in the (surviving) part of the corresponding sections in *QG* I, but we have noticed above<sup>16</sup> that Cain's exile is mentioned at *QG* I 76, *ad finem*). We have also noticed that at *QG* I 74, comment on Gen 4:14a ("everyone who finds me will kill me"), the theme of the "attack of the elements" is repeated from I 71;<sup>17</sup> the exegesis, however, of this part of Gen 4:14 at *Deter.* 164-5 does not refer to it.

But in his discussion of Cain's exile at *Deter.* 150ff., Philo, in a rather odd way to be sure, uses the main ideas of Emp. B 115. He argues against Cain, whom for better effect he apostrophizes, (151-2), that he will not be able to hide himself if he has been cast out of the *earth*, for man is a land-creature; the *water* has its own inhabitants who, if they change their habitat, are bound to die. So will Cain if he tries to live as an aquatic creature. Attempts to transform oneself into a sort of bird and live in the *air* will also fail; if he tries to fly, he will fall back on the earth. No created thing, Philo continues (153), will be able to hide from "what is", i.e., God (κρύπτεσθαι τὸ ὄν; possibly, an allusive use of Heraclitus, *Vorsokr.* 22 B 16, Cornutus' version of which—Heracl. fr. 81 (c) Marc.<sup>18</sup>—is remarkably similar to the context in Philo). Why? Because οὐδὲ τὰς ὑλικὰς ἀρχὰς [the elements] ἐνεσσι διεκδύναι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τῷ μίαν διαφύγοντι εἰς ἑτέραν μεταβῆναι. Which continuous passing from one element into another clearly echoes Emp. B 115, 9 ff., whereas διαφύγοντι takes up the theme of the "attack of the elements" as expressed at *QG* I 71 and 74. If God would have been willing to create a revolutionary amphibious creature that could have lived anywhere, this would have gone from the heavy elements, *earth* and *water*, to the light ones, *air* and *fire*, and back again—but even such a creature would have been unable to hide itself since one cannot leave the world and there is nothing outside anyway, God having entirely used up *all the four elements* to constitute the world (154; a Platonic-Stoic theme, familiar from *Aet.* 20-6.<sup>19</sup> Cf. also *Poster.* 5). Really a remarkable *a fortiori*: one cannot hide from God because one cannot leave the earth, and if one could leave the earth one still could not hide from God. Carried along by his apostrophe, Philo forgets (or wants to forget) that elsewhere he recognizes that such an amphibious creature exists, viz. the soul, which can at least inhabit both the *earth* and the *air* (e.g., *Gig.* 8-15; here some of these souls study τὸν μετὰ σωμάτων ἀποθνήσκειν βίον — again the Heraclitean-Platonic motif; cf. also *Somn.* I 138-9, already referred to above,<sup>20</sup> which is also one of the three places where the word

τύμβος occurs). This, I submit, is because he feels bound to reject the Pythagorean-Platonic-Empedoclean idea of the transmigration of the soul into animal forms, a theme forcefully expressed in Emp. B 115—a fragment which, as we have noticed, played an important part in the exegesis of Gen 4:11, 14, and 16.

The Heraclitean oxymoron is again quoted in the finale of *Deter.*, 177-8, viz. in the exegesis of the sign set upon Cain by God according to Gen 4:15 (also explained *QG* I 76). Here Philo clearly says (*QG* I 76 is a little more vague) that the meaning of the sign is that Cain will never be killed, for nowhere in the Books of the Law has his death been mentioned. The allegorical significance of this is that 'folly', like the Scylla of myth, is a "deathless evil" (quotation of *Od.* 12,118, also quoted *QG* I 76),<sup>21</sup> "never experiencing the end that consists in having died, but subject to all eternity to that which consists in *ever dying*" (178; my italics).

The Homeric quotation as found in this context is very important and must derive from the pre-Middle Platonist exegesis of the *Odyssey* according to which Odysseus' wanderings and adventures represent those of the soul.<sup>22</sup> In *QG* I 76, Scylla, the "immortal evil", applies to Cain himself, the immortal exile who is "transformed into the nature of the beasts" (p. 46 Marcus), i.e., also represents the evil in our soul. At *Deter.* 178, the exegesis is somewhat different; here the "immortal evil" threatening the soul and so to speak killing it for ever is called 'folly' (ἀφροσύνη). At *Fug.* 61, where we find the same quotation,<sup>23</sup> Scylla represents 'impiety'. It should be noted that at *Somn.* II 70 Philo quotes part of *Od.* 12, 219, on Charybdis; Adam is doomed to die when disobeying God he touches the "twofold tree".<sup>24</sup> This one should not do: "Pass clear away 'from the smoke and wave' and flee from the silly cares and aims of mortal life as from that dread Charybdis ..." Again, the context is that the soul is endangered since 'death' is lurking, just as Odysseus is endangered. It should be noted that Clement, too, cites these lines in the context of an allegorical interpretation of the *Odyssey* (adapted to his Christian purpose).<sup>25</sup> *Od.* 12, 118 is quoted *Strom.* III 5, 42, 4; the "immortal evil" of Scylla here pertains to the consequences of pleasure. *Od.* 12, 219-20 (of 220 only the first word) is quoted *Protr.* XII 118, 1; here Charybdis is 'custom'. The textual differences alone already show that Clement does not derive from Philo. At *Protr.*, *loc. cit.*, the address to the pagan audience to give up 'custom' is effective because he appeals to an allegory familiar to them.

I have pointed out above<sup>26</sup> that Gen 4:10, “the voice of thy brother calls out from the earth” cannot be the scriptural basis, or proof-text, for the Platonic-Heraclitean exegesis that is attached to it. Philo’s justification for the application of the theme of the living dead and its corollaries are the expressions *θανάτω ἀποθανεῖσθε* at Gen 2:17 and *θανάτω θανατούσθω* at Exod 21:12. Gen 2:17 is explained at *QG* I 16 and at *Leg. All.* I 105-8. God tells Adam that, in the day that he will eat of the tree of knowledge, he will “die by the death”. At *QG* I 16, the explanation is that there are two kinds of life, with the body and without it; “the evil man dies by death even when he breathes”, the good man “passes away [...] to eternal life”. We recognize the Heraclitean-Platonic theme of *QG* I 70; briefly formulated as it may be. At *QG* I 16, we have its first occurrence in *QG*, at a focal point: Adam is forewarned of the life that will be his when he will have been driven from paradise, and we are informed about the origin of our *condition humaine*. The exegesis at *Leg. All.* I 105-8, which constitutes the finale of this book of the treatise, is more extensive. Here Philo points out that Adam and Eve do *not* die after eating the fruit, but beget children and pass on life to the rest of us. Consequently, the expression “die by the death” indicates the special death ὅς ἐστι ψυχῆς ἐντυμβευομένης (for the ‘grave’ cf. above<sup>27</sup>) πάθεισι καὶ κακίαις. “Whenever Moses speaks of θανάτω ἀποθανεῖν”, Philo adds, “he means the penalty-death” (107, my italics. τὸν ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ: the ‘Orphic’ element in the cento, cf., e.g., Plat., *Crat.* 400 c, and the other texts cited at *Orph.* fr. 8 Kern). This penalty-death takes place when the “soul dies to the life of virtue and is alive only to that of wickedness” (τὸν ἀρετῆς βίον θνήσκει, τὸν δὲ κακίας ζῆ μόνον). Philo continues (108): “that is an excellent saying of Heraclitus, who on this point followed Moses’ teaching, φησὶ γάρ· ‘Ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον’ [Heracl. fr. 47 (d') Marc.].”<sup>28</sup> He means that now, when we are living, the soul is dead and has been entombed in the body as in a sepulchre (ὡς ἂν ἐν σήματι τῷ σώματι ἐντετυμβευμένης); whereas, should we die, the soul lives forthwith its own proper life, and is released from the body, the baneful corpse (*νεκροῦ*) to which it was tied”. At *Leg. All.* 105-8, the cento is rather rich (possibly because of its strategic position in the *Allegorical Commentary*): the Heraclitean “living death” confirmed by a quotation with name attached, the Platonic-Pythagorean tomb, the ‘Orphic’ punishment, the Platonic life of the virtuous incorporeal soul, and last but not least the Aristotelian ‘corpse’ (cf. *Protr.* fr. 10 b Ross). The latter is also part of the cento elsewhere; Philo even uses

an expressive verb, *νεκροφορεῖν*, at *Leg. All.* III 69 and 74, *Migr.* 21, *Somn.* II 237, and *QG* II 12 (cf. also *QG* I 93). From a more general point of view, it is important to realize that for Philo the burial of the soul in the body dates from Adam’s sin. Cf. also *QG* I 45 (exegesis of Gen 3:9 “Adam where are you?”), where the first explicit hint at the corporeal tomb in *QG* is found: “O man [sc., Adam], giving up immortality, thou hast gone over to death and unhappiness, in which thou hast been *buried*” (my italics). As a consequence, Adam is exiled from paradise<sup>29</sup> and our own life on earth must, indeed, be a form of exile. The Heraclitean fragment is so important to Philo because he can use it *on the allegorical level of exegesis*. The proof-expression to which it is attached occurs in one of the more important pericopes of Gen.

The other occurrence of the proof-expression (at Exod 21:12 θανάτω θανατούσθω) is the subject of an important exegetical passage at *Fug.* 53-64. It should be noted that *Fug.* 53 is the only place in Philo where Exod 21:12-4 are quoted. “To die by the death” is the penalty for voluntary manslaughter. Philo is troubled (or pretends to be troubled) by the apparently superfluous θανάτω; “knowing that he [Moses] never puts in a superfluous word, [...], I began debating with myself why he said that the intentional slayer is not to be put to death only but ‘by death to be put to death’” (54). “So I consulted a wise (σοφὴν) lady, whose name is Σκέψις, and was rid of my questioning. For she taught me that some people are dead even while living, and some alive even while dead” (καὶ ζῶντες ἔνιοι τεθνήκασι καὶ τεθνηκότες ζῶσι). Evil people are corpses (*νεκρούς*), deprived of the life in association with virtue; virtuous people, even if cut off from the association with the body, live forever. This lady “confirmed (ἐπιστοῦτο) her explanation (λόγος) by holy oracles (χρησμοῖς, i.e., biblical texts), too ...”

This passage is not only interesting because we again meet the cento (its Platonic-Heraclitean-Aristotelian variety) in relation to the proof-expression, but also for the privileged insight into Philo’s method it provides. It is to be noted that *skepsis*, in Philo, does not denote Skepticism, but “philosophical inquiry” (*Plant.* 142, 149; *Ebr.* 200, 202; *Somn.* I 58, 183; *Abrah.* 162; *Prob.* 18; *Aet.* 4), or “inquiry into the nature of God” (*Poster.* 16; *Ebr.* 94; *Fug.* 130, 141; *Spec.* I 40), or “philological inquiry” (*Deus* 70; *Mut.* 157), or “inquiry” in a more general sense (*Fug.* 216). In our present passage, lady *Skepsis* is both familiar with a (Greek) philosophical doctrine and with scriptural evidence that can be quoted in support thereof. She is Philo’s method

personified; Mme Starobinski's comment, "exégèse biblique fondée sur la réflexion", is somewhat better than Nikiprowetzky's "Examen" crowned by "inspiration".<sup>30</sup> Philo hardly could have suggested more clearly that, in case of perplexity, you may turn to the philosophers, i.e., to those whom Philo sees as the Greek exegetes of Moses (or perhaps to a Jewish exegesis which already incorporated Greek ideas), for there is a definite contrast between the wise lady's *logos* and the scriptural confirmation quoted.

*Skepsis* quotes three verses from Scripture (*Fug.* 56-8), viz. Deut 4:4, 30:15, and 30:20, to which Philo adds two more passages, viz. Lev 10:2-3 and Ps 113:25-6 (presumably, an instance of his interweaving what he was told with what he had read, cf. *Mos.* I 4). Study of *Skepsis*' catena is rewarding. Deut 4:4 runs: "ye that did cleave unto the Lord your God are alive (ζῆτε) all of you to this day". Which is said to mean that God's supplicants are alive and all other men are corpses (νεκρούς), and indeed that immortality is ascribed to the former. There are two other occasions in Philo on which this verse is quoted, viz. *Spec.* I 31 and 345. At I 31, there is nothing special about the interpretation, but at I 345 the Heraclitean-Platonic allusion is again found: οἱ μὲν ἄθεοι τὰς ψυχὰς τεθνάσιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν παρὰ τῷ ὄντι θεῷ τεταγμένοι τάξιν ἀθάνατον βίον ζῶσιν. The second quotation, Deut 30:15, runs: "Behold, I have given you life and death (τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὸν θάνατον), good and evil": goodness is life and evil is death. This verse is quoted in two fragments (*non vidi*) and at *Deus* 50, where the exegesis is different. *Skepsis*' third quotation, Deut 30:20, runs: "This is thy life (ζωή) and length of days, to love the Lord thy God". Which is said to define the immortal life. It is also quoted *Congr.* 134 (different interpretation) and *Post.* 12: to love God is the real life.

Philo adds two more passages to the catena. At Lev 10:2 (paraphrased not quoted) it is said that the priests Nahab and Abihu "died (ἀπέθανον) before the Lord". Philo explains that these men exchanged mortal for immortal life, ἐτελεύτησαν ἐνώπιον κυρίου τουτέστιν ἔζησαν· νεκρὸν γὰρ οὐ θέμις εἰς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ. He also paraphrased Lev 10:3, found only here. Lev 10:2 occurs in two other places: *Somn.* II 67, merely a paraphrase, and *Her.* 309. In the latter, Nahab and Abihu are said to have been transformed into "sacred fire"; in a similar way, the sparks in our mind should be encouraged that it may not be chilled by the passions in the manner of corpses (νεκρῶν ... σωμαμάτων). Philo's last confirmatory text is a paraphrasing quotation of Ps 113:25-6 (found

only here): "the dead (νεκροί) will not praise you, o Lord [...], but we the living (ζῶντες) shall praise the Lord". Philo has: νεκροὶ δ' [...] οὐκ αἰνέσουσι κύριον· ζώντων γὰρ τὸ ἔργον. The unique quotations of Lev 10:3 and Ps 113:25-6 are symptomatic of the special care lavished by Philo on the exegesis of Exod 21:12 θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. However it is clear that in the 'oracles' adduced by the wise lady and by Philo, the textual support for the allegorical exegesis in the terms of the Platonic-Heraclitean-Aristotelian cento is slender, really only a matter of identical words found in isolation, so that the exegesis is only possible if one really wants to find it.

As further evidence for his interpretation Philo now (*Fug.* 60) adduces Gen. 4:15—his exegesis of which has been discussed above<sup>31</sup>—, about Cain. In the present context, this is of course appropriate because Cain is the first voluntary manslayer on record. Scripture nowhere refers to his death, and "the Lord set a sign on Cain, even this, that no man that should find him should kill him". The exegesis given (60) is already familiar: impiety is an evil that cannot come to an end. Philo continues (61): "... being ever set alight and never to be quenched" (ἐξαπτόμενον καὶ μηδέποτε σβεσθῆναι δυνάμενον). I assume this alludes to a Heraclitean theme (cf. fr. 58 (c) and fr. 61 (a<sup>2</sup>) Marc.). Then Philo cites *Od.* 12, 118 on the "immortal evil" (Scylla);<sup>32</sup> this introduces the Middle Platonist allegory of Odysseus' voyages as the wanderings of the soul. This evil, Philo explains, is only immortal here on earth, because compared to the life in God it is lifeless and a 'corpse' (νεκρός) and, "as someone has said, 'more to be thrown out than dung'" (κοπρίων ἐκβλητότερον). Here another Heraclitean fragment is blended in, *Vorsokr.* 22 B 96 νέκυες κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι; *Fug.* 61 is printed as Heracl. fr. 76 (i) Marc. Marcovich has not seen this quotation is also to be found at *QG* I 81 (not preserved in Greek), which is part of the story of Cain: exegesis of Gen 5:3, question: why is Cain not mentioned in the genealogy of Adam (viz. in Gen 5)? Answer: "Scripture does not associate the foul and violent homicide [Cain] with the order of either reason or number, for he is to be thrown out like ordure, as someone has said ...". [Possibly, by the way, the adjective ἐκβλητος for Philo also alludes to exile (cf. Gen 4:14 εἰ ἐκβάλλεις με).] ἐκβλητος is found only one more time in Philo, viz. *Her.* 29, where the context is different; yet, rather than looking for parallels of the idea of human nothingness, expressed in *Her.* 29, in the Bible,<sup>33</sup> I would suggest one should ponder a possibly 'Heraclitean' implication (man a creature comparable to what is most



rejectable). Because the opposition between the (immortal life of the) soul (outside the body) and the body as a corpse worse than dung (*Fug.* 61) also occurs in a Middle Platonist, viz. Celsus, *ap. Orig., C. Cels.* V 14 (Heracl. fr. 76 (c) Marc.), and in Plotinus, V 1 [10] 2, 40 (Heracl. fr. 76 (e) Marc.), who do not, of course, have it from Philo, one may assume that this Heraclitean *gnomè* was first adduced in this context by the pre-Middle Platonist author or authors whom we have supposed to be Philo's source for the *Odyssey* of the soul and the Heraclitean-Platonic-etc. cento. The *Quellen* situation in this case (Philo Celsus Plotinus) is exactly similar to that discussed above.<sup>34</sup>

Returning to *Fug.*, we now find Philo speaking (62) of the familiar distinction (possibly deriving, ultimately, from Aristotle's *De phil.*, cf. the Aristotle of the doxographical vulgate at Aëtius II 4, 12; for Philo see *QG* III 7 and the Philonic passages cited—with many others—in Pease's note to Cic., *N.D.* II 56) between the evil found below the moon and the good above it (cf. also Hipp., *Ref.* I 3-4, where this view is attributed to Empedocles and Heraclitus,<sup>35</sup> and Plut., *Soll. anim.* 964 D and *Isid.* 370 D f., with Burkert's comments).<sup>36</sup> A familiar motif, ultimately deriving from the myth in *Phaedr.* and similar passages, is blended in: the good is "upward-soaring". "If ever it comes to us", Philo continues, "in the bounty of its father, it hastens to return" (παλινδρομησαι: a veiled reference to the descent and ascent of the soul, cf. *Somn.* I 138-9, where we again have the Platonic-Heraclitean-Aristotelian cento and where παλινδρομοῦσιν—as is usual in Philo—refers to the return to the body, not, as at *Fug.* 62, to that to its original abode; cf. also *Gig.* 13, some souls πάλιν ἀνέπτυσαν, whereas others (*Gig.* 15) abandon themselves to the συμφύα νεκρόν). However, evil [Cain] remains forever here below. This has also (!) been said "in a noble way by a highly esteemed man, one of those admired for their wisdom, in *Theaetetus*"; at 63, *Th.* 76 a-b, the famous *Wanderzitat* concerned with the evil that always hovers in the mortal sphere and with ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, is appositely quoted. Consequently, Philo concludes, it is only natural that Cain will not die, "being the symbol of evil, which must of necessity always live among men". There is, therefore, definite point in the direction that the homicide must "by death be put to death" (64).

*Fug.* 53-64 is beautifully constructed. Starting from θανάτω θαναθοῦσθω at 53, it returns to it at 64, θανάτω θαναθοῦσθαι. The scriptural text, Exod 21:12, is the spring-board for a rich and varied exegesis structured in a symmetrical way: (Greek) wisdom at 54-5 and at 61-3,

and biblical evidence in the central position, viz. a catena of quotations confirming the philosophical exegesis of Exod 21:12, continued by the Cain story (Gen 4:15). However what we have here is a little Middle Platonist treatise (or a treatise in the Middle Platonist manner) concerned with the vicissitudes of the soul as illustrated by a plurality of related ideas ultimately deriving from ('Pythagoras', the 'Orphics',) Heraclitus, Plato, Aristotle, Homer, which have been reinterpreted in order to serve a common purpose. Philo has merely applied this cento to the exegesis of Scripture, bringing out his proof-expression and listing scriptural passages that can be integrated in the cento. Perhaps, therefore, this is the right moment to comment on the form in which Philo quotes (or cites) Heracl., *Vorsokr.* B 62, of which the original text runs ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοί ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες. Philo only quotes the second part of this text, in the form ζῶμεν τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τεθνήκαμεν δὲ τὸν ἐκείνων βίον (*Leg. All.* I 108, cf. *QG* IV 152), for which he is our earliest source. The text is quoted in about the same form by the Middle Platonists Numenius (Heracl. fr. 47 (d<sup>4</sup>) Marc.) and Hierocles (fr. 47 (d<sup>5</sup>) Marc.), and paraphrased by Sextus (fr. 47 (d<sup>3</sup>) Marc.), whose interpretation, blended with his paraphrase, is the same as Philo's: ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἡμεῖς ζῶμεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν τεθνάναι καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν τεθῆσθαι (! Platonic-Pythagorean element of the cento), ὅτε δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀποθνήσκομεν, τὰς ψυχὰς ἀναβιοῦν καὶ ζῆν. However Heracl. B 62, original text, is not about the soul but, as it appears, deals with the transformations of the elements; the version found in Philo Numenius Hierocles Sextus is an *interpretive paraphrase*, which applies Heraclitus' statement about the elements to ourselves ("we live ..."), viz. to our souls. The origin of this reinterpretation can still be traced. In another well-known fragment, where Heraclitus also speaks of elemental transformations, and uses the terms "to be born" (or: "to come to be") and "death", he mentions *water* and *earth*, but does not speak of *fire*, but of *soul(s)* as the third element, *Vorsokr.* 22 B 36 (66 Marc.) ψυχῇσιν θάνατος ὕδωρ γενέσθαι, ὕδατι δὲ θάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι· ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὕδωρ γίνεται, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχῇ. Philo cites the first part of this fragment (ψυχῇσι ... γῆν γενέσθαι) at *Aet.* 111 in a passage about the transformations of the elements (στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου) into one another which, in this way, θνήσκειν δοκοῦντα ἀθανατίζεται (*Aet.* 109. The whole passage, *Aet.* 109-11, is printed as fr. 66 (b) Marc.) The interpretive words "seeming to die they are made immortal" derive from the *first* part of Heracl. B 62 (not quoted elsewhere by Philo). We may assume that, just as part of B 62

was used for the interpretation of B 36, so the 'soul(s)' of B 36 were transposed to B 62 and used for the interpretation of the latter. Obviously, this is not a Stoicizing interpretation, but a Platonist one, linked up with the cycle of reincarnation and transmigration.

We may follow Philo still further on his tortuous exegetical path, again using Heraclitus as our guide. The other place where the interpretive paraphrase of the second part of Heracl., *Vorsokr.* B 62, is quoted is, as we have noticed, at *QG* IV 152, which is the comment on Gen 25:8a, on the death of Abraham: "leaving [ἐκλιπών, wrongly translated by Marcus as 'failing'] he died, in a good old age and full of days". We must also consider IV 153, comment on Gen 25:8b "he was added to his people". At IV 152, the explanation provided is "that the death of the body is the life of the soul", etc., which idea Heraclitus is then said by Philo to have taken from Moses "like a thief". It is obvious that the scriptural text at issue can hardly be the starting-point of this exegesis or 'theft'. At IV 153, Philo refers back to 152: "when (Scripture) spoke a little earlier of his 'leaving', it did not allude to his corruption but to his stable endurance". The allegorical interpretation of "he was added to his people" (p. 437 Marcus) is that this "people is truly of God [...]. For every soul is rational which flees and is loosed and released from that to which it is bound [...]". It is clear that the exegesis at *QG* IV 152-3 belongs with our cento. The only other place where Gen 25:8 is quoted is *Sacrif.* 5-10, part of the exegesis of Gen 4:2 "and he added to this that she brought forth Abel his brother". In order to explain 'added' (προσέθηκεν), Philo adduces scriptural evidence containing this verb and referring to the decease of the patriarchs (Gen 25:8, Abraham; 49:33b, Jacob; 35:29, Isaac; apparently, the 'addition' of Abel<sup>37</sup> is a complementary phenomenon). Moses however was not "added to ...". This passage has been excellently interpreted by Wolfson:<sup>38</sup> Abraham and Isaac, on 'leaving', are added to the 'people', i.e., the company of the incorporeal and blessed souls. Isaac, on 'leaving', is added to a higher level [viz. that of the Logos and the incorporeal Forms]. Moses however returns to and is reunited with the transcendental God Himself, who "sent him as a loan to the earthly sphere" (*Sacr.* 9). Wolfson links up this interpretation of the 'people' of Gen 25:8 and 49:33 with what he calls the "proof-text",<sup>39</sup> viz. Gen 15:15, God's promise to Abraham that he will return to his "Fathers (πατέρας) [...] in a good old age". At *QG* III 11, Philo explains that this clearly refers to the "other life ... without the body". Those who argue that the

'Fathers' denote the physical elements are wrong: the angels (ἀγγέλους) are meant. Wolfson points out correctly that at *Her.* 280-3, exegesis of Gen 15:15 (the only other occurrence besides *QG* III 11), Philo does not give his own view but merely lists the interpretations suggested by other exegetes.<sup>40</sup> It is interesting to note that one of these earlier interpretations stated that the 'Fathers' are the incorporeal Forms—a Middle Platonizing exegesis comparable to that concerned with the two types of man.<sup>41</sup>

Presumably, when at *Mos.* II 288 Philo has Moses on his death be resolved into a monad which is a most sunlike intellect, he integrates an earlier exegesis rather than giving his own view found at *Sacr.* 8-10. At *Mos.* I 158, which explains the revelation received by Moses, Philo tells us that he enjoyed the partnership of the "Father and Maker", i.e., of the First Power; he entered into the darkness where ὁ θεός was, i.e. εἰς τὴν αἰδῆ καὶ ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον τῶν ὄντων παραδειγματικὴν οὐσίαν. This again, is the level of the Logos. It seems appropriate, however, that Moses while not definitely separated from the body should rise no higher than the incorporeal Forms.

A parallel for the interesting hierarchy described at *Sacr.* 5-10 is to be found at *Conf.* 77-82. Here the temporary presence on earth of 'souls' such as those of the patriarchs is discussed, and Moses is also mentioned. The patriarchs are 'immigrants' (παροικίος, παροιμία),<sup>42</sup> but Moses is a "total stranger" (γειῳράς). Philo points out that this is a far stronger term (*Conf.* 82).

We have noticed above<sup>43</sup> that the bounty of the Father sends certain souls towards the earth (*Fug.* 62), and seen that according to *Sacr.* 9 Moses, who returns to "Him who is" Himself, was sent down on loan. It is interesting to note that according to the Greek text of *QG* III 11 (a section lost in Arm. but, as Mme Petit points out *ad loc.*, indirectly preserved in Ambrosius, *Abrah.* p. 618-9 Schenkl) among these 'Fathers' or incorporeal and blessed souls one may also reckon Abel and Enos and Seth and Enoch and Noah. At *QG* I 86, Enoch Moses Elijah all ascend to an "incorporeal and intelligible form"; Philo here apparently reports the earlier view which, as at *Her.* 280, has the patriarchs and prophets return to the level of the Logos. At *QG* I 78, Abel is said to be "like one who comes from above to below". Philo's hierarchy (viz. (a) Abel Enos Seth Enoch Noah Abraham Jacob as incorporeal souls; (b) Isaac as being elevated to the level of the Logos; (c) Moses returning to the transcendental God) is remarkable. It is an improve-

ment upon a previous Platonizing Jewish exegesis which had all these paragons return to the Logos, and appears to have a Gnostic ring. Moses, the author of the Holy Books, reminds one of the Gnostic *Erlöser*, whereas the others appear in the rôle of earlier prophets (or *Erlöser*) announcing the real *Erlöser*. I cannot enter into this fascinating aspect here, although it seems undeniable that a sort of weak 'typology' is involved.

It is the expression "leaving, he died" (ἐκλιπὼν ἀπέθανεν, Gen 25:8, 35:29; cf. 49:33) which to Philo suggests the 'Heraclitean' theme that the death of the body is the life of the soul and thus helps him to interpret the 'Fathers' (Gen 15:15) or the 'people' (Gen 25:8, 49:33) in a Platonist way as incorporeal souls living the blessed life. This doctrine is of course not derived from these 'proof'-texts, but superimposed upon them. The Middle Platonist cento enables Philo to link up quite a number of important scriptural passages with one another and to impute a sort of general and grand design to the stories involved. As he says at *QG* IV 169, the ἐκλειψις of the good is called πρόσθεσις, for ἐκλείποντες [...] τὸν θνητὸν βίον ἀθανάτῳ ζωῇ προστίθενται.

At *Mos.* II 45-7 Philo advises us which are the real issues in the holy books. The works of Moses consist of a historical part and a juridical part, the historical part being divided into a section dealing with the creation of the world [not the most important one in a quantitative sense, of course] and a 'genealogical' section [viz. the history of the "generations of man"], the latter being concerned both with the *punishment of the impious* (ἀσεβῶν) and the *honouring of the good*.

As we have noticed, Cain is one who is punished: an exile forever, persecuted by all the parts of the world, living a life of eternal death. But Cain is not the first sinner and exile, for this is Adam. There is a synkrisis of Adam and Cain at *Poster.* 10-11: Adam is banished by God (ἐκβάλλει, cf. Gen. 3:24), Cain goes into voluntary exile. Adam, the involuntary sinner, will be healed in as far as this is possible, for God gives Seth to replace Abel whom Cain slew. The voluntary exile [and voluntary sinner and homicide] however "must incur woes for ever beyond healing". One may add that the death of his soul is a permanent one, whereas for the involuntary sinner Adam (as for those who are his descendants) there is a possibility of redemption. Cain so to speak is banished from the whole world; Adam is banished only from paradise (cf. *Congr.* 171). The exegesis of Gen 3:24 καὶ ἐξέβαλεν τὸν Ἀδὰμ κτλ. (cf. *Leg. All.* I 55 ἐκείνον [sc. the 'moulded' man] ἐκβάλλει) is at *QG* I 56 and

*Cher.* 1 ff. The latter passage is of special interest. Adam's banishment from paradise entails that he can never return there (eternal *exile*: ὁ δ' ἐκβληθεὶς ὑπὸ θεοῦ τὴν αἰδίου φυγὴν ὑπομένει); "he is thrust forth to the place of the impious", εἰς ἀσεβῶν χώρον:<sup>44</sup> Philo's term for Hell. Not, however, the nether world of myth, but life on earth, in the body. Philo is familiar with a Greek allegorical interpretation of the Hades of the poets and the old wives' tales which has been studied by, among others, F. Cumont and P. Boyancé;<sup>45</sup> a version of it is found at *Lucr.* III, 989-1024,<sup>46</sup> and *Verg., Aen.* VI 724-51 (thirty years later),<sup>47</sup> has been influenced by another version of it. Cumont argued that this is originally a Pythagorean idea, whereas Boyancé (who compared the parallels in Philo which had also been briefly studied by Cumont) implausibly suggested Antiochus.<sup>48</sup> Passages in Philo include *Somn.* I 152 (the depths of Hades are the abode allotted to the bad who make dying their occupation), *Her.* 45 and 79, and *Congr.* 57, which has: "he banishes (φυγαδεύων) the unjust and godless soul [...] to the place of pleasures and lusts and injustices. That place is most fitly called the place of the impious (χώρος ... ἀσεβῶν), but is not that mythical place of the impious in Hades. For the true Hades is the life of the bad [...]". At *Post.* 31, Philo speaks of the "Hades of the passions".

In Empedocles' *Katharmoi*, the fallen daimon (or soul) first enters Hades—the old-fashioned nether world,<sup>49</sup> not the Hell on earth which later interpretations read into it.<sup>50</sup> The tradition investigated by Cumont and Boyancé may be older, but I suggest that not too long before Philo Empedocles was linked up with it in a new way. At *Somn.* II, 133, the ἀσεβῶν ... χώρον is again referred to. Philo speaks of people who are driven to "the sunless place of the impious where deep night reigns and endless darkness, and innumerable tribes of spectres and phantoms and dream-illusions" (ὅν ἐπέχουσι νύξ βαθεῖα καὶ σκότος ἀτελεύτητον καὶ εἰδῶλων καὶ φασμάτων καὶ ὄνειράτων ἔθνη μυρία). It is hard not to think of *Emp., Vorsokr.* 31 B 121 (*ap. Hierocl., In Carm. Aur.* 24, 2, where this Hades is interpreted as the earth): "... a place, where (there are) slaughter and hatred and hordes (ἔθνεα) of other evils [...]; they [the fallen souls] wander in darkness (σκότος) over the field of Ate", and its sequel (?) B 122, which lists some of these horrors (together with their opposites). It is to be noted that the only Empedoclean line quoted by Philo (anonymously, and in a different context) is B 121, 2, in the form ἐνθα φόνοι ἡτελοῦνται<sup>51</sup> καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν (*Prov.* II 24 *ap. Eus., P. E.* VIII 14, 23). The word κῆρες, as Boyancé pointed out<sup>52</sup> (without refer-



ing to Empedocles) is a favourite term with Philo, designating the evils endemic to the human condition (*Leg. All.* III 200, 235; *Cher.* 66; *Sacr.* 15, 31, 95, 111; *Det.* 27, 44; *Post.* 11, 52; *Deus* 112; *Plant.* 43, 145; *Ebr.* 79; *Sobr.* 38; *Her.* 272; *Mutat.* 49; *Spec.* III 2; *Aet.* 73). The combination νόσους (τε) καὶ κῆρας occurs at *Sacr.* 31 and *Det.* 44; although it is not certain that Emp. B 121, 3, which mentions the 'diseases', is genuine, this need not be an objection to Philo's alluding to it.

The weak 'typology' which links up these early exiles, Adam and Cain, is to a certain extent shored up by shared allusive references to the earthly Hades and, possibly, to Empedocles' *Katharmoi*. I have pointed out above<sup>53</sup> that Adam, on leaving paradise, is also the first to be 'buried'.<sup>54</sup>

I would like to conclude this study of some aspects of the Philonic theme of the honouring of the good and the punishment of the bad by looking at other passages which introduce the "persecution by the elements".

In his description of the contents of the Holy Books, Philo points out (*Mos.* II 53) that all those who were favoured by God with good fortune and yet turned to evil deeds were considered the "enemies not of men but of the whole heaven and universe, and suffer not the ordinary, but strange and unexampled (καινοτάτας καὶ παρηλλαγμένους) punishments wrought by the might of Justice (Δίκη), the hater of evil and assessor of God [i.e., the second Power<sup>55</sup>]. For the most powerful *elements of the universe, fire and water, fell upon them* (στοιχείων ἐπιθεμένων ὕδατος καὶ πυρός), so that, as the times revolved (καιρῶν περιόδοις), some were destroyed by deluges, others perished by being burnt" (II 53, my italics). In a way, these evildoers threaten the existence of the world ...<sup>56</sup> This is the late Hellenistic Platonic-Stoic theory of the partial catastrophes,<sup>57</sup> used by Philo in the exegesis of the Deluge and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorra (cf. *Abrah.* 1<sup>58</sup>). The Deluge is described *Mos.* II 54, the destruction of the cities of the plain II 55-6. After the Deluge, i.e., after the "purification of the things below the moon"<sup>59</sup> by water, at a time when "the earth [...] showed itself renewed with the likeness which we may suppose it to have when originally it was created with the world", the crew and the animals leave Noah's vessel (64-5). These survivors have escaped the τῶν στοιχείων νεωτερίσμον (cf. II 53) and are now παλιγγενεσίας ... ἡγεμόνες καὶ δευτέρας ἀρχηγέται περιόδου. This terminology is remarkably Stoic: a new 'period' begins, and there is a 'rebirth' (Cic., *N.D.* II 119 speaks of the *renovatio mundi*). As a

rule, Philo uses *palingenesia* not of persons but of the Stoic world (*Aet.* 9, 47, 76, 85, 93, 99, 103, 107), but at *Poster.* 124 Seth is ὡσπερ παλιγγενεσία of Abel (note the ὡσπερ). At *QG* II 51 and 56, however, the 'rebirth' (Noah coming out of the vessel) is fully parallel to *Mos.* II 65. The Stoic theory of the cosmic periods entailed an *ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen*; all events were to reoccur in the same way, and the same persons would lead the same lives all over again.<sup>60</sup> Philo transposes this Stoic idea: there is a new beginning, but Noah is both the end of the old and the origin of the new; the world is as it was when newly created, but there is no repetition of same. It should, furthermore, be noted that at *QG* II 51 and 56 the 'rebirth' is part of the *literal* exegesis. The parallel at *Mos.* II 53-65 is also on the literal level. But the unheard-of behaviour of the elements which attack and destroy the sinners goes way beyond Gen 6:5-7:19 (the water and the torrents of the Deluge) and Gen 19:24-5 and 28 (God rains θεῖον καὶ πῦρ from heaven, and Abraham sees a φλόξ rising from the earth).

The second passage is *Mos.* I 96 ff., on the punishments inflicted on Egypt. These, Philo notes, were "different from the usual kind" (cf. *Mos.* II 53 and 64). "The elements of the universe, *earth and water and air and fire*, carry out the assault (ἐπιτίθενται), God's judgement being that the (elements) by which the world had been completed should be the means of destruction of the land of the impious" (τὴν ἀσεβῶν χώραν—possibly, a pun on τὸν ἀσεβῶν χώρον).<sup>61</sup> Three punishments belong to the denser elements, earth and water, and three to air and fire, the elements most productive of life (97). It should be noted that Philo has altered the sequence of the punishments as described in the Bible, no doubt in the interest of his elemental scheme. The attacks by means of water are described 98 ff., by earth 107 ff., by air and heaven, αἱ καθαρῶνται μοῖραι τῆς τῶν ὄλων οὐσίας, at 113 ff. At 112, Philo points out that God, if He so wishes, is capable of destroying the whole world. This long systematical description also goes way beyond the scriptural text, Exod 7 ff. (water is mentioned Exod 7:14-25). Philo has superimposed a cosmological and even eschatological perspective. It is noteworthy that in this passage, all four elements are involved (cf. also I 143 γῆς ὕδατος ἀέρος πυρός, ἃ μέρη τῆς φύσεώς ἐστιν, ἣν ἀμήχανον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἐπιθεμένων) whereas *Mos.* II 53 ff. only speaks of water (Deluge) and fire (Sodom). The Deluge, by the way, is the only event that is of more than local importance.

The last passage is *Mos.* II 281-6, the punishment of the temple atten-

dants that are in revolt. According to Num 16:30-33, these are swallowed up by the earth and, according to 16:35, killed by fire. The death of the sinners (281) is not κατὰ φύσιν, but of a "new and different kind" (cf. Mos. II 53 and 64, I 96). The earth bursts open, thunderbolts fall from heaven (282-3). We should not fail to note, Philo comments, that the "work of punishing the impious (ἀσεβῶν) was shared by earth and heaven, the principles of the universe" (285). "Therefore each of the two elements supplied its punishment ..." (τῶν στοιχείων ἑκάτερον ἐχορήγησε τὰς τιμωρίας, 286). Again, Philo has superimposed a learned theory upon the data presented by his scriptural proof-text.

Yet in all these passages, there is some basis in Scripture for Philo's interpretation. Water, after all, is the instrument of the Deluge, as fire is of the destruction of the cities of the plain. The punishments of Egypt (at least Philo's first six) are related to the water, the land, the air, the heaven. The temple attendants are really swallowed by earth and burnt by fire. But in Philo's learned perspective, these events become parts of a more general pattern involving God's government of the world and his providential justice in not destroying everything but the sinners only. The best parallel for this *Weltanschauung* is provided by Prov. I 36, 89-8.<sup>62</sup> We are still on the level of the literal exegesis.

Previously, I have commented at some length on the "attack of the elements" on Cain (QG I 71 and 74<sup>63</sup>). One may feel that this, too, should be attributed to the literal level of interpretation. I believe, however, that this is unlikely because (1) Cain, unlike all those other impious people, is *not* destroyed, and because (2) in the case of Cain the attack by the elements is part of the allegory of the (in this case, never ascending) soul. The real punishments meted out to the impious as described in Mos. I and II, *locc. citt.*, appear to be a Philonic development of ideas derived from Stoic (and, to a certain extent, Platonic) cosmology, whereas the persecution of Cain by the elements developed out of the interpretation of an Empedoclean fragment dealing with the soul. To a certain extent, these two interpretive doctrines, viz. the Stoic (-Platonic) cosmological and the Middle Platonist (Empedoclean) psychological one, overlap and meet. In the present case, Philo had a fortunate hand; in the context of his exegetical manoeuvres, doctrines of different provenance may turn out to be sufficiently alike to be integrated into a larger exegetic whole. Philo, the eclectic exegete, here would be in a position to say that his sources, after all, agree with one another.<sup>64</sup>

## NOTES

\* For Philo, I have used the Loeb ed. and the volumes that have been published of *Les Oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* (1961 ff.), abbreviated *OeuvPh*. Translations are from the Loeb ed., with occasional modifications.

*Essential bibliography:*

G. Mayer, *Index Philoneus* (Berlin-New York 1974); does not include the fragments.

*Biblia Patristica: Supplément. Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1982); lists all the scriptural passages quoted or alluded to.

For the formal structure of the treatises and *Quaestiones*, see:

P. Borgen-R. Skarsten, *Quaestiones et solutiones: Some Observations on the Form of Philo's Exegesis*, *StudPhil* 4 (1976-7), 1 ff.

V. Nikiprowetzky, *Le commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie*, ALGHJ 11 (Leiden 1977).

V. Nikiprowetzky, *ap.* D. Winston-J. Dillon, *Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria*, Brown Univ. Jud. St. 25 (Chico, Calif. 1983), 5 ff.

For the distinction between Philo's literal and allegorical exegesis, see the pioneering study of:

T. H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation*, Cath. Bibl. Qu. Monogr. 14 (Washington D.C. 1983).

For Philo's philosophical eclecticism, see my paper:

*Using Philosophy: Quaestiones in Philonem*, forthcoming in: J. Dillon-A. A. Long (eds.), *Acts of the 1984 Dublin (FIEC) Colloquium on Eclecticism*. \*

See further the *bibliographie raisonnée* of: \*

R. Radice, *Filone d'Alessandria. Bibliografia generale 1937-1982* (Napoli 1983).

By no means all Heraclitean references in Philo have been collected. The most complete edition is:

M. Marcovich, *Eraclito: Frammenti*, Bibl. Stud. Super. 64 (Firenze 1978), abbreviated Marc.

The best edition of the fragments of Empedocles' *Katharmoi* is:

G. Zunz, *Persephone*. Bk. 2: *Empedokles' Katharmoi*, 181 ff. (Oxford 1971).

See also:

M. R. Wright, *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments* (New Haven and London 1981).

<sup>1</sup> Cornucopias of parallels but little systematic study of the history of the various traditions of transmission in P. Courcelle, *Connais-toi toi-même* (Paris 1975): prison of the soul, 345 ff.; tomb of the soul, 394 ff.; etc. etc. Cf. also M. Harl, "L'Odyssée des âmes", in: *OeuvPh* 15, pp. 103 ff. For the Orphic and Pythagorean antecedents see my paper *Bad World and Demiurge: A Gnostic 'Motif' from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo*, in: *EPRO* 91 (1981), 292.

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 140, 145.

<sup>3</sup> See pp. 140 f.

<sup>4</sup> The theme of the body as prison of the soul (cf. Th. Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus*, Chicago 1919, repr. New York-London 1979, 69, 101) of course also belongs with this cento. I have not followed this out in detail.

<sup>5</sup> See pp. 141 ff.

<sup>6</sup> Reading φόνω with all the editors except Wright, *o.c.*, 136, 272 f., who preserves *ms.* φόβω which is as unsatisfactory as to grammar as it is to sense.

<sup>7</sup> There is another possible echo of Emp. B 115 elsewhere, viz. *Spec. leg.* II 27, where the punishment for perjury—cf. Emp. B 115, 4—resembles that meted out to Cain: “God is not gentle to such impious persons, but μένειν εἰς αἰὲν δυσκαθάρτους ἐξ”.

<sup>8</sup> Cain's *eternal* entombment constitutes another difference with Empedocles; presumably, Philo (or his source) blended in the Platonic notion of the souls that never leave the nether world (*Rep.* X, 615 d-616 a); for allegorization of this nether world see pp. 149 f.

<sup>9</sup> In: *Kephalaion: Festschr. De Vogel* (Assen 1975), 137 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. p. 140, 145.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. p. 132.

<sup>12</sup> *O.c.*, 134.

<sup>13</sup> See pp. 145 f.

<sup>14</sup> This interpretation of the *akousma* is unique, to my knowledge; the parallels adduced by F. Cumont, *Lucrèce et le symbolisme pythagoricien des enfers*, RPH 44 (1920), 232 n. 3, are not good.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. p. 135 f.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. p. 133 f.

<sup>17</sup> On this theme see also pp. 150 ff.

<sup>18</sup> ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις λέγεται καὶ ὅτι πάντ' ἐφορᾷ Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούει. πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τέ ἐστι τὴν διὰ πάντων διήκουσαν δύναμιν λανθάνειν τι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ γιγνομένων;

<sup>19</sup> Cf. my paper *Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought*, EPRO 78 (Leiden 1979), 139, 141, 148 ff.

<sup>20</sup> See p. 132.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. p. 133.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. P. Boyancé, *Échos des exégèses de la mythologie grecque chez Philon*, in: *Philon d'Alexandrie* (Lyon 1967), 169 ff.; U. Früchtel, *Die kosmologischen Vorstellungen bei Philon von Alexandrien*, ALGHJ 2 (Leiden 1968), 104-5; J. Dillon, *Ganymede as the Logos: Traces of a Forgotten Allegorization in Philo*, StudPhil 6 (1979-80), 37 ff. and Cl. Qu. 31 (1981), 183 ff.; and esp. Tobin, *o.c.*, 150 ff. F. Buffière, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris 1956), 392 ff., remains important for the later Platonist allegorization of the *Odyssey* although (as Boyancé was the first to point out) he neglected the evidence in Philo.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. p. 143.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. p. 140.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. N. Zeegers-vander Vorst, *Les citations des poètes grecs chez les apologistes chrétiens du IIe siècle*, Un. Louv., Rec. trav. hist. & philol., 4e S., Fasc. 47 (Louvain 1972), 278 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. p. 134.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. p. 132.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. p. 145.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. pp. 148 f.

<sup>30</sup> *OeuvPh* 17, *ad loc.*; Nikiprowetzky 1976, 36 n. 158.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. p. 139.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. p. 139.

<sup>33</sup> So M. Harl, *ad loc.*

<sup>34</sup> Cf. p. 135 f.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. p. 136.

<sup>36</sup> *O.c.*, 139-40.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. *QG* I 78, and above p. 147 f.

<sup>38</sup> H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, I (Cambridge Mass. 1948), 402 ff.

<sup>39</sup> *O.c.*, 398.

<sup>40</sup> *O.c.*, 398 f.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Tobin, *o.c.*, *passim*, according to whom the exegesis of Gen 1:27 and 2:7 as pertaining to one and the same Man is earlier, and the Middle Platonist Jewish (cf. *QG* I 8) exegesis which has 1:27 refer to the intelligible and 2:7 to the sensible Man is later. The intelligible Man is located on the level of the Logos.

<sup>42</sup> R. A. Bitter, *Vreemdelingschap bij Philo: Een onderzoek naar de betekenis van παράκοιτος* (diss. Utrecht 1982).

<sup>43</sup> Cf. p. 144.

<sup>44</sup> This expression is also found Jos., *B.J.* II 156, and in the interesting ps. Platonic dialogue *Axiochus*, 371 e 6. [Several items in *Ax.* recall our cento, cf. 365 b 4 f., the Empedoclean motif of life as exile; 365 e 6 f., body as prison; 366 d 3 f., echo of Emp., *Vorsokr.* 31 B 118 (cf. also *infra*, n. 46). The Heraclitean oxymoron is not found (cf. *supra*, text to n. 11); what is in the Epicureanizing section of *Ax.*, 369 b-c, would be in flagrant contradiction with the suggestion that we live the death and die the life, although it should of course be acknowledged that the author attempts to get away with the somewhat less flagrant contradiction between his Epicurean echoes and his Pythagoreanizing-Platonizing view on the immortality of the soul. *T.a.q.* for *Ax.* is the list of recognized Platonic *spuria* at Diog. Laertius III 62, but no agreement on the *t.p.q.* has been reached. J. P. Hershbell, *Pseudo-Plato: Axiochus*, Texts and Transl. 21—Gr.-R. Ser. 6 (Chico, Calif. 1981), 20 f., argues for the 2nd-1st cent. BCE. However, he does not seem to realize that his interesting suggestion (perhaps made for inadequate reasons) that *Ax.* is a Middle Platonist piece points at the 1st cent. rather than the 2nd. I cannot find anything specifically Middle Platonist in *Ax.* J. Chevalier, *Étude critique du dialogue pseudo-platonicien l'Axiochus* (Paris 1915), 106 ff., argued that the treatise is Neopythagorean and dated it to the 1st cent. BCE; again, it is hard to pinpoint anything specifically Neopythagorean. C. W. Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge der Appendix Platonica*, Stud. et Testim. ant. 17 (München 1975), 36, 296 f., 328, dates it to the first 30 years of the 1st cent. BCE. But his argument that the *spuria* were part of the corpus before the works considered to be genuine were arranged in tetralogies (which ordering M. dates to the 1st cent. BCE) is not cogent, because the number of *spuria* could fluctuate (note that Hershbell has missed Müller's important study). However, Müller's suggestion that *Ax.* should be attributed to post-Carneadean Academic circles is worth pondering, for the equanimity with which the conflicting Platonic and Epicurean views are placed alongside one another suggests the hand of a person who is even milder than Cicero, who likewise puts views on a par in as far as they are or can be useful but who as a rule excludes Epicureanism. The dialogue should be studied in the light of recent research on later Academic Skepticism, Neopythagoreanism, and Middle Platonism and its preparation. Unfortunately, Hershbell's study provides little that is new.]

<sup>45</sup> F. Cumont, *o.c.* (*supra*, n. 14); P. Boyancé, *Sur le discours d'Anchise*, in: *Hommages Dumézil*, Coll. Latomus 45 (Bruxelles 1960), 60 ff.

<sup>46</sup> Against P. Boyancé, *Lucrèce et l'Épicurisme* (Paris 1963), 179 ff., I would argue in favour of an independent Epicurean tradition. It has not been noticed that the Epicurean interpretation of Empedocles, *Vorsokr.* 31 B 118, for which see also *Lucr.* V 222-6, is



quoted already by Philo, *Opif.* 161, a passage which is remarkably parallel to Sext., *M.* X 96 = *Epic.* fr. 398, pp. 274, 29-275, 4 Us. Philo here quotes Empedocles without knowing he does.

<sup>47</sup> At VI 734, *carcere caeco*, we have the theme of the body as prison.

<sup>48</sup> For Antiochus, man is the whole person composed of body and soul; cf. J. Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu* (Paris 1971), 115 ff.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Zuntz, *Persephone*, 199 ff., 254 f., and my note at EPRO 91, 285 f. n. 59.

<sup>50</sup> Cf., e.g., Burkert, *o.c.*, 143 f.

<sup>51</sup> The corruption has not been explained. Perhaps Philo quoted two half-lines, viz. ἐνθα φανοὶ πωλεῦνται + ἄλλων ἔθνεα κηρῶν.

<sup>52</sup> *Anchise*, 67 (he compares the *corporeae* ... *pestes* at *Aen.* VI 737 and, better, *Plat.*, *Nom.* XI 937 d).

<sup>53</sup> Cf. p. 140 f.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. p. 140, on *QG* I 16.

<sup>55</sup> See esp. N. A. Dahl-A. F. Segal, *Philo and the Rabbis on the Names of God*, *JStJud* 9 (1978), 1 ff.

<sup>56</sup> See my paper *Using Philos.*, Pt. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. EPRO 78 (*supra*, n. 19), 147 n. 52.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. n. 57.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. p. 144.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. this journal 37 (1983), 219 ff.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. p. 149.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. n. 56.

<sup>63</sup> See pp. 134 ff.

<sup>64</sup> I wish to thank Prof. R. v.d. Broek, Dr. P. W. v.d. Horst, Prof. G. Quispel, Dr. D. T. Runia, Prof. J. C. M. van Winden and the members of the corona of the FIEC Colloquium on Eclecticism (Dublin, Aug. 1984) for their critical remarks, and Dr. C. W. Hudson for looking at my English text.

## HERACLITUS FR. B 63 D.-K.

Hippolytus, *Ref.* ix 10, 6 (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 63) finds the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh in a saying of Heraclitus<sup>1</sup>:

λέγει δὲ καὶ σαρκὸς ἀνάστασιν ταύτης (τῆς) φανεράς ἐν ἡ γεγενήμεθαι καὶ τὸν θεὸν οἶδε ταύτης τῆς ἀναστάσεως αἷτιον οὕτως λέγων· "ἐνθα δ' ἐόντι ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ φύλακας γίνεσθαι ἐγερτὶ ζώντων καὶ νεκρῶν".

According to Hippolytus, Heraclitus « speaks of » the resurrection of the flesh, and « knows » that God is the cause of this resurrection. As a rule, scholars have sought a reference to ἀνάστασις as well as one to God in the fragment, and found both at the beginning. The resurrection is of course easily linked up with the verb ἐπανίστασθαι; the reference to God was got out of Diels' ἐνθα δ' ἐόντι, to be translated, e.g., as: « for Him who is there ... »<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See my paper *Resurrection Added: the interpretatio christiana of a Stoic Doctrine*, « *Vigiliae Christianae* », xxxvii (1983) pp. 218-31 ff.

<sup>2</sup> D.-K. translate: « Vor ihm aber, der dort ist ... »; Diels, *ad loc.*, explains: « Der Gott erscheint. Die in der Finsternis des Todes Liegenden erheben sich wie die Neophyten der Mysterien » etc.; M. MARCOVICH, *Eraclito: Frammenti*, Firenze 1978, p. 276, translates: « Davanti a lui (Dio?) ... », and suggests that

I have always believed that the beginning of the fragment is corrupt<sup>3</sup> and that the attempts that have been made to emend it<sup>4</sup> are unsatisfactory. Ch. H. Kahn is of the same opinion<sup>5</sup>. Recently, I have thought of a solution which may be satisfactory, both in the context of Hippolytus' exegesis of Heraclitus as the source of Noetus' heresy, and for the interpretation of the fragment when severed from this context.

My assumption is that Hippolytus does not suggest that an explicit reference to God is to be found in the text of the fragment; the text speaks of the resurrection only. Since, however, the resurrection occurs because God wants it to occur, Heraclitus must of course have "known" that God is its cause. In a similar way, Clement finds the Christian doctrine of the purification of the sinners by fire in a fragment of Heraclitus which he quotes, but which does *not* mention the fire, *Strom.* v, 1 9, 3-4 (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 28)<sup>6</sup>:

καὶ μέντοι καὶ "δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας καὶ μάρτυρας" ὁ Ἐφέσιός φησιν· οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἐκ τῆς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διὰ πυρὸς κάθαρσιν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων ...

Clement's οἶδεν parallels Hippolytus' οἶδεν; he believes that Heraclitus' words have a deeper sense. A fire that "seizes" occurs in another fragment, cited by Hippolytus, *Ref.* ix 10, 7 (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 66)

Hippolytus found a reference to God in ἐόντι, « che pertanto non va emendato ». Diano, in C. DIANO-G. SERRA, *Eraclito: I frammenti e le testimonianze*, Milano 1980, p. 51 [fr. 115], translates: « Egli è lì, ed essi sorgono davanti a lui ... »; Serra (*ibid.*, p. 115) admits that the fragment is enigmatic but states that « colui davanti al quale esse sorgono sarebbe Dio ». C. MAZZANTINI, *Eraclito*, Torino 1944, p. 146, proposes « colà veramente ». Note that δ' ἐόντι is Diels' rendering of ms. δέοντι.

<sup>3</sup> See *Heraclitus: Fragmenten*, Amsterdam 1979, p. 64.

<sup>4</sup> Listed by Marcovich *ad fr.* 73 M., by Walzer *ad fr.* 63.

<sup>5</sup> CH. H. KAHN, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*, Cambridge 1979, p. 78 f., *ad fr.* CX K.; cfr. also *ibid.*, p. 254. Cfr. also W.K.C. GUTHRIE, *Hist. Gr. Philos.*, I, Cambridge 1962, p. 478; R. WALZER, *Eraclito*, Hildesheim 1964<sup>2</sup>, p. 102.

<sup>6</sup> Cfr. the paper cit. *supra*, note 1.

"πάντα γάρ", φησί, "τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται". Clement never quotes this fragment; however, he goes on to say, *loc. cit.* (= *SVF* II 660), that the Stoics later called this event *ekpyrosis* and that they followed Heraclitus in assuming that the individual person will rise again. Furthermore, Clement is explicit about (what he thinks is) Heraclitus' theory of fire (shored up by several quotations) and its acceptance by the Stoics elsewhere, *Strom.* v, xiv 103, 6-105, 1 (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 30-B 31, *SVF* II 590)<sup>7</sup>. What he knows (or believes he knows) about Heraclitus' thought in general provides the background for his interpretation of *Vorsokr.* 22 B 28. For all that, this interpretation is a purely arbitrary one, which gets something out of a text which is not there, and it can only be justified on the — to us, unacceptable — assumption that Heraclitus "knew" what Clement says he knew because he depends on the "barbarian", i.e., Jewish, philosophy<sup>8</sup>.

Hippolytus, too, believes the Greeks stole their wisdom from the Jews, and he argues that the heretics stole theirs from the Greeks. Thus, Noetus' theology, which according to Hippolytus derives from Heraclitus, can be found in the sayings of the latter<sup>9</sup>. In this way, Hippolytus performs remarkable feats of interpretation. He finds a reference to God (or rather to various conceptions about God) in two fragments which do not mention God at all, *Ref.* ix 9, 5, p. 242, 10 f. W. (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 54-B 55):

ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶν [*scil.* ὁ πατὴρ πάντων τῶν γεγονότων]<sup>10</sup> ἀφανὴς ἀόρατος ἄγνωστος ἀνθρώποις ἐν τούτοις λέγει· "ἁρμονίῃ ἀφανὴς φανερωῆς κρείττων" ... ὅτι δὲ ἐστὶν ὁρατὸς ἀνθρώποις καὶ οὐκ ἀνεξεύ-

<sup>7</sup> Cfr. the paper cit. *supra*, note 1. Cfr. also my paper *On Two Fragments of Heraclitus*, « *Mnemosyne* », xxxvii (1984).

<sup>8</sup> See S. R. C. LILLA, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism*, Oxford 1971, p. 9 ff.

<sup>9</sup> See M. MARCOVICH, *Hippolytus and Heraclitus*, in *Studia Patristica* VII, ed. by F. L. CROSS, pt. I, Berlin 1966, p. 256 ff.

<sup>10</sup> For the correct text see M. MARCOVICH, *Textkritisches I zu Hippolyt Refutatio B. III-X*, « *Rheinisches Museum* », N. F., cvii (1964) p. 308.

ρετος ἐν τούτοις λέγει· “ὅσων ὅψις ἀκοή μάθησις, ταῦτα ἐγὼ προτιμέω”...

I submit that the method of “reading” a fragment is the same here as in the case of *Vorsokr.* 22 B 63, or conversely. B 54 is only about the superiority of the hidden over the apparent harmony; Hippolytus superimposes a reference to God. B 55 is only about Heraclitus’ preference for such things as provide information when they are seen and heard; Hippolytus superimposes a reference to God. In the same way, I assume, B 63 is only about some sort of “resurrection”; Hippolytus superimposes a reference to God, because, quite naturally, he believes that whoever believes in the resurrection must believe that God is its cause.

If this interpretation is correct, we no longer have to look for an explicit reference to God in the text of B 63, which simplifies the attempt to emend its corrupt beginning. I suggest that we read: ἐνθα εὐδοντας κ.τ.λ., «thereupon those asleep rise again ...». It is not necessary to emend ἐπανίστασθαι<sup>11</sup>. The change from †δέοντι† to εὐδοντας is minimal, and the dative may have crept in because of the following ἐπανίστασθαι, which often is connected with the dative. If Hippolytus quoted the text in this form, he must have thought that those who are asleep represent those who are asleep *in death*. This idea can be paralleled from the *Ref.*

Hippolytus’ exposition of the doctrines of the Jewish sects has been stolen from Josephus, whose account, however, is falsified without compunction by interpolations which express Hippolytus’ own ideas<sup>12</sup>. In this way, what is in *Ref.* ix 27, pp. 260, 28-261, 3 Wendland, viz., a statement about the condition of the virtuous soul

<sup>11</sup> CH. H. KAHN, *op. cit.*, p. 333, note 358, objects that the verb ἐπανίστασθαι means “to rise in revolt against”. But the dative in B 63 is corrupt; the verb means either “to rise from sleep” or “to rise from a sitting position”, as at *Il.* B 85 (cfr. MARCOVICH, *ad fr.* 73 M).

<sup>12</sup> Cfr. K. KOSCHORKE, *Hippolyt's Ketzerbekämpfung und Polemik gegen die Gnostiker: eine tendenzkritische Untersuchung seiner 'Refutatio omnium haeresium'*, Wiesbaden 1975, p. 22 f.

waiting for the Final Judgement according to the Essenes, is almost pure Hippolytus<sup>13</sup>:

ἔρρωται δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ ὁ τῆς ἀναστάσεως λόγος· ὁμολογοῦσι γὰρ καὶ τὴν σάρκα ἀναστήσεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ἀθάνατον, ὃν τρόπον ἤδη ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ· ἣν χωρισθεῖσαν νῦν [ἐστίν] εἰς ἓνα χῶρον εὐπνουν καὶ φωτεῖνον ἀναπαύεσθαι ἕως κρίσεως ...<sup>14</sup>.

In death, the soul is asleep, or resting, in a blessed place, but it will rise again together with the body. The idea that the soul of a dead person is asleep until the resurrection comes does not impress one as valid for Heraclitus, but for a Christian author such as Hippolytus it would make sense to find this thought in a Heraclitean fragment; after all, the Greeks, he believed, had stolen their wisdom from the Jews. In the chapter on the Essenes from which I have just quoted Hippolytus tells us explicitly that Pythagoras and the Stoics have derived their doctrines about the resurrection, the Final Judgement, and the *ekpyrosis*, from the Essenes, i.e., from the Jews, and his Heraclitus is a Stoicized Heraclitus, whereas his Stoics are followers, as to *ekpyrosis*, of a Heracliteanized Empedocles (*Ref.* i 3-4)<sup>15</sup>. There is a Hippolytean

<sup>13</sup> What Jos. *bell. Jud.* ii, viii 11 (154) wrote is: καὶ γὰρ ἔρρωται παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἥδε ἡ δόξα, φθαρτὰ μὲν εἶναι τὰ σώματα καὶ τὴν ὕλην οὐ μόνιμον αὐτῶν, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἀθάνατους αἰεὶ διαμένειν ...

<sup>14</sup> M. MARCOVICH, *One Hundred Hippolytean Emendations*, in *Gesellschaft-Kultur-Literatur: Beiträge Luitpold Wallach gewidmet*, ed. by K. BOSL, Stuttgart 1975, p. 126, comparing Jos. *bell. Jud.* ii, viii 11 (155), suggests ... ἣν χωρισθεῖσαν (τοῦ σώματος) νῦν [ἐστίν] εἰς ἓνα χῶρον ... (ἀναφερεσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖ) ἀναπαύεσθαι ... But it is too risky to emend Hippolytus by appealing to his source; he had a free hand when excerpting and interpolating. To bracket [ἐστίν], however, is a good idea; I assume someone wrote ἐξ τιν(α), corrected this to εἰς ἓνα and forgot to cross out the former.

<sup>15</sup> Cfr. K. KOSCHORKE, *op. cit.*, p. 22 f., 76 f., 80 f. See further H. DIELS, *Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin 1965<sup>4</sup>, p. 145; J. P. HERSHBELL, *Hippolytus' Elenchus as a Source for Empedocles Reconsidered*, I, «Phronesis», xviii (1972) p. 100 f.; W. BURKERT, *Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles*, in *Kephalaion: Studies ... de Vogel*, ed. by J. MANSFELD-L.M.



*diadoche* beginning with Pythagoras and including Empedocles, Heraclitus, and the Stoics<sup>16</sup>.

I assume that Hippolytus interpreted B 63 in the following way. First, he need not have assumed that the guardians (φύλακες) are also the subject of ἐπανίστασθαι; probably, he thought the fragment meant: «those who are asleep in that place<sup>17</sup> rise [*scil.*, from the dead], and there will be guardians of those who live in wakefulness and those who are dead». Those who live in wakefulness are those who will enter eternal bliss and can be said to be fully awake<sup>18</sup>; those who are dead are the damned. The guardians are God's servants, who assist in separating the blessed from the damned and who will stand watch over both for ever and ever. In other words, B 63 would be about the resurrection and the Final Judgement, and Hippolytus would superimpose a reference to God to φύλακας, just as he superimposed one to ἐπανίστασθαι. It should be noted that in the immediately following passage, which contains several Heraclitean quotations (*Ref.* ix 9, 7; *Vorsokr.* 22 B 64, B 65, B 66) he is explicit about the Final Judgement through fire and *ekpyrosis*.

This cannot, of course, have been what Heraclitus meant. Without exception, scholars have assumed that the subject of γίνεσθαι, viz., the guardians, is the same as that of ἐπανίστασθαι, and this must be correct. The verb ἐπανίστασθαι here does not mean "to rise from death", but "to rise from sleep". The fragment connects four categories of persons, or four types of consciousness c.q. lack of consciousness, which are also known from other fragments, viz., the sleepers and those who are awake, and the living and the dead. In the enigmatic fragment *Vorsokr.* 22 B 26, the end, these two pairs of opposites are chiasmatically intertwined:

DE RIJK, Assen 1975, p. 137 f. For Hippolytus' Stoicized Heraclitus see also G. S. KIRK, *Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge 1962<sup>2</sup>, p. 349 ff.

<sup>16</sup> Which I shall discuss at some length in a study on Hippolytus which is in preparation.

<sup>17</sup> Hippolytus may have thinking of the places where the souls and the bodies repose; he may also, however, have understood ἐνθα as meaning «thereupon».

<sup>18</sup> Cfr. CLEM. *strom.* v, xiv 105, 3-106, 1; see further my paper cit. *supra*, note 7.

... ζῶν δὲ ἀπτεται τεθνεώτος εὐδων, [...] <sup>19</sup> ἐγρηγορώς ἀπτεται εὐδοντος.

In Ch. H. Kahn's translation: «... living, he [*scil.*, a man] touches the dead in his sleep; waking, he touches the sleeper»<sup>20</sup>. In another chiasmic fragment (as restored by the present writer<sup>21</sup>) we have, *Vorsokr.* 22 B 21:

θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ὁρέμεν, ὁκόσα δὲ ἐγερθέντες ὕπνος.

We may translate: «death are all things we see when we are asleep; all things (we see) when awake are sleep». The couple "sleeping" - "waking" figures prominently at the end of *Vorsokr.* 22 B 1, as a description of modes of consciousness, or of cognition:

... τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται<sup>22</sup>.

In Heraclitus' view, these opposites are "one", i.e., form polar pairs, *Vorsokr.* 22 B 88:

ταυτό τ' ἐνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορός καὶ τὸ καθεῦδον ...: τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν κάκεινα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

That is to say, these opposites are "the same" because, in a polar way, they are productive of one another, or change into one another<sup>23</sup>. Life

<sup>19</sup> I do not wish to suggest that the words left out here for the sake of convenience should be considered an interpolation, as editors generally do.

<sup>20</sup> CH. H. KAHN, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

<sup>21</sup> I have made the participles change places; see the paper cited *supra*, note 7.

<sup>22</sup> Marcovich may be right in assuming (*op. cit.*, p. 6) that *Vorsokr.* 22 B 73 (fr. 1 *b<sup>1</sup>* M.) is merely a reminiscence of the final phrase of B 1; yet it may also echo a lost passage in which this thought was put in a more explicit way. I quote the text: οὐ δεῖ ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν.

<sup>23</sup> The enigmatic *Vorsokr.* 22 B 62 is also about an identity of life and death.

borders on death and conversely, just as sleep borders on wakefulness and conversely. But life includes both sleep and wakefulness; sleep and wakefulness border on death, although sleep is closer to death than wakefulness. As a descriptive analysis of the range of normal human experience, this is valid. Heraclitus, however, goes one step further; metaphorically, he applies death to our experience when we are asleep (B 26, B 20), sleep to our experience when we are awake (B 26, B 20, B 1), and thus brings himself in a position to apply the term wakefulness (cfr. B 63, ἐγερτί) to our condition when we have achieved the required insight into the true nature of things. This insight is outlined in *Vorsokr.* 22 B 1, and consists in understanding the *logos*.

Consequently, I believe that *Vorsokr.* 22 B 63 is not merely eschatological — as is the common interpretation<sup>24</sup> —, but also has an epistemological meaning. Those who rise from sleep are those able to transcend normal human consciousness, or cognition, i.e., those able to understand the *logos*. They are entrusted with a mission, just as the prophet Heraclitus is entrusted with a mission, i.e., they have to guard their fellow humans. It is the common run of humanity that is indicated by “the living and the dead”, or those who are awake in the normal way and those who are asleep in the normal way. I have always been bothered by the assumption, often encountered in the learned literature, that Heraclitus’ guardians are derived from Hesiod’s φύλακες, for the latter stand guard over *the living only*<sup>25</sup>. Even if we assume that Heraclitus (in B 63) also thought of heroic or philosophical souls which arise from the sleep of normal life in death and then guard those still alive, we must account for the fact

<sup>24</sup> M. MARCOVICH, *op. cit.*, p. 276 f.; DIANO-SERRA, *op. cit.*, p. 189; CH. H. KAHN, *op. cit.*, p. 254 f. *Vorsokr.* 22 B 27 should be a warning for philologists as well.

<sup>25</sup> HES. *Op.* 123 and 252, speaks of φύλακες θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων, i.e., of the living. Heraclitus may have been guilty of a hyperinterpretation of this passage: the fact that living man is mortal entails that life and death are “the same” (cfr. *Vorsokr.* 22 B 20 and the paper cit. *supra*, note 7). For Heraclitus’ study of Hesiod see *Vorsokr.* B 57, B 40.

that those alive include the dead, which can only be realized if we assume that “living” and “dead” here represent states of consciousness linked up with a specific physical condition<sup>26</sup>.

B 63, then, is to be translated as follows: « thereupon those asleep rise again and, fully awake, become watchers over the living and the dead ».

<sup>26</sup> See further my paper *Heraclitus on Sleep and Rivers*, « Mnemosyne », XIX (1967) p. 1 ff.; CH. H. KAHN, *op. cit.*, p. 755, on “corpses”, which, however, I doubt is the correct translation of νεκρῶν.

# ON TWO FRAGMENTS OF HERACLITUS IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

## 1. *Vorsokr.* 22 B 21

At *Strom.* V XIV 103, 6-105, 1 (cf. *Vorsokr.* 22 B 30, B 31; SVF II 590) Clement expounds a Stoicized version of Heraclitus' view that all things, one time or another, change into fire, arguing that this change is both complete and periodical. The Stoics, he continues, much resemble Heraclitus in their views of the *ekpyrosis*, of the way the world is organized, of the resurrection of the individual world and of the individual person<sup>1</sup>), and of the persistence of our souls.

The soul had not been mentioned in the exposition of Heraclitus' doctrine; the word "souls" at the end of this section, however, sets off another train of thought, XIV 105, 2-106, 1. Plato, Clement tells us, in the same way as Heraclitus, had said that the descent of the soul into the body is sleep and death: ὕπνον τε καὶ θάνατον τὴν εἰς σῶμα χάθοδον τῆς ψυχῆς. This view of the life of the embodied soul is also suggested as the probable deeper sense of two scriptural passages. The first of these (*Ps.* 3: 6) would



not only entail that the “awakening from sleep” (ἐξ ὕπνου ἔγερσιν) is the resurrection of Christ, but also that ‘sleep’ (ὕπνος) is the descent of the Lord into the body. The word of the Saviour, “wake up” (*Matth.* 24: 42), means: spare no effort to live, and try to separate the soul from the body.

According to Clement, therefore, the life of the embodied soul is sleep and death. For Heraclitus (or rather Heraclitus as interpreted by Clement) editors refer to another passage in the *Strom.*<sup>2)</sup> Marcovich rightly prints both passages as fr. 49 M.<sup>3)</sup> In the other passage, *Strom.* III III 21, 2 (= *Vorsokr.* 22 B 21), the same link between Plato and Heraclitus (with Pythagoras thrown in) is found as in the passage in book V:

τί δέ; οὐχὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος θάνατον τὴν γένεσιν καλεῖ Πυθαγόρα τε καὶ τῷ ἐν Γοργία Σωκράτει ἐμπερὼς ἐν οἷς φησι: “θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ὀρέομεν, ὁκόσα δὲ εὐδοντες, ὕπνος”;

With this quotation, Clement winds up a long passage (*Strom.* III III 12, 1-21, 2) concerned with the theme that to be born, i.e., for the soul, to descend into the body, is an evil according to numerous Greek authorities. Many quotations are given in support, among whom a good number come from Plato<sup>4)</sup>. At III III 21, 2, therefore, γένεσις means “to be born”, and the quotation from Heraclitus (*Vorsokr.* B 21) shores up the attribution to him of the assumption that to be born equals ‘death’ (θάνατον τὴν γένεσιν καλεῖ). At V XIV 105, 2, where Clement obviously has the whole of III III 12, 1-21, 2 in mind, the descent of the soul into the body, i.e., to be born, is called both ‘sleep’ and ‘death’. Both these words occur in the text quoted at III III 21, 2.

The fragment is strange. Kahn, in his ordering of the fragments of Heraclitus, has placed it “at the climax of Heraclitus’ riddling, the darkest moment following on a succession of other mysteries ...”<sup>5)</sup>. This is because, as he frankly avows, he cannot see how to interpret it (as transmitted)<sup>6)</sup>. One has to be grateful for this admission, for the other interpretations that have been suggested so far are, to say the least, rather fanciful. Others have proposed emendations: Nestle replaced ὕπνος by ζωή, Marcovich conjectured ὕπαρ, Kranz added (ὁκόσα δὲ τεθνηκότες ζωή). But ὕπνος is sound as is proved by the parallel in V XIV 105, 2. The statement that what we see when asleep is sleep, however, is utterly trivial. I therefore suggest that we swap the participles, and read:

Θάνατός ἐστιν ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ὀρέομεν,  
ὁκόσα δὲ ἐγερθέντες ὕπνος.

For Heraclitus, this would make sense, cf. the clear parallel in *Vorsokr.* 22 B 26 (also from Clement: *Strom.* IV 141, 1-2) ...ἄπτεται τεθνεώτος εὐδων, ἐγρηγορῶς ἄπτεται εὐδοντος. I shall return to this in a moment. Would it also make sense for Clement?

I think it does: when the soul is embodied, all a person sees when asleep is death, all he sees when awake is sleep. Life, the condition of the embodied soul, is only death and sleep, as at V XIV 105, 2. The participle ἐγερθέντες cannot mean “awake” in the sense that a liberation from the body has occurred (as at V XIV 106, 1, interpretation of “wake up”<sup>7)</sup>), at least not when the text is kept as transmitted, i.e., with ἐγερθέντες in the first colon; for Clement would then say that, according to Heraclitus, to be born equals death, and self-contradictingly support this by quoting him for the idea that to wake up, i.e., to liberate the soul from the body, amounts to death. But the descent of the soul into the body (γένεσις) is the opposite of the liberation of the soul from the body (*interpretatio christiana* of ἐγερθέντες). The quotation is apposite, however, if we assume that Clement, in the text quoted at III III 21, 2, takes both εὐδοντες and ἐγερθέντες in their ordinary sense, viz. as referring to the ordinary alternating experiences of sleeping and waking, and would say that these, when considered together inclusive of what they entail, mean that the life of the embodied soul equals death: to be awake in the normal way entails to be asleep, and to be asleep entails death. Consequently, if *Strom.* V XIV 105, 2 refers to III III 21, 2, as has been assumed by editors, the swapping of the participles in Clement’s text of *Vorsokr.* 22 B 21 is inevitable. And I do not see how a relation between these two passages in *Strom.* could be denied.

Reconstructed in the above way, the fragment also makes sense for Heraclitus. As I have pointed out, it expresses a thought also found in B 26. The ὀρέομεν of B 21 takes up one aspect of the deliberately ambiguous ἄπτεται (both “is in touch with” and “is kindled from”) of B 26, viz. the visual metaphor. Many years ago, I have argued that B 26 is both epistemological and physiological<sup>8)</sup>. B 21, I think, is an epistemological evaluation of the *condition humaine*. For unenlightened people, to be awake equals sleep, just as to be asleep equals death. The same thought is expressed, in a slightly different way (but note the ὁκόσα-ὁκόσα, as in B 21), in the final sentence of *Vorsokr.* 22 B 1: τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιοῦσιν, ὥκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται (“others have no idea of what they do awake, just as they forget everything when asleep”). This is said of those who have never heard, or have failed to understand, Heraclitus’ *logos*, his account of how things really are. In B 1, it is said that, for ordinary people, to be awake is a sort of sleep, a not knowing what is going on; in B 21, it is said that “we”, i.e., people in general, when asleep, see death, when awake, sleep. A link is provided by *Vorsokr.* 22 B 26: the sleeper ‘touches’ the dead, the waker ‘touches’ the sleeper.

## 2. *Vorsokr.* 22 B 20

The passage from *Strom.* III cited above is a sort of ring-composition; the section concerned with the Greek authorities is not only wound up

with a quotation from Heraclitus, but also begins with one, III III 14, 1 = *Vorsokr.* 22 B 20:

Ἡράκλειτος γοῦν κακίζων φαίνεται τὴν γένεσιν,  
ἐπειδὴν φη· “γενόμενοι ζῶειν ἐθέλουσι μὲν τὸ  
ἔχειν”, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι· “καὶ παῖδας κα-  
ταλείπουσι μὲν γένεσθαι”.

Reinhardt<sup>9)</sup> and others have argued that μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι is an interpolation by Clement; they are right in as far as μᾶλλον δέ, a favourite turn of Clement's, can hardly be archaic Greek. Reinhardt suggested that ἀναπαύεσθαι refers to the 'resting' of the righteous *after* the Final Judgement. Burkert<sup>10)</sup> argued that, since ἀναπαύεσθαι is, after all, a Heraclitean term, what Clement did was to interpolate Heraclitus with Heraclitus; he suggests that the word as used by Clement denotes the descent of the soul into the body.

However, although Clement may have found support for his interpolating of ἀναπαύεσθαι in his knowledge that this term is also found in Heraclitus, he can only have used it in a Christian sense, and this does not entail a reference to the descent of the soul into the body. The word means: to 'rest' in general; and to 'rest' in death, either before, or after, the Final Judgement<sup>11)</sup>; i.e., it refers to the condition of the disembodied soul; and it can also be used of martyrs' relics.

I think that it is important to ascertain exactly the part of the fragment to which the gloss μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι pertains. The general assumption seems to be that it pertains to μὲν τὸ ἔχειν only: "to die" had rather be called "to rest". But μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναπαύεσθαι links up with κακίζων φαίνεται τὴν γένεσιν. The word γένεσιν pertains to the word γενόμενοι in the fragment; the value-judgement (κακίζων) is concerned with ζῶειν ἐθέλουσι μὲν τὸ ἔχειν, which the subsequent gloss is meant to explain. In Clement's view, to 'live', ζῶειν (cf. ζῆν at V XIV 106, 1, cited above<sup>12)</sup>) means: to live the life of the soul, the disembodied life, a thing one can and must attempt to do even while the soul is in the body. Therefore, ζῶειν, in Clement's interpretation, denotes the same thing as μὲν τὸ ἔχειν does, and it is, after all, connected with the latter by means of a τ(ε). "Once they are born [into the body], they want to live [the real life], i.e., to die [: to leave the body]". This is not, of course, what Heraclitus meant. Heraclitus was concerned with the *coincidentia oppositorum*: once born, to accept life means to accept its counterpart, death, and to leave children behind is to accept that new deaths are born.

2) Mras (GCS 52) and Le Boulluec (SC 278) *ad loc.*

3) M. Marcovich, *Heraclitus: Editio Maior* (Merida, Ven. 1967), 247; M. M., *Eraclito: Frammenti* (Firenze 1978), 174 f.

4) Cf. W. Burkert, *Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles*, in: J. Mansfeld-L. M. de Rijk (eds.), *Kephalaion: Studies ... de Vogel* (Assen 1975), 138 f.

5) Ch. H. Kahn, *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus* (Cambridge 1979), 213.

6) Rejection of Marcovich's conjecture, *o.c.*, 68, *ad fr.* LXXXIX; Marcovich sticks to ὕπαρ in Gnomon 54 (1982), 428.

7) Cf. *supra*, p. 448.

8) Mnem. Ser. IV, Vol. XX (1967), 1 ff.

9) K. Reinhardt, *Heraklits Lehre vom Feuer*, in: K. R., *Vermächtnis der Antike* (Göttingen 1966), 44 f.

10) *O.c.*, 138 f., 144 n. 11.

11) Cf. Hipp., *Ref.* IX 27, p. 261, 2 f. Wendland: ἦν [sc. τὴν ψυχὴν] χωριθεῖσαν ... ἀναπαύεσθαι ἕως κρίσεως. N.B.: these words are interpolated in the section stolen from Josephus. See further the paper cited *supra*, n. 1.

12) *Supra*, p. 448.

1) Attribution of resurrection to Heraclitus and the Stoics also at *Strom.* V I 9, 3-4 (*Vorsokr.* 22 B 28 b + SVF II 630). See further my paper *Resurrection Added: The interpretatio christiana of a Stoic Doctrine*, in: Vig. Christ. 1983, 218 ff.

## Philosophy in the service of Scripture

### *Philo's exegetical strategies*

#### INTRODUCTION

Whatever one may think of the terms *eclecticism* and *eclectic* as used in a general sense, they continue to be useful and applicable in the case of Philo's philosophical interpretations of Scripture and of his scriptural interpretations of Greek philosophy.

In this chapter I shall try to describe the different levels on which Philo's eclectic strategies work and to provide the necessary qualifications so far as the idea of eclecticism itself is concerned. In Part 1, I shall attempt to account for the two ways of

For Philo, I have used the Loeb edition and the volumes that have been published of *Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie* (1961– ), abbreviated here as *Oeuv. PhA*. Other editions used are indicated in the footnotes. Translations of Philonic texts are from the Loeb edition, with occasional modifications. Indispensable instruments for research included G. Mayer, *Index Philoneus* (Berlin, 1974) (does not include the fragments); *Biblia patristica: Supplément. Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1982) (index of all the biblical passages quoted or alluded to); and R. Radice, *Filone d'Alessandria: bibliografia generale 1937–1982* (Naples, 1983) (*bibliographie raisonnée*).

interpreting Scripture that are valid according to Philo: the literal way, and the allegorical way. Some of the interpretations called literal by Philo may strike us as being allegorical, for instance the one concerned with the Platonic cosmology, which he finds in the first chapters of Genesis. For Philo, however, the allegorical or, as he often calls it, the deeper interpretation pertains to the inner, not the outer, world. It follows that philosophical theories that are useful at the literal level need not be so at the allegorical, and conversely. The application of this distinction throws some light on the vexed problem of the place of the so-called philosophical treatises within the Philonic *corpus*.

In Part 2, I shall deal with Philo's use of the Skeptic technique of constructing a "disagreement" (*diaphōnia*) by arranging the theories of the philosophers in polar opposition. Philo exploits this technique in order to neutralize and overcome these conflicting views. Yet a responsible choice among the more important of the warring doctrines is feasible, because for Philo what Moses says is decisive. Philo feels he has a right to adduce the philosophical views of the Greeks because he is convinced that Greek philosophy itself derives from the interpretation of the books of Moses.

#### 1. REZEPTION AND LEVELS OF EXEGESIS

Exegesis of the Torah by means of concepts and terms derived from Greek philosophy did not begin with Philo. Fragments of the writings of his predecessor and fellow-Alexandrian Aristobulus (perhaps ca. 100 B.C.) survive. In his books, Philo often enough refers to other Jewish exegetes who had proposed a philosophical interpretation of Scripture. For example, at QG 1.8 he attributes to *others* the important (Middle) Platonizing exegesis of Genesis 1:27 as referring to an intelligible, and of 2:7 as



referring to a sensible, Man ("some . . . have said").<sup>1</sup> Aristobulus had already stated that Pythagoras, Plato, and Socrates, as well as Orpheus, Linus, Hesiod, Homer, and even Aratus, are dependent on Moses (*ap. Euseb. PE* 13.12 = Aristob. fr. 3–5). As is well known, this is also Philo's view. According to the fragment *De deo* 6–7 (partly printed at *SVF* 2.422),<sup>2</sup> Moses spoke of the "technical fire" which informs the world long before the (Stoic) philosophers did, and much more clearly. Plato's account of the formation of the world and of man in the *Timaeus* had been anticipated in a superior way in the first chapters of Genesis.<sup>3</sup> The paradoxical view of the Stoic Zeno that only the wise man is free (*Prob.* 53) and his ethical principle that one should live in agreement with nature (160) have been derived from the lawgiver of the Jews (57, 160). Heraclitus's view that as long as we are in the body we live the death of the soul<sup>4</sup> has been derived (*LA* 1.107) or even stolen (*QG* 4.152) from Moses, and his theory that the opposites are "one" comes from the same source (*Her.* 214, *QG* 3.5). The "deeper meaning" of Genesis 15:18 is said to have been "praised by some of the philosophers who came afterward: Aristotle and the Peripatetics, . . . Pythagoras" (*QG* 3.16). In a remarkable passage (*Aet.* 76), Philo argues that the Stoics Boethus of Sidon and Panaetius, who abandoned the theory of the periodical conflagrations and regenerations of the world, did so under "divine inspiration" (*theolēptoi*; this is the only occurrence of the adjective listed in the *Index Philoneus*).

There is today a growing consensus that Philo was, first and foremost, a deeply religious Jewish person who lived according

1. Cf. below, p. 81, pp. 87ff.

2. Newly translated from the Armenian by F. Siegert, *Drei hellenistisch-jüdische Predigten*, Wiss. Unt. N.T. 20 (Tübingen, 1980), 84ff.

3. For the influence of *Tim.* see the exhaustive study by D. T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato*, *Philosophia antiqua* 44 (Leiden, 1986).

4. Cf. my paper "Heraclitus, Empedocles and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria," in *Vig. Chr.* 39 (1985), 131ff.

to the Mosaic laws and whose primary objective as a writer and scholar was the faithful interpretation of Scripture. This, it is thought, explains what is often called his eclecticism,<sup>5</sup> or rather, (as I would prefer to say) his preferences in the fields of Greek philosophy. To attribute a naive sort of eclectic attitude to him or to suggest that he was merely a constant dabbler in the commonplaces found in abundance in the philosophical and rhetorical circles of his day would be not only unfair but false. There is more system in his interpretation of the sacred text than is visible at first blush: there are themes, such as the creation of the world by a provident God, or the "migration" of the soul, that are overwhelmingly present in most of what survives. Furthermore, once it is acknowledged that some of the individual tracts constituting the *Allegorical Commentary* are constructed as a series of questions and answers geared to the exegesis of the individual verses that form a biblical pericope, after the pattern of the much more formal *Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim* and *In Exodum*, these treatises turn out to be far less rambling and incoherent than they have often been assumed to be.<sup>6</sup> I would like to add that in these more formal commentaries the individual questions and answers dealing with separate lemmata tend to group themselves in clusters which possess a definite thematic unity; they are therefore comparable to the individual allegorical tracts with their larger and more varied themes. Indeed, for all their roots in the Sabbath liturgy of the synagogue and the study-house which may have been connected therewith, and for all their

5. See V. Nikiprowetzky, *Le commentaire de l'Écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie*, ALGHJ 11 (Leiden, 1977), 191f.

6. P. Borgen and R. Skarsten, "Quaestiones et Solutiones: Some Observations on the Form of Philo's Exegesis," *Studia Philonica* 4 (1976–1977), 1ff; Nikiprowetzky (n. 5 above), *passim*, and his chapter in D. Winston and J. Dillon, *Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria*, Brown Univ. Jud. St. 25 (Chico, California, 1983), 5ff. See now also D. T. Runia, "The Structure of Philo's Allegorical Treatises," *Vig. Chr.* 38 (1984), 209ff., and R. Radice, "Filone d'Allessandria nella interpretazione di V. Nikiprowetzky e della sua scuola," *Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica* 76 (1984), 15ff.

affinities with earlier Greek literary forms (the scientific *problēmata*, or the “problems and solutions” literature dealing with the poets already mentioned by Aristotle in *Poet.* 25.1460b6), large sections of the *Quaestiones* are very much concerned with one dominant theme: the vicissitudes of the human soul. That, presumably, can be explained on the assumption that Philo was familiar with a Middle Platonist exegesis of the *Odyssey*<sup>7</sup> according to which Odysseus’s arduous journey home symbolizes the labors of the soul attempting to return to its original abode. (But we do not know that this was a formal commentary of the “problems and solutions” type.)

However, a better understanding of Philo’s exegetical aims and method of presentation is by no means equivalent to an explanation of his so-called eclecticism, that is to say, his important use of Greek philosophical ideas. The matter is much more complicated than that. Philo belongs to two different worlds and to two traditions, that of Greek philosophy and that of the Jewish exegesis of the Bible. Perhaps the German term *Rezeption*, less ambiguous and more informative than *eclecticism*, should be preferred. In Philo’s case, as in that of some of his Jewish predecessors, *Rezeption*—for which “assimilation” is perhaps a better equivalent than the ugly “reception”—is concerned with two inherited historical complexities, each of which has its own definite and special character. Yet Philo endeavors to interpret each of these in terms of the other. Consequently, the attempt to unravel

7. Cf. P. Boyancé, “Echos des exégèses de la mythologie grecque chez Philon,” in *Philon d’Alexandrie* (Lyon, 1967), 169ff.; U. Früchtel, “Die kosmologischen Vorstellungen bei Philon von Alexandrien,” *ALGHJ* 2 (Leiden, 1968), 104–5; J. Dillon, “Ganymede as the Logos: Traces of a Forgotten Allegorization in Philo?” *CQ* 31 (1981), 183ff.; and esp. H. Tobin, *The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation*, Cath. Bibl. Qu. Monogr. 14 (Washington, D.C., 1983), 150ff., with other references to the learned literature. F. Buffière, *Les mythes d’Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1956), 392ff., remains important for the allegorized *Odyssey*, although he failed to take account of the evidence in Philo.

the strands of his ingenious fabric is uphill work. His attitude toward Greek philosophy is dependent on his position as an exegete, and his attitude toward the Bible is to a large degree dependent on his philosophical beliefs. The student of Philo is therefore faced with an interpretive circle that threatens to be vicious rather than hermeneutical. Philo’s attitude toward Greek philosophy may be eclectic, and his *Rezeption* be determined by his Jewish background. However, his attitude toward the exegesis of Scripture may also be eclectic, both because, from a philosophical point of view, he believed that certain things in Scripture are more important than other things, and insofar as concerns his evaluation of the works of his Jewish predecessors (some of whom were themselves interested in Greek philosophy).

But the history of pre-Philonic Alexandrian exegesis of the Torah (for a clear general reference to which see, for example, *Mos.* 1.4) must for the most part be extracted from Philo’s own works.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, as I shall argue, Philo is *both* capable of assimilating an existing “eclectic” doctrine—or, as I would prefer to say, of reinterpreting and integrating doctrines considered to be Classical (here names such as Posidonius, Antiochus, and Eudorus come to mind)—*and* of distinguishing between the main schools of Greek philosophy in a more historically responsible manner. He is, moreover, quite capable of aligning himself with a doctrine that does fall outside the scope of, say, the Middle Platonism of his day. He is even capable of an eclectic, or interpretive, attitude toward certain Middle Platonist doctrines.

There is another important point. Philo throughout distinguishes between what he calls the “literal” and what he calls the “allegorical” interpretation, the latter as a rule representing the core of his thought. This distinction is largely unheeded in the

8. See Tobin (n. 7 above), *passim*, and the unphilosophical B.L. Mack, “Philo Judaeus and the Exegetical Tradition in Alexandria,” *ANRW* 21 (Berlin, 1984), 227ff.

scholarly literature,<sup>9</sup> and understandably so, because the "literal" interpretations presented (or cited from others) often look quite allegorical to us. One should, however, follow Philo's own indications, for these are relevant to the evaluation of his attitude toward Greek philosophy (his "eclecticism"). I shall argue presently that philosophical theories exist which can be adduced at the literal but not at the allegorical level, and conversely.

But I do not wish to argue against the growing modern consensus<sup>10</sup> that claims that much of Philo's philosophizing reflects the reinterpretive system of his so-called Middle Platonist contemporaries. For instance, although Philo read the *Timaeus* for himself, *De opificio mundi*, the first treatise of the *Exposition of the Law*, is much influenced by Middle Platonism, and its points of view can be paralleled from numerous passages elsewhere in Philo. This is important, since our sources for Middle Platonism (with the exception of *Timaeus Locrus* and a few fragments of Eudorus and Arius Didymus) are all rather later than Philo. We are therefore in a position to postulate that this reinterpretive system originated in Alexandria after, say, 50 B.C.<sup>11</sup>

However, there are other works which cannot, by any stretching of the term, be called Middle Platonist. For instance, if his

9. Tobin's pioneering and inspiring study (n. 7 above) is a notable exception.

10. Boyancé (n. 7 above), "Sur la théologie de Varron," *REA* 57 (1955), 57ff.; "Fulvius Nobilior et le Dieu ineffable," *RPh* 29 (1955), 172ff.; "Sur le discours d'Anchise," in *Homm. Dumézil*, Coll. Latomus 45 (Brussels, 1960), 60ff.; "Etudes philoniennes," *REG* 76 (1963), 64ff.; "Sur l'exégèse hellénistique du Phèdre," in *Miscellanea Rostagni* (Turin, 1963), 45ff. Boyancé tends to overemphasize Antiochus's contribution. W. Theiler, "Philon von Alexandria und der Beginn des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus" (1965), repr. in his *Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur* (Berlin, 1970), 484ff.; "Philon von Alexandria und der hellenisierte Timaeus," in *Philomathes: Festschrift Merlan* (The Hague, 1971), 20ff. Früchtel (n. 7 above). J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977), 139ff. P.L. Donini, *Le scuole l'anima l'impero* (Turin, 1982), 100ff. Tobin (n. 7 above), 11ff. Interesting and useful critical remarks in Runia (n. 3 above), 483ff., 505ff.

11. For my discussion of this aspect of Philo's thought, cf. n. 4 above.

only surviving works were *Quod omnis probus liber* and *De animalibus*, would we not say that "if he had made a few little changes," Philo could be designated a "most genuine Stoic," even more so, perhaps, than Antiochus, for whom the sobriquet was coined by Cicero (*Acad.* 2.132)?<sup>12</sup> In Philo's day, the theories of the Stoics (unlike those of the Presocratics) lived on not only in books, but also in persons who saw themselves as Stoics. Indeed, not only does there exist the phenomenon known as Roman Stoicism, but there were even Stoics around in the days of Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus. It may therefore be of some importance to point out that Philo's contemporary and fellow-Alexandrian, Chaeremon, who was a notorious enemy of the Jews, was a Stoic. Chaeremon interpreted Egyptian religion in the terms of Greek philosophy, just as Philo did for the Jewish religion; he appears to have been a member of the Egyptian embassy to Gaius in A.D. 40, just as Philo was one of the Jewish embassy.<sup>13</sup> Philo may have been familiar with Chaeremon's views, for (*Mos.* 1.23) he speaks of the Egyptian "philosophy conveyed in symbols, as displayed in the so-called holy letters" (the hieroglyphs), thus mentioning one of Chaeremon's favorite themes.<sup>14</sup> If even an Egyptian could be a Stoic in Alexandria, there must, of course, have been other Stoics in town.

Furthermore, in another philosophical work, *De aeternitate mundi*, Philo, rather than proceeding in a Middle Platonist way, displays a rather thorough knowledge of the various doctrines concerned with this topic as professed by the important schools

12. For *Prob.* cf. M. Petit, *Oeuv. PhA.* 28, 54ff., 78ff.; for *Anim.* see A. Terian, *Philonis Alexandrini De animalibus*, Stud. Hell. Jud. 1 (Chico, California, 1981), 49f., and "A Critical Introduction to Philo's Dialogues," *ANRW* 21 (1984), 277f. (also on Stoic arguments in *Prov.*).

13. See now P.W. van der Horst, *Chaeremon: Egyptian Priest and Stoic Philosopher*, EPRO 101 (Leiden, 1984).

14. Cf. fr. 12 van der Horst. On *Mos.* 1.23 see P.W. van der Horst, "The Secret Hieroglyphs in Classical Literature," *Actus: Festschrift Nelson* (Utrecht, 1982), 116, who, however, does not suggest that Philo may have known Chaeremon's work.



and is perfectly capable of distinguishing the Stoics from Plato and Aristotle, and Aristotle from the Stoics and Plato. He lists three views concerning the cosmos that have been put forward:<sup>15</sup> (1) that the world is eternal, uncreated and imperishable; (2) the opposite view, that it is created and will be destroyed; the third view (3) is a compromise, which "takes from"<sup>16</sup> (2) the idea that it is created and from (1) that it is imperishable (*Aet.* 7). This presentation is systematic, not historical.

The three main views are presented in the manner of a Skeptic "disagreement" followed by a compromise. In *Aet.* 7, the Aristotelian (and Pythagorean) view is cited first and that of (Democritus), Epicurus, and the Stoics second; in 8–12, this order is reversed. The view of Plato (and Hesiod) is cited last both at 7 and at 8–18. The suggestion at *Aet.* 7 that the third view is a compromise between the other two is of course only tenable from a systematic and not from a historical point of view (cf. n. 16 above). The "Succession" in the descriptive passage (8–18) is determined by both systematic and historical considerations. The important views, those of the Epicureans-and-Stoics/Aristotle/Plato, are presented in an inverted historical sequence. Presumably, Philo believes that the history of Greek philosophy is one of decadence and that the farther one goes back, the nearer one gets to the truth, that is to say, to what Moses taught. The same

15. Cf. my paper "Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought," in M.J. Vermaseren, ed., *Studies in Hellenistic Religion*, EPRO 78 (Leiden, 1979), 136ff.; D.T. Runia, "Philo's *De aeternitate mundi*," *Vig. Chr.* 35 (1981), 105ff.

16. John Dillon pointed out in the discussion of my paper that *Aet.* 7 surprisingly describes the third view as an *eclectic* combination of elements taken from both others (although chronologically it is the earliest): εἰσὶ δ' οἱ παρ' ἑκατέρων ἐκλαβόντες . . . μίχτην δόξαν ἀπέλιπον. For the expression μίχτην δόξαν, cf. *Comm. Lucani*, p. 290 Usener (*SVF* 2.817, 225, line 3) *mixtum dogma cum Platonico Stoicum*. Philo's scheme of two opposed views and a third, mixed one is anticipated at Aristotle *De an.* 1.2.404b30ff. (μίξαντες . . . ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν). A similar (though not unchronological) presentation of a "disagreement" and a compromise view is found at Cicero *Fat.* 39 (= *SVF* 2.974).

suggestion is entailed by the series of ancestors of the main views—Democritus/some Pythagoreans/Hesiod—the earliest of whom is again closest to Moses.

Philo, naturally, sides with Moses.<sup>17</sup> However, the text of *De aeternitate*, after an extensive presentation of Aristotle's case (taken up—as Philo shows—also by Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, and by some Stoics) against the orthodox Stoic view that the world will necessarily be destroyed and reborn again, breaks off with the announcement that the Aristotelian arguments will be met "point by point" (150).

The various doctrines, I would like to suggest, are here described in an order of validity. The theory of Democritus and Epicurus, cited first, is farthest from the truth, because these thinkers, when generating and destroying a plurality of worlds, only appeal to matter and chance. The Stoic theory is better, because it ascribes the generation of the one world to God and its destruction to Fire. It is curious that Philo has here chosen to present a very unorthodox Stoic view of the world-conflagration; possibly he could not resist the temptation to forget that the Stoic Fire is the same god as the god who generates the universe, in order to have the Stoic Fire resemble the elemental instrument used by his own god. He also argues that in a way the Stoics present the world as being eternal. Presumably, he emphasizes this aspect of genuine Stoic thought in order to expose it as a bastard form of Aristotelianism, or at any rate in order to bring it closer to Aristotle's view. Aristotle's theory, he argues, is better insofar as it is more God-fearing, since he does not want to credit God with creating something that would be less than perfect, i.e., destructible. Plato's theory however, is the best, because it comes closest to Moses'.

The best parallels for this presentation in the guise of an evaluative sequence are to be found in the later philosophical works

17. Cf. Runia (n. 15 above), 126f.

of Cicero, for which I may refer to W. Görler's discovery<sup>18</sup> of what he calls a *Stufensystem*, a triadic pattern according to which you first have a "low" view; next, an "elevated" view sharply opposed to the low view; and, third, a "middle" view that is a sort of compromise between the two others. In *ND* 1, for instance, the Epicurean view, the first to be discussed, is rejected (cf. the position of the Epicurean view in *De aeternitate*). The Stoic position, presented next (*ND* 2), is admired, but a more moderate view is argued in book 3. According to Görler, Cicero does not really choose between the more elevated and the middle position; the latter is to be preferred from a rational point of view, while the former is what he would really like to prefer. Görler argues that this refusal to take sides in a definite way is characteristic of Cicero and in fact is what his philosophical position amounts to, which may be right. What cannot be right, however, is his claim that the pattern of presentation is Cicero's, for this is ruled out by the parallel in Philo.<sup>19</sup> Philo, who has no affinities with Skepticism so far as his own convictions are concerned, is in a position to make a definite choice among possible options.<sup>20</sup> Cicero and Philo each use the pattern in their own way, which I think proves that the scheme is traditional.

However this may be, as one studies the way Philo presents various philosophical doctrines in *De aeternitate mundi*, it gradually becomes clear that he is not merely dependent on "eclectic"

18. W. Görler, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophie* (Heidelberg, 1974), esp. 20–62; there is a survey of "stages" (*Stufen*) at p. 61, and Cicero is called "originator of this method" at p. 15. Cicero's Skepticism should be freshly studied in the light of Behrends's argument that the legal experts of Cicero's generation were all influenced by Skepticism; this, I think, helps to explain Cicero's change (or rather return) to Skepticism in his later years (O. Behrends, *Die Fraus Legis* [Göttingen, 1982]; cf. also the review by U. Manthe, *Gnomon* 56 [1984], esp. 145–46, and Glucker's study in this volume).

19. More instances from Philo are cited by Runia (n. 15 above), 147 n.

94.

20. See further below, part 2.

systems such as the (largely hypothetical) Alexandrian Platonism of his day, but is also familiar (as is Cicero), with a more historical approach to the great men and systems of the Greek past which enables him to state, compare, and judge their respective views. Actually, Philo's contemporary, the Neo-Pythagorean or Middle Platonist Eudorus, is also said to have written an extensive historical work in which he described the various doctrines of the schools, and Arius Didymus apparently did something similar.<sup>21</sup>

In another philosophical work, *De animalibus*, Philo in his reply to Alexander's array of arguments (73–100) defends the Stoic view that the animals do not possess reason; they have been created for the benefit of man. Although Philo does not say so, it is certain that the opposite view is unacceptable to him, not only because it conflicts with the prescriptions of the Mosaic cult but also because it cannot be squared with statements about man and the animals in Scripture; in this work, however, no biblical references are given.<sup>22</sup> At Genesis 2:19, man is said to have *given names* to the animals (this is Philo's *sensible* man, to be distinguished from the intelligible man at Genesis 1:27). At *Opif.* 148–49 and 1.18, 20, 21, Philo argues that man obtains this honor because he is the lord of the animals (cf. *Praem.* 9). Scriptural support for the latter idea is found elsewhere, at Genesis 1:26 (*archetōsan*) and 1:28 (*archete*), i.e., in the pericope which, according to Philo, deals with the *intelligible* man. There is only one quotation of Genesis 1:28 in Philo: at *QG* 2.56 (pp. 140–41 Marcus), where it serves to explain God's speech to Noah at Genesis 9:1–2 (which echoes 1:28). Noah is made "righteous king of earthly creatures" and is said to have "been equal in honor not to the molded and earthly Man [of Genesis 2:7] but to him who was made in the likeness and form, who is incorporeal" (p. 141 Marcus, whose partly hypothetical translation I

21. Cf. Dillon (n. 10 above), 116.

22. See Terian (n. 12 above), 46f.

have corrected; cf. also *Oeuvr. Ph. ad loc.*). According to Philo (p. 142 Marcus), this is the "literal" interpretation—which, one should note, he does not reject; the "deeper meaning" is concerned with the domination of mind over the body, the senses, and the passions. The theme of man's domination of the animals (in a literal sense) also occurs elsewhere (e.g., *Opif.* 83–84, 142, *Agric.* 8, *Prov.* 1.9, 2.105), where scriptural evidence is not quoted.

It appears to be the case that Genesis 1:26 and 28 were no favorites with Philo (and/or with the Jewish exegetical tradition he is following) and that he preferred to conflate the idea of domination from Genesis 1:26 and 29 with that of the giving of names at Genesis 2:19, which figures much more prominently in his oeuvre. That tralaticious material is used by Philo also appears from *QG* 2.66, where another tradition is followed (or another possibility is exploited) and Noah is made to represent the "first molded [i.e., sensible] man."

The lack of biblical references in *De animalibus* may therefore be explained by means of Philo's attitude toward Genesis 1:26 and 28 elsewhere. Furthermore, it does not seem to have been noticed that in a remote corner of the *QG* (1.94), where he comments on Genesis 6:7 (God will wipe out man and destroy the beasts), Philo argues as follows: "The literal meaning is this [N.B. what follows has also been preserved in Greek]: *it makes it clearly known that the beasts [aloga] were not primarily generated for their own sakes, but for the sake of men and for their service.* And when these were destroyed, the former were rightly destroyed together with them, since there no longer existed those for which they were made" (my italics). This "literal meaning" of Genesis 6:7 (for which cf. also *Abrah.* 45) not only agrees with the interpretation of Genesis 2:19 at *Opif.* 148–49 and *QG* 1.18, 20, 21 (where, as we have noticed, the idea of domination has been blended in from Genesis 1:26 and 28) but also with the point of view defended by Philo in *Anim.* 73–100. According to *QG* 1.94,

the "allegorical meaning" is that "Man is the mind within us, and beast is sensation." The latter is very close to the view presented in the allegorical commentary (*LA* 2.9–18; exegesis of Genesis 2:19 again), where, however, the animals are said to represent the passions (for which cf. also the "deeper meaning" at *QG* 2.56).

Another parallel is at *QG* 2.9 (on Genesis 6:17, "whatever is on earth shall die." Question: "What sins did the beasts commit?"). Here the "literal meaning" is set out at much greater length, and an interesting and significant link with the philosophical views rejected in *De animalibus* is to be found in Philo's phrase, "the beasts were made, not for their own sake, *as wise men reason*, but for . . . men" (my italics). According to the "deeper meaning" as set out here, the animals represent the "earthly part of the body," i.e., the senses, which must die together with the body (cf. *QG* 1.94) when the latter is "deluged by streams of passion. . . . For a life of evil is death." (Cf. also *Conf.* 23–24.)

It follows that the philosophical view defended by Philo in *De animalibus*, which is that of the Stoics, is pertinent only at the *literal level of the interpretation* of the relevant texts in Scripture. According to Philo, the literal interpretation, if it provides a satisfactory sense, is fully acceptable; the symbolic or allegorical or deeper interpretation, however, is what his exegesis is really about. Apparently, it is important for Philo that the literal interpretation of man's naming of the animals, blended with the idea of his lordship over them, can be defended on purely philosophical grounds and that here Greek philosophy (in the guise of a Stoic doctrine) and Scripture meet. It should also be noted that the allegorical interpretation, i.e., the *domination* of mind over the body, the senses, the passions, is *derived from* (or, rather, geared to) the *domination* of the animals by man in the literal interpretation. The deeper meaning exploits themes familiar from both Stoic and Platonic philosophy: reason versus the passions



or, more Platonically, reason versus the body. *De animalibus* itself only enters the outer orbit of Philo's thought, that connected with the literal interpretation.

From the passages studied above it appears that Philo's attitude toward Greek philosophy is a very complicated one indeed. He may draw on "eclectic" Middle Platonist theories for the literal interpretation of the creation story as well as on purely Stoic ideas for the literal interpretation of man's relation to the animals. But what is useful at the literal level need not be so at the allegorical. Furthermore, even at the literal level Philo may see fit to produce an interpretive blend of his own, as in the case of the world's possible end, described in terms both Platonic and Stoic. The demands of scriptural exegesis seem often to be decisive in respect to the option chosen. Some of Philo's literal interpretations seem to be an already traditional part of Jewish philosophical exegesis (e.g., the two types of man, *QG* 1.8). Doubtless, there are also unphilosophical Jewish motifs of an already traditional nature in Philo, which further influenced his selection among possible options; but this is a subject better left to the historians of Jewish thought.<sup>23</sup> Reading through Philo, however, one cannot help feeling that for all his Jewish piety and loyalty to Moses and for all his indebtedness to specifically Jewish exegetical themes, Greek philosophy really dominates the field,<sup>24</sup> and that Moses and the Jewish prophets are virtually converted into Greek philosophers. The attitude of Philo and his Alexandrian predecessors was not adopted by the rabbis who gave shape to the orthodox Judaism which was to develop after the destruction of the temple by Titus. This shows that in the interpretation of Scripture other options were open.

23. See P. Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria: A Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research since World War II," in *ANRW* 21 (Berlin, 1984), 124ff., 132ff.; P. Borgen in M.E. Stone, ed., *Jewish Writings of the Second Temple Period* [*Compendia rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum*, Section 2] (Assen, 1984), 259ff., 264ff.; Mack (n. 8 above).

24. Cf. also Runia (n. 3 above), 535ff.

An important question, then, which I believe has not yet been answered in a fully satisfactory way, is: why did Philo and his Alexandrian predecessors choose to interpret Scripture as a (Greek) philosophy? The answer, I believe, is provided by Philo's (and his predecessors') view of the history of Mosaic philosophy. Moses came first, and the Greeks have taken over his ideas, or perhaps in individual cases been favored with a special revelation which made them talk in the manner of Moses. It follows that, for Philo, it is perfectly legitimate to adduce the views of the Greek philosophers for the interpretation of Scripture; for all practical purposes, they can be seen as *fellow-exegetes*. Without exception, Philo cites his Jewish predecessors without giving their names. A few times, he gives the names of his Greek predecessors, but their views, too, are usually cited (or even paraphrased) anonymously.<sup>25</sup> In this way, Greek philosophy, which by no means always provides a correct interpretation of Scripture, is as indispensable to exegesis as the not always correct views of the Jewish exegetes cited by Philo.

Furthermore, the history of Greek philosophy itself can be understood as one of (re-)interpretation: Aristotle's interpretation of Plato,<sup>26</sup> Zeno's interpretation of Plato and Aristotle (think of Antiochus). The Middle Platonists of Philo's Alexandria certainly belonged to such an interpretive tradition or school of thought, and it is only natural that Philo turned to these contemporaries and studied the most up-to-date interpretation of Plato that was available (indeed, his predecessors who introduced the two types of man seem already to have done so). The study of Greek philosophy, when viewed from this angle, is, ultimately, a study of the pagan interpretive tradition which itself, in the last

25. Why Greek names are (sometimes) given, but Jewish names never, remains a mystery; in the Talmud names are the rule. Perhaps the simple fact is that before, and in, Philo's time most Jewish exegetes preferred anonymity, whereas the Greek philosophers had after all signed their works and were persons of great prestige.

26. Note, however, that Philo, *Aet.* 16, is aware of important innovations on Aristotle's part.

resort, is nothing but an interpretation of Scripture, either directly or at one or more removes.

When placed in this perspective, Philo's so-called philosophical works are not as singular as they have often been thought to be. All of them deal with matters that are ultimately geared to the interpretation of Scripture. Philo must really have felt rather superior to his Greek colleagues, for they did not have the books of Moses. His willingness in the philosophical works to meet them, as it were, in their own field (cf. *Det.* 1ff.) shows his sense of security: only the follower of Moses (to whose authority a discreet reference is several times inserted at focal points of the argument) is in a position to adjudicate between the competing views of the Greek experts. On the other hand, Philo believes that the study of pagan philosophy (itself the sequel to the study of the "standard curriculum" [*enkuklia*]) is a necessary condition for the study and understanding of the true, i.e., the Mosaic philosophy.<sup>27</sup> This suggests that he believed the Greeks had often been better exegetes of Scripture than their Jewish colleagues, or at least not inferior to them. The philosophical works, among which *De animalibus* and *De providentia* 2 have been proved to be works of Philo's old age,<sup>28</sup> in this sense pave the way for the exegesis of Scripture.

Some of these writings (*Aet.*, *Prov.* 1, and *Prob.*)<sup>29</sup> may have had as their intended public the pagan philosophical milieu, and others (*Prov.* 2, *Anim.*) the Jewish apostates. This does not entail, however, that no systematic position is reserved for them in the developing grand design of Philo's work. Philo's proof, presented to the Greeks, that their own philosophy in its most representative and valuable aspects is confirmed by and even derived from

27. See P. Borgen, *Bread from Heaven*, Suppl. n.s. 10 (Leiden, 1965), 99ff.; Nikiprowetzky (n. 5 above), 97ff.; A. Mendelson, *Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria*, Monogr. Hebr. Un. Coll. 7 (Cincinnati, 1982), 35ff.

28. Terian (n. 12 above) (1981), 28ff.; (1984), 289ff. Note that this proof is valid for the dialogues only, not for *Prov.* 1, *Prob.*, *Aet.*

29. The dates of *Aet.* and *Prov.* 1 are uncertain, but the old hypothesis of the "early writings" has lost its charm.

the Law implies that it would be useful for Greek philosophers to study the Torah. Jewish apostates who use Greek philosophy against the Torah, as Alexander did, are invited to return to the truth. Simultaneously, however, these works may serve as an introduction to the more important discussions of Greek philosophers about subjects that are dominant in the Torah, an introduction already doctored to suit the Jewish point of view, which those who want to interpret Scripture in a rational way may use with profit.

Because the Greek philosophers are Philo's predecessors, he can use them the way he uses his Jewish colleagues: he can read them with an open mind, reject what is wrong or one-sided, and adduce and use what is satisfactory and feasible. On the other hand, his use of Scripture is not as invariably decisive as a modern consensus would want us to believe. I have already referred<sup>30</sup> to the curious way Genesis 1:26 and 28 are treated, and I would like to add a related instance.

In Philo, we find *both* the view that Genesis 1:27 and 2:7 are about the creation of the same man *and* that they are about different types of man, i.e., the "created man" (*epoiēsen*) and the "molded man" (*eplastēsen*). The latter view, as we have noticed, is attributed by him to others (*QG* 1.8)<sup>31</sup> but not rejected (it is also the starting point of the allegory at *LA* 1.35ff.).<sup>32</sup> The other view is not rejected either. Tobin has argued that the "two types" interpretation is later than the "one man" interpretation.<sup>33</sup> There is an interesting complication which, to my knowledge, has not

30. Above, p. 82.

31. Above, p. 71.

32. Biblical scholarship attributes Genesis 1:27 to the *Priesterschrift*, 2:7 to the *Jahwist*. See, e.g., R. Smend, *Die Entstehung des Alten Testaments*, Theol. Wiss. 1 (Stuttgart, 1984), 40. Philo and his predecessors were faced with a real exegetical problem, that of the double version of the same story which also inspired the modern *Quellenforschung*. The *LXX* introduces the word *Adam* only at Genesis 2:16; in parts, this translation is a *midrash*.

33. Tobin (n. 7 above), 102ff. Runia (n. 3 above), 556ff., with backward references, has bravely argued that according to Philo, Genesis 1:27 and 2:7 are about one and the same man.

been observed: Genesis 5:1b–2 does not enter into this discussion. Here, it would appear, the text of the Bible states beyond possible doubt that the “created” (intelligible) man, i.e., the man “in the image” of Genesis 1:27, and the “molded” (sensible) man of 2:7 are the same person:

- (1b) On the day on which God created [*epoiēsen*] Adam, he created [*epoiēsen*] him in the image of God. (2) Male and female he created [*epoiēsen*] them, and he praised them. And he called them by the name of Adam, on the day on which he created [*epoiēsen*] them. (3) And Adam lived for two hundred and thirty years and begat

...

The (sensible) Adam (the “molded” man of 2:7) who begat Seth (5:3, cf. 4:25) is “male and female,” just like the (intelligible) *anthrōpos* at 1:27, and the verb for *created* at 5:1b–2 is none other than the *epoiēsen* also found at 1:27. Yet Philo can be very dogmatic about the differences between the two types of man (as at *Opif.* 134–35).

Now, as long as Jewish exegetes believed that 1:27 and 2:7 refer to the same man, they were in a position to ignore 5:1b–2, which merely confirms this view. But it is certainly odd that those who believed that two types of man are involved ignored 5:1b–2, which contradicts this interpretation (they also virtually ignored Genesis 1:26 and 28, likewise hard to square with the two different types).<sup>34</sup> One may, of course, assume that they kept silent about this part of the evidence on purpose, but it is perhaps more to the point to assume that what they did was not so much interpret the Bible as reinterpret the view of their predecessors, who had only discussed 1:27 and 2:7. Philo *never* quotes or refers to Genesis 5:1b–2, although he quotes and comments on 5:1a, “this is the book of the generation of men.”<sup>35</sup> Most remarkably, however, he connects this half-verse not with what follows but with what precedes, that is, with the brief genealogy of Adam

34. The point I am about to make corroborates Tobin’s thesis that the “one man” interpretation is earlier.

35. αὕτη ἡ βίβλος γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων (*sefer toledoth adam*).

that concludes Genesis 4 (*QG* 1.79–80, *Det.* 138–39; cf. esp. *Abrah.* 9, *epilegei*). Yet he *knows* that Genesis 5 also contains the (full) “genealogy of Adam,” for he cites and interprets the characterization of Seth at *QG* 1.81 from this chapter (Genesis 5:3). Thus the awkward, or unwelcome, verses 5:1b–2 were tactfully omitted. To repeat, we may perhaps assume that Philo, rather than willfully distorting the evidence, felt committed, without noticing what this entailed, to an exegetical tradition that had failed to take these verses into account. Yet in a person who is merely a loyal follower of Moses this procedure is most noteworthy. We are justified in concluding that his predecessors, and Philo himself, really *wanted* very much to produce a (Middle) Platonizing interpretation of the creation story in Genesis. In other words, they were prepared to be silent about scriptural evidence that could not find a place in their philosophy. And yet, at *QG* 3.3 (Greek fragment), Philo posits that one should not interpret Scripture by arguing from the part to the whole, but, conversely, should adduce all the evidence available.

## 2. DISSENSION AND DECISION

The Skeptical<sup>36</sup> technical term for disagreement, *diaphōnia* (*dissensio*),<sup>37</sup> occurs only once in the Philonic corpus, at *Her.* 248:

36. For Philo’s Skepticism see, e.g., Früchtel (n. 7 above), 132ff., and especially Nikiprowetzky (n. 5 above), 183ff., who, however, overemphasizes Philo’s pious indifference to the debates of physical science. Philo is not indifferent when the major issues of physics (including theology) are concerned, but only when lesser questions are at stake. Note that the *dissensio* in Cicero *Acad.* 2.117ff. first lists the major issues (118–21), then the minor ones (122–25).

37. An argument for *dissensio* is already attributed to the Skeptical Academy at Cicero *Acad.* 2.117f.; the word occurs at 117, and a plurality of discrepant philosophical views is listed at 118 (cf. also, e.g., *Lael.* 32, *dissentiant*; *Tusc.* 5.83, *dissentientium*). One may further adduce the instance cited above in n. 16. That Arcesilaus already opposed conflicting theoretical views is argued by G. Striker, “Über den Unterschied zwischen den Pyrrhoneern und den Akademikern,” *Phronesis* 26 (1981), 156ff., and by A. M. Ioppolo, “Doxa ed epoche in Arcesilao,” *Elenchos* 5 (1984), 36, 41.



"Philosophy is full of *disagreement*, because truth flees from the credulous mind, which deals in conjecture. It is her nature to elude discovery and pursuit, and it is this which in my opinion produces these verbal feudings [*staseis*]." These sentences round off a description (246–47) of what Philo calls the "dogmatic [*dogmatikas*] wranglings of the sophists," of which he lists the following (246): (1) those who say the universe has not come to be versus those who say it has, and (2) those who say it will be destroyed versus those who say that "though by nature destructible, it will never be destroyed, since it is held together by a bond of superior strength, namely the will of its Maker." In a parallel passage (*Ebr.* 199), which derives from one of Aenesidemus's tropes,<sup>38</sup> Philo in a similar way opposes the anti-creationists to the creationists, and those who reject providence (the description recalls Democritus and the Epicureans) to those who believe in it.<sup>39</sup> We are of course immediately reminded of the debate reported by Philo in *De aeternitate mundi* and *De providentia* 1 and recall that in these philosophical works (as indeed also elsewhere) he each time adopted one of these opposed options: the world has been created, is therefore by nature destructible, but is held together by the will of its creator. At *Her.* 246, Philo next opposes (3) those who maintain that "nothing is but all things

38. As was discovered by von Arnim and has now been definitively proved by K. Janáček, "Philon von Alexandria und skeptische Tropen," *Eirene* 19 (1982), 83ff., esp. 84–85.

39. For providence, cf. Aenesidemus's last trope *ap. Sextus PH* 1.151: "we oppose dogmatic conceptions to one another when we say that some declare . . . that human affairs are controlled by the providence of the gods, and others without providence." See also *Eugnostos the Blessed*, *NHC* 3, 4.70.10–21: "But the speculation has not reached the truth. For the ordering is spoken of in three [different] opinions by all the philosophers, and hence they do not agree. For some say about the world that it was directed by itself. Some, that it is providence [that directs it]. Some, that it is fate" (trans. D.M. Parrott in J.M. Robinson, ed., *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* [Leiden, 1977], 208). I owe this parallel to R. van den Broek. The Greek original of *Eugnostos* appears to have been composed by an Alexandrian Jewish near-contemporary of Philo's.

become" to those who assume the opposite. Although these or similar issues are familiar (cf. Xenophon *Mem.* 1.1, 14, Plato *Tht.* 152E, Aristotle *Cael.* 3.1, 298b14–33 [although in a more intricate form], and ps.-Arist. *MXG* 1.974a2–4 and 975a14–15), the most plausible assumption is that Philo here reproduces a Skeptic "disagreement."

Next, Philo turns (4) to those who make man the criterion<sup>40</sup> (his actual words refer to those who say man is the measure of all things), whom he opposes to those who make havoc of the criteria of both sense-perception and mind; and (5) to those who maintain that all things are beyond comprehension, whom he opposes to those who hold that a good many things can be known. The Protagorean reference in (4) may be read as a caption for those who assign complete reliability to all sense-experience such as the Epicureans, they being opposed to thorough-going Sceptics such as the Pyrrhonists. At (5) he clearly has the Academic Sceptics and presumably their opponents, the Stoics, in mind. These neat "reversals" (*peritropai*), which reduce the Academics and the Pyrrhonists to mere parties in a "disagreement" (*diaphōnia*), may conceivably be Philo's own clever idea. He wants no truck with Skepticism, of whatever denomination, as a serious sect (cf. *QG* 3.33, which mentions "Academics" and "Skeptics" in one breath). One may compare the characterization of the Sophist as a Skeptic at *Fug.* 210: "He strikes all representatives of learning, opposing each individually and all in common, and is struck by all in return, since they naturally defend the doctrines [*dogmata*] to which their soul has given birth." (For this conflict between all the others and the Sceptics, cf. also Cicero *Acad.* 2.70.)

Finally, in *Her.* 247, Philo briefly lists the "disagreements"

40. For man as the criterion, cf. Sextus *PH* 2.22–42, G. Striker, "The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus" in M. Burnyeat, ed., *The Skeptical Tradition* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), 106ff., and Long's study in this volume, pp. 188–91.

concerned with a plurality of natural phenomena, in a manner that anticipates the use of ps.-Plutarch by, say, Irenaeus and Eusebius, and of ps.-Plutarch and Aetius by Theodoretus.<sup>41</sup> According to Philo in *Her.* 247, these quarrels go on until the “male midwife who is also the judge observes the brood of each disputant’s soul, throws away all that is not worth rearing, but saves what is worth saving and approves it for such careful treatment as is required.” Colson *ad loc.* of course refers to Socrates (e.g., Plato *Tht.* 151), and Marguerite Harl *ad loc.* links the “judge” with Abraham, i.e., “the human intellect in its highest function, which assimilates it to the divine Logos” (my translation). One may also think of passages such as Plato *Phaedo* 96A–99E, and perhaps Xenophon *Mem.* 1.1.11–14, where Socrates, disappointed by the disagreement among the natural philosophers, goes his own way (note that the latter passage is quoted in a Skeptical context by Eusebius *PE* 15.62.7ff.). As far as the image of the judge is concerned, it is also interesting to recall Aristotle *Metaph.* B 1.995b2f.: “one who has heard all the conflicting theories, like one who has heard both sides in a lawsuit, is necessarily more competent to judge” (trans. Tredennick). One may also compare Cicero *Fat.* 39: “Chrysippus in the guise of a respected umpire” (*Chrysippus tamquam arbiter honorarius*).

41. Cf. R. M. Grant, *Miracle and Natural Law* (Amsterdam, 1952), 80f., on Irenaeus *Adv. haer.* 2.28.1–2; Grant, *After the New Testament* (Philadelphia, 1967), 158ff.; W. R. Schoedel, “Philosophy and Rhetoric in the *Adversus Haereses* of Irenaeus,” *Vig. Chr.* 13 (1959), 22ff.; and W. C. van Unnik, “Theological Speculation and Its Limits,” in W. R. Schoedel and R. L. Wilken, eds., *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition*, Theol. Hist. 54 (Paris, 1979), 33ff., who emphasizes Irenaeus’s theological inference. Cf. Eusebius *PE* 1.7.16 (διαφωνίας) and the chapter title of 1.8; also 14.13.9 (ἀντιδοξίας) and Theodoretus *Gr. aff. cur.* 4.31 (διαφωνίαν), and note that Theodoretus distinguishes between Aetius and ps.-Plut. See also R. van den Broek, “Eugnostos: Via Skepsis naar Gnosis,” *Ned. Theol. Tijdschr.* 37 (1983), 104ff. Philo also knew “Aetius”; cf. on *Prov.* 1.22, P. Wendland, “Eine doxographische Quelle Philos,” *Sitzb. Akad. Berl.* (1897), 1074ff., and my remarks in *The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract ΠΕΡΙ ΞΕΛΑΟΜΑΔΩΝ* (Assen, 1971), 130f. n. 4.

In another passage, *Abr.* 162–64, the “disagreement” is presented in much less scathing terms, and indeed culminates in a list of issues that are of primary importance to Philo. He here explains why God spared one of the cities of the plain: the five cities symbolize the senses, the fifth representing sight. The eyes observe the heavens and draw the mind in the same direction so that it starts wondering and philosophizing (a Platonic theme, cf. *Tim.* 47a). This wondering is not open-minded, but follows the pattern of a “disagreement”: are these phenomena created, or do they have a beginning? Are they infinitely many, or finitely many (cf. the related points of Aenesidemus *ap. Sextus PH* 1.151 and Philo *Ebr.* 199)? Are there four elements, or should one add a more divine substance as a fifth? The question that follows suggests an answer is possible and leads to further questions, thus showing what philosophy really is about: “If the world has indeed come into being, by whose agency did it come into being and who is the Demiurge as to his being and quality, what was his purpose in making it, and what does he do now, and what is his occupation and way of life?”

Briefly commenting on the former passage (*Her.* 246–48), Nikiprowetzky points out: “The disagreements which abound in philosophy are brought about by the fact that the mind—without doubt for lack of an unerring criterion—has let go of the truth in favor of conjectures and probabilities.”<sup>42</sup> This is not entirely correct; as long as no definite and objective decision regarding warring views is feasible, the mind cannot reach the truth on its own. However, Philo suggests that such a decision is, after all, within reach; the passage on the “male midwife and judge” may of course be read as an exhortation to proceed in an eclectic way, but there is more to it. Truth, which flees the conjecturing soul, may reveal itself to the right sort of person, who is then able to decide which philosophical views are incorrect and which are correct, and to what extent. As Seneca said, “The truth is mine”

42. Nikiprowetzky (n. 5 above), 98 (my translation).

(*quod verum est, meum est*, *Ep.* 12.11). The question as to the manner in which, according to Philo, such a decision is brought about or rendered possible is therefore a legitimate one. The answer, as will appear from the passage to be studied now, is: because God takes the decision for us and makes it known to us, either immediately or through the books of his prophets, especially Moses.

As Janáček has shown,<sup>43</sup> Philo, when speaking of dilemmas in a Skeptical manner (or of Skeptical dilemmas) introduces a vocabulary for “to be in doubt” that is his own: *endoiazein*, *epamphoterizein*, etc. Several times Philo tells us that God is not one who does not know the answer (*QG* 1.21, “God does not doubt [*endoiazei*]”; 1.55, “there is neither doubt [*endoiasmos*] nor jealousy about God”; cf., e.g., *Opif.* 149). Man, however, is a “natural doubter” (*epamphoteristēn tēi phusei*, *QG* 1.55). Man’s natural propensity to doubt is presented here in terms that are a fascinating distortion of the very familiar Stoic theory of perception. Whereas Stoics supposed that certain sense-impressions, by their sheer clarity, naturally induce the mind’s assent, Philo suggests that man’s natural response to all impressions is ambivalent. I quote this text after the Greek (the Armenian is confused): “Whenever the impression of an object occurs [to us], three things immediately result: disinclination away from what appears, inclination toward what appears, and, third, doubt [*endoiasmos*] inclined toward both these directions, because the soul is drawn both ways as to whether [the impression] should be accepted or not.”<sup>44</sup> Time and again, Philo in such contexts uses the metaphor of the scales of the balance.

Several passages in the biography of Moses repay further study in this context. At *Mos.* 1.21–24, we are informed about

43. Janáček (n. 38 above).

44. ὅταν γὰρ προσπέσῃ τινος φαντασία, τρία εὐθὺς ἐπιγίνεται ἀφορμὴ ἐκ τοῦ φανέντος, ὁρμὴ πρὸς τὸ φανέν, τρίτον ἐνδοιασμός ἀμφικλινής, ἀντισπωμένης τῆς ψυχῆς εἴθ’ αἰρετέον εἴτε μὴ. Cf. also *QG* 3.58.

the education of the young prince. He has Egyptians instructing him in a number of subjects, and “Greeks to teach him the other standard disciplines” (23), who have been summoned from Greece at great expense (21). Chaldaean scholars teach him their native “science of the heavenly bodies,” which he acquires from the Egyptians as well, who further instruct him in the “philosophy conveyed in symbols as displayed in their so-called holy letters” (23–24).<sup>45</sup> Moses was a prodigious pupil (21–22), forestalling the instruction of his teachers and advancing beyond their capacities, “so that his seemed a case rather of recollection [*anamnēsis*] than of learning, and indeed he himself devised and propounded problems that are difficult to solve. For great natures carve out much that is new in the way of knowledge [*epistēmē*]. . . . The gifted soul [*euphuēs psuchē*] takes the lead in meeting the lessons given by itself [cf. above, “recollection”] rather than by the teacher<sup>46</sup> . . . and as soon as it has a grasp of some scientific principle presses forward.”

The amusing anachronisms need not bother us. What is at issue is that Philo improvises an explanation for Moses’ development toward his outstanding role as *the* prophet of God. He cannot, of course, have the Greeks teach him philosophy, since all such philosophy, according to Philo, is later than and derived from Moses. He cannot have him study the books of Moses either. Therefore, recourse is had to a Platonizing suggestion: in going beyond his teachers, i.e., toward philosophy, Moses seems to remember what his soul would have known before entering his body. It is, by the way, rather astonishing that Philo is silent about possible Jewish teachers; presumably, he believed that one could not speak of these in the context of the education of an Egyptian prince. Nothing is said about the influence upon young Moses of the stories about the “living laws” (*sc.* the Patriarchs) either.

45. Cf. nn. 13 and 14 above.

46. D. T. Runia points out to me that *Aet.* 16, on Aristotle’s originality, provides a sort of parallel.



Now, Moses' attitude toward his teacher much resembles that toward the teachings of Greek philosophy recommended by Philo elsewhere: "When he had mastered the lore of *both groups* of teachers, *both where they agreed and where they differed* [*en hois te sumphōnousi kai diapherousi*], he rose above their quarrels [*eridas*] without infatuation with victory [*aphiloneikōs*; cf. below] and sought for the *truth*. His mind was incapable of accepting any falsehood, as is the way with the *aggressive sectarians* [*haresiomachois*], who defend the doctrines [*dogmata*] they have propounded without examining whether they can stand scrutiny, and thus put themselves on a par with hired lawyers who have no thought or care for justice" (24; my italics). Apparently, such sectarians argue that "what is mine, is true." The term *haresiomachos* is unique not only in the Philonic corpus but, it appears, in the whole of Greek literature (cf., however, *Prov.* 2.85, "in the manner of those who indulge in sectarian strife").

One cannot help feeling that Philo somewhat overplays his hand; his description of Moses' attitude toward the aggressive sectarians would be rather more apt as an analysis of the recommended attitude toward dissenting philosophers. The term *erides*, "quarrels," is also found in the "disagreement" of the philosophers at *Her.* 247. (Cf. *Mos.* 1.24, "without infatuation with victory eschewing the quarrels" [*aphiloneikōs tas eridas hyperbas*]; *Her.* 247 "quarrels and infatuations with victory" [*eridas kai philoneikeias*]). Moses is "without infatuation with victory" in contrast to the *haresiomachoi*,<sup>47</sup> and *haeresis* is a term denoting a

47. For φιλονεικία as characteristic of the diehard sectarian see Galen *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 2, p. 102, lines 12f. De Lacy: "all such notions have been boldly advanced by men who were ambitious [φιλονεικούντων] to overthrow all the excellent teachings of the ancients, in order to found a newer sect [*haeresis*] of their own"; cf. also 3, pp. 194, line 20, and 198, line 28; 3, p. 288, line 14; 5, p. 294, lines 11 and 17. It may be doubted whether Proclus *ap. Philop. Aet. mund.*, p. 32, 8 Rabe, διὰ φιλονεικίαν ἀντιλέγειν (= Aristotle, *De Philos.*, fr. 10 Ross), reflects Aristotle's own usage. The Stoics defined φιλονεικία as ἐπιθυμία τις περὶ αἰρέσεως (Diogenes Laertius 7.113 = *SVF* 3.396).

philosophical sect (or school of thought). The division of the teachers in the opposite camps required by a Skeptic "disagreement" is labored, since no information is provided as to the point where the Egyptians and the Chaldaeans (and presumably the Greeks) differed. The only philosophical studies hinted at are in the field of astronomy (Chaldaeans and Egyptians), insofar as the theory of the heavenly bodies is part of physics (cf. *Her.* 247; *Abrah.* 162f.), and an Egyptian type of mystery is hinted at. In the concluding sentence, the warring parties are described as what Philo elsewhere calls "sophists" (cf., e.g., *Mos.* 2.212, "the word-catchers and sophists who *sell* their tenets and arguments [*dogmata kai logous*] . . . , who forever use philosophy against philosophy without a blush"). Philo suggests that Moses is capable of determining which, among the opposed views, is true (cf. the interesting parallel about the element of truth in the "standard curriculum" at *QG* 3.32), just like the "male midwife and judge" at *Her.* 247; and it is interesting to note that he is credited with an understanding not only of the disagreement, but also of the agreement (*Mos.* 1.24, *sumphōnousi*) among the sectarians, a point which reminds us of Antiochus and others. But Moses, as Philo says—and had to say in view of what he saw as Moses' contribution to human thought—not only took from his teachers what was true, but went much farther.

A later stage in his development is described at *Mos.* 1.47f.: he has left Egypt and lives in Arabia. Already he has a special relationship with God (46). He now pursues the exercise of virtue (*aretē*), trained by his own wise reason (*en heautōi logismon aseteion*; cf. above on his gifted nature and *anamnēsis*), and under this management he "labored to fit himself for the best forms of life, the theoretical and practical. *He was forever opening the scroll of philosophical doctrines* [*philosophias aei anelittōn dogmata*], digested them inwardly, *committed them to memory* and brought his personal conduct into conformity with them; for he desired *truth* rather than seeming" (48; my italics). Here the anachronism is flagrant even from Philo's own point of view; momentarily

forgetting his conviction that all philosophy derives from Moses, i.e., from the books later composed by Moses himself, he has him make a thorough study of the philosophical *literature* (on his own, to be sure). Consequently, Moses follows the educational course prescribed by Philo elsewhere: first the “standard curriculum” (*Mos.* 1.21–24), then the philosophical theories (47). According to Philo, the good philosopher is one whose life agrees with his doctrine (and he believes this can best be realized in a Jewish context; cf. two important passages, *Mos.* 2.48 and *Prob.* 160). Moses is such a philosopher; he pursues the *truth*, so we may presume his attitude toward the philosophical doctrines anachronistically studied by him resembled that toward the “standard curriculum.”

The reconstruction provided by Philo of Moses’ educational career is most revealing. Perhaps better than any other passage it tells us how important a Greek education (including philosophy) really was in his view, for he cannot imagine the development of his greatest hero in any other terms.

We should now turn to some passages, dealing with important points of law, where even Moses himself is (uncharacteristically) in doubt. His first problem, involving the conflict between a divine rule and a reasonable human claim, is described at *Mos.* 2.225–28. Moses “wavered in his judgment, and oscillated as on a balance. . . . So, vacillating between refusal and assent, he besought God to act as a judge [cf. *Her.* 247] and give an oracle declaring his decision. And God hearkened to him and vouchsafed an answer.”<sup>48</sup> God, it will be recalled, is not a doubter. His

48. ἐπαμφοτερίζων δὲ τὴν γνώμην καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ πλάστιγγος ἀντιρρόπων . . . ἀρνήσεως καὶ συγκαταθέσεως μεταξὺ φορούμενος ἰκετεύει τὸν θεὸν δικαστὴν γενέσθαι καὶ χρησάμην τὴν κρίσιν ἀποφῆναι, *Mos.* 2.228. For an interesting parallel showing in what way a rationalist may escape from the Skeptic trap see Galen *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 5, pp. 314, line 25–316, line 3 De Lacy. Galen here surveys the attitudes that are possible when two judgments are in conflict: “If the judgments should be of equal credibility, we must suspend judgment [*epechein*] about the reality of the state

“oracle”—in Philo, *chrēsmos* usually denotes a verse, or set of verses, from Scripture—is a sort of compromise providing a rider to the rule that allows for the reasonable claim. The section *Mos.* 2.222–32 as a whole is based on Numbers 9:1–14; in the biblical text, when presented with the problem (9–10), Moses says: “Stand here, and I shall hear whether God utters a command about you.” The text continues: “And God spoke to Moses, saying . . .” The important epistemological interlude has therefore been interpolated by Philo.

Moses’ second problem is described at *Mos.* 2.234–45 and is based on Numbers 27:1–11. Here he is presented with a petition of orphaned girls which similarly entails a conflict between an established rule and a reasonable claim. “Naturally, therefore, in this wavering and undecided state of mind, he referred the difficulty to God, who alone, as he knew, can distinguish by infallible and absolutely unerring criteria the finest differences and thereby show his truth and justice.”<sup>49</sup> This time, God’s answer is not an amendment of the rule, but a decision between the rival claims, and he comes down in favor of the girls’ case. Again, Moses’ doubt is not found in the biblical passage, which merely says (Numbers 27:5–6): “And Moses brought the judgment about them before God. And the Lord said . . .”

With these passages in *De vita Moysis*, D. Daube<sup>50</sup> has inter-

of affairs; but if one of them should appear far more convincing, we must assent to it.” A person who makes a supposition “may have yet another supposition that pulls against it [*antispōmenēs*]; or someone may, like Pyrrho, assign equal value to both and suspend judgment as to assertion and assent” (trans. De Lacy, modified). The text is not included by F. Decleva Caizzi, although it agrees with T67 and T68 in her *Pirrone, Testimonianze*, Elenchos 5 (Naples, 1981).

49. τῆς διανοίας ἀμφικλινῶς ἐχούσης καὶ ἀντισπωμένης, ἀναφέρει τῷ θεῷ τὴν διαπόρησιν, ὃν ἥδει μόνον ἀψευδέσι καὶ ἀπλανεστάτοις κριτηρίοις τὰς κατὰ μικρὸν διαφορὰς διαστέλλοντα πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, *Mos.* 2.237. The “finest differences” recall the Stoic argument against the Skeptics at Cicero *Acad.* 2.56–58 (not in *SVF*).

50. D. Daube, “Alexandrian Methods of Interpretation and the Rabbis,” repr. in H. A. Fischel, ed., *Essays in Greco-Roman and Related Talmudic Literature* (New York, 1977), 174–75.

estingly compared the thirteenth interpretive rule (*Middah*) attributed to Rabbi Ishmael (new compared with those of Hillel):<sup>51</sup> "Two scriptural passages may contradict one another until a third one comes and *tips the balance* between them" (my italics). Note that at *QG* 3.3 (Greek fragment) Philo, against the extreme literalists, emphasizes the unity of Scripture: one should judge the part from the whole. It is not clear whether Ishmael's rule derives from Philo,<sup>52</sup> or whether, perhaps, both Philo and Ishmael reflect an established rule of *midrash* which Philo would project into the distant past, in order to show God actually delivering an "oracle." We may compare Eusebius's characterization of the activities of the Jewish exegetes: "the logical method [*logikos tropos*] of the philosophy of the Hebrews," "a logic which pursues the truth, unlike the clever sophistries of the Greeks" (*PE* 11.5.1).

However this may be, if we adduce the Philonic passages about the conflicting ideas of the philosophers that are adjudicated by the true judge, a sort of methodology appears. Man is uncertain, a doubter by nature; one may, in the Skeptic way, describe how opinions differ and clash. But the *epochē* of Skepticism is not acceptable, because a decision is needed. Such a decision is provided by God, either directly (as when the sage—e.g., Moses—is in doubt) or through his oracles as taken down by Moses. The teachings of Scripture are decisive for the adjudication of the conflicts among the Greek philosophers, who, themselves, have borrowed some of Moses' ideas and interpreted them more or less correctly, but who have never taken the whole of the teachings contained in Scripture seriously enough.<sup>53</sup> Diversity and disagreement could arise precisely because Scripture was not adduced the way it should be.

51. See [H.L. Strack–]G. Stemberger, *Einleitung in Talmud und Midrasch* (Munich, 1982), 31.

52. S. Lieberman, *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine*, Texts and Stud. Jew. Theol. Sem. Amer. 18 (New York, 1950, 1962<sup>2</sup>), 54f.

53. Cf. the examples in Runia (n. 3 above), 528ff.

A *midrashic* origin for Philo's rule of adjudication is, as we have seen, not certain. What is at any rate certain is that the metaphor of the balance in relation to human ratiocinative processes is not his own idea. We may assume he borrowed it from Stoicizing sources, or from the common philosophical jargon of his time.<sup>54</sup> It occurs in passages where Sextus discusses Stoic epistemology (*M.* 7.37 = *SVF* 2.107; *M.* 7.440 = *SVF* 2.158, p. 36, lines 8–9), and, in a Stoic context, in Philo himself, *Prob.* 61 = *SVF* 3.363, p. 89, line 3 (typical Philonic terminology: "The mind is poised [*isorropei*] as on a balance [*plastingi*]"). These three texts were discussed some years ago by K.-H. Rolke in a study dealing with the metaphors in the Stoic fragments,<sup>55</sup> because the evidence is late and couched in general language, he can only suggest that it is not incompatible with Chrysippus's epistemology. However, he has missed the most important text, Plutarch *St. Rep.* 1045B–D (= *SVF* 2.973): this proves that Chrysippus here refutes the Epicureans<sup>56</sup> who—Chrysippus implies—had argued that when it is necessary to choose one of two equivalent and equally pressing alternatives, the "adventitious motion" in the soul "takes an inclination [*epiklisis*] of itself and resolves the perplexity." "In many places," however, Chrysippus cited as evidence dice and "the balance" (*zugon*;<sup>57</sup> cf. *SVF* 2.107, 158, cited above) and many other things "that cannot fall or incline now one way now another without some cause."

54. Note that the "scales" listed by Th. H. Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus* (Chicago, 1919; repr. New York, 1979), 101, is a different figure.

55. K.-H. Rolke, *Die bildhaften Vergleiche in den Fragmenten der Stoiker von Zenon bis Panaitios*, *Spudasmata* 32 (Hildesheim, 1971), 208–14.

56. Cf. Cherniss *ad loc.* I cannot enter here into the implications of this neglected text (not printed by Usener, not translated by M. Isnardi Parente, *Opere di Epicuro* [Turin, 1983<sup>2</sup>], and not, to my knowledge, adduced in the recent scholarly literature) for the study of the Epicurean arguments against determinism. For other evidence concerning Chrysippus's objections to "uncaused motion" see M. Isnardi Parente, "Stoici, Epicurei, e il 'motus sine causa,'" *RSF* 35 (1980), 23ff.

57. Philo uses *πλάστιγξ*, presumably because this is a Platonic word.



To conclude, I would like to point out that Philo really needed the Skeptic aloofness from the theories of the dogmatists, because in this way (strategically adopting the Skeptics' technique of organization) he could begin by, so to speak, neutralizing them and reducing them to one side in a "disagreement." Unlike the Skeptics, however, he believed that the scales could be, and should be, tipped, at least where the more important perplexities are at issue. God takes the decision for us—not, however, without an enduring effort on our own side (cf. *Sacrif.* 8off.). Even Moses only received his revelations after a preparatory period. In Philo's day, God's decisions are represented by the collected oracles of Moses (and his fellow-prophets) and their correct exegesis, and Philo seems to assume that God assists and inspires<sup>58</sup> the studious and humble interpreter (cf. esp. *Sacrif.* 77–79). With the backing of the books of Moses and supported by the religious traditions of his people which are grounded in these books, the studious exegete is in a position to lord it over the Greek philosophers. The other side of this coin,<sup>59</sup> of course, is that it is the body of divergent opinions among the Greek philosophers that is adjudicated by Scripture and its correct interpretation. Inevitably, the male midwife and judge will make an eclectic impression. However, to the extent that—as we noticed in the first part of this chapter—Philo's exegesis operates on different levels, his eclecticism may be said to be free of syncretistic taints.<sup>60</sup>

58. On inspiration (also of exegetes) according to Philo see Billings (n. 54 above), 67.

59. Cf. the detailed analysis of the Greekness of the arguments against the Greeks in *C. Ap.* by C. Schaublin, "Josephus und die Griechen," *Hermes* 110 (1982), 316ff.

60. I wish to thank the members of the Dublin colloquium, as well as R. van den Broek, P. W. van der Horst, J. C. M. van Winden, and especially D. T. Runia, for their comments, and C. W. Hudson for looking at my English.

D. O'BRIEN, *Pour interpréter Empédocle*. Paris, Les Belles Lettres - Leiden, Brill, 1981. Pp. X, 139. Pr. Gld. 48.—.

This essay is a refutation of a dissertation by N. van der Ben defended at the University of Amsterdam in 1975<sup>1</sup>), in which the author lifted a large number of fragments from Empedocles' *Katharmoi* in order to place them at the beginning of the physical poem, which is where editors before Stein and Diels (i.e., before the first publication of Hipp., *Ref.* V-X, in 1851) had put them. Interpolating other fragments—among which 31 B 30, about Strife's resumption of power—into *Kath.* 31 B 115 (itself, to be sure, assembled by editors from various sources) and appending the majority of *Kath.*-fragments, van der Ben reconstructed a proem for the *Peri physeos* in which a *katabasis* of the soul is described. In order to justify his inclusion of 31 B 30, he argued that the evidence which had been interpreted by other scholars as pertaining to a cosmic cycle does not bear out this interpretation. O'Brien (O.) successfully

tears down this untenable construction. He apologizes for writing a monograph *contra*, claiming that it is urgent that someone take upon himself the burden of exposing the defects of much of today's scholarship, and that this can only be achieved by making a serious example of somebody's deviations.

Of course, one is grateful that van der B. has been refuted. It would have been sufficient, however, to point out that the *description of contents* of the *Kath.* at Hipp., *Ref.* VII 30, 3 (= *Vorsokr.* ad 31 B 110, where we hear that this poem—τοὺς Ἐμπεδοκλέους Καθαρμοὺς—forbade procreation and the consumption of meat) as corroborated by Hippolytus' interpretation of 31 B 115 at *Ref.* VII 29, 22, precludes the reallocation of fragments advocated by van der B. To the clear evidence of Hipp., O. however adds possible allusions to the title of the *Kath.* in two Middle Platonist authors quoting from 31 B 115, viz., Celsus *ap. Orig.*, *C. Cels.* VIII 53, ἐκκαθαρθῆ, and Plut., *De Isid.* 361 C, καθαρθέντες (16-18). This is followed by a plausible interpretation of references in the sources pertaining to the location of fragments at the beginning of each of Emp.' major poems (21-28). He rehearses the evidence in Emp., 31 B 17, Plat., *Sph.* 242 d-243 a, Arist., *Phys.* VIII 1, 250 b 23 f., 252 a 5 f., *Cael.* I 10, 279 b 14 f., *Met.* B 4, 1000 a 18-b 21, all in favour of a cosmic cycle (29-65). He points out that Eudem., fr. 110 Wehrli *ap. Simpl.*, *In Phys.* pp. 1183, 28-1184, 4, is not the first to ascribe such a cycle to Emp., and perhaps even provides independent evidence in its favour (40-1). Simplicius, whatever his own preferred view, certainly knew Aristotle's (42 f.). Finally, *Vorsokr.* 31 B 30 indubitably refers to a crucial phase in the cycle (51-54)<sup>2</sup>.

Incidentally, O. argues a good point, not always appreciated by scholars<sup>3</sup>). Emp. himself always speaks of Love as uniting, and Strife as separating, *different* elements. The paradox that Love must also separate and Strife also unite, viz. parts of *one and the same element* was invented by Aristotle (*GC* II 6, 333 b 32 f.). O., however, does not sufficiently apply this insight into Aristotle's argumentation on another occasion, for the point that Strife, called a destructive agent by Emp., is also a constructive one in that it generates plurality (which is a necessary condition for the construction of compounds [by Love], and that, conversely, Love, called a constructive agent by Emp., is also a destructive one in that it destroys the plurality (i.e., the world and the individual living beings therein when generating the One God, Sphairos) is likewise an invention of Arist. (*Met.* B 4, *loc. cit.*)<sup>4</sup>). One may even carry Arist.' critique *ad absurdum* by arguing that Strife, by generating the plurality from

which the One is formed, creates the One as much as it—thus Arist.—generates individual compounds, but this is by the way. I mention this point now because *Met.* B 4, *loc. cit.*, is part of O.'s evidence for a zoogony of Strife (see *infra*, p. 186).

The most important section of this essay, the concluding chapter, is valuable both as a contribution to the study of Emp. and to that of later Platonism. Unfortunately, O. has missed important papers by Burkert and Frickel<sup>5</sup>), the first of which appeared simultaneously with van der B.'s dissertation and the second a mere two years later. O.'s point of departure is Simplicius' quotation of lines 1-2 of *Vorsokr.* 31 B 115 (*In Phys.*, p. 1184, 9-12) together with quotations from the physical poem. Actually, Simpl. quotes from 31 B 115 in order to elucidate a terminological point at issue, as he believes, in 31 B 30. This concatenation of quotes is exploited by van der B. for shoring up his ramshackle edifice. In a most rewarding argument O. proves that the amalgam of ideas from the physical poem (Love, Strife, and their 'worlds') with the notion of the fallen soul from the *Kath.* is a commonplace of the Neoplatonist interpretation of Emp. The One dominated by Love, in this allegorical reading, corresponds to the intelligible world and the plurality dominated by Strife to the sensible world. In Neoplatonism, the Descent of Soul results in cosmogony; hence 31 B 115, a very popular piece as some late Neoplatonists point out themselves, could be fitted in as describing what happens to Soul as it goes from the intelligible to the sensible world. This interpretation, already found in Iamblichus and used by Proclus, is set out at required length by commentators such as Syrianus, Philoponus, and Asclepius (from which O. translates substantial extracts). Simplicius' quotation of some lines from 31 B 115 (his only quote from the *Kath.*) in the context of quotations from the physical poem is therefore easily explained as derived from his Neoplatonist background, whatever his actual source for these lines themselves (89, cf. 76).

O. points out that this Neoplatonist construction has its roots in earlier Platonism. He notes some partial anticipations in Plutarch (77), and is aware that it is already to be found in Hipp., *Ref.* VII 29, where the sphere of Love, or the One, is an intelligible world from which souls have been detached (79). In a "note complémentaire" (93 ff.), he attempts to revive Diels' hypothesis that Plutarch's lost work about Emp. in 10 books was Hippolytus' source; Diels, however, had been definitively refuted by Burkert in 1975<sup>6</sup>). Burkert has also shown that what is in Hipp., *loc. cit.*, is to be linked

up with a Pythagoreanizing and Platonizing interpretation of Empedocles and Heraclitus, both believed to be speaking of the Descent of Soul into the sensible world, which must be earlier than Plutarch<sup>7)</sup>. O. has missed Frickel's argument that Hipp., *loc. cit.*, is Gnostic: in Hipp., Love plays no zoogonic part whatever; like the world itself, all beings are generated by Strife only who, operating as a true Gnostic Evil Demiurge, detaches the souls from the One with which Love is eventually to reunite them. Even if one would be unwilling to accept Frickel's thesis that Hipp. used a Gnostic source for his chapters on Emp. in *Ref. VII*, one still would have to admit that he provided an *interpretatio gnostica* of Emp. in order the better to refute Marcion. Hence the attribution, by Hipp., not only of the (historically correct) taboo on meat, but also of the Marcionite prohibition of procreation to Emp. (cf. Clem., *Strom.* III 12, 1 ff. The persons cited I *Tim.* IV 2-3, on which see O., 93, possibly are Gnostic predecessors of Marcion). To attribute, with O., the ban on procreation to Emp. himself is irresponsible<sup>8)</sup>; his statement (94) that what is in Hipp. is compatible with what is in Arist., *Met.* B 4, *loc. cit.*, is misleading, for Arist., as we have noticed (*supra*, p. 184) only argues that Strife is a principle that generates things inasmuch as it is the cause of plurality. I assume O. would not have Arist. say that Emp. did not describe a zoogony of Love.

It was pointed out above that O.'s aim in writing his essay is to express a plea for better manners. His opponent's main defect, representative according to O. of much of today's work on the Presocratics, is his unwillingness to take into account such ancient evidence, or such arguments of other scholars as are concerned with this evidence, as would imply that other options are open besides the one he plumps for himself. I quote a representative sentence: "Peut-on ... faire confiance à ... M. van der Ben, si l'auteur n'a pas lui-même examiné une opinion soutenue ailleurs et opposée à la sienne et qui, si elle était vraie, renverserait son argumentation et réduirait à néant sa conclusion?" (p. 51). Now I want to repeat that I agree both with O.'s arguments against van der B. and with his general principle. O., however, does not obey his own rule where a view dear to himself is at issue. In his learned book of 1969, most of which had been completed several years before, O. argued for an Empedoclean cosmic cycle with two zoogonies. Objections to this reconstruction of O.'s have been stated by, among others, A. A. Long and the present reviewer<sup>9)</sup> "qui, si elles étaient vraies, renverseraient son argumentation" etc. Long's paper is referred to twice, but only very briefly; I quote from pp. 48-9: "La tentative

... d'établir un compromis entre l'interprétation (de) ... Bollack ... et la nôtre ne nous semble guère plus heureuse" (sc., than another objection to O. formulated by someone else). This is dismissal, not argument, and it is simply false that Long advocates a "renouveau de l'interprétation non-cyclique", since he argues for a "two-stage linear cycle"<sup>10)</sup>. My own alternative interpretation of 31 B 17, 3-5 is spared such cavalier treatment because it is dealt with through the *argumentum silentii* (not *argumentum ex silentio*). O. still manages to get two zoogonies out of these lines by the simple expedient of interpolating, in his translation of line 3 "<des deux générations>", and in that of line 5 "l'autre <génération>" (33). Which is applying the method van der B. is rightly reproached for, viz. that of putting into a text what suits one's convenience. Ignoring alternative suggestions made by others, O. states that the οὐλοφουεῖς ... τύποι of 31 B 62 must have arisen under Strife's dominion (44). One could continue in this vein. Apparently, O. not just wanted to kill two birds (viz. van der B.'s thesis, and the method of van der B. and so many others) with one stone, but believed that the same stone would serve to reanimate a third bird, declared dead by others. The argument as a whole would have suffered nothing if O. had left out his first zoogony, for he is of course right, against van der B., that a cosmic cycle must be attributed to Emp. and that the Neoplatonist non-cyclical interpretation, however interesting in its own right, is not historically true.

1) N. van der Ben, *The Poem of Empedocles' 'Peri Physéas': Towards a new edition of all the fragments*, Amsterdam, Grüner 1975. O'Brien is the author of, *inter alia*, the excellent *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle: A reconstruction from the fragments and secondary sources*, Cambridge, CUP 1969.

2) For O.'s plausible argument that Simpl. did not quote 31 B 30 from Aristotle's *Met.* see 66-72.

3) Cf. my paper *Bad World and Demiurge: A 'Gnostic' Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo*, in: R. v.d. Broek-M. J. Vermaseren (eds.), *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions*, EPRO 91, Leiden, Brill 1981, [261 ff.], 279 n. 47.

4) O.'s transl. of *Met.* B 4, 1000 a 28-29 (pp. 56, 63) is not a happy one. Surely, it is more natural to assume that πάντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτου τὰλλα ἐστὶ πλὴν ὁ θεός explains the preceding δόξειε δ' ἂν ... καὶ τοῦτο [sc., Νεῖκος] γενῶν ἔξω τοῦ ἐνός, and to translate: "but none the less this [principle] would seem to be productive, apart from the One, for all other things are [derived] from it except the God". O.'s preferred transl. of ἔξω τοῦ ἐνός as "provenant de l'un", although supported by Alexander, is laboured, and it is nowise necessary that ἔξω here should balance



εἰς several lines further down (1000 b 12). The symmetry is in Aristotle's paradoxical idea: Strife produces all things except the One it destroys, Love destroys all things except the One it produces—neither of which statements is valid for Emp. if they are taken *au pied de la lettre*.

5) W. Burkert, *Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles*, in: J. Mansfeld-L. M. de Rijk (eds.), *Kephalaion: Studies ... de Vogel*, Wijsgerige teksten en studies 23, Van Gorcum, Assen 1975, 137 ff.; J. Frickel, *Unerkannte gnostische Schriften in Hippolyts Refutatio*, in: *Gnosis and Gnosticism*, Nag Hammadi Studies 8, Leiden, Brill 1977, 119 ff.

6) *O.c.*, 141.

7) *O.c.*, *passim*.

8) See EPRO 91 (*supra*, n. 3), 289 n. 70.

9) A. A. Long, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in the Sixties*, in: A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), *The Pre-Socratics*, New York, Anchor Press/Doubleday 1974, 397 ff.; J. Mansfeld, *Ambiguity in Empedocles B 17, 3-5: A Suggestion*, in: *Phronesis* 17 (1972), 17 ff.

10) *O.c.*, 424.

P. MASTANDREA, *Un Neoplatonico Latino: Cornelio Labeone*. Testimonianze e Frammenti (Études Préliminaires aux Religions Orientales dans l'Empire Romain, 79) Leiden, Brill, 1979. XXX, 259 pp. Pr. Fl. 124,—.

This study (an object-lesson in moderate *Quellenforschung*) is the first extensive discussion of [Cornelius] L[abeo] to be published since the hey-day of Labeonian controversy in the later 19th and early 20th cent., and contains the first new edition of 'fragments' since those of Kettner (1877) and Muelleneisen (1889). M [astandrea] prints only 18 texts to Kettner's 26 and Muelleneisen's 28, but adds 4 passages—one, fr. 7, important (see *infra*)—lacking in

his predecessors, viz., fr. 4 (Lyd., *Mens.* I 21, cf. pp. 46f.), 6 (*Mens.* III 10, cf. pp. 59f.), 7 (Anast. Sin., *Hexaem.* I, cf. pp. 68f.), and 8 (Lyd., *Ost.* 42, cf. pp. 78f.)<sup>1</sup>); the collection only includes texts with L.'s name (pp. 230-40, transl. pp. 241-6; fr. 9—cf. p. 88—is the only *verbatim* quotation). However, in the 4 chapters of this study—corresponding to the known 4 works by L.—(viz., I: “I ‘Fasti’”, pp. 14ff.; II: “La ‘Disciplina Etrusca’”, pp. 74ff.; III: “I Libri ‘De Diis Animalibus’. La Demonologia”, pp. 103ff.; IV: “Il ‘De Oraculo Apollinis Clarii’. La Teologia”, pp. 159ff.), where the ‘fragments’<sup>2</sup>) are studied according to the order at pp. 230ff., several important passages deriving from the same contexts but lacking L.’s name are investigated and plausibly attributed to L. Readers would have been better served had these been added, as ‘probable’ fr., to the collection of secure ones—esp. because there are, at pp. 230ff., no references to the preceding chapters, and almost none to the collection of numbered fr. in these chapters themselves. In order to understand the argument and the lay-out of this book, one has to read it twice, confectioning one’s own cross-references.

It is important that M. successfully dates L. to the 2nd half of the 3rd cent. CE (in 1977, Flamant could still refer to this question as unsolved<sup>3</sup>)). L. was used by Arnobius (*Nat.*), which entails the first decade of the 4th cent. CE as *t.a.q.* (pp. 108ff.); he quoted Numenius (fr. 57 des Pl.), which entails a *t.p.q.* (pp. 49-50). An even later *t.p.q.* is entailed by an echo, in L. fr. 7, from Porphyry, *Περὶ ἀγαλμάτων* fr. 8 Bid. (p. 65-7, p. 71). Even more important is M.’s proof that L. not only was an important source for Macrobius, Servius, Arnobius (and Augustine), but also for Iohannes Lydus, cf. the extensive passages deriving from the *Fasti* quoted from Macr., Serv. and Arn. and printed in parallel columns at pp. 21-3<sup>4</sup>) (containing fr. 2) and pp. 61-5 (containing fr. 4, 5, 3, 6)<sup>5</sup>). Arn., *Nat.* III 29-42 mainly derives from L. (pp. 108ff.), and Lyd., *Ost.* 42-52 is important for the *Disc. Etr.* (pp. 78ff.). Arnobius never mentions L.’s name, but is found out through the parallels in other authors. Macrobius and Lydus (*Mens.*) only rarely mention L., but the parallels prove that a passage in the former derives from L. because the parallel passage in the latter happens to mention him, or conversely. Arnobius, Macrobius, Lydus prefer to cite (generally in clusters) the posh early sources adduced by L., viz., Cato, Cincius, Fonteius, Fulvius Nobilior, Granius Flaccus, Verrius Flaccus, Gavius Bassus, Lutatius Catulus, Cornificius Longus, Nigidius Figulus, M. Messala, Piso, even Varro; the ‘Etruscan books’, the

*libri pontificales*. M. argues, plausibly, that the occurrence of these names and titles in the later authors points to their use of L.

The picture of L. that emerges is that of an antiquary with a message: L. attempted to do for Roman (and Etruscan, pp. 74ff.) religion what Porphyry and others had attempted for Greek (and heathen Oriental) religion, viz., to invest it with religious significance for the common man living in fear of what will happen after death (cf. pp. 119ff.) and to make it acceptable to a philosophically minded pagan élite. Thus, L., who excerpted a plurality of earlier Latin authors who in their own days had provided Stoicizing and Pythagoreanizing interpretations of Roman religion (perhaps we had better say: who spoke the philosophical *koine* of the first cent. BCE and CE), is an important forerunner of Macrobius and his circle. As a philosopher, L. is unimportant; as a representative of the Roman *Rezeption* of Greek philosophy, in which capacity he is studied by M., he is highly interesting.

In the *Fasti*, L. apparently first gave etymological speculations concerned with the names of the gods and/or speculated about the symbolic meanings of the attributes of their statues; he then gave the opinions of his Pleiads of early authors, and finally defined the divine beings who have given their names to the months of the year. In this way, Ianus is equated with Ἰανῶν, one of the names of the highest divinity of the Hellenized Orient (or of the Demiurge), pp. 32-4; p. 165; but the equation Ianus ~ Ἰανῶν was already in Messala, quoted by L. (and, one should add, Ianus is already a cosmic divinity in Ovid’s *Fasti* (!), I 117ff.) The equation Ianus ~ Apollo ~ Sol points to later times (p. 38, pp. 169ff.). Ianus is also equated with the *daimones* of Plato, *Symp.* 202e-203a (Gavius Bassus is quoted here; see p. 31, p. 137). It will be difficult to point out specific *Neo-Platonic* elements in the *Fasti*, which, as M. should have emphasized (but cf. p. 151, p. 166), appear to be inspired by a pre-Plotinian Porphyry, viz., by *On Divine Names* and *On Statues* (cf. p. 174). In *De diis animalibus*, L. spoke of “ogni tipo di divinità e semidivinità, anche ellenica, creata da anime umane” (p. 119). We are rather well informed about his discussion of Lares, Penates, Viales, and Compitales, and hear about sacrifices necessary for the divinization of the human soul that were offered to the divinities of the nether world (Ch. 3). What is more, L. distinguished between good and evil lower divinities (p. 45, p. 55, pp. 145ff.), which implies a form of dualism. For the sacrifices to the evil divinities M. adduces parallels from Porph., *De abst.* II 36-45 (pp. 151ff.). Finally, the *Oracle of Apollo Clarius* must have been inspired by Porphyry’s

(pre-Plotinian!) *De philosophia ex oraculis hauriunda* (pp. 159ff.). M. argues that Porphyry (*On Statues*; *On Divine Names*; "Ἡλῖος" is, through L., the main source of Macr., *Sat.* I 17-23 (pp. 169ff.).

M.'s book shows in what way native Roman (and Etruscan) religion were 'orientalized' by L., and therefore is a welcome addition to Vermaseren's splendid EPRO; being incompetent in this field, I cannot attempt either to evaluate this aspect of L.'s work or his importance as a source for Roman (and Etruscan)<sup>6</sup> religion. I limit my criticism to a few points relevant to the history of philosophy. First, I have to point out that to call L. a 'Neo-Platonist' is perhaps misleading, or only acceptable from a chronological point of view, since his main affinities are with such works of Porphyry as are close to Middle Platonism and the Latin authors quoted by L. make him an important source for the Roman contribution to the philosophical *koine* of the first cent. BCE and CE. A moot point is the presence of L. at Arn., *Nat.* II 11-66, the argument against the *virī novi*. M. argues (p. 130, p. 133) that the (veiled) quote from L. at II 62 (cf. fr. 10) is an isolated reference and, following Courcelle, affirms that the source for the section as a whole is Porphyry (pp. 131ff.). But I think this assumption does not exclude that L. figures as *Zwischenquelle*; the undoubtedly Porphyrian items (a) and (b) at II 62 (see p. 130) are 'connected' with *neque ... neque*; a third *neque* introduces the L.-fr. = (c), and cannot be used as an argument that (c) is isolated from (a) + (b). Elsewhere, moreover, M. argues that L. syncretized Porphyrian Platonism, Eastern mysticism, and Roman and Etruscan Religion (e.g., p. 119, p. 165, p. 176); therefore, such syncretism at *Nat.* II 62 may well derive from L., who may be Arnobius' main source for 11-66 after all.

The discussion of name magic and etymology (pp. 181ff., 188ff.) betrays painful ignorance of Stoic logic; note that, p. 189, the *σημαίνόμενον* ("meaning") is interpreted as 'thing'. M. does not distinguish between the early Porphyry and the late Porphyry who rejected name magic etc. (cf. *Πρὸς Μαρκέλλαν* 17; *Epist. ad Aneb.* p. 22, 1f. Sod.)<sup>7</sup> The fr. of Messala *ap.* Macr., *Sat.* I 9, 14 (p. 23, pp. 32ff.) is Stoicizing, cf. SVF I 99 and esp. Cic., *N.D.* II 115-6. The unique etymology of Apollo in fr. 7 (see p. 69, pp. 71f.) should not be linked up with the common ἀ-πολλῶν. In the context, this etymology belongs with the Porphyrean etymology of Artemis as ἀερότεμις. Lydus *ap.* Anast. Sin. says that Leto bore Artemis (the moon) first, and ὁ Ἀπολλῶν, τουτέστιν ὁ ἀπὸ ὅλων ὦν Ἡλῖος, ἵνα μὴ καταθαλάσῃ τὸ πᾶν, second: Apollo ~ Sun "does not dominate the

whole [ἀπὸ τῶν ὅλων ὦν] in order that the universe be not burned to ashes". This may be directed against the Stoic *ekpyrosis* and may well derive from Porphyry, perhaps even from (his interpretation of) the *Oracula Chaldaica*. The idea that L.'s sacrifices *animorum sanguine* (pp. 95f.) are originally Pythagorean cannot be right; indeed, the attempt to derive L.'s theory from Early Italian Orphism (the Orphic-Bacchic tablets do not speak of sacrifices) and Pythagoreanism (p. 96, p. 108; better p. 121) is highly improbable.

1) Frr. 4 and 6 are only known since the discovery of a more complete ms. of *Mens.* first publ. by Wünsch (1898, i.e., 9 years after Muelleneisen's work). R. Schöne and Fr. Cumont (cf. p. 67) showed that Anast. Sin. (fr. 7) used an even better text of *Mens.* Fr. 8 was overlooked because Wachsmuth (cf. pp. 76-8) had argued that Lydus is a fraud. Note that M. gives his own *recensio* for the text of the new fr.

2) The punctuation of the fr. as cited in the body of M.'s work sometimes differs from that at pp. 230ff. At p. 139, line 7 (fr. 13), the word *aliquid* is missing. At p. 234, the complete title of the section from *Ost.* is not given (cf. p. 79).

3) J. Flamant, *Macrobie et le néoplatonisme latin à la fin du IV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (EPRO 58, Leiden 1977), 295-6, where it is also pointed out that L.'s importance for Macrobius had not yet been clearly defined.

4) Note that at p. 22, left column, line 22 (*Mens.* II 1) a number of words have disappeared between κατὰ and τοῦ; fortunately, the full text is printed p. 32 (with n. 64).

5) See also pp. 113-5, for parallel passages from *De diis animalibus*; p. 168, pp. 170-1, for parallel passages from *De Oraculo Apollinis Clarii*.

6) See A. J. Pfiffig, *Religio Etrusca* (Graz 1975), 42-3.

7) See M. Hirschle, *Sprachphilosophie und Namenmagie im Neuplatonismus* (Beitr. z. kl. Phil. 96, Meisenheim a. Gl. 1979), 42-6.



## ALEXANDER AND THE HISTORY OF NEOPLATONISM

- \* 1. The importance of Alexander's treatise is not limited to its being an early Greek source for the doctrines of Mani. Equally important is the fact that it argues against these doctrines, point by point, from a philosophical point of view.

Alexander's own philosophical position is that of a Platonist. He does not impress one as an original philosopher, but as a middling follower or representative of a philosophical tradition or school. Such people must have been rather numerous at all times: it is only accident or rather the specific objective of his work which has rescued Alexander's name from oblivion. The importance of his treatise for the history of Neoplatonism derives from its having survived at all. It affords a glimpse of what was known and taught in the philosophical circles of Alexandria some years before 300 A.D.

The existence of a philosophical school or tradition at Alexandria at this time is proved by the reference, p. 8, 14-5 Br., to those who studied philosophy with or together with Alexander (τινας τῶν συνεσχολακόντων ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν). That we may consider Alexander as a professional philosopher also follows from his remarks, in

Ch. I, about the low scientific level of Christian philosophy and his complaints, in Ch. VI, about the unscientific character of Manichaeism: his interest in philosophy is more than casual. Moreover, the brief and rather indirect way in which, as a rule, philosophical doctrines are used or referred to reveals that he assumes his readers, among whom of course the fellow-philosophers converted to Manichaeism should be counted,<sup>12</sup> to be philosophically educated people.

The polemical nature of the treatise has as one of its consequences that it is not easy to gauge where exactly, as a philosopher, Alexander himself may have stood. His method may be compared to that of allegorical interpretation: <sup>13</sup> he tries to make sense of the Manichaean cosmological myth and religious doctrines by so to speak translating these into Greek philosophical concepts. However, he only succeeds in making nonsense of Manichaeism in this way — which, of course, is what he had set out to achieve. In theory at least, such a method permits him who uses it to adduce ideas which he does not necessarily subscribe to himself. However, certain points of doctrine are unmistakably Alexander's in the sense that he explicitly states them to be correct, while his acceptance of other points is entailed by the fact that he clearly takes them for granted. I have accordingly tried to look for such points. Though the polemical nature of the treatise makes it not very easy to reconstruct a systematical picture so that a number of lacunas and uncertainties remain, a rough impression of the philosophical viewpoint represented by Alexander can be pieced together.

2. Praechter correctly says of Alexander: "dass er nicht Christ, sondern Neuplatoniker war, geht aus dem Traktat deutlich hervor". He also correctly compares him with Hierocles of Alexandria (about 400 A.D.): "wie Hierokles, (lässt) er die präexistierende Materie fallen... Von über dem weltanschaffenden Gott anzusetzenden Hypostasen ist bei

<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, Hierocles, *In Carm. aur.* p. 51, 9 ff. Mullach, says that it is one's duty to bring back into the fold such friends as have deserted philosophy for some other purpose in life (μεταβαλλομένοις ἐκ τῆς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν σπουδῆς εἰς ἑτέραν τινὰ τοῦ βίου πρόθεσιν). The fact that certain of his fellow-philosophers have become converts to Manichaeism is Alexander's motive for writing his treatise. Similar motives in part inspired Plot., *Enn.* II, 9, cf. Harder[9].

<sup>13</sup> Cf. below, p. 57 n. 209, p. 58 n. 212, p. 70 n. 275, p. 95 n. 388.

Saccas as reconstructed by Theiler. A discussion of the problem of the reconstruction of this system must, however, be postponed until another occasion.

3. Alexander is a Neoplatonist : he is familiar with a theory of hypostatic origins which, to him, is the "true doctrine".<sup>24</sup> Praechter already pointed out that this theory is remarkable in that no hypostases are assumed above the demiurgic God.<sup>25</sup> This can be formulated more precisely. Alexander's supreme principle is not a totally transcendent One, as in Plotinus. Nor is it a Plotinian One which has shed some of the marks distinguishing it from the other perfect hypostases, as in Porphyry (I am not only thinking of the faithful follower of Plotinus who wrote the *Starting-points toward the Intelligibles*, but also of the original metaphysician who endeavoured to reconcile the doctrine of Plotinus with that of the *Chaldaean Oracles* by identifying the Plotinian One with the Chaldaean 'Father' and by uniting Intellect with the Father before it produces itself out of the One).<sup>26</sup> Alexander's first principle is called Noûs, i.e. Intellect, and it is in relation to "that Intellect" (ἐκεῖνον τὸν Νοῦν, p. 10, 3-4 Br.) that all things are capable of coming into being hypostatically.<sup>27</sup> He nowhere speaks of this Intellect as being One or as being in whatever way united with a One, though it is without parts (cf. p. 24, 14 ff. Br.), simple (ἀπλοῦν) and incorporeal (not σωματικόν), cf. p. 17, 8 ff., 24, 14 ff. Br. At p. 9, 21-10, 4 Br. he calls it God (θεός) and productive cause (τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον). It is beyond being in so far as God is said to be so (τὸν ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας, p. 39, 18 Br.) and it is hard to arrive at a proper understanding of it (p. 17, 10-13 Br.). Among its products matter is to be counted, for which see below. Alexander whole-heartedly approves of the Christian

<sup>24</sup> p. 24, 18-19 Br., ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ὅτι τὰ ἐφεξῆς μένοντος τοῦ θεοῦ ὑποστάσεις εἰσὶν; p. 10, 3-4 Br., ἐν ὑποστάσει δυναμένων γίνεσθαι πάντων πρὸς ἐκεῖνον τὸν Νοῦν.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. above, p. 7-8.

<sup>26</sup> For Porphyry's so-called "telescoping of the hypostases" see Lloyd, *o.c.* 287 ff.; for Porphyry as the interpreter of the *Chaldaean Oracles* see P. Hadot, *Porphyre et Victorinus*, I, Paris 1968, esp. 96 ff., 260 ff., and *La métaphysique de Porphyre*, in : Entr. Hardt XII, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1966, 136 ff., 142 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. above, n. 24.

doctrine<sup>28</sup> in so far as it assumes that the productive cause is the first principle and cause of all things (τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον τιμιώτατον τίθενται καὶ πρεσβύτατον καὶ πάντων αἴτιον τῶν ὄντων, which εἰκότως ἅπαντες ἂν ἀποδέξαιτο, p. 3, 5-7 Br.).

This conception of the first principle as an incorporeal, simple, divine, productive Intellect which is beyond being and hard to know is close to the various conceptions of such Middle Platonists as Albinus, Maximus of Tyre, Celsus and Numenius.<sup>29</sup> That the first principle is the cause of all things can be paralleled from Plotinus and Porphyry,<sup>30</sup> who however do not speak of it as Intellect. The theory of hypostases (cf. p. 24, 19 Br.) is not Middle Platonist, though the so-called "principle of undiminished giving" found in Numenius (whose words are echoed by Alexander)<sup>31</sup> and even earlier<sup>31a</sup> may be considered as a precursor of

<sup>28</sup> Just as, on the other hand, the Christian Origen approved of those philosophers who put nothing above the Demiurge : τυγχάνειν τοῦ μὲν δημιουργοῦ μέζονα οὐδένα ἐπιλήψασιν, ὅγιός τοῦτο ποιῶντες, *De princ.* IV, 2, 1, p. 308, 5 Koetschau.

<sup>29</sup> Albinus, *Didasc.* 10, p. 164, 16 ff. Hermann (he did not assume anything beyond Intellect, cf. J. Mansfeld, *Théta-Pi* 1, 1972, 61 ff.); Maximus of Tyre, *Diss.* XI, 8-12, p. 139, 2 ff. Hobein; Numenius, fgt. 17, fgt. 22 des Places (cf. E. R. Dodds, *Numenius and Ammonius*, in : Entr. Hardt V, Vandoeuvres-Genève 1960, 12 ff. and J. H. Waszink, *Porphyrios und Numenios*, in : Entr. Hardt XII, 41). Also Clement may be cited, cf. e.g. *Strom.* IV, 155, 2 and S.R.C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, Oxford 1971, 222 ff., who also gives a number of Middle Platonist parallels. Celsus is an exception in that his first principle is not only above being, but also beyond Intellect, though yet ἀπρήτω τινὶ δυνάμει νοητός, *ap. Orig., C. Cels.* VII, 45, cf. H. Dörrie, *Die platonische Theologie des Kelsos in ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit der christlichen Theologie*, Nachr. Ak. Göttingen 1967, 2, 38 ff. On the epistemological problems of Middle Platonist theology see A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, 4, *Le Dieu Inconnu et la Gnose*, Paris 1954, 111-112, 135-140 and J. Whittaker, *ΕΠΕΚΕΙΝΑ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΣΙΑΣ*, Vig. Christ. 23, 1969, 91 ff. (whose interpretation of Albinus at p. 103 is however incorrect). For a survey of Middle Platonist views about the first principle cf. also Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 8-10; cf. also the passages in Lewy cited below, p. 13 n. 38.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. the passages collected by H. Schwyzer, *Plotinos, RE* XXI, 1951, 562; for Porphyry, cf. below, p. 20 and n. 61. Note that also Albinus' first Intellect is, in a sense, αἴτιος ... πάντων, p. 164, 35-36 H. (see further below, p. 49 n. 164).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. below, p. 69 n. 273.

<sup>31a</sup> Cf. E. R. Dodds, *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*, Oxford 1963, 214, who adduces evidence to show that it is a product of the Middle Stoa; to the passages quoted there add Justin, *Dial.* 61 and Tatian, *Or. ad Graec.* 5 (cf. below, p. 16 n. 47). Cf. also Schwyzer, *Plotinos*, 578 sub d.

the Neoplatonist concept of emanation. The closest parallel to Alexander is found among the meagre remains of the Neoplatonist Origen, Plotinus' fellow-pupil, who visited the latter in Rome, and who published his principal work, *Only the King is Demiurge*, about 269 A.D.<sup>32</sup> ("Οτι μόνος ποιητής ὁ βασιλεύς, Porph., V. Plot. 3 = Orig., fgt. 2 Weber). As this title shows, Origen held the demiurge to be the supreme principle. To Proclus' dismay, he stated it to be Intellect (*In Plat. theol.* II, 4, p. 89 ff. Portus = fgt. 7 Weber). As W. Jaeger suggested,<sup>33</sup> the book may have been critical of Plotinus; if so, it may have defended what its author believed was the authentic thought of Ammonius Saccas. This is also suggested by the fact that another of the latter's pupils, Antoninus, likewise considered Intellect as the supreme principle.<sup>34</sup> Understandably, it has been said of the pagan Origen that he continues the traditions of Middle Platonism;<sup>35</sup> Alexander's position is exactly similar. In this connection, the fact that he says that "in all fairness, no one will take exception" to the Christian view that the productive cause is the first principle etc. deserves special attention. Before he met Plotinus, Porphyry in his *On Divine Images* identified the demiurgic Intellect with the king of the universe, a position which is not different from that of the pagan Origen.<sup>36</sup> In his equally pre-Plotinian *Philosophy from Oracles* he stated that the

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Theiler, *Forsch. Neupl.* 38.

<sup>33</sup> *Nemesios von Emesa*, Berlin 1914, 65.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. H. Dörrie, *Ammonios der Lehrer Plotins*, Hermes 83, 1955 (439 ff.), 474-475, on Procl., *In Tim.* II, p. 154, 4 Diehl.

<sup>35</sup> E.g. A. H. Armstrong, in: *Cambr. Hist.* 199; H. Dörrie, in: *Entret. Hardt* V, 42, whose contention that this constitutes a reaction against Ammonius Saccas does not follow. Armstrong, ibd. 198-200 suggests that Plotinus' theory of the One is an original development which maybe was not felt to be such by Plotinus himself, which is not very likely. Note that at *Enn.* V 4 [7], 2, an early treatise, Plotinus awkwardly speaks of the μένεις of his supreme principle, which is not Intellect, in terms borrowed from Plato's description of the demiurge at *Tim.* 42e, μένοντος ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ᾗθει (cf. H. Dörrie, 'Υπόστασις, Nachr. Ak. Gött. 1965, 3, 71).

<sup>36</sup> Cf. W. Theiler, *Forsch. Neupl.* 258 = *Die Chaldäischen Orakel u.d. Hymnen des Synesios* (1942), 5-6; P. Hadot, *Citations de Porphyre chez Augustin*, R. Et. Aug. 1960, (205 ff.), 214-215 and n. 36, who refers to H. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles and Theurgy*, Le Caire 1956. For the text of *II. ἀγαλμάτων* see J. Bidez, *La Vie de Porphyre*, Gent 1913, repr. Hildesheim 1964, \*7.

God of the Hebrews is the equivalent of the highest principle.<sup>37</sup> In his Plotinian interpretation of the *Chaldaean Oracles*, however, he took exception to this identification and said that the demiurge of the universe (τὸν τῶν ὅλων δημιουργόν) equivalent to the God of the Hebrews is the second principle.<sup>38</sup> Alexander's words reveal that he either did not know Porphyry's later view or had sound doctrinal reasons for rejecting it, just as the pagan Origen may have rejected the metaphysics of Plotinus.

4. We have already observed that, in Alexander, the divine Intellect is also the cause of matter. It is worth our while to go into this question more closely.

Alexander defines matter by using a Middle Platonist formula:<sup>39</sup> "matter, taken in itself and absolutely, is neither body nor something definitely incorporeal" (ὅλως γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν μὲν ἢ ὕλη οὔτε σῶμα ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀκριβῶς ἀσώματόν τι, p. 10, 19-20 Br.).<sup>40</sup> His descriptions of matter as the undetermined *X* which receives the forms and the qualities echo similar descriptions in the Middle Platonists.<sup>41</sup> There is no evidence of any Middle Platonist's having argued in favour of a derivation of matter from the first principle itself. Alexander, however, admits that God may perhaps be conceived as being both active and passible, since in relation to that Intellect all things are capable of coming into being hypostatically (Ch. VI, the beginning: matter should not be viewed as both active and passible, *although* it should not be forgotten that in relation to God etc., καίτοι οὐ δεομένου τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὰ ἀποτελέσματα ὕλης, ἐν ὑποστάσει δυναμένων πάντων γίνεσ-

<sup>37</sup> Cf. Hadot, *l.c.*

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Lewy, o.c. 78 n. 43, 322-323; Hadot, *l.c.*; Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 258.

<sup>39</sup> Albinus, *Didasc.* 8, p. 163, 6-7 H. (ὕλη) οὔτε σῶμα ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἀσώματον, δυνάμει δὲ σῶμα; Apuleius, *De dogm. Plat.*, p. 87, 10-11 Thomas *neque corpoream neque sane incorpoream*; Hermogenes *ap. Tert.*, *Adv. Herm.* p. 54, 19-21 Waszink, *neque corporalis neque incorporalis*. Also echoed Calc., in *Tim.* p. 314, 19 W. Cf. also, in the (Middle Platonist) abstract of Plato's doctrines, Hippolytus, *Ref. I*, 19, 3, p. 19, 13-20, 1 Wendland τὴν δὲ ὕλην δυνάμει μὲν σῶμα, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδέπω · ἀσχημάτιστον γὰρ αὐτὴν οὖσαν καὶ ἄποιον, προσλαβοῦσαν σχήματα καὶ ποιότητος γενέσθαι σῶμα.

<sup>40</sup> For the last item in Alexander's definition, here omitted, cf. below, p. 22 ff.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. below, p. 53 n. 188, p. 62 n. 230, p. 85 n. 351, n. 353, p. 87 n. 361.



θαι πρὸς ἐκείνους τὸν Νοῦν, p. 10, 2 ff. Br.). At p. 24, 21 ff. Br. we read that "God is the cause of all the other things" (besides soul) "which come into being..., without being dependent on any pre-existent matter in any way" (καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν γενομένων αἴτιος ἐγένετο οὐδὲν ὕλης προϋπαρχούσης προσδεγείς). He also says that Mani's positing of two independent principles would entail that "another matter will come into being for God" (ἐτέρα τις ὕλη τῷ θεῷ ὑποστήσεται, p. 10, 9 Br.). This is a far cry from Plato's theory in the *Timaeus*, followed by all Middle Platonists, according to which matter or rather "the receptacle of becoming" is already there from eternity before the demiurge starts organizing it. There can be no coming into being from what is not, or, in e.g. Plutarch's words, "the becoming is not from non-being, but from what is neither good nor sufficient" (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μήδ' ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, *De an. procr.* 1014 B).

It will be recalled that Praechter spoke in this connexion of the influence of the Christian doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, and it will perhaps be objected that Alexander is not explicit about the origin of matter. However, a closer look reveals that Alexander indeed means a creation of matter by God out of Himself, and that we should distinguish this conception from that of *creatio ex nihilo*.

A derivation of matter from the first principle was first taught, as far as we know, in Pythagorean circles in the second cent. B.C.; we also find it in Eudorus (first cent. B.C.) and Moderatus of Gades (first cent. A.D.).<sup>42</sup> Such Pythagoreans were sharply criticized by

<sup>42</sup> The anonymous Pythagoreans of Alexander Polyhistor *ap. Diog. Laërt.*, VIII, 25, the pythagorizing Platonist (cf. Theiler, *Unt. ant. Lit.* 488-489, 492-493) Eudorus *ap. Simpl.*, *In Phys.* p. 181, 33-34 D., and Moderatus of Gades *ap. Porph. ap. Simpl.*, ibd. p. 231, 5 ff. D., further developing Plato's "unwritten doctrines" about the One and the Indeterminate Dyad, derived matter, though not, it seems, always sensible matter, from the One. Cf. Theiler, *Unters. ant. Lit.* 519, *Forsch. Neupl.* 23, 41-42, Lilla o.c. 233 ff., C. J. de Vogel, *Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism*, Assen 1966, 207 ff. and *Philosophia* I, ibd. 1970, 378 ff. Ph. Merlan, *Monismus und Dualismus bei einigen Platonikern*, in: *Parusia*, Festschr. J. Hirschberger, Frankfurt/M. 1965, 143 ff. has shown in how far these later Pythagoreans could base themselves upon monistic tendencies in earlier Pythagoreanism.

Numenius.<sup>43</sup> The doctrine that matter is "born from the Father" was also found in the *Chaldaean Oracles* (published during the reign of Marcus Aurelius) and approvingly cited by Porphyry.<sup>44</sup> It is also found in the Christian apologist Tatian, *Or. ad Graec.* 5 (probably published somewhat later than 170 A.D.),<sup>45</sup> who says that matter is generated and produced by the demiurge of all things (γεννητὴ ... μόνου δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πάντων δημιουργοῦ προβεβλημένη).<sup>46</sup> It is not a Middle Platonist doctrine. The only approximation to such a generative activity of the first principle is found in Plutarch, *Quaest.*

<sup>43</sup> The derivation of dyadic matter from the one by "some Pythagoreans" is rejected by Numenius *ap. Calc.*, *In Tim.* p. 297, 16-298,3 Waszink = fgt. 52, p. 95, 15 ff. des Places. See further below, n. 46, *in fine*.

<sup>44</sup> Lydus, *Mens.* 175,5 ff. Wünsch (πατρογενὴ τὴν ὕλην); Porphyry's approval *ap. Aeneas Gaza, Theophr.* p. 51 Boiss. Cf. Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 179-180 (= Porphyrios und Augustin (1933), 16-17). See also *Or. Chald.* fgt. 34, 1 des Places, ἐθεν (sc. from the "source of sources" or "Father") ἀποθρόσκει γένεσις πολυποικίλου ὕλης. Cf. also Lewy, o.c. 117-118. The doctrine of generated matter is also found in the anonymous hymn quoted by Porphyry in the second book of his *Phil. from Or.*, Wolff, *Porph., Phil. ex orac. haur.* p. 144-145; cf. Lewy, o.c. 79-80, 149.

<sup>45</sup> See M. Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie*, Göttingen 1960, 44. Elze, o.c. 29 ff. has correctly demonstrated Tatian's dependence on Greek cultural traditions. He also discusses his dependence on Platonist and Stoic philosophy, 29 ff., 63 ff., 88 ff. His comparison (ibd. 64) between Tatian's God and Albinus' First Intellect is, however, incorrect (cf. above, p. 11 n. 29); moreover, Albinus' Intellect creates neither World-Soul nor matter.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. also ibd. 12, 1 τὴν ὕλην δὲ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ προβεβλημένην. Elze, o.c. 84 gives no parallels for this conception although in view of his thesis concerning Tatian's dependence on Greek philosophy he might have referred to 'some' Pythagoreans. That God creates matter and does so out of Himself is not in Justin. Elze, *l.c.*, refuses to label Tatian's view as Gnostic; on the other hand A. Orbe, *Estudios Valentinianos*, I, Romae 1958, 585 ff. has Tatian sympathize with Valentinus. But in Valentinus, matter is not produced by the first principle out of himself. Elze admits that the term *προβάλλειν* was used by certain Gnostics (cf. also J. Ratzinger, *Emanation*, *RAC* IV, 1959, 1219 ff.), but points out that both Just., *Dial.* 61 and Tatian, *Or.* 5, innocently use it of the production of speech (this image is already in Homer, see H. Dörrie, *Emanation*, *Ein unphilosophisches Wort im spätantiken Denken*, in: *Parusia* (119 ff.), 123). For Justin's and Tatian's views on undiminished giving as dependent on Philo cf. below, p. 16 n. 47. See further the excellent pages in H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik*, Amsterdam 1964, 319-321, on the Neopythagorean origin of the concept of emanation as found in Plotinus and the Gnostics; ibd. 322 n. 486 on the early Apologists, whom he believes to be influenced by the Stoa as well.

plat. 1001 BC, which, however, does not concern matter but soul, and which is not a piece of established doctrine but a topic of discussion.<sup>46a</sup> Dörrie has shown that Plutarch, when speaking of God as the "out of whom" and "from whom" soul becomes rational World-Soul, is influenced by a Stoic 'Prinzipienreihe', according to which God is both the "out of whom", "in whom" and "towards whom" the cosmological process occurs — a conception which has its antecedents in earlier religious thought.<sup>47</sup> This Stoic 'Prinzipienreihe', by the way, may be the ultimate origin of Alexander's suggestion that God is perhaps both active and passible. Plutarch, *l.c.*, even says that the organized World-Soul, *qua* organized, is *part* (μέρος) of God. Albinus, on the other hand, represents the orthodox tradition of Middle Platonism when contending that the first God has no parts (p. 165, 12 H. οὐτε ὡς ὅλον ἔχον τινὰ μέρος).<sup>48</sup>

We have already noticed Numenius' opposition to the 'Pythagorean' view. That three different conceptions about matter were indeed discussed in the Middle Platonist schools of the second cent. is confirmed by Hermogenes, the Christian heretic and follower of the Middle Platonists<sup>49</sup> who is criticized by Tertullian. Hermogenes distinguished three possibilities:<sup>50</sup> "God either made things out of Himself or

<sup>46a</sup> This is overlooked by Dörrie (see next n.).

<sup>47</sup> H. Dörrie, *Präpositionen und Metaphysik*, MH 26, 1969, 217 ff. Plutarch's position may be compared to that of Philo, who considers matter as ungenerated, but who states that the Logos is produced by God; see Lilla, o.c. 194-195 n. 3, 199 ff. Dörrie, o.c. 224, has excellently pointed out that compared to Philo, Plutarch is "noch im Stadium des Experimentierens". Apparently, Philo's conception of the origin of the Logos influenced Justin, *Dial.* 61, where we also find a further development of Philo's formulation of the "principle of undiminished giving" (cf. above, p. 11 n. 31a; on these points, Justin is followed by Tatian, *Or. ad Graec.* 5).

<sup>48</sup> Albinus' statement p. 165, 1 ff. H. that the First Intellect "filled all things with himself" (ἐμπέπηκε πάντα ἑαυτοῦ) at first sight recalls Plutarch's suggestion, but Albinus only discusses the First Intellect in relation to the World-Soul; in Albinus, we do not find the concept of emanation but only that of ἐπίστροφη. Cf. J. Mansfeld, *Thêta-Pi* 1, 1972, 79. — Albinus rejects the idea of a God having parts since the part is prior to the whole (p. 165, 31-2 H.), cf. Mansfeld, o.c. 68 n. 2.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. J. H. Waszink, *Observations on Tertullian's Treatise Against Hermogenes*, Vig. Chr. 9, 1955, 129 ff.; Tertullian, *The Treatise Against Hermogenes*, tr. and ann. by J. H. Waszink, *Ancient Christian Writers* 24, London 1956, 3 ff.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Waszink 1956, 105-106.

out of nothing or out of something else" (*dominum de semetipso fecisse cuncta aut de nihilo aut de aliquo*, *Adv. Herm.* p. 16, 11 ff. Waszink); this "something else" is matter. Hermogenes rejected the first two possibilities and, following Middle Platonist orthodoxy, accepted the third.<sup>50a</sup> His refutation of the first possibility, i.e. that represented for us by the *Chaldaean Oracles*, Tatian<sup>51</sup> and certain Pythagoreans, is, as Waszink has pointed out, conducted by purely logical means:<sup>52</sup> when creating things out of Himself, God would have parts etc. Compare Albinus' statement that God has no parts.

The really important thing is that Hermogenes' dialectical discussion explicitly distinguishes creation "out of Himself" from *creatio ex nihilo* (the latter, as we have seen, is also rejected by e.g. Plutarch). Alexander at Ch. XVIII, p. 25, 16 ff. uses the familiar ontological argument that

<sup>50a</sup> These three possibilities and the preferred solution can be paralleled from Methodius of Olympus (d. 311 A.D.), *De lib. arb.* 2-3, where the "follower of Valentinus", contemplating the cosmic order, at first assumes that all things derive from God (2, 9, p. 150, 5 Bonwetsch, ἐξ <μόνου> αὐτοῦ τὰ ὄντα γεγονέναι), since *creatio ex nihilo* is absurd and another eternal principle next to God irrelevant. It should be noticed, however, that when he next rejects the first possibility, sc. creation "out of Himself", he does so not, as Hermogenes, on purely logical grounds, but because of the existence of evil. The existence of evil, on the other hand, is Hermogenes' reason for rejecting the second possibility, sc. *creatio ex nihilo*. Methodius' Valentinian refuses to derive evil from God Himself or to accept it as a result of *creatio ex nihilo*: hence, he opts for the assumption of ungenerated matter, characterising it in a purely Middle Platonist way (3, 9, p. 154, 3 ff. B, ἀποίου τε γὰρ καὶ ἀσχηματίστου οὐσῆς αὐτῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἀτάκτως φερομένης, cf. also 6, 2, p. 159, 11 B. ἀτάκτως φέρεσθαι. See below, p. 21 n. 65 and p. 85 n. 351). We may say that Methodius' Valentinian undergoes a spontaneous metamorphosis: before being refuted by Methodius, he has already become a follower of the Middle Platonists. His position is similar to that of the third person of the dialogue, Methodius' 'friend'. In Ch. 4 Methodius answers that the Valentinian's dilemma is a traditional one and announces that he will refute both him and the 'friend'. He himself argues in favour of *creatio ex nihilo*.

<sup>51</sup> It can not be wholly excluded that Hermogenes thinks especially of Tatian, but the philosophical form of his argument indicates that he falls back on a Middle Platonist school-discussion. It should be added that Tatian, *Or. ad Graec.* 5 (following and improving upon Justin, *Dial.* 61, who picks up a simile of Philo, *De gig.* 25) had spoken of the production of Logos as being κατὰ μερισμόν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποκοπήν, while ibd. 15 he says that God is not composite. However, Tatian does not speak of matter in terms of κατὰ μερισμόν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποκοπήν. On Tatian's doctrine cf. Elze, o.c. 66, 76 ff.

<sup>52</sup> 1956, 4.

"it is impossible for any existing thing to perish into what is not, for what is not does not exist".<sup>53</sup> He omits the other half of this thesis, viz., that what is cannot come to be from non-being (cf. the above quotation from Plutarch) since his argument *l.c.* is only concerned with passing away, but cannot but have adhered to the thesis as a whole. This excludes *creatio ex nihilo* (Hermogenes' second possibility). We may conclude that Alexander, when speaking about a God who is maybe both active and passible and in relation to whom all hypostases come into being, has indeed in mind a "creation out of Himself". It should be pointed out that at p. 7, 9 Br. it is said that Mani's matter creates man "out of itself" (ἐξ αὐτῆς), i.e. acts as if it were God.<sup>53a</sup> Furthermore, at p. 24, 14 ff. Alexander explicitly rejects the idea that the first 'Power' (= soul) is a part (μέρος) of God, for this would make God composite<sup>53b</sup> and corporeal, and it is exactly this notion of a 'part' of God which he contrasts, *ibid.* p. 24, 16 ff. with that of the hypostatic origins of things while God 'remains' (τὰ ἐφεξῆς μένοντος τοῦ θεοῦ ὑποστάσεις εἶσιν).

Accordingly, the theory of the hypostatic origin of soul and matter from Intellect found in Alexander answers the objections of such Middle Platonists as had rejected the notion of a God having parts. The introduction of the concept of hypostases<sup>53c</sup> permits another choice than that made by Hermogenes, while the concept of "creation out of Himself" is not the same as that of *creatio ex nihilo*. It is not necessary to follow Theiler, who argues that the conception of matter created by a demiurgic first God which he attributes to Ammonius Saccas was derived by the latter from the *Chaldaean Oracles*.<sup>54</sup> Although this possibility cannot be excluded, also the other parallels enumerated above should be taken into account.

It should be added that Alexander again and again refutes the Mani-

<sup>53</sup> Cf. below, p. 82 n. 338.

<sup>53a</sup> Cf. below, p. 56 n. 201, p. 90 n. 375a, p. 91 n. 377.

<sup>53b</sup> That God is without parts is an important doctrine for Alexander, cf. below, p. 49 n. 163.

<sup>53c</sup> Cf. the similar arguments of Dörrie, *Emanation* 143, who however only discusses Neoplatonist hypostasis as compared to Gnostic emanation.

<sup>54</sup> *Forsch. Neupl.* 23, 41-42.

chaeon doctrine that matter is the principle of evil and that not the slightest hint of a possible connection of matter and evil is to be found in the whole treatise. In view of his theory of the origin of matter out of God Himself, this is understandable.

5. Alexander's views on matter can be partly paralleled from Plotinus and, especially, Porphyry. The differences are, however, equally important. We shall also see that Alexander and Porphyry concur in so far as certain differences from Middle Platonist doctrines are found in both.

In Plotinus, we find two views of matter which cannot be easily reconciled, viz. that of matter as the last of generated things and that of matter as evil. At *Enn.* II 4 [12], 16, 25 matter is said to be wholly evil (πάντη κακόν). In the late treatise *On the Origin of Evil*, *Enn.* I 8 [51] he states that matter is a negative principle; though not being in any way substantial, it is a privation or absence of the good (I 8, 11; the viewpoint of II 4, 16 is similar). This complete lack (παντελῆς ἔλλειψις) of the good is the *absolute* evil since it has no part of the good whatsoever (ἡ ὕλη ... τὸ παντελῶς κακὸν μηδεμίαν ἔχον ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν I 8, 5, 5-14).<sup>55</sup> In one of his earliest treatises, on the other hand, he formulates a dilemma<sup>56</sup> which leaves open the possibility that matter is the final term in the process of transcendental causation; for this very reason, it must share in the good (*Enn.* IV 8 [6], 6). At *Enn.* III 9 [13], 3, 7-16 Soul creates around itself a circle of darkness which, next, it illuminates.

The more positive view of matter appears to be more prominent in the earlier treatises. It should be noticed that in these treatises, matter is not a product of the first principle but of a lower hypostasis.<sup>57</sup> Possibly, Plotinus' lasting tendency to consider matter as evil is influenced by the views of those Middle Platonists who connected matter with evil (we know that he continued to lecture on Numenius).<sup>58</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Cf. e.g. A. H. Armstrong, in: *Cambr. Hist.*, 256-257.

<sup>56</sup> See P. Henry, in: *Entret. Hardt* V, 247; cf. also Armstrong, *o.c.* 257; *Plotinus Schriften* ed. Harder - Beutler - Theiler, VI, Hamburg 1971, 153.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Theiler, *Forsch. Neupl.* 24.

<sup>58</sup> Porph., *V. Plot.* 14.



though it should be stressed that unlike these he does not consider matter as an independent principle. His early view has no connexion with the Christian *creatio ex nihilo*. It is not exactly the "out of Himself"-doctrine described above either, for Plotinus' first principle (and also his second) is only related to what is immediately below it. We may consider it as some sort of refinement of the "out of Himself"-doctrine.

The discrepancies in Plotinus' conceptions of matter may help to explain why Porphyry, who describes matter as a principle of evil (*Sent.* 30, 2, p. 16, 6-7 Mommert *κακοὶ ἡ ὕλη*) and as absolute non-being (*Sent.* 20, the approved doctrine of the 'ancients': ἀληθινὸν μὴ ὄν, p. 8, 2 M.; ἑλλειψίς παντός τοῦ ὄντος, p. 8, 7-8 M.),<sup>59</sup> also adhered to a far more positive view. In his *Commentary on the Timaeus*<sup>60</sup> Porphyry argued against such Middle Platonists as Atticus, who posited a plurality of principles, *viz.*, God, matter (and ideas). He distinguished the Father from the demiurge by having the former produce "the whole out of himself" (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν τὸ ὅλον, *ap. Procl., In Tim.* I, p. 300, 1 ff. Diehl) and having the latter receive matter from someone else.<sup>61</sup> He endorsed the doctrine of the *Chaldaean Oracles* that matter is "born from the Father".<sup>62</sup> Consequently, what we find in Porphyry is the "out of Himself"-doctrine discussed above. Theiler assumes that Porphyry's view of created matter (which Theiler does not distinguish

<sup>59</sup> Cf. J. H. Waszink, preface to *Calc., In Tim.*, London-Leiden 1962, p. CIII n. 1; *Porph. u. Amm.* 68-70.

<sup>60</sup> Published after the death of Amelius (cf. R. Beutler, *Porphyrios*, RE XXII, 1953, 281), i.e. at a time when Porphyry had definitively become a follower of Plotinus. Accordingly, the numerous Middle Platonist elements in Calcidius which are probably derived from Porphyry's *Commentary* (on Porphyry as Calcidius' source see Waszink, preface, p. LXXIX ff., XC ff. and J. den Boeft, *Calcidius on Fate, His Doctrine and Sources*, Leiden 1970) should be accounted for by Porphyry's doxographic zeal. J. C. M. van Winden, in the "supplementary notes" to his *Calcidius on Matter, His Doctrine and Sources*, (Leiden 1959), *ibid.* 21965, 248 ff., though admitting that Porphyry is often Calcidius' source, explains certain Middle Platonist elements in Calcidius by referring to Porphyry's pre-Plotinian period; in view of the date of the *Commentary*, however, a reference to Porphyry's doxographic habits is sufficient.

<sup>61</sup> Cf. Theiler, *Forsch. Neupl.* 177-180 (= *Porph. u. Aug.* 14-17) who also adduces other passages quoted by Proclus; Beutler, *Porph.* 303.

<sup>62</sup> Cf. above, p. 15 n. 44.

sharply from the Christian view) goes back to Ammonius Saccas.<sup>63</sup> It is, in any case, remarkably similar to that of Alexander, who, on the other hand, is significantly different from Porphyry in adopting the Middle Platonist definition of matter as neither corporeal nor incorporeal,<sup>64</sup> while Porphyry, following Plotinus (e.g. *Enn.* II 4 [12], 9, 4-5) stated it to be incorporeal (ἀσώματος, *ap. Philop., De act. mund.* p. 547, 10 Rabe). Alexander also differs from Porphyry in that, as we have already noticed, he does not connect matter and evil.

Another close parallel between Alexander's and Porphyry's conceptions of matter consists in their rejection of the random motion of matter. Alexander at length refutes what he says is Mani's definition of matter, *sc.* "random motion" (ἄτακτος κίνησις, p. 5, 8; 10, 5; 26, 1 Br.). Now Plato, *Tim.* 30 a, had said that the demiurge took over and organized "all that was visible, which was not at rest, but moving in confusion and at random" (πάν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν ... οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως), while at *Tim.* 53b he had spoken of the 'traces' (ἔχνη) of the elements contained in the randomly moving receptacle. Notwithstanding such authoritative parallels, Alexander even ridicules Mani's definition. This is all the more significant since this random motion of matter is found in all Middle Platonists.<sup>65</sup> A possible reason for Alexander's tacit rejection of the Middle Platonist view is the fact that, with the important exception of Albinus, most Middle Platonists associated the random motion of matter with its being evil, or with the evil soul embedded in matter: we may refer to Plutarch, Atticus and Numenius.<sup>66</sup>

Alexander's refutation of Mani's definition starts with the argument

<sup>63</sup> *Forsch. Neupl.* 40.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. above, p. 13 and *ibid.* n. 39.

<sup>65</sup> ἄτακτος κίνησις: e.g. Albinus, *Didasc.* p. 167, 11-13 H.; *ibid.*, 169, 4-5 H., where also the ἔχνη are mentioned; Atticus, *ap. Procl. In Tim.* I, p. 283, 27; 381, 27; 394, 27 D.; Numenius, *fgt.* 4a des Places = Euseb., *PE* XV, 819c, matter is ἄτακτος, τὸ δὲ ἄτακτον οὐχ ἔστηκεν; *fgt.* 52 des Places = *Calc., In Tim.* p. 299, 16 W. *incondite fluctuet*.

<sup>66</sup> Plutarch, *De Isid.* 369E-371E, *De an. procr.* 1015C; Atticus, *ap. Procl., In Tim.* I, p. 391, 10, p. 381, 27 D.; Numenius, *fgt.* 52 des Places. Numenius is not wholly consistent: matter is evil in itself (p. 298, 13 W.) but also identified with the evil World-Soul (p. 299, 16 W.) which moves at random (p. 300, 12-13 W.); cf. Waszink, *Porph. u. Num.* 67 ff.

that matter cannot be motion, since motion is inseparable from the moving object<sup>67</sup> and objects presuppose matter which has been informed<sup>68</sup> (Ch. VI, p. 10, 23 ff. Br.). As soon as fire etc. can be spoken of, shape has been given to matter; in that case, says Alexander, "how is it possible for matter to be the random motion of the elements?" (πῶς οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἡ ἀτακτος κίνησις ἢ ὕλη, p. 10, 23-24 Br.). This is obviously reminiscent of the 'traces' of the elements moving about in Plato's receptacle. To this it should be added that Alexander's Middle Platonist definition of matter contains an additional element which I now quote for the first time: matter is not "a concrete individual object either" (οὔτε ἀπλῶς τόδε τι,<sup>69</sup> p. 10, 20 Br.), i.e., not a compositum of matter and form. This connects up well with Alexander's statement that motion is inseparable from moving objects and that moving objects presuppose informed matter: matter is not a concrete object, hence cannot be motion.

Now Porphyry, in a rather forced interpretation of Plato's text, took exception to the conception of matter as suggested at *Tim.* 30a and 53b and, by implication, to the Middle Platonist views referred to above. He argued that Plato's formula "all that is visible" entails that not matter as such, but informed matter has to be understood as being in motion.<sup>70</sup> See Philoponus, *De aet. mund.* p. 546, 5-547, 19 R., from which I quote: "Porphyry... says that it is not matter which, together with the traces, moves in confusion and at random, but that here you have already the bodies composed of matter and form" (ὁ γοῦν Π. ... οὐ τὴν ὕλην φησὶν μετὰ τῶν ἔχων τὸ πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον, ... ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤδη ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἰδούς γενόμενα σώματα). The conceptual parallel with Alexander is striking indeed. On the other hand, Alexander devotes a separate argument to the refutation not so much of matter as motion, but as *random* motion, see Ch. VII, p. 11, 10-12, 24 Br.<sup>71</sup> Furthermore, his casual reference

<sup>67</sup> Originally, an Aristotelian doctrine; cf. below, p. 62 n. 233.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* II, 1: φύσις as the principle of motion is inherent in physical things and living beings.

<sup>69</sup> Aristotelian terminology, cf. below, p. 62 n. 229.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. also Calc., *In Tim.* p. 302, 17 ff. W. and Waszink *ad. l.*

<sup>71</sup> Cf. below, p. 63 n. 239, p. 65 n. 248, n. 250.

to the irregular motion of the Manichaean First 'Power' = Soul embedded in matter (ἀνωμάλως φέρεσθαι, p. 6, 17 ff. Br.) may betray that his arguments derive from a refutation of some of the Middle Platonist views mentioned above.<sup>72</sup>

To sum up: Alexander's views on generated matter are somewhat similar to those of the younger Plotinus, and strikingly similar to those of Porphyry. He is, however, more consistent than either of these in absolutely refusing to consider matter as evil. This is not accidental: as a matter of fact, that matter cannot be evil since it is generated by God is one of his chief arguments against the Manichaeans, who considered matter as an evil, autonomous principle. His definition of matter differs from that of Plotinus and Porphyry in being largely a Middle Platonist one. Though the possibility of Porphyrian influences upon Alexander's conception cannot be excluded *a priori*, such an influence does not explain the differences. Hence, one is tempted to formulate an 'Arbeitssatz' in the manner of Theiler: whenever Porphyry and Alexander differ from Plotinus and at the same time agree with one another, a common dependence on Ammonius Saccas should be seriously pondered.

6. Another argument, at least at first sight, in favour of a possible influence of Porphyry is Alexander's use of the theory of the proper places of the elements and of natural and unnatural motion in order to refute Mani's thesis that matter (the 'below') went upwards towards the abode of God and did so of its own accord (Ch. VIII, p. 13, 20-14, 12 Br.). This theory of place and motion, first suggested by Plato

<sup>72</sup> At p. 39, 18 ff. Br. Alexander says that "those who have their wits about them" (i.e., the Platonists) find matter to be "either absolutely non-existent or that which comes last in the scale of being" (cf. also p. 18, 21-22; 28, 8 Br.). It would follow that Alexander, though himself preferring the latter view, also accepts the legitimacy of the former. Plotinus, *Enn.* I 8 [51], 11, 6-7 speaks of arguments (λόγοι) in favour of the non-existence of matter, for which Harder - Beutler - Theiler refer to Aristotle's interpretation of Plato's receptacle (cf. also Porphyry's reference to the 'ancients', above p. 20). Lilla, o.c. 195-196 is right in pointing out that in Aristotle and e.g. Numenius matter is opposed to being, but goes too far in assuming that this implies that it was considered as non-being. Clement, *Strom.* V, 89, 5-6 argues that Plato had defined matter as μὴ ὄν, which may have been deduced from such statements of Aristotle as are quoted by Lilla.

in the *Timaeus* <sup>73</sup> and developed into a full-grown theory by Aristotle, <sup>74</sup> was incorporated into the Stoic system. <sup>75</sup> It is found in a number of authors, for instance in Philo, who in his *On the Eternity of the Universe* used (or used a book which used) Aristotle's lost work *On Philosophy*, <sup>76</sup> in Cicero <sup>77</sup> who perhaps derives from Posidonius, <sup>78</sup> and in many others both before and after Alexander. <sup>79</sup>

We happen to know that Porphyry argued against the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body by means of the theory of the proper places of the elements (*Against the Christians* fgt. 35 Harnack). <sup>80</sup> It has been argued <sup>81</sup> that the anonymous author, <sup>82</sup> quoted by Augustine, <sup>83</sup> of an argument against the resurrection of the body which not only uses the theory of proper place and natural motion but is, as to its details, closely parallel to the parallel accounts in Philo and Cicero, <sup>84</sup> is no one but Porphyry: Augustine may have been using an anonymous compilation partly based upon the *Against the Christi-*

<sup>73</sup> *Tim.* 57c, 81b. See also below, p. 64 n. 242.

<sup>74</sup> E.g. *Cael.* 276a23 ff., 310a16 ff.; *Phys.* 192b36, 208b19-20, 214b14-16. It was also held by Theophrastus, cf. *Sens.* 88 (*Dox.* p. 526, 5 ff. Diels) and *ap. Philo, De aet. mund.* 135-136.

<sup>75</sup> E.g. Zeno, *SVF* I, 99; Chrysippus, *SVF* II, 527. See also Diog. Laërt. VII, 137 = *SVF* II, 580; Aët., *Plac.* I, 12, 4 (*Dox.* p. 311, 3 ff. D.).

<sup>76</sup> *De aet. mund.* 28-34 = *Π. φιλοσοφίας* fgt. 19b Ross; cf. also *ibid.*, 115. See B. Effe, *Studien zur Theologie und Kosmologie der Aristotelischen Schrift "Über die Philosophie"*, München 1970, 7 ff.

<sup>77</sup> *ND* I, 37, 103; II, 45, 115-46, 119.

<sup>78</sup> K. Reinhardt, *Poseidonios*, *RE* XXII, 1953, 656-657.

<sup>79</sup> An extensive list is given by A.S. Pease in his note on Cic., *ND* I, 37, 103 (vol. I, Cambridge Ma., 1955, 474-5). An important reference is Plutarch, *De fac.* 6-14, 923E-928A, who argues at length against the Stoic theory of natural place, without, however, completely rejecting it (cf. also *De prim. frig.* 952E). See Effe, *o.c.* 14 ff. and H. Görge-manns, *Unters. zu Plutarchs Dialog De facie*, Heidelberg 1970, 91 ff.

<sup>80</sup> A. v. Harnack, *Porphyrios "Gegen die Christen"*, *Abh. Preuss. Ak.* 1916, 1 (Berlin 1916), 61-62.

<sup>81</sup> By J. Pépin, *Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne*, Paris 1964, 418-461. Pépin is inspired by a suggestion of P. Courcelle.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. P. Courcelle, *Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources*, Cambridge Ma. 1969, 188 n. 176, 210-211 n. 14.

<sup>83</sup> *De civ. Dei* XI, 34; XII, 11; *Gen. ad litt.* II, 1; II, 3.

<sup>84</sup> Pépin, *o.c.* 428 ff. n. 3.

*ans.* <sup>85</sup> Thus, a parallel between Alexander's argument against the insurrection of matter against God and Porphyry's argument against the resurrection of the body cannot be denied. In view of the fact that the theory of proper place and natural motion is a common-place one, however, this parallel does not prove that Alexander depends upon Porphyry. To this it must be added that the argument against Zeno's doctrine of fire <sup>86</sup> which he quotes in Ch. XIV recalls the similar anti-Stoic views adduced by Philo in the above-mentioned treatise.

7. Praechter's comparison between Alexander and Hierocles of Alexandria has been quoted above. <sup>87</sup> Hierocles studied with the Neoplatonist Plutarch of Athens, who died, at a very advanced age, in 431 or 432 A.D. Plutarch of Athens, interpreting the *Parmenides* of Plato, held that the first three hypostases are God = the One, Intellect and Soul (*θεός* = *ἐν*, *νοῦς*, *ψυχή*, Procl. *In Parm.* VI, 27-30, p. 1058, 21 ff. Cousin). <sup>88</sup> Hierocles, on the other hand, as appears from the extracts and abstracts of his *On Providence and Human Liberty* found in Photius' *Library* argued against those Platonists who had not preserved a proper notion of the demiurgic God (p. 460b 23-25 Bekker, from the beginning of the work). He held that the supreme principle is a demiurgic Intellect, <sup>89</sup> cf. p. 462b 18-19 B. "Intellect, being the leader of all, God the cause of the universe" (*νοῦ τῶν πάντων ἡγουμένου καὶ θεοῦ τῶν ὄλων ὄντος αἰτίου*), p. 461, 18-21 B., "the God and Father who is their maker is king of all, and this fatherly kingship of his is providence" (*πάντων δὲ βασιλεύειν τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα, καὶ ταύτην τὴν πατρονομικὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν*). The same view is found in his *Commentary on the Golden Verses of the Pythagoreans*, where he speaks of the "demiurgic Intellect and divine Will which eternally produces all things and everlastingly preserves them, and the lawful order deriving from the Father of the universe and demiurge" (*ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς καὶ ἡ θεία βούλησις ἡ*

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* 433 ff.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. below, p. 74 n. 294 and 295.

<sup>87</sup> p. 7-8.

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Beutler, *Plutarch von Athen*, *RE* XXI, 1951, 970-971.

<sup>89</sup> Cf. Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 10.



ἀδιώως προάγουσα τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς αἰὶ διασφύζουσα, τάξις δὲ ἔννομος ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν ὄλων καὶ δημιουργοῦ, p. 28, 12-15 Mullach). The echoes of the title of the pagan Origen's *Only the King is Demiurge* are obvious.<sup>90</sup> Hierocles' view of the relation between God and matter also parallels that of Alexander, cf. *ap. Phot.*, p. 461b6 ff. B., "God, ... the demiurge, ... is Lord of the whole visible and invisible orderly arrangement of the universe, which came to be out of no prior substratum whatsoever; for his Will suffices as to the hypostasis of things" (ὅτι δημιουργὸν θεόν, φησί, προϋφίστησι ὁ Πλάτων ἐφεστῶτα πάσης ἐμφανοῦς τε καὶ ἀφανοῦς διακοσμήσεως, ἐκ μηδενὸς προϋποκειμένου γεγεννημένης · ἀρκεῖν γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνου βούλημα εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων). Even the notion that God's will<sup>91</sup> is a sufficient cause of hypostasis can be paralleled in Alexander, who says, p. 24, 16 ff. Br., that according to the true doctrine God would have made Soul because he wanted to do so (τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἐποίησεν βουληθεὶς ὁ θεός). We need no longer follow Praechter<sup>92</sup> by assuming that Hierocles' views are influenced by Christian conceptions.

Another important parallel to Alexander is Hierocles' rejection of a separate principle of evil (*In Carm. Aur.*, p. 71, 11 M., καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ κακῶν ἀρχῆς, οὔτε ἐνυποκειμένης οὔτε ἔξωθεν κ.τ.λ.).<sup>93</sup>

The conception of a demiurgic Intellect causing matter is not found in

<sup>90</sup> Cf. F. Heinemann, *Ammonios Sakkas und die Ursprung der neuplatonischen Hypostasenlehre*, Hermes 61, 1926, 19; Dodds, *Num. and Amm.* 26.

<sup>91</sup> Cf. also Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 23, who however adduces parallels which do not refer to the creative will of God, but to God's will as cause of structure; Lilla, o.c. 223, adduces the Christian Pantaeus *ap. Clem.*, fgt. 48 Stählin. An early parallel for the creative will of God is found in line 11 of the anonymous hymn mentioned above, p. 15 n. 44. See also Moderatus of Gades, *ap. Simpl., In Phys.* p. 231, 6 ff. D. βουληθεὶς ὁ ἐνιαῖος λόγος ... τὴν γένεσιν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῶν ὄντων ἀσπείσασθαι, cf. Hadot, *Porph. et Vict.* I, 312.

<sup>92</sup> [3], *passim*.

<sup>93</sup> Cf. Praechter, o.c. 11-12; Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 21, who supposes that Ammonius Saccas argued against Gnostics such as Marcion (it would be fascinating to compare Alexander's anti-Manichaeism with Ammonius' assumed anti-Gnosticism, but this cannot be pursued here; cf. however below, p. 66 n. 255). Praechter, *l.c.*, who had also discussed Alexander, suggested that Hierocles' view too may be anti-Manichaean; strangely, Hierocles' presumed anti-Manichaeism has become a certainty for Courcelle, *Late Latin Writers* 320-321.

Putarch of Athens or in his pupils Syrianus and Proclus. It has been pointed out (by É. Évrard)<sup>94</sup> that these other pupils of Plutarch significantly differ from their master in being largely influenced by Iamblichus.<sup>95</sup> Évrard explains this difference by referring to the influences of the milieux where these two studied before following Plutarch's lectures.<sup>96</sup> A similar independence on Hierocles' part is fully understandable; we may assume that he remained true to the traditions of his native town. This would explain his similarities with the pagan Origen and with Alexander as well as his differences from Porphyry and later Athenian Neoplatonism. Since certain of his most significant similarities with Alexander (and the pagan Origen) are precisely those points of view in respect of which Hierocles, Alexander and Origen differ from Porphyry, we may again think of Ammonius Saccas as a possible common source. The points of difference can be traced to Plotinus, which makes those points on which Porphyry differs from Plotinus and agrees with Alexander and Origen even more significant. It should be added that, in Hierocles' view, Ammonius Saccas is the key figure in the history of Platonism.<sup>97</sup>

8. The theory of incorporeals and the relation of incorporeals to bodies found in Alexander is not that of Plotinus and Porphyry.

At Ch. VIII, p. 13, 10-14, 17 Br. Alexander asks if Mani's two ultimate principles, God and matter, are to be considered as (a) both incorporeal (ἀσώματα), (b) the one corporeal, the other incorporeal or (c) both corporeal (σώματα), and triumphantly shows that neither of these assumptions fits the Manichaean doctrine of the arrival of matter in the house of God (cf. p. 5, 16 Br.).

As to the first possibility, Alexander points out that "when both are incorporeal, neither one can be in the other"<sup>97a</sup> — except perhaps in the manner of grammatical knowledge being in the soul" (εἰ μὲν γὰρ

<sup>94</sup> *Le maître de Plutarque d'Athènes et les origines du Néoplatonisme Athénien*, Ant. Class. 29, 1960 (108 ff., 391 ff.).

<sup>95</sup> O.c. 392, 397.

<sup>96</sup> O.c. 398.

<sup>97</sup> *Ap. Phot.*, p. 173a18-40; p. 461a24-39 B.

<sup>97a</sup> Cf. below, p. 66 n. 255.

ἀσώματα ἑκάτερα, οὐδέτερον ἐν οὐδετέρῳ, πλὴν εἰ μὴ ὡς γραμματικῇ ἐν ψυχῇ, p. 13, 11-14 Br.). In respect of ultimate principles, however, such a suggestion would be absurd. Nor can the one be in the other as in a void,<sup>98</sup> since the essence of the void is nothingness (τὸ μηδέν, p. 13, 17 Br.), i.e. Mani would contradict himself by depriving one of his ultimate principles from being. Nor, Alexander goes on, can they be in one another in the manner of attributes (συμβεβηκότα, p. 13, 17 Br.), for when both are of an attributive nature they can be nowhere at all: when bereft of substance (οὐσία), attributes cannot be anywhere at all, since "substance is a kind of vehicle supporting the attributes" (ὄχημα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ὑποβεβλημένον τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν ἢ οὐσία).<sup>98a</sup> However if we assume that the one is corporeal, the other incorporeal, then, Alexander says, "if the one" (sc. the one considered incorporeal) "is mingled with the other, it should be either soul or intellect or attribute. For it is only in this way that incorporeals are capable of mingling with bodies" (εἰ δὲ μέμικται τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ, ἢ ψυχῇ ἢ νοῦς ἢ συμβεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη · οὕτω γὰρ μόνον τὰ ἀσώματα τοῖς σώμασι πάρεστι μίγνυσθαι, p. 14, 15-18 Br.).

9. I shall first concentrate upon Alexander's apodictic denial of the possibility for an incorporeal to be in another incorporeal. The position of Plotinus and Porphyry is the exact opposite.

Plotinus held that no soul, not even the embodied human soul, is entirely within the sensible sphere, but that on the contrary soul to some extent always remains in the region of the intelligible. This is his so-called theory of the unconscious,<sup>99</sup> expressed in terms of the presence of the lower hypostasis in the higher. Cf. *Enn.* IV 8 [6], 8, 3, ἔστι τι αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀεί and ibd. 7, 2; cf. also ibd. IV 7 [2], 9-10, where he speaks of soul as being both in itself and above itself. The everlasting presence, to some extent, of soul in Intellect of course provides the ontological foundation for Plotinus' theory of *ekstasis*, cf. *Enn.* IV 7 [2], 10, 31-32 and 40, ibd. 12, 7-8. Of this theory of the unconscious

<sup>98</sup> Cf. below, p. 67 n. 259.

<sup>98a</sup> Cf. below, p. 35 n. 122, p. 66 n. 255.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Ph. Merlan, *Mysticism Monopsychism Metacosciousness*, Den Haag 1963, 13 and the references ibd., n. 2.

Plotinus *expressis verbis* says that it is a novelty<sup>100</sup> and so to speak apologizes for bringing it up at all (εἰ χρὴ παρὰ δόξαν τῶν ἄλλων τολμῆσαι τὸ λεγόμενον λέγειν σαφέστερον, *Enn.* IV 8, [6], 8, 1-2). It should be emphasized that soul, while being in Intellect, yet remains soul. This distinguishes Plotinus' view from that of Numenius, fgt. 42 des Places (= Iambl. *ap. Stob.* I, p. 458, 3-4 Wachsmuth-Hense), according to which the human soul is absorbed by its origins *after death*,<sup>101</sup> while another view attributed to Numenius by Iamblichus, that of the presence of the intelligibles in soul (fgt. 41 des Places = *ap. Stob.* I, p. 365, 5-21 W.-H.) is the opposite of Plotinus' novel view<sup>101a</sup> in that the latter speaks of the presence of the lower in the higher, not of the higher in the lower.<sup>102</sup> Iamblichus correctly says that Plotinus does not agree with Numenius all the way. He also says that Porphyry did not make up his mind about this question and that he sometimes explicitly disagreed with Numenius, and at other times accepted his view as being the traditional one (*παραδοθείση ἄνωθεν*). Since Iamblichus is not more explicit, it is difficult to exactly interpret his remark about Porphyry. We know, however, that Porphyry followed Plotinus in his *Symm. Zel.*<sup>103</sup> to the extent of stating that intelligibles = incorporeals are either within themselves or in the intelligibles which are above them, e.g. soul is in itself when ratiocinating, in Intellect when intelligizing (*ap. Nemes.*, *De nat. hom.* 3, p. 135, 6 ff. M. νοητὰ γὰρ ὄντα ἐν νοητοῖς καὶ τόποις ἐστί, ἢ γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὑπερκειμένοις νοητοῖς. ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ ποτὲ μὲν ἐν ἑαυτῇ ἐστίν, ὅτε λογίζεται, ποτὲ δὲ ἐν τῷ νῷ, ὅταν νοῇ, cf. also *Sent.* 16, p. 5, 7 M.). Porphyry accepted Plotinus' view that embodied soul can be in Intellect; however, his words do not permit us to conclude that like Plotinus he believed some part of soul to be always in Intellect in an unconscious way, though this possibility cannot be altogether excluded. Anyhow,

<sup>100</sup> Cf. H. Dörrie, *Porph.* SZ 193, 196.

<sup>101</sup> Cf. Festugière, *Herm. Trism.* 3, *Les doctrines de l'âme*, Paris 1953, 46-47, 247 n. 5.

<sup>101a</sup> Plotinus also speaks of the presence of the higher hypostases in ourselves, *Enn.* V 1 [10], 10-12, but as based on the assumptions about the 'unconscious'.

<sup>102</sup> Hence, I cannot wholly agree with e.g. Hadot, *Porph. et Vict.* I, 485 and the references quoted ibd., n. 2.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Dörrie's fundamental exposition *Porph.* SZ 83-86.

his exposition in *On the Way in which Embryos are Ensouled*, 12, p. 50, 10 ff. Kalbfleisch has it that Intellect only enters the embodied soul at a later age, and from outside,<sup>104</sup> just as the leading soul enters the body at the moment of birth. Perhaps Iamblichus has this passage in mind when speaking of Porphyry's adherence to the traditional view, since Porphyry *l.c.* refers to Plato and to Aristotle's *noûs* which enters from outside.

Dörrie has rightly argued that this conception of soul in Intellect is unique, and typical of Plotinus and Porphyry.<sup>105</sup> Significantly, Theiler's attempts to find parallels in Hierocles and the Christian Origen<sup>106</sup> cannot be considered successful: in Hierocles, there is no parallel for the presence of intelligibles in other intelligibles, while the only parallel in the Christian Origen which at first sight looks acceptable (*De orat.* p. 319, 4 ff. Koetschau) deals not with the presence of the embodied intelligizing soul in Intellect but is about the mystical union<sup>107</sup> of praying soul and Spirit. It should also be noticed that the theory about incorporeals attributed to Ammonius Saccas by Porphyry<sup>108</sup> *ap. Nemes.* p. 129, 9 ff. is given as Ammonius' solution to the soul-body problem, and contrasts intelligibles with those entities which are fit to receive them in a manner which suggests that the receiving entities are not themselves intelligibles. This makes Alexander's denial of the presence of one incorporeal in another all the more important. It even has a polemical ring, as if inspired by a critique of Plotinus' innovation, and may owe its formulation to the book of the pagan Origen.<sup>109</sup> We have noticed that Plotinus presents his theory of the presence of soul in Intellect as a novelty, and may at least be sure that it was not held by Ammonius Saccas or any of the latter's

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Hadot, *Porph. et Vict.* I, 183 ff., who suggests the influence of Alexander of Aphrodisias. However, he does not distinguish sharply enough between the respective conceptions of Plotinus and Porphyry. — See also below, p. 92-93 n. 380, 381, 382.

<sup>105</sup> *Porph. SZ* 83 ff., 196. Cf. the review by Armstrong, *Cl. R.* 10, 1960, 220-221.

<sup>106</sup> *Forsch. Neupl.* 35-37.

<sup>107</sup> For Origen's mysticism cf. e.g. J. Quasten, *Patrology*, 2, Utrecht etc. 1953, 94 ff.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Dörrie, *Porph. SZ* 55. Theiler, *Forsch. Neupl.* 35 ff., *Unters. ant. Lit.* 531 accepts the whole passage in Nemesius as pure Ammonius, but I think Dörrie's more cautious view (for which cf. also *Ammonios*, 450) is to be preferred.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. above, p. 9, p. 12.

other pupils. It is, as we have seen, also an innovation compared with the ideas of Numenius. I would like to suggest that a theory comparable to Alexander's axiom may have been held by Ammonius Saccas; it would in any case have agreed very well with the system of a reality in compartments ("Schottensystem")<sup>110</sup> reconstructed for the latter by Theiler.

However this may be, the difference between the refined theory of the presence of one incorporeal in another represented by Plotinus and Porphyry and the categorical denial of the possibility of such a presence by Alexander is of crucial significance.

Also significant is Alexander's exception, *viz.*, that of grammatical knowledge being in the soul. Both Peripatetics and Middle Platonists held soul to be an incorporeal.<sup>111</sup> They defended this conception against the Stoics by criticizing the Stoic theory that the soul is like a quality (*ποιότης*) in being a body which as such is capable of total mixture (*κρᾶσις δι' ὅλου, μίξις*) with another body.<sup>112</sup> Alexander's exception recalls the Stoic idea that knowledge is a certain state, or being qualified, of the leading part of the soul, i.e. a body mingled with another body.<sup>113</sup> A Platonist cannot but consider knowledge as incorporeal, but he is prepared to admit the presence of such an incorporeal in the incorporeal soul. It is the doctrine of e.g. Albinus that soul, which has knowledge of all things, should contain all things, i.e. both intelligibles and (strangely, for the soul is an incorporeal, *Didasc.* 25, p. 177, 19 H.) sensibles, see *Didasc.* 14, p. 169, 16 ff. H.<sup>114</sup> Alexander theorizes on the same level as such Middle Platonists. Note, however, that his conception appears to be a more Stoicized one than that of Albinus in that he apparently restricts himself to objects of cognition integrated into the knowing soul itself.

10. We have already noticed that Alexander accepts the mixture of the incorporeals soul, intellect and attribute with body. That is to

<sup>110</sup> *Forsch. Neupl.* 30,

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Dörrie, *Porph. SZ* 179 ff.

<sup>112</sup> E.g. *SVF* I, 142, 518, II, 467; I, 145.

<sup>113</sup> Cf. M. Reesor, *The Stoic Concept of Quality*, *AJPh* 78, 1957 (40 ff.), 41-42; *SVF* I, 132.

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Dörrie, *Porph. SZ* 190.



say, Alexander accepts the above-mentioned Stoic theory of mixture, but substitutes incorporeals for the Stoic corporeals. Also in this respect Alexander's views are significantly different from those of Plotinus and Porphyry. Though it would be correct to state that both Plotinus' and Porphyry's conceptions of the relation between soul and body have been decisively influenced by the conceptual structures of Stoic physics,<sup>115</sup> they do not, as Alexander, place soul on the same level as the attribute. Furthermore, Plotinus rejected the mixture of soul and body, while Porphyry *expressis verbis* put this mixture on a wholly different level.

Plotinus of course defends the incorporeality of the soul. Although, when speaking about its connexion with the body, he again and again uses terms borrowed from Stoic physics, e.g. when saying that soul "completely penetrates" the body, he says that it does so as incorporeal, and he explicitly rejects<sup>116</sup> a mixture of soul and body (*Enn.* I 1 [53], 4; *ibid.* he critically discusses the possibility of its being 'interwoven' — *διαπλακεῖσα, διαπεπλέχθαι* — with the body). At *Enn.* IV 3 [27], 20, 26 ff. he says that soul is not in body as in a substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*), for this would make soul a state (*πάθος*) of the substratum, as e.g. colour and form. *Ibid.* 22, 1 ff. he compares the presence of soul in body to that of light in air which, being present, "is at the same time not present and which being present throughout" (Stoic language) "does not mingle with anything" (*καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦτο παρὸν οὐ πάρεστι καὶ δι' ὅλου παρὸν οὐδενὶ μίγνυται*).

Porphyry explicitly denies that the union of incorporeal soul and body can be put on one and the same level with the various forms of mixture as distinguished by Stoic physics: it is "not blend or mixture or combination or juxtaposition, but a different way ... transcending all those (unions) which fall within the sphere of sensation" (*Sent.* 35,

<sup>115</sup> For Plotinus, cf. A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics*, Leiden 1972, 18 ff., for Porphyry, Dörrie, *Porph. SZ* 24-73, 160.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. A.N.M. Rich, *Body and Soul in the Philosophy of Plotinus*, in: Anton-Kustas (ed.), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Albany N.Y. 1971 (620 ff.), 626-628. Graeser, l.c., has collected passages where Plotinus appears to sympathize with the notion of mixture as such, but omits *Enn.* I 1 [53]. For Plotinus' attempts to construct an entity connecting soul and body see the article of Rich.

p. 27, 10 ff. M. οὐτε οὖν κρᾶσις ἢ μίξις ἢ σύνοδος ἢ παράθεσις, ἀλλ' ἕτερος τρόπος ... πασῶν (sc. κοινωνιῶν) ... ἐπιβεβηκώς τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἰσθησιν πιπτουσῶν). In the *Symm. Zet.*, soul is said to be of a transcendental and metaphysical nature and to 'unite' with body in a manner which so to speak makes it both have and eat its cake: it is as if mingled, but retains its own nature, as if only juxtaposed. At *Sent.* 4, p. 1, 12 ff. M. he denies that incorporeals are mixed with (*συγκίρνεται*) bodies as to their hypostasis and essence. In his treatise *On...Embr.*, he likewise discusses the union between the vegetative soul and the body and that between vegetative soul and higher soul by manipulating the Stoic vocabulary of physical mixture. Contrary to what one would expect when coming from the *Sent.*, however, he this time does not refrain from using the term 'total' mixture, though this is immediately qualified as not entailing the destruction of the proper natures of its constituents (*τῆς ἀσυμφθάρτου δι' ὅλων κράσεως*, 10, 6, p. 47, 27 K.).<sup>116a</sup> *Ibid.* 10, 5, p. 47, 22 K. he again uses the term 'mixture', but qualifies this mixture as being of a divine and paradoxal kind (*τὴν θείαν ἐκείνην κρᾶσιν καὶ παράδοξον*). We may conclude that Porphyry in principle prefers to avoid the term 'mixture' (*κρᾶσις*) because of its physical and Stoic connotations and that, when using it, he immediately makes clear that he does so in an entirely new sense. In the *Symm. Zet.*, he uses the term 'union' (*ἔνωσις*): the divine and paradoxical mixture of soul and body is *sub specie* of the One; cf. also 'unite' (*ἐνοῦνται*), *On ... Embr.* p. 47, 23 K.<sup>117</sup>

Certain Middle Platonists already argued against the Stoic theory of the mixture of corporeal soul and body. An argument to this effect has been preserved by both Calcidius and Nemesius;<sup>118</sup> it refutes the Stoic conception of physical mixture etc. of corporeals, but allows for

<sup>116a</sup> This has been overlooked by Dörrie, who denies the term *κρᾶσις* to Porphyry altogether.

<sup>117</sup> On *ἔνωσις* and *κρᾶσις* cf. already K. Kalbfleisch, *Die neuplatonische fälschlich dem Galen zugeschriebene Schrift Πρὸς Γαῦρον πῶς ἐμψυχοῦται τὰ ἔμβρυα*, Abh. Ak. Berlin 1895, 14-20. — The term *ἔνωσις* itself appears to be of Stoic provenience, cf. e.g. Graeser, o.c. 117 ff.

<sup>118</sup> Cf. Dörrie, *Porph. SZ* 30 ff. — Note that Plutarch, *Quaest. Plat.* 1001B speaks of the mixture of World-Soul and world (below, p. 40).

soul's penetration of the body in the way of an incorporeal quality (Calc. 227, p. 242, 20 ff. W., *proprium vero est hoc eius naturae quae est sine corpore, ut dulcedinis quae pervadit melleum corpus, ut lucis quae corpus aëreum penetrat*). It will be recalled that Plotinus compared the presence of soul in body to that of light in air, just as Calcidius, but that on the other hand he refused to consider soul as a state of a substratum. The argument in Calcidius, however, by giving as its other example "sweetness in honey" accepts an equivalence between soul and attribute.<sup>118a</sup> Though we may owe the preservation of this Middle Platonist argument to the doxographic zeal of Porphyry, I believe that Waszink's suggestion<sup>119</sup> that it was Porphyry himself who constructed it out of an anti-Stoic argument of the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias (who comes after the Middle Platonist period) need not be accepted.<sup>119a</sup> Dörrie was right in stating that Porphyry himself cannot have put attribute and transcendental soul on the same level.<sup>120</sup> As a matter of fact, this is confirmed by a fragment of Porphyry's *On the Soul*, ap. Euseb., *PE* XV, 11, II, p. 374, 9 ff. Mras: "to compare soul to heaviness or singular and unchanging corporeal qualities, in accordance with which the substratum is either moved or qualified in such or such a way, is to be mistaken" (τὸ δὲ βαρύτητι ἀπεικάζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ ποιότησι μονοειδέσι καὶ ἀκινήτοις σωματικαῖς, καθ' ὥς ἡ κινεῖται ἢ ποῖον ἐστὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ἐκπεπτωκότος ἦν κ.τ.λ.).

To this it should be added that already before Alexander of Aphrodisias, certain authoritative Middle Platonists actually argued against the Stoic doctrine of the corporeality of the qualities with the help of Peripatetic concepts. This can be illustrated from Albinus, whose *Didascalicus* incorporates large chunks of Peripatetic doctrine into the canon of Platonist philosophy. The Peripatetic vocabulary used by Albinus is also found in an anonymous treatise *On the incorporeal qualities*,<sup>121</sup> preserved under Galen's name, which may be dated to the second cent. A.D. It is also found in our Alexander.

<sup>118a</sup> Dörrie, *Porph. SZ* 75 ff. says the link between Calc. and Plot. is verbal and accidental, not genetic. He correctly lists the differences. But Plotinus deals with the same problems which occupied the Middle Platonists.

<sup>119</sup> Introd. to Calc., *In Tim.*, p. LXXV-LXXVI; cf. also Calc. *ad p.* 234, 5 ff.

<sup>119a</sup> (see p. 48, *add.*). <sup>120</sup> *Porph. SZ* 35; cf. also *Ammonios*, 451.

<sup>121</sup> Ed. J. Westenberger, *Galenī qui fertur de qualitatibus incorporeis libellus*, Hamburg 1906. Cf. below, p. 35 n. 125.

We have already noticed that Alexander denies that Mani's first principles, if incorporeals, are able to mingle in the manner of attributes (συμβεβηκότα, p. 13, 17 Br.), for then they would be without substance (οὐσία) which is the "vehicle of the attributes"<sup>122</sup> (p. 13, 17-20 Br.). Again, at p. 14, 17 Br. he states that the incorporeal attribute (συμβεβηκός), just as soul, mingles with body. The Stoics, however, did not speak of attributes, but of qualities (ποιότητες): Alexander's distinction between substance and attributes is (ultimately) Aristotelian.<sup>123</sup> Albinus' treatise testifies to the incorporation into Platonism of these Peripatetic concepts: *Didasc.* 5, p. 156, 21-23 H. he says that it is the purpose of dialectics to look first at substance, next at the attributes; *ibid.* 6, p. 159, 34-35 H. he affirms that Plato, in the *Parmenides* and elsewhere, discusses the ten (Aristotelian!) categories, which implies that he held nine of these to be attributes of substance.<sup>124</sup> His refutation of the corporeality of the qualities formally equates (Stoic) quality (ποιότης) and (Peripatetic and Middle Platonist) attribute (συμβεβηκός), *Didasc.* 11, p. 166, 15-16 H. ἡ δὲ ποιότης οὐχ' ὑποκείμενον, ἀλλὰ συμβεβηκός.<sup>125</sup> This formal equation, by the way, also explains

<sup>122</sup> This curious metaphor should probably be explained on the basis of the connection between the arguments against corporeal qualities and corporeal soul (for which cf. above, p. 34). For the ὄχημα in this context we should think not so much of the soul's astral body, but of Plato's humorous description of the body as the ὄχημα of the head containing the rational soul at *Tim.* 44de, which is quite seriously cited Alb., *Didasc.* 23, p. 176, 14-15 H. In itself, the notion of οὐσία as "supporting" the attributes is not incomprehensible; cf., for a description of a similar nature, Arist., *Met.* 1003b16 ff., 1028a20 ff. D. M. Mackinnon, discussing *Aristotle's Conception of Substance* (in: R. Bambrough (ed.), *New Essays in Plato and Aristotle*, London 1965, 103) points out that the material cause is "the substrate, the vehicle that bears the qualities both accidental and essential".

<sup>123</sup> Cf. H. J. Krämer, *Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie*, Berlin 1971, 82 ff., and esp. 43 n. 368 on Aristotle's own distinction between substance and accidents; see also J. Mansfeld, *Thêta-Pi* 1, 1972, 63 n. 2, where it is suggested that the Stoics themselves already adapted Aristotle's theory.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. R. E. Witt, *Albinus* 66.

<sup>125</sup> Cf. Mansfeld, *l.c.* For parallels in *De qual. incorp.* see p. 1, 9-11; 3, 3-4; 3, 20 ff.; 5, 3 W.; at p. 16, 18-19 W. he uses the terminology of attribution when speaking of a quality qualifying another quality; p. 16, 17-19 W. refers to Aristotle's division of beings into essences and attributes.

why Alexander does not deem it to be necessary to replace the term 'quality' in the traditional Middle Platonist definitions of matter which have been referred to above. In the present context, however, the term 'attribute', besides being just as traditional in the anti-Stoic arguments which he uses as is the term 'quality' in his partly Stoicized definition of matter, also better suits his polemical purpose. In a wholly different context (p. 12, 35-13, 2 Br.) he even finds it convenient to remember, likewise for a polemical purpose, the orthodox Aristotelian distinction between quality and quantity, though we shall see that in that passage he uses the term 'quality' in completely different, sc. ethical sense;<sup>126</sup> which confirms our analysis of the use of 'attribute' in the present context.

Porphry,<sup>127</sup> however, did not speak in these Middle Platonist terms. He significantly restricts the use of 'attribute' by defining it as "that which comes and goes without entailing the destruction of the substratum" (*Isag.*, p. 12, 25 Busse, *συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ἐστὶν ὃ γίνεται καὶ ἀπογίνεται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φθορᾶς*), and speaks of substantial or rather essential 'quality' as being united to substance (*ibid.*, p. 95, 12 ff. B., *οὐσιώδεις ποιότητες*).

To sum up : Alexander, in accepting the mixture of the incorporeals soul, intellect and attribute with body does so in a way which can be fully explained from a Middle Platonist point of view. Unlike Plotinus and Porphyry, he in this context puts soul and attribute on the same level. He apparently has no qualms about using the term 'mixture' (*μίξις*) which Plotinus rejects and Porphyry either rejects or uses in an explicitly new sense. Unlike Plotinus and Porphyry, he denies that incorporeals may be in other incorporeals, though making an exception for objects of thought integrated in the soul.

11. Alexander argues against the Manichaean view of the mixture of soul and matter; not because he objects against such a mixture in itself (see above), but because the Manichaeans treat soul, an incorporeal,

<sup>126</sup> Cf. below, p. 45.

<sup>127</sup> Plotinus' position (*Enn.* II, 4, *On Quality and Form*) is not Middle Platonist either, and appears to take as its starting-point the sort of difficulties which I have discussed in *Thêta-Pi* 1, 1972, 67 ff.

as if it were a body. In view of this, it is only natural to look for an anti-Stoic background of this argument as well.

In his synopsis of the cosmological myth, Alexander speaks of the "dividing up of the divine Power over matter" (*τὴν θεϊὰν δύναμιν μερίζεσθαι εἰς τὴν ὕλην*, p. 8, 9 Br.). His discussion of this point in Ch. XX to some extent looks like a blend of two different arguments, since he criticizes the Manichaeans both for "making the divine Power into something corporeal and cutting it up just as those <things which have> parts" (*σωματικὴν ποιοῦντες τὴν θεϊὰν δύναμιν καὶ τέμνοντες καθάπερ τὰ μέρη <ἔχοντα>*, p. 28, 2 ff. Br.) and for treating it as matter (*ὕλη*). It will be recalled that the Middle Platonist definition of matter which Alexander elsewhere makes his own defines matter as that which is neither corporeal nor incorporeal.<sup>128</sup> However, in the present passage Alexander continues : "for why should not the divine Power be matter also, if it is (a) passible and divisible throughout and (b) if one of its parts becomes sun and another moon?" (*διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχ' ὕλη ἢ θεία δύναμις, εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν παθητὴ καὶ διαιρετὴ διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ μὲν τι αὐτῆς γίνεται ἥλιος, τὸ δὲ σελήνη*; p. 28, 4-6 Br.). He appeals to his definition of matter as the undetermined entity which becomes all sorts of determined things by receiving the qualities and shapes; if, now, different things such as sun and moon come to be from the divine Power as from a single substratum (*ὡς ἀφ' ἑνὸς ὑποκειμένου*, p. 28, 10-11 Br.), why should not this substratum become all other things as well? But then the divine Power is matter, qualified according to the shapes (*ὕλη ... πρὸς τὰ σχήματα ποιουμένη*, p. 28, 14-15 Br.).

It should be pointed out that Alexander elsewhere, when defining or describing matter, does not describe it as "passible and divisible throughout", but only speaks of its being determined by the shapes and qualities.<sup>129</sup> In the present passage, this divisibility is not only attributed to matter, but to body as well. In view of the distinction between body and matter which he makes elsewhere, their combined treatment in the present passage is unexpected, but is made easier by their common attribute, *viz.*, divisibility. Although the argument against the divine Power as 'matter' chiefly depends upon matter as

<sup>128</sup> Cf. above, p. 13.

<sup>129</sup> Cf. below, p. 53 n. 188 and the other notes referred to *ibid.*



the *ad lib.* determinable, the combination of the aspects of determinability and divisibility is made palatable because according to the Manichaean view, *parts* of this 'matter' become different things.

Furthermore, both the lack of distinction between matter and body and the connexion between the former's divisibility and its determinability can be illuminated by adducing Stoic views. According to Diog. Laërt., VII, 150 (cf. *SVF* I, 87; II, 316, 482; III, Ant. 32, Apollod. 4) the Stoics spoke of substance (οὐσία) and matter (ὕλη) in a two-fold sense, *viz.*, as belonging to all things and as belonging to individual things; body is finite or determinate substance (οὐσία ... πεπερασμένη). Again, substance or matter in the primary or universal sense (also called substratum, ὑποκείμενον,<sup>130</sup> e.g. *SVF* II, 374) is that out of which anything whatsoever comes to be (ἐξ ἧς ὅτιδήποτε οὐν γίνεται). It is passible (παθητή), otherwise this coming to be would be impossible. Hence, it is infinitely divisible (τομή εἰς ἄπειρον). Chrysippus argued that bodies are infinitely divisible too (τὰ σώματα εἰς ἄπειρον τέμνεσθαι, *SVF* II, 482 = Aët., I, 6, 4).<sup>131</sup> It is this infinite divisibility which explains total mixture (Diog. Laërt. VII, 151 = *SVF* II, 479).

Hence, the passibility and total divisibility of primary matter which allow it to become all things, which, Alexander argues, is a characteristic of the Manichaean divine Power, is originally a Stoic notion. So is that of the divisibility of body: the Stoics, just as Alexander in the present passage, did not distinguish between matter and body in respect of divisibility. Alexander's terminology here is Stoic. His polemical point, of course, is that the Manichaeans, by having the divine Power function like a (Stoic) body or like (Stoic) primary matter are no longer dealing with incorporeal soul.<sup>132</sup>

<sup>130</sup> Cf. below, p. 62-63 n. 234.

<sup>131</sup> Cf. also *De qual. inc.* p. 6, 12 ff. W.

<sup>132</sup> In Nemes., *De nat. hom.* 2, p. 69, 6 ff., p. 110, 5-112, 7 M. an argument is found against the Manichaean doctrine that all souls are one and that soul is parcelled out among the individual things and beings, while the particles finally unite again with the whole of soul. Dörrie, *Porph. SZ* 142-144 suggests that this passage derives from Porphyry, since certain technical terms (κατακερματίζομένην, p. 69, 8, p. 110, 8-9 M.; ἀμερίστως μερίζεσθαι, p. 114, 4 M.) are typically Plotinian. He furthermore says, o.c. 142 n. 2 that "die polemische Erwähnung der Manichäer... von vornherein auf Porphyrios

This reduction of the Manichaean doctrine of "soul divided up over matter" to the misguided manipulation of a Stoic theory also helps to explain another point. In Ch. XVIII, Alexander says that "it would have been better to say that, just as in a lyre which produces disorderly sounds the coming of *harmony* brings everything into concord, so also the divine

(weist)". However, the term κατακερματίζεσθαι is already in Plato (*Parm.* 144b, *Soph.* 226b), as Dörrie, *ibid.* 143, admits; in Method., *De lib. arb.* 5, 2, p. 158, 2-3 B. the unity of componentia is compared to that of the human body: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔχοντα διάφορα μέρη κατακερματίζομεν εἰς πολλὰ γενητά. Furthermore, A. Orbe, in his rev. of Dörrie, *Greg.* 41, 1960, 732-734 (cf. also his *Est. Valent.* I, 598 ff.) demonstrates that the phrase "indivisible division" is already in Clement, *Strom.* III, 69, 1; VI, 138, 2. For his contention that the polemics against the Manichaeans is itself proof of Porphyry's authorship Dörrie offers no evidence; the first Manichaean missionaries to appear in Italy seem to have done so after 300 A.D., cf. above p. 5 n. 8. If Dörrie's suggestion would be acceptable, the conclusion that Alexander of Lycopolis was influenced by Porphyry would be almost inescapable. However, I do not think that we have to assume that the anti-Manichaean argument in Nemesius, even if derived from Porphyry, was so lock, stock and barrel. At p. 69, 6 ff. M. the doctrine of the unity of Soul is attributed to "the Manichaeans and others;" these "others" are not mentioned at p. 110, 5 ff. M. If Porphyry was Nemesius' source, he may have refrained from mentioning his opponents by name, just as Plotinus does when at *Enn.* IV, 3 [27], 1 he argues against those who defend too crude views of the unity of soul. Henry-Schwyzler *ad l.* correctly refer to the Stoics (*SVF* I, 495, II, 774), but the sequel of Plotinus' discussion shows that his opponents adduced arguments derived from Plato. As a matter of fact, Plotinus himself believed that all souls are in a sense one (see e.g. H. Blumenthal, *Soul, World-Soul and Individual Soul in Plotinus*, in: *Le Néoplatonisme*, Coll. Royaumont, Paris 1971, 55 ff.), though not in the rather crude way of his pupil Amelius, who upheld the numerical identity of all souls (cf. Iambl., *De an., ap. Stob.* I, p. 372, 7 ff. W-H. and Festugière, *Herm. Trism.* 3, 23 ff.; on the unity of soul in Platonism cf. also Graeser, o.c. 30-31). Consequently, a certain delicacy may have withheld Porphyry, as it did Plotinus, from naming his opponents; in that case it is Nemesius who filled in the blank, possibly because the Manichaean doctrine of the gradual withdrawal of soul from the universe is the converse of the Eunomian theory, which has it that ever more souls are sent into this world (cf. p. 106 M.). It should furthermore be pointed out that the argument in Nemesius only discusses the treatment of soul as a body, not as matter, while Alexander refers to both. It is not impossible that Nemesius' argument was in its original form directed against the Stoics (the return of the human souls to the World-Soul was a Stoic doctrine, cf. *SVF* II, 810, 811, 821), and that it was revised by a Neoplatonist who wanted to include those Platonists who came too close to the Stoic viewpoint. A further substantiation of this interpretation of Nemesius' argument would entail a further discussion of Nemesius' sources and the way he uses them; this has to be postponed until another occasion.



1001BC says that God informs matter, but states *ibd.* 1003A that this task is executed by the World-Soul. However, this must remain hypothetical; it is safer and in itself sufficient to limit oneself to the negative side of Alexander's argument.

12. In a well-known article,<sup>141</sup> Theiler reconstructs a Middle Platonist doctrine,<sup>142</sup> to be attributed to the so-called school of Gaius, which was developed as an alternative to the Stoic doctrine that human liberty and responsibility are restricted to our attitude towards the inexorable course of events, or that human liberty only manifests itself when what we want to do turns out to be what fate had in store for us.<sup>143</sup> Gaius (if we may think of him) and his followers argued that the relation between fate and human liberty is, logically speaking, one of entailment, which is why in certain of our sources (*ps.-Plut., De fat.* 570B, *Nemes., De nat. hom.* 38) this doctrine is designated as the *ex hypotheseos* (ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, "by entailment") doctrine. We are free to choose between *p* and *q*, but *p* inevitably entails *x*, while *z* inevitably follows upon *q* (ἐπόμενον = *consequens*, originally a *term. techn.* of Stoic logic). It appears that this entailment-doctrine, for which Tacitus and Albinus are our earliest sources,<sup>144</sup> pertained both to the choice of lives prior to the embodiment of soul (based upon Plato's exposition in the famous myth of Er, *Rep.* X) and to the character-building options which are part of our everyday lives. It also occurs in Hierocles, who however emphasizes that what happens during a lifetime is determined by what we did in a former life.<sup>145</sup> Recently, Theiler has argued that this emphasis on the former life which he also finds in the Christian Origen should be traced back to Ammonius Saccas, who modified the original entailment-doctrine in order to justify divine

<sup>141</sup> Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre (1945), repr. *Forsch. Neuplat.* 48 ff.

<sup>142</sup> Following A. Gercke, *Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus*, Rh. M. 41, 1886, 266 ff., who first compared *ps. Plut., Calc.* and *Nemesius*, suggested the school of Gaius and insisted upon the anti-Stoic character of the doctrine.

<sup>143</sup> *Forsch. Neuplat.* 67, 70 ff., 80 ff. On such Middle Platonist views on human responsibility and their influence upon Justin and Clement see Andresen, *o.c.* 184 ff., Lilla, *o.c.* 42, 50-51.

<sup>144</sup> Another early source is Justin, *Apol.* I, 43, 7, cf. Andresen, *o.c.* 187.

<sup>145</sup> Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 88 ff.

providence.<sup>146</sup> However probable this may be, it is unlikely that Ammonius Saccas (if we may think of him) ignored the importance of empirical options: punishment would not be just if during a former life certain options had not been within our reach, while a certain amount of freedom is our only hope of doing better next time.

The entailment-doctrine is also found in Alexander, who however does not speak of the consequences of former lives and hence appears to be closer to the original Middle Platonist doctrine than to the same doctrine in a modified form which Theiler attributes to Ammonius Saccas. In his earlier article, Theiler rightly referred to the importance of character-formation in Peripatetic and Epicurean ethical theory:<sup>147</sup> the Middle Platonist doctrine belongs in the same intellectual climate. He also adduced Plato, *Laws* X, 903-904, which, describing the workings of divine providence, leaves room for ordinary human responsibility by pointing out the importance of character (ἡθος) and quality (ποιόν).<sup>148</sup> However, he quoted no parallels in order to prove that this important passage had indeed been used by the author or authors of the entailment-doctrine. Alexander's arguments show that this must actually have been the case. They also make clear that the explanation of the allegory of the cave in *Rep.* VII, which deals with our empirical options, was among the *loci Platonici* used by the author or authors of the entailment-doctrine.

In Ch. XVI, p. 22, 23-24, 1 Br. Alexander argues against the Manichaean doctrine that certain people, i.e. the so-called *electi*, are already good. What, then, about the others? What about the pretensions of Mani, the best of the good, that he is capable of making other people better? Interestingly, this passage reads like an attack against the Stoic doctrine of the ideal Sage. Mani is called *spoudaios*, just like the Stoic good man. Two arguments directed at the Manichaean Sage are originally anti-Stoic arguments. At p. 23, 11-12 Br. Alexander says that Mani's theory of human goodness implies that we could become good even while we are asleep (γενοίμεθα γὰρ ἂν καθεύδοντες σπουδαῖοι).

<sup>146</sup> *ibd.* 13 ff.

<sup>147</sup> *ibd.* 71-72. For Epicurus as a follower of Aristotle in this respect cf. D. J. Furley, *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists*, Princeton 1967, 184 ff. Cf. also below, p. 51 n. 174.

<sup>148</sup> *ibd.* 70-71; ἡθος: 903d7, 904d5; ποιόν: 904b7, c2.



The same argument is used by Plutarch against the Stoic paradox that one may occasionally attain sage-hood unconsciously: "one could go to bed a bad man, and wake up being a Sage" (καταδαρθόνητα φαῦλον ἀνέγρεσθαι σοφόν, *SVF* III, 539). Again, Alexander points out that Mani's absurd doctrine implies that certain people "would be in possession of their proper good even when spending their time in whoring" (καὶ γὰρ καλινδούμενοι σὺν ταῖς ἐταίραις τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔχοιεν ἂν ἀγαθόν). That intercourse with harlots does not infringe upon the goodness of the Sage is one of the Stoic paradoxes, cf. *SVF* III, 755, 756. These parallels are important in view of the fact that the entailment-doctrine was developed as an alternative to a Stoic doctrine.

Furthermore, Alexander again and again points out that Manichaeism abolishes the need for education and punishment.<sup>149</sup> When discussing the problems of theodicy, he says (p. 21, 17-23 Br.) that Mani has nothing to say in respect of "acts of intemperance and wrongdoings etc." (ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας καὶ πᾶν ὅτι οὖν τοιοῦτον) notwithstanding the experiential fact that education and law (ἡ παιδείσις καὶ ὁ νόμος) have been instituted as aids against human misbehaviour: "education, which tries to prevent such things from occurring among men, and law, which punishes whoever is convicted of having committed an evil deed" (ἡ μὲν παιδείσις ἐκφροντίζουσα τοῦ μηδὲ τοιοῦτόν τι περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμβαίνειν, ὁ νόμος δὲ τιμωρούμενος τὸν ἀλόντα ἐν τινὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὄντα). So also in Ch. XIV, where he says that if "education and conversion towards the better" (ἡ παιδείσις καὶ ἡ περιαγωγή ἡ βελτίων, p. 23, 16-17 Br.) are able to make some people virtuous, all may become so. "It would have been far better to say that wisdom has been given to men by God as an instrument, in order that it may gradually turn towards the good what, by being endowed with sense-perception, they have got through desire and pleasure, and take away from these the entailed evil" (p. 23, 22 ff. Br., esp. τοῦτο κατὰ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν περιάγουσα τὸ ἐπόμενον ἄτοπον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀνέλγη). The terms 'conversion' and

<sup>149</sup> Similar complaints against the Stoics are found in the Middle Platonists, cf. Andresen, o.c. 184 ff. Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 67 explains the need for a theory different from that of the Stoa by pointing out that "man auf praktische Pädagogik nicht verzichten (kann)".

'turning-around' (περιαγωγή, περιάγουσα) recall the passages in Plato's *Rep.* VII, where it is said that man, the prisoner in the cave, should be "turned around": at 515c, the prisoner's head is turned (περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα), at 518d, the "art of conversion" (τεχνή ... τῆς περιαγωγῆς) is discussed in connexion with the education of philosophers,<sup>150</sup> at 521e the "conversion of the soul" (ψυχῆς περιαγωγή) is mentioned; at 518e-519c the possibilities for being either good or bad are said to depend on conversion, for which education should pave the way. Also in Alexander, education is all-important. His remark about the necessity of overruling sense-perception is likewise paralleled in Plato.<sup>151</sup>

That it is indeed the entailment-doctrine which we find in Alexander is proved by his reference to the "entailed evil" (τὸ ἐπόμενον ἄτοπον). An at first sight very puzzling remark in an earlier chapter, p. 13, 1 Br. "it is *quality* which holds sway over vice and virtue" (κακίας δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἡγεμών ἐστὶν ἡ ποιότης) can be fully explained in the context of the entailment-doctrine and proves, moreover, that the passage from *Laws* X adduced by Theiler was actually used.<sup>151a</sup> The discussion in Ch. I, with its underlining of the importance of the formation of character (ἦθος)<sup>152</sup> also belongs within this context. Furthermore, the discussion of desire and pleasure as bound up with sense-perception (Ch. XV) which precedes the criticism of Manichaean ethics in Ch. XVI from which we have just been quoting ends with the remark that man is endowed with both sense-perception and judgement (p. 22, 21-22 Br. καὶ αἰσθεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν δυνάμενος), or rather with the faculty of rational discrimination (κρίνειν),<sup>153</sup> and that, though potentially wise = good, he is liable to destroy his capacity for goodness (p. 22, 22-24 Br., καὶ δυνάμει σοφὸς ... ἀπολαβὼν τὸ ἴδιον δῆ, καταπατεῖ).

In Hierocles, education, law and punishment are also mentioned. At Phot. p. 465a14 B. we read that "human laws will not be instituted

<sup>150</sup> Cf. one of Albinus' definitions of philosophy, p. 153, 2 ff. H... περιαγωγή ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος, ἐπὶ τὰ νοητὰ ἡμῶν τρεπομένων καὶ τὰ σώματα.

<sup>151</sup> At *Laws* 863b9, e2, ἡδονὴ καὶ ἐπιθυμία are said to influence human volition, see Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 70.

<sup>151a</sup> Cf. above, p. 43 and n. 148 (ποῖον).

<sup>152</sup> Cf. also below, p. 50 n. 169, 170, p. 51 n. 173, 174.

<sup>153</sup> Cf. Theiler, *Forsch. Neuplat.* 73 n. 118. In Albinus, *ap. Iambl. ap. Stob.* I, p. 374, 21 ff. W.-H. soul's ethical choice (κρίσις; cf. also *Didasc.* p. 178, 32 ff. H.) is a rational one; see J. Mansfeld, *Thêta-Pi* 1, 1972, 75 ff.

in vain" (οὐ μάρτην ... νόμοι κείσονται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), At p. 462a 11 B., the educative aspect of divine judgement is emphasized (θεία κρίσει ... παιδαγωγηθῇ), while at p. 172b44 B. it is said that we are free to choose, but that punishment is a correction of this choice. Hence, though in Hierocles everything has been put *sub specie* of the divine, certain traces of the importance of empirical choice still remain.

13. It has already been pointed out above <sup>154</sup> that Alexander speaks of the Christian doctrine of God as a productive first cause in approving terms. This is in Ch. I, where he also admits that Christian ethics, however unscientific it may be, to some extent succeeds in making people pious (p. 3, 15-16 Br. τῆς εὐσεβείας χαρακτήρ ἐνιζάνει αὐτῶν τοῖς ἡθεσιν).<sup>155</sup> Porphyry, on the other hand, was an enemy of Christianity, think of his treatise *Against the Christians* in fifteen books. He emphatically denied that Christians can be pious (εὐσεβεῖς).<sup>156</sup> Alexander however even so to speak defends Christian orthodoxy <sup>157</sup> against the aberrations of Mani. He is, as a matter of fact, rather well-informed about Christianity. This shows that Alexander is a representative of the spiritual and intellectual climate of Alexandria, where Christians, since the days at least of Pantaenus and Clement in the latter part of the second cent. A.D., studied Greek philosophy, where the Christian Origen followed the lectures of Ammonius Saccas, where again, about 400 A.D., the Christian Synesius of Cyrene studied pagan philosophy, and where, on the other hand, the philosophers, in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., were, contrary to their Athenian colleagues, tolerant of Christianity or even, like Philoponus, Christians themselves.

14. I would like to conclude this discussion (in which only the points of primary importance which I have been able to discover have been touched upon) by again pointing out that Alexander is of eminent

<sup>154</sup> p. 10-11.

<sup>155</sup> Cf. also below, p. 50 n. 171.

<sup>156</sup> See H. Dörrie, *Die Schultradition im Mittelplatonismus und Porphyrios*, *Entret. Hardt* XII, 21-25.

<sup>157</sup> Cf. above, p. 3 and n. 5.

importance as a source for the history of Neoplatonism as a whole, and of its Alexandrian variety in particular. In a number of crucial respects, his independence from his contemporaries Plotinus and Porphyry has, in my view, been established. He argues against the Manichaeans from a Platonist <sup>157a</sup> point of view, often treating his opponents as if they were some sort of crypto-Stoics. This, at least, is what is suggested by the originally anti-Stoic arguments which he brings into the field, e.g. those related to the corporeality of soul and to human responsibility. Such a point of view would also explain why Alexander occasionally saddles his opponents with Stoic points of view which to us may appear rather far-fetched, such as Zeno's theory of fire in Ch. XII <sup>158</sup> and the doctrine of things to be preferred and not to be preferred in Ch. XIX, p. 16 ff. Br.<sup>159</sup> We may end with Theiler's words about what happened after the final victory of Platonism in the second half of the third cent. A.D.: "Als Disputiergeräte gleichsam blieben die Meinungen der anderen Schulen im Platonismus erhalten".<sup>160</sup>

#### 4. *Bibliography of Alexandriana* <sup>161</sup>

- [1] J. B. Hawkins, *Treatise of Alexander, Bishop of Lycopolis, On the Tenets of the Manichaeans*, in: Ante-Nicene Christian Library vol. XIV: *The Writings of Methodius, etc.*, Edinburgh 1869, 236-266.
- [2] *Alexandri Lycopolitani contra Manichaei opiniones disputatio*, ed. A. Brinkmann, Leipzig 1895 (important introduction).
- [3] K. Praechter, *Christlich-neuplatonische Beziehungen*, *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 21 (1912), 1-27, esp. 9-11.
- [4] K. Gronau, *Poseidonios und die jüdisch-christliche Genesisexegese*, Leipzig-Berlin 1914, 283-284.

<sup>157a</sup> Alexander is, moreover, a Platonist for whom large parts of Aristotelian doctrine have become incorporated into Platonist philosophy: the line of the "School of Gaius" and, apparently, Ammonius Saccas. Cf. *Intro.* p. 22, p. 23-24, p. 34-35 and p. 22 n. 67, n. 69, p. 30 n. 104, p. 35 n. 123, n. 125, p. 53 n. 188, p. 58 n. 213, p. 59 n. 215, p. 62 n. 229, n. 233, n. 234, p. 63 n. 235, n. 239, p. 64 n. 244, p. 65 n. 248-250, p. 74 n. 295, p. 78 n. 315, p. 83 n. 340, p. 92-94 n. 380-382, p. 95 n. 390.

<sup>158</sup> Cf. below, p. 74 n. 294.

<sup>159</sup> Cf. below, p. 84 n. 348; cf. also p. 66 n. 251.

<sup>160</sup> *Forsch. Neupl.* p. VII. We may also think of e.g. Hippolytus, who refutes heretics by identifying their doctrines with those of notable pagan philosophers.

<sup>161</sup> Listing only items dealing with Alexander.

- [5] F. Überweg - K. Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, Berlin 1926<sup>12</sup> (repr. Darmstadt 1961), 644.
- [6] H. H. Schaefer, *Urform und Fortbildungen des manichäischen Systems*, Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg 1924-25, Leipzig-Berlin 1927, 65-157, esp. 106 ff.
- [7] J. Geffcken, *Der Ausgang des griechisch-römischen Heidentums*, Heidelberg 1929 (repr. Darmstadt 1963), 77.
- [8] R. Reitzenstein, *Die Vorgeschichte der christlichen Taufe*, Leipzig-Berlin 1929 (repr. Darmstadt 1967), 91-95.
- [9] R. Harder, *Prismata II*, *Philologus* 85 (1930), 247-250.
- [10] R. Reitzenstein, *Alexander von Lykopolis*, *Philologus* 86 (1931), 185-198.
- [11] R. Reitzenstein, *Eine wertlose und eine wertvolle Überlieferung über den Manichäismus*, Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen 1931, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 28-58.
- [12] P. de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne*, Paris 1934, 317.
- [13] L. Troje, *Zum Begriff ἀρακτος κίνησις bei Platon und Mani*, *Museum Helveticum* 5 (1948), 96-115.
- [14] M. Dibelius, *Alexander von Lykopolis*, *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum I* (1950), 270-271.
- [15] H. Dörrie, *Alexander von Lykopolis*, *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart I*<sup>3</sup> (1957), 230.
- [16] A. Orbe, *Estudios Valentinianos I*, Romae 1958, 277.
- [17] H. Dörrie, *Porphyrrios' "Symmiktā Zetemata"*, *Zetemata* 20, München 1959, 143.
- [18] E. R. Dodds, *Numenius and Ammonius*, in: *Les Sources de Plotin*, Entr. Hardt V, *Vandoeuvres-Genève* 1960, 10.
- [19] C. Riggi, *Una testimonianza del "kerygma" cristiano in Alessandro di Licopoli*, *Salesianum* 31 (1969), 561-628.

#### ADDENDUM to p. 34

<sup>119a</sup> It should be added that the example of light in air, found in Calcidius and Plotinus, actually constitutes a piece of the Stoic doctrine of the mixture of corporeal qualities. Though the evidence collected in *SVF II*, 386, 432 (p. 142, 26 τὸ φῶς ποιότης ... καὶ σῶμα) and 473 (p. 155, 38 τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ὁ Χρυσίππος κινῶσθαι λέγει) is quoted from Alexander of Aphrodisias, the doctrine of the mixture of light, as a quality, with air is also discussed by the Middle Platonist Plutarch, *De fac.* 922 EF (part of which is printed as *SVF II*, 570) and ibd. 930 F (cf. Cherniss, Loeb ed., ad L).

## BAD WORLD AND DEMIURGE: A 'GNOSTIC' MOTIF FROM PARMENIDES AND EMPEDOCLES TO LUCRETIUS AND PHILO

### 1. Greek Antecedents of Gnosticism?

It is not my intention, in this paper, to contribute to the perennial discussion about the origins, so-called, of Gnosticism. I have no desire to ferret out ideas or factors which 'produced' Gnosticism. There are several reasons for this abstinence. The most obvious of these is that such knowledge of Gnosticism as I may believe to possess is derivative; I do not belong to the elect who have access to the sacred books, found in Egypt, in their original translation, and have only read part of the literature in Greek and a very small part, no doubt, of the scholarly literature. Some compensation for this lack may perhaps be found in my claim to belong to the outer circle of admirors of the distinguished student of Gnosticism to whom this volume is presented. Over the years, I may, to some extent, have been initiated by Professor Quispel himself.

There is another reason why I am reluctant to stake out claims for Gnostic origins. I have come to believe that the question concerning the origins of what is original is not necessarily seminal. Take Greek philosophy. For all its links with the pre-philosophic past, this is something novel right from the start. I submit that it is impossible to offer a full historical explanation of what is *sui generis*; if what is original could be deduced, so to speak, from what precedes it just as, according to Aristotle, the conclusion of a syllogism is already contained in its premisses, there would no longer be anything *novel* to explain (except, perhaps, the art of combining the premisses, but this is not how such things happen). There are important respects, for instance, in which Presocratic cosmogony links up with the cosmogony of myth. What counts, however, is the *differentia specifica*.



Perhaps Professor Quispel will agree. If I understand him correctly, he is, at any rate, convinced (with Jonas) that there is a psychological or existentialist explanation for the Gnostic frame of mind.<sup>1</sup> I take this to imply the assumption that a person or persons made a personal, original and decisive contribution to the history of human thought and sensibility.

There is a corollary to this assumption which, anyhow, I would be prepared to argue myself, viz. that what is novel to some extent influences and changes what was already there. Myth became 'myth' only when philosophy had arrived. Of course, this is not the whole picture, since myth or 'myth' was able to influence philosophy because some philosophers, spurred on by hindsight, tried to distinguish philosophical elements in it or made use of mythological means for philosophical purposes. Conversely, people with a mythopoetic and religious bent of mind (Pherecydes, some Orphics, and, I dare say, certain Gnostics) adapted philosophical notions for religious and mythological purposes. On the other hand, however, novel developments may serve as a sudden eye-opener where ideas or facts from a more or less remote past are concerned. Ideas or their potential may remain dormant for any number of centuries;<sup>2</sup> many instances, such as e.g. the rediscovery of Stoic logic in our century, could be given. Jonas' famous philosophical rediscovery of Gnosticism is another such instance.

Consequently, what I propose to do in the present paper is to open up the following question: is it possible, in Greek philosophy before the Christian era, to indicate elements or features which even a slight familiarity with the main tenets of Gnosticism *may help us to under-*

<sup>1</sup> G. Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, Zürich <sup>2</sup>1972, 36-38, taking up the epoch-making idea of H. Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist*, I, Göttingen <sup>2</sup>1963. — In order to be clearly understood I should perhaps add that, for my part, I do not believe in an existentialist interpretation. I am more concerned with the 'how' than with the 'why' of Gnosticism. I do believe, however, that one should not philosophize about 'hows' and 'whys' by playing off abstractions against one another in the manner of e.g. J. Taubes, *Der dogmatische Mythos der Gnosis*, in M. Fuhrmann (ed.), *Terror und Spiel. Probleme der Mythenrezeption*, München 1971, 145ff., a paper followed by a very confused discussion (ib., 379ff.), into which R. Merkelbach vainly tried to infuse some sense.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. W. Burkert, *Plotin, Plutarch und die platonisierende Interpretation von Heraklit und Empedokles*, in *Kephalaion* (Festschr. de Vogel), Assen 1975, 137ff., on the rediscovery of Empedocles' *Katharmoi* by Platonists from the 1st cent. A.D. onwards.

*stand somewhat better?* There is a related question which, although it lies beyond the edge of my competence, I shall not be able to avoid altogether: could such ideas possibly have appealed to a Gnostic, i.e. have lent themselves to an *interpretatio Gnostica*? I shall try to look for part of an answer to the first question by concentrating on the vexing problem of the Evil Demiurge and his Associates and of the Bad World. And I should perhaps add at this point that I do not pretend that 'anticipations' of Gnostic ideas are to be looked for in the Greek sphere only. On the contrary: a study of some Gnostic texts and of some of the learned literature, much of it written by Professor Quispel, has convinced me that also Jewish, (Iranian, and Egyptian) 'antece-dents' have to be taken into account.

By and large, Greek philosophical cosmology is positive and optimistic. This holds especially for Plato, and for Aristotle and the Stoics, who have been decisively influenced by Plato in this respect. This, however, does not imply that such optimistic views were proposed or accepted without argument, or that no difficulties were sensed at all. There were even exceptions (the Epicureans).<sup>3</sup> But the mainstream of Greek thought concerning the cosmos is optimistic; such less positive views as can be found, are, as a rule, against the current, or are only introduced for the sake of an argument.

However, Plato, after all, both continued and reacted against the ideas of his predecessors. If one wants to look for ideas which may be linked with the notion of an evil Demiurge one should go back to the Presocratics, i.e. to Parmenides and Empedocles. There is no sign of pessimism in the Milesians (one could think of Anaximander, but in Anaximander, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 12B1, cosmic injustice is simultaneously cosmic justice, or at least answered by cosmic justice). Heraclitus does not come into play because he explicitly stated that our world has not been made by any god or man, but is eternal (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 22B61). For the Pythagoreans see below, p. 292f.

## 2. Parmenides

Helped by 'Gnostic' hindsight, one may reconsider the thought of the great Parmenides. I give a short summary of his philosophy:

<sup>3</sup> See below, p. 309f.

Only Being exists in the full sense of the word, and only Being can be truly known (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B2, B8), but Being is not of this world, but “in itself” (Fr. 28B8, 29). The universe is a big mistake, to be explained or excused by reference to a confusion between Being and not-Being (Fr. 28B6, 9-10; B8, 40), which should have been — or rather should be — rigorously kept apart (Fr. 28B2; B8, 15-18). In this universe, men lead silly lives, analytically described by Parmenides in unflattering terms which he borrowed from passages in Greek literature dealing with the *condition humaine*<sup>4</sup> (Fr. 28B6). Eternal, unchanging Being cannot come into being, grow, or perish (Fr. 28B2; B8, 6-21). The world, on the other hand, has come into being and has developed and will perish (Fr. 28B19). But Being remains forever unalterable in the bonds of three divine ladies: Justice (Δίκη, Fr. 28B8, 14), Necessity (Ἀνάγκη, Fr. B8, 20), and Destiny (Μοῖρα, Fr. B8, 27). Of these goddesses, Justice is specifically concerned with “separating” Being from not-Being, i.e. with keeping coming to be and passing away at bay (cf. Fr. B8, 13-18).<sup>5</sup>

This raises a very difficult problem — one which, without overstatement, may be called *the* conundrum of the interpretation of Parmenides. If the inviolability of Being is vouchsafed by divine powers and if, indeed, according to Parmenides, it is absolutely unthinkable that this should not be the case, in what way, then, is a confusion — both ontic and epistemic — between Being and not-Being possible? If Parmenides had remained silent about the universe, our exegetic problem would be minimal, but he gives us, in the second part of his poem, a cosmogony and cosmology which constitute a serious, original, and even influential theory of ‘nature’ in the Presocratic sense of the world (cf. also the goddess’ announcement, Fr. 28B1, 28-32). When I was a child, I believed that the *vitium originis* should be laid with men: men, by confusing Being and not-Being, would have fashioned the elements Light and Night from which the world is built.<sup>6</sup> Light and Night, again, constitute both the bodily frame and, simultaneously, the consciousness of men (Fr. 28B16). Difficult in this explanation,

<sup>4</sup> See my dissertation, *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die menschliche Welt*, Assen 1964, Ch. I.

<sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 263f.

<sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 131f., 144f., 214ff.

of course, is the implication that a mistake is made by entities whose very existence depends on the mistake’s having been made. I still believe that this explanation is defensible: at Fr. 28B8, 53f. the goddess who is Parmenides’ informant certainly puts the blame upon men, for it is they who, as she says, “have decided to name two Forms” (sc. the Elements), “in which they are mistaken”. In the beginning, consequently, there is a human mistake. [There is not, at this time, a world, but only ‘matter’ — not, of course, in the later sense of an independent principle yet to be informed, but ‘matter’ already informed: the elements with their respective characteristics].

Recently, however, and perhaps rather tardily, another thought has crossed my mind, which supplements my earlier suggestion. The revealing goddess, *loc. cit.*, lines 51-52, says that Parmenides will learn about the [false! cf. Fr. 28B1, 30] opinions of men by hearing, so she says, “the deceiving structure of my words” (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλόν).<sup>7</sup> “Deceiving” — this rings a bell. Deceit was much practised by Greek gods upon each other and upon Greek mortals.<sup>8</sup> The account of the universe is yet a deceiving structure of words, and the universe itself<sup>9</sup> is not the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Is the goddess, perhaps, suggesting that the responsibility for the origin of the universe is one she shares with men? Or is it, rather, *another* divinity<sup>10</sup> who is responsible for such a deception — a deception which, after all, produced something, apparently next to inviolate Being, which amounts

<sup>7</sup> For parallels to κόσμον ἐπέων see L. Tarán, *Parmenides*, Princeton N.J. 1965, 221 n. 50. Significantly, Empedocles says to his pupil Pausanias: σὺ δ’ ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B17, 26 (see W.J. Verdenius, *Parmenides. Some Comments on his Poem* (diss. Utrecht). Groningen 1942. Amsterdam <sup>2</sup>1964), 70); cf. below, p. 283.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Verdenius, *Parm.*, 58f.; M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists*, Oxford 1954, 108ff., 185ff.; H. Pfeiffer, *Die Stellung des parmenideischen Lehrgedichts in der epischen Tradition*, Bonn 1975, 39 and 40 n. 2. A.P.D. Mourelatos, *The Route of Parmenides*, New Haven/London 1970, 222f., esp. 259f., splendidly investigates the second part of the poem as “a Study in Deception”. I have learnt much from a paper (to be published in a collective volume) read by Professor Verdenius during the 3rd Int. Coll. Anc. Philos., Bad Homburg Aug. 29th-Sept. 1st 1979.

<sup>9</sup> Having described the elements, the goddess says she will now give the “resembling ordering” (διάκοσμον εἰκότα, Fr. 28B8, 60), sc. of the elements in question.

<sup>10</sup> In my diss., 271, 272, I suggested that the same divinity is concerned (Δίκη = revealing goddess = δαίμων of Fr. 28B12), but I knew that this identification is incapable of proof (*ib.*, 272 n. 1). See further below.

to a confusion between Being and not-Being? There is, at any rate, a goddess who is responsible for the *elaboration* and *implementation* of the original mistake: a goddess who supervises the “mingling” of the elements which results in the cosmos as inhabited by compound beings.<sup>11</sup> For in a fragment from the *cosmogonical* section of part two of the poem, when speaking of the elemental rings which are to become the heavenly bodies, the revealing goddess mentions a goddess “in the midst of these” (ἐν δὲ μεσῷ τούτων), a “goddess who steers all things: for she commands the dreadful birth and coupling of all things, sending the female to couple with the male and the male, again, with the female” (δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ· πάντων γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει / πέμπουσ’ ἄρσενι θῆλυ μίγῃν τό τ’ ἐναντίον αὐτὶς / ἄρσεν θηλυτέρῳ, Fr. 28B12, 3-6). It is she who, “first of all the gods, created Eros” (πρώτιστον μὲν Ἐρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων, Fr. 28B13). Aristotle, commenting on Fr. B13, says Parmenides speaks of Eros “in his exposition of the origin of the universe” (*Met.* A 4, 984b25f.). Plutarch gives a name to the goddess: Aphrodite, and tells us that the line is from the cosmogony (*Amat.* 756F).<sup>12</sup> Simplicius not only tells us that this goddess created the other gods (θεῶν αἰτίαν),<sup>13</sup> but adds, in tantalizingly cryptic words, that she

<sup>11</sup> F. Solmsen, *Nature as Craftsman in Greek Thought*, in *JHI* 1963, [473ff. (repr. *Kl. Schr.* I, Hildesheim 1968, 332ff.)], 475 (= *Kl. Schr.* I, 334) appears to suggest that Parmenides’ *daimon* is a sort of proto-Demiurge; cf. also my diss., 215.

<sup>12</sup> See H. Martin Jr., *Plutarch’s Citation of Empedocles at Amatorius 756 D*, in *GRBS* 1969, 57ff., and below, p. 268. For the scope of the activities of the goddess see Verdenius, *Parm.* 6-7 (what he says holds good even if his — and Fränkel’s — interpretation of ἐν ... μεσῷ is not accepted). — For the correct reading of *Vorsokr.* Fr. 12, 4 see D. Sider, in *Phoenix* 1979, 67f.

<sup>13</sup> Confirmed by Cic., *ND* I, 28 (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28A37), who mentions “*Bellum, ... Discordiam, ... Cupiditatem ceteraque eiusdem generis*” (cf. below, n. 51). This derives from a doxography which was more detailed (or contained other details) than Aët. II, 7, 1 (that it did so follows from what Cicero says immediately before: “*Parmenides quidem commenticium quiddam coronae similem efficit* (στεφάνην appellat), *continentem ardorem lucis orbem* [so the majority of ms., unnecessarily emended by editors], *qui cingit caelum, quem appellat deum*” (“P. invents a purely faciful something like a crown (he calls it *stephane*), a ring containing fiery heat, who encompasses the heaven and whom he calls god”). Cicero identifies the *outer* ring with god, not, as Aëtius — who is anyhow mistaken here — the *midmost* of the *mixed* rings (see below, n. 17, and text thereto). With “*continentem ardorem lucis orbem*” cf. Aët., *Vorsokr.* I p. 224, 6 ὅφ’ ὅ πάλιν πυρώδης; for “*ardorem lucis*” cf. expressions such as Fr. 28B10, 3 λάμπαδος ἑργ(α) αἰδηλα, of the sun. See further below, p. 268f).

has power over “the souls of men, which she sends now from the visible towards the invisible and then the other way round” (καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφάνους εἰς τὸ ἀειδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, *In Phys.* 39, 20f. Diels. Simplicius had the poem before his eyes<sup>14,15</sup>). Plutarch’s identification of the goddess as Aphrodite appears to be no more than an inference, although it should be noted that it recurs at *Fac.* 927 A.<sup>16</sup> But we have another reference to the cosmogonical process in Parmenides own words, Fr. 28B10, 6-7, where it is said that it is “Necessity” who “bound Heaven so that it held the bonds of the stars” [ὥς μιν (sc. οὐρανόν) ἄγουσ(α) ἐπέδησεν

<sup>14</sup> I have called this an “indirektes Zitat” (*o.c.*, 168); my earlier interpretation in terms of the psychology (following Theophr.) of *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28A46 (ib., 172) is probably too narrow; cf. below, n. 19.

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle, Plutarch and Simplicius are quoted *Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 28B13; so also Plat., *Symp.* 178b [195b-c should also have been quoted]. Arist., *loc. cit.*, 984b23f., further quotes Hes., *Th.* 116f. (incompletely): first Chaos, then Gaia and Eros (see West *ad loc.*, *Hesiod. Theogony*, Oxford<sup>2</sup> 1971, 195f.). Plato, *loc. cit.*, adds both Hesiod and Acusilaus [cf. *Vorsokr.* Fr. 9B2], who, he says, agree with one another. — On Parmenides’ cosmogony see also J.S. Morrison, *Four Notes on Plato’s Symposium*, in *Cl. Qu.* 1964, [42ff.], 49f.

<sup>16</sup> H. Diels, *Parmenides. Lehrgedicht* (Berlin 1897), 107, is sceptical about the identification at *Amat.* 756. F.J. Hershbell, *Plutarch and Parmenides*, in *GRBS* 1972, 193ff., tentatively suggests that Plutarch had read the poem; I think this is certain. Martin, *o.c.*, 61, 64f., who treats both passages [note that *Fac.* 927 A is lacking in *Vorsokr.* Ch. 28, being quoted only ad Fr. 31B27, I, 333, 18f.] argues that Plutarch sets out to correct Plato and Aristotle, but seems to imply that Plutarch had no Parmenidean evidence upon which to base his identification.

It is a definite possibility that Plato and Aristotle, in the doxographical passages at issue, used the sophist Hippias’ compendium of “important and related ideas” (τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὁμόφύλα) collected from “Orpheus” and “Musaeus” and “Hesiod” and “Homer” and “other poets and prose writers, both Greek and non-Greek” [Hippias, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 86B6; this capital reference to Orpheus — repeated *Vorsokr.* Fr. 1A13 — has been missed by Kern]; see B. Snell, *Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales und die Anfänge der griech. Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte*, in *Philologus* 1944, 170ff., repr. in C.J. Classen (ed.), *Sophistik* (WdF 178), Darmstadt 1976, 478ff., and W. von Kienle, *Die Berichte über die Sukzessionen der Philosophen* (diss. Berlin 1961), 38ff. If this is acceptable, it becomes all the more remarkable that neither Plato nor Aristotle refers to an *Orphic* Eros, since elsewhere (*Crat.* 402b ~ *Met.* A3, 983b21ff.) they quote Orphic lines or refer to Orphic ideas in such “Hippian” doxographic passages. It is also remarkable that no trace survives of Early Stoic interest in an *Orphic* Eros: Zeno interpreted that of *Hesiod* allegorically (*SVF* I, 104, 105). As yet, the only witness for an early *Orphic*? this is not what he calls it) Eros is Aristoph., *Av.* 693ff. (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 1A12, Orph. Fr. 1 Kern), but it should never be forgotten that Aristophanes’ aim is to amuse, not to inform. See further below p. 291.



Ἀνάγκη / πείρατ' ἔχειν ἄστρον. Note (1) that in Fr. 28B10 the stars are distinguished from sun and moon and (2) that, according to Aët. II 15, 7 = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28A40a, Parmenides located the stars below the sun]. Necessity, then, is a more likely identification of the goddess than Aphrodite. There is some confirmation in Aët. II 7, 1 = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28A37, I p. 224, 8-10: the midmost of the mixed rings — this obviously derives from a not too accurate paraphrase of Fr. 28B10, 1f.<sup>17</sup> — is for all of the cosmic rings the beginning and cause of “motion” (κινήσεως) and “coming into being” (γενέσεως), “and he also calls her steering goddess (δαίμονα κυβερνήτιν, cf. Fr. 28B10, 3 δαίμων ἢ ... κυβερνή) and holder of allotments (or lots, κληροῦχον)<sup>18</sup> and Justice (Δίκην) and Necessity” (Ἀνάγκην, cf. Fr. 28B10, 6). “Holder of allotments” — this should probably be connected with Simplicius’ obscure statement<sup>19</sup> about the goddess, viz. that she sends the souls of men from the visible to the invisible and back. Support for this connection may be derived from Fr. 28B10, 4: the goddess holds sway over “gruesome birth”. “From the visible to the invisible” may mean from life to death, and “the other way round” then

<sup>17</sup> Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgr. Denkens*, München <sup>2</sup>1955, 183f.; for Cicero cf. above, n. 13.

<sup>18</sup> So the ms.; κληροῦχον Fülleborn, Diels-Kranz (cf. Fr. 28B1, 14); J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, London <sup>4</sup>1930, 190 n. 3, argues against this incommendable emendation. The word is analogous to e.g. σκηπτουχος. Note that Phil., *Vit. Mos.*, I, 255, has ἡδὸν εἰς τὸν κληροῦχον θεόν, and that Diels (!) conjectured κληροῦχους at *Aet. mu.* 73 τὸν γὰρ τελειότατον ὄρατῶν περίβολον καὶ τοὺς ἐν μέρει περιέχοντα κληροῦχους [this is about the universe and the lesser gods; cf. *Aet. mu.* 10 = Arist., *De phil.* Fr. 18 Rose/Ross and E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, II, Firenze <sup>2</sup>1973, 141]. In the myth of Er, Plat. *Rep.* X, 617, κλήροι lie in the lap of Ananke's daughter Lachesis. — If, as I believe, Moira “holding the lots” is identical with the δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνή, it is permissible to quote Lucr. V, 107: “*Fortuna gubernans*”, cf. Aesch., *Ag.* 663-4, and, for τύχη in early Greek thought, my diss., 13ff., 20.

<sup>19</sup> W. Burkert, *Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras*, in *Phronesis* 1969, [1ff.], 28f., argues convincingly that this is about metempsychosis. An interesting parallel to Simplicius’ language is to be found Plut., *An recte*, 1129 F f., where Plutarch interweaves ideas culled from a variety of sources, exploiting them and subordinating them to his general theme that to be known is better than to be unknown: life is a gift of God, before birth man is ἄδηλος, ... ὅταν δὲ γένηται, ... καθίσταται δηλὸς ἐξ ἀδήλου καὶ φανερός ἐξ ἀφανούς (1129 F); εἰς αἰδὲς καὶ ἀόρατον ἡμῶν ὅταν διαλυθῶμεν βαδίζοντων (see H. D. Betz, *Observations on Some Gnosticizing Passages in Plutarch*, in *Proc. Int. Coll. Gnosticizing Stockholm 1973*, Stockholm-Leiden 1977, 169ff.).

pertains to birth; it is noteworthy that Parmenides associated life and light, death and darkness according to Theophrastus, *De sensu* 4 = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28A46, I, 226, 13f. Aët. II, 7, 1 — cited above — *only deals with the divinity which is active in the universe*. I have argued above that this divinity is perhaps not only responsible for arranging the elements, but also co-responsible for their being constituted (see p. 265f.). Aëtius, *loc. cit.*, says the divinity is also in charge of the *coming into being* of the rings, which, however, need not mean more than that it constructs them out of elements that are already there.

Ananke (Necessity), however, not only commands heaven, but is also one of the divine beings that hold Being in fetters (Fr. B8, 20). Can Aëtius’ statement — often ignored by scholars — that *cosmic* Ananke is also called Dike (Justice) be justified? There is not, as in the case of Ananke, evidence among the remains of the second part of the poem. In a remarkable passage of the prooemium (Fr. 28B1, more about which shortly), however, Dike is said to guard the Gates of the paths of Night and Day (lines 11-14), which, if one translates the language of myth, means that she has power over the motions of the heavenly bodies;<sup>20</sup> cf. κινήσεως in Aët. II, 1, 7, cited above. This agrees with the function of Ananke in Fr. 28B10. Furthermore, in the same line which states that she guards the Gates, Dike is called “severely punishing” (τῶν [sc. the Gates] δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς, line 14). There is a definite suggestion here that Dike’s function is not only cosmological, but also — as is only to be expected of Justice — has something to do with men in general. This, again, affords a transition to other epitheta and functions: “holder of allotments” (Aët.) and “she commands over birth” (Parm.) would be apt characteristics of Moira (Destiny), who, like Dike and Ananke, holds Being in its bonds in the first part of the poem (Fr. 28B8, 27; she is the last of the triad to be mentioned there). In the prooemium, the revealing goddess says to the poet-philosopher that it is “not evil destiny” which escorted him hither, but “right and justice” (οὔτε σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι / τήνδ’ ὁδὸν ... / ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε, Fr. 28B1, 26-28). “Evil destiny” sounds like

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Burkert, *ib.* 9f., esp. 11: “Dike in ihrer gleichsam astronomischen Funktion”; Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 54.

a euphemism for death (cf. *Il.* XIII, 603); one is reminded of the "holder of lots" (κληροῦχον) and indeed of the goddess who, as Simplicius has it, sends the souls of men "from the visible towards the *invisible*": for behind the Gates guarded by Dike lies the Palace of *Night*! (Fr. B1, 9-11). "Right and justice" — indeed, it was Justice (Dike) who let him pass through the Gates.<sup>21</sup> "Not an evil destiny" amounts to: a good destiny. Moira has two faces, just as Dike, who is capable both of granting and of denying admission (she has to be persuaded, in the prooemium, to open up). In any case, the Moira which holds Being in its bonds (Fr. 28B8, 17) is not evil.

There is, indeed, much to be said for the assumption that Justice, Necessity and Destiny are different names for one and the same female divine power, πολλῶν ὀνόματων ἐπώνυμος, which both reigns in the universe and dominates Being.<sup>22</sup> [I would not, today, argue that this divinity is also the revealing goddess.<sup>23</sup>] This, again, strengthens the assumption that divine deception plays a part in the being constituted of the elements, for the only forces capable of *pretending* to slacken the bonds of Being are, precisely, those who hold them. [Also, the fact that this formidable triad is necessary to keep Being fettered perhaps suggests that Being is prone to behave unbeingly — it would be wrong to say unbecomingly — if not closely and forcefully guarded].

What is there about this conception of the origin of the universe that could be called 'Gnostic'? *First*, the idea that the world of heaven and earth and of human life is absolutely inferior when compared

<sup>21</sup> Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 99, argues that μοῖρα κακή and θέμις τε δίκη τε are "formelhaft"; this does not appeal to me, especially because οὔτι ... μοῖρα κακή is also to be connected with Fr. 28B1, 24 ὃ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτοισι συνάρορος ἡνιόχοισιν. In the company of such immortal guides, the obstacles of mortality are overcome.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. e.g. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Hist. Gr. Phil.*, II, Cambridge 1965, 72; W. J. Verdenius, *Der Logosbegriff bei Heraklit und Parmenides*, II, in *Phronesis* 1967, [99ff.], 100f.; Mourelatos, *o.c.*, 25f.; some scholars, as the present writer in his diss., include the revealing goddess. [It is noteworthy that in Empedocles' *Katharmoi* it is Ananke who has given the "oracle" which is also "an ancient decree voted by the gods" according to which the divinity (*daimon*) who sins by killing is condemned to metempsychosis (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B115, 1-2; cf. below, p. 284). G. Zuntz, *Persephone*, Oxford 1972, 403, points out that Empedocles' Ananke derives from Parmenides'. This would support our identification of the goddess at Parm. Fr. 28B12, Simpl., *In phys., loc. cit.*, etc.].

<sup>23</sup> I accept the argument of my critics (Burkert, in *Phronesis* 1969, 13; Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 103f.; Ch. H. Kahn, in *Gnomon* 1970, 113f.).

to the perfection of Being. *Secondly*, that 'something happened' which made this inferior world and its misguided inhabitants possible: a human error or self-deception, perhaps compounded with a deception or error on the part of the divine; at the very least, divine powers are responsible for the (deceptive) elaboration of the original error. *Thirdly*, that the cosmopoetic powers are shared out among a plurality of divinities. Plato, who in the *Timaeus* spoke of other gods created by the Demiurge which construct, as demiurges of a lower order, our bodies and the mortal parts of our souls,<sup>24</sup> was not the first to propose such a distinction. Parmenides has his cosmogonical goddess create Eros, who undoubtedly further carries out the task (the coupling) she is said to supervise at Fr. 28B12, 6-8, and other functions — not all of them pleasant — will have been delegated to the other created gods. *Fourthly*, the goddess who presides over the combination of the elements, i.e. directs the construction of the world, is placed "in the midst" of what are to be the *heavenly bodies*. If she is indeed the Ananke of Fr. 28B10, it is she who binds the stars to heaven. This makes one think of the part played by the planetary Archons assisting the Gnostic Demiurge; indeed, in some Gnostic systems, the Demiurge as first Archon is put on top of the other seven. *Fifthly*, the goddess "commands" (ἄρχει, Fr. 28B12, 4). This is perhaps an innocuous word, although it has at least clear associations with Anaximander's invention, the *arche* that "surrounds and steers [κυβερνᾷν, cf. Parm. Fr. 28B12, 3] all things" (*Vorsokr.*, Anaxim. Fr. 12B1, A15, A11(1)). In any case, it is also used — perhaps again innocuously — of the subaltern demiurgic gods, among whom are the heavenly bodies, by Plato (*Tim.* 42e, ἄρχειν). However, P. Boyancé, who pointed this out in a very perceptive paper, noted that Plato in two other passages calls the subaltern gods that administrate the world *archontes* (ἄρχοντες, *Plt.* 270d; *Lg.* X, 903b).<sup>25</sup> He also reminds us that the lesser gods in the *Timaeus* are co-responsible for moral evil by constructing the inferior parts of our souls, and for physical evil to the extent that they construct

<sup>24</sup> *Tim.* 41aff.

<sup>25</sup> *Dieu cosmique et dualisme. Les archontes et Platon*, in *Origini* (SHR XII), Leiden 1967, [340ff.], 353-4. [On the Archons see now K. Rudolph, *Die Gnosis*, Göttingen 1978, 66, 75, 82, 111f.]. Solmsen's otherwise excellent analysis, *o.c.*, 480ff. = 339ff., puts insufficient emphasis upon the distinction between Plato's Demiurge and his lesser gods.

our bodies (although these are the best possible), and he suggests that this distinction between the good Demiurge and the lesser gods prefigures that which, in Gnosticism, operates between the Highest God on the one hand and the Demiurge and Archon on the other.<sup>26</sup> I would, at any rate, be prepared to defend the proposition that Plato's plurality of demiurges, to some extent of course, echoes that of Parmenides whom he very much admired [for the additional echo of Empedocles see below] — even if his First Demiurge, as he came to be called by later writers, is *toto coelo* different from the goddess-in-the-midst-of-the-rings. In any case, in Parmenides, Plato, and the Gnostics, the lower demiurges are created by the first.

Yet Parmenides' universe, however wrong it may be from an epistemological and ontological point of view, is still the best of possible worlds. This constitutes a radical difference with Gnosticism. Not only each of the elements separately, but also the cosmos as a whole share in at least some of the fundamental characteristics of Being.<sup>27</sup> The information concerning the world which Parmenides is to receive is the best available (Fr. 28B8, 61). What is more, Parmenides really is a man with a scientific purpose; he systematically explains everything, from astronomical phenomena (Fr. 28B10, B11, B14, B15, B15a) down to the determination of the sex of infants in the womb (Fr. 28B17, B18). Presumably, we should say that the world, such as it is, constitutes the best possible mistake. On the other hand, there is not, in Parmenides, as there is in the *Timaeus*, a gradual lessening of perfection, a clear continuity from the highest to the lowest things. In Parmenides, there is and remains a gap between the encapsulated ball of Being and the universe, for all his and our efforts to bridge it. The fundamental question: how can this mistake, i.e. this universe, have happened, cannot be silenced. The reference to a mistake made by men and to divine

<sup>26</sup> *O.c.*, 355-6. Boyancé, however, tends to play down the difference between Plato's splendid Demiurge and that of the Gnostics. *Tim.* 42e, ἔμμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἦθαι is not "négatif": Plot., *Enn.* V 4 [7], 2, describes the One in terms borrowed from precisely this passage.

<sup>27</sup> Each element is identical with itself, Fr. 28B8, 57-8; for Being, cf. B8, 29, 49. The universe is a *plenum*, Fr. B9, 3; for Being, cf. B8, 24. See further my diss., 134ff., 151f.; Verdenius, *Parm.*, 46ff., and in *Phronesis* 1967, 116f.; Burkert, in *Phronesis* 1969, 15; A.P.D. Mourelatos, *Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Naive Metaphysics of Things*, in *Exegesis and Argument* (Festschr. Vlastos), Assen 1973, [16ff.], 42.

deceit is not exactly rational. The ideas of error, and of a gap between our world and what lies beyond, powerfully remind one of Gnostic thought.

There is, I would say, a *sixth* element in the thought of Parmenides which may be pondered in connection with Gnosticism.<sup>28</sup> The poem, as we have seen, for the most part consists of a revelation; the prooemium describes the poet's journey to the revealing goddess, and tells us how she receives him. This journey may be read as going either in the upward direction towards some sort of heavenly region or as being directed towards the mythically remote ends of heaven and earth.<sup>29</sup> However this may be, the revelation itself, as I argued in my dissertation, should at any rate be taken seriously,<sup>30</sup> although it is not, as I would now like to add, a revelation pure and simple. The goddess is not

<sup>28</sup> The attempt was already made by H. Leisegang, *Die Gnosis*, Stuttgart 1955, 364, though rather unsatisfactorily; besides, he unnecessarily called the prooemium 'Orphic'.

<sup>29</sup> Upwards: cf. my diss., 244f.; Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 52f., 57ff. Catabasis: J.S. Morrison, *Parmenides and Er*, in *JHS* 1955, 59ff. To the remote ends of heaven, earth and Hades: Burkert, in *Phronesis* 1969, 1ff. [Note that Er, who has to return to mankind as ἄγγελος to tell what he has seen, travels to a place where heaven and earth and underworld are very near to one another; cf. also Hes., *Th.* 736-57]. Pfeiffer points out that Dike is one of the Horai (Hes., *Th.* 901f.) and that, in Homer, these ladies guard the Gates of Heaven (*Il.* V, 749f.); Burkert's parallels are equally impressive. What today, on the umpteenth reading of the prooemium, strikes me most of all is the contrast between (a) the clarity of the technical details (moving wheels, opening Gates) and (b) the majestic vagueness of the topography. I admit (or rather still believe) that Fr. B1, 11 ἐνθα πύλαι refers to the vicinity of the Palace of Night (ib., line 9), but one cannot be sure where exactly is this Palace. One is led to believe that the precision concerning the technical details is somehow effective and compels acceptance of the other paraphernalia. In fairy-tales, too, some details can be very precise and realistic. In the words of Aristotle, *De phil.* Fr. 15 Ross (Synes.): Ἄ. ἀξιοὶ τοὺς τελουμένους οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι, δηλονότι γενομένων ἐπιτηδείους. — R.J. Clark, *Catabasis: Virgil and the Wisdom-Tradition*, Amsterdam 1979, 33f. and n. 49, puts "Parmenides' ... experience" into the class of 'exstatic', not into that of 'catabatic' journeys ("a kind of astral travel ... by a person's projected self"), but does not enter into the interpretative difficulties of the prooemium; it is useful to realize, however, that Parmenides belongs to what Clark calls the "wisdom-tradition".

<sup>30</sup> Diss., 247: 251 (for what I really should have said see Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 148 n. 0). Cf. Burkert, in *Phronesis* 1969, 15f. Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 149, argues that the prooemium is a "literarische Fiktion", one of his reasons being that the poet uses traditional language and imagery; if this were true, no writer of love poems should be believed to have ever been in love. I note that ib., 144-5, Pfeiffer says: "Es ist richtig, dass Parmenides die Epiphanie einer Göttin erlebt haben muss".



just to be believed on her word; on the contrary, she offers rational arguments one is to judge for oneself (e.g. Fr. 28B7, 4-5).<sup>31</sup> For all that, the prooemium describes what looks like — or is meant, seriously, to look like — a real experience. We start *in medias res*, when the poet is already on his way on the “path of the goddess” (ὁδὸν ... δαίμονος,<sup>32</sup> Fr. 28B1, 2-3), “far away from the walks of men”, as the revealing goddess affirms when she welcomes the poet (Fr. 28B1, 27). Undoubtedly, the philosopher-poet has been chosen c.q. is destined to receive his revelation (Fr. 28B1, 26-28; B8, 61). In a way, the extraordinary things which happen here remind one of the Gnostic ‘Ruf’,<sup>33</sup> for instance of the opening scene of the *Poimandres*.

The Gates of Day and Night at the borders of the universe<sup>34</sup> guarded by Dike through which the poet passes remind one of the central Gnostic tenet that the soul, on its way upwards, has to pass through each of the gates guarded by the Archons.<sup>35</sup> These Archons have to be persuaded. Also Dike has to be persuaded: the Daughters of Sun who are Parmenides’ companions and guides speak to her “with gentle arguments and knowingly persuade her” (τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι ... μαλακοῖσι λογοῖσι / πείσαν ἐπιφραδέως, Fr. 28B1, 15-16). We are not told what it is that they say, but the implication is clear: they know *what* they have to say. This is a remarkable incident, which, to the best of my knowledge, has not been the subject of scholarly inquiry. In a way, what happens is normal: whoever wants to pass closed and guarded doors must identify himself or even know the password. Here, however, we have not a normal situation. The only parallel I know from early Greek literature is to be found in the texts of the so-called Orphic grave-amulets which, perhaps, had better be called

<sup>31</sup> See Verdenius, in *Phronesis* 1967, 99f.; Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 135, 145.

<sup>32</sup> Burkert, in *Phronesis* 1969, 4f. Is this *daimon* the many-named divinity again? — For parallels of “the road of the goddess” see Verdenius, *Parm.*, 66.

<sup>33</sup> See R. Haardt, *Die Gnosis. Wesen und Zeugnisse*, Salzburg 1967, 11; W. Foerster, *Die Gnosis I, Zeugnisse der Kirchenväter*, Zürich/Stuttgart 1969, 8f.; Rudolph, *Die Gnosis*, 137f.

<sup>34</sup> According to Aët. II 7, 1 (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28A37, I p. 224, 5) the firmament constructed during cosmogony lies round all things “like a Wall” (τείχους δίκην). Although the topography of the prooemium, as befits a mythopoetic context (see above, n. 29), is vague, I still like to think that there may be a connection between Dike’s Gates and this Wall.

<sup>35</sup> Rudolph, *o.c.*, 186f.; S. R. C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria*, Oxford 1971, 177, 182.

Bacchic,<sup>36</sup> but there the guardians who have to be persuaded by correct words do not guard gates.<sup>37</sup> There are, however, early Egyptian parallels for gates in the Nether World to the guardians of which the soul has to say certain things;<sup>38</sup> these parallels have been adduced to explain the scene depicted in the Greek grave tablets (where, as we saw, there are no gates). Perhaps Parmenides took the motif of the *mot de passe* from such Orphic-Bacchic examples and transposed it to his Gates; perhaps he had some information about Egyptian lore. This must remain speculation. The parallel with what is found in Gnostic thought is not less surprising for this reason, even if — as is, on the whole, the most probable explanation — the Gnostics took over their plurality of gates from Egyptian religion, transposing them from the Nether World to the Heavens.

There is one detail which I have reserved up till now, since it makes

<sup>36</sup> Splendidly edited by Zuntz, *o.c.*, 275ff. A few years after his book had been published a new tablet was found, the earliest so far (c. 400 B.C.); see G. Pugliese Carratelli, *Par. di Pass.* 1974, 108ff.; M. West, *ZPE* 1975, 229ff.; Pugliese Carratelli, *Par. di Pass.* 1975, 226ff.; G. Zuntz, *WS* 1976, 129ff. There is a fascinating treatment of all of them by W. Burkert, *Le laminette auree: da Orfeo a Lampona*, in: *Atti 14. Convegno Magna Grecia*, Napoli 1975, 83ff. In his *Griech. Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche*, Stuttgart etc. 1977, 432-51, a survey of Orphism and related phenomena, Burkert now appears to believe that the “laminette auree” are Bacchic.

<sup>37</sup> In the Hipponion poem, line 7f., there are φύλακες (of the cold water of Memory) who have to be persuaded by the soul, who identifies itself, to let it drink. This is paralleled in two other tablets (Zuntz, Nr. B 1 and B 2), whereas the others only contain the little speech of the soul (ib., Nr. B3-B8). A related motif, perhaps, is that of the ἄνδρες ... ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστώτες at the bellowing mouth of the chasm of hell at *Rep.* X, 615d-e, who grab tyrants and such-like people; cf. J. Kroll, *Gott und Hölle*, Leipzig-Berlin 1932, 91 n. 3. [There is at least some association between Dike’s Gates and the πύλαι Ἀΐδου]. — For the Gates of Heaven in earlier Greek literature see Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 67f. and for those to the Nether World the — somewhat slovenly — survey in B. Haarløv, *The Half-Open Door*, Odense 1977, 57ff. — H. Diels, *Ein Orphischer Totenpass*, in *Philotesia* (Festschr. P. Kleinert), Berlin 1907, [41ff.], who is skeptical as to the validity of the Egyptian parallel (43 n. 3), aptly characterizes this type of document as a “Reisepass”, but does not dwell on the fact that the more extensive texts start with a “Reiseführer”. The analogy between the Orphic/Bacchic tablets and the Gnostic texts about the voyage of the soul was noticed by R. Crahay, *Éléments d’une mythopée gnostique dans la Grèce classique*, in *Origini* [323ff.], 331: “le thème des ‘gardes’ qui n’accordent le passage de retour qu’aux âmes préalablement instruites”.

<sup>38</sup> *The Book of the Dead* and other texts, cf. Zuntz, *Pers.*, 370f., and P. Boyancé, *Le culte des Muses chez les philosophes Grecs*, Paris 1936, <sup>2</sup>1972, 79, who refers to earlier literature.

the most immediately 'Gnostic' impression of all and certainly, I dare say, would have appealed to any Gnostic who happened to read the text. In the very first lines, the travelling poet is designated as "a man who knows" (εἰδὼτα φῶτα, Fr. 28B1,3). Burkert has argued impressively in favour of the thesis of Diels and Jaeger that what is meant by these words is an "initiated person".<sup>39</sup> I still do not know that this is correct, since the goddess elsewhere calls men "mortals knowing nothing", a traditional epitheton<sup>40</sup> with no obvious reference to whatever mysteries (βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδέν, Fr. 28B6, 4). There is nothing mysterious, i.e. secret, about the revelation, once received, either: Parmenides 'publishes' a poem, which may be read by anyone who is interested; he is not the founder of a religion or of a sect. Furthermore, "the man who knows" is given this qualification *before* he had heard what the goddess has to say,<sup>41</sup> i.e., if one speaks in terms of mysteries, he is called 'initiated' before he has been initiated. Or should we perhaps think of some sort of lesser preliminary initiation, as at Eleusis? This would amount to what may be simplest solution of all, viz. that the traveller has been told or has understood what is his destination,<sup>42</sup> which by no means implies that he would be able to get there on his own or that he already knows what he will experience when he will have arrived.<sup>43</sup> For this reason, a 'Gnostic' interpretation

<sup>39</sup> H. Diels, *Parmenides' Lehrgedicht*, Berlin 1897, 49; W. Jaeger, *Die Theologie der frühen griechischen Denker*, Stuttgart 1963, 116; Burkert, in *Phronesis* 1969, 5, who adds that the revealing goddess is anonymous (just θεά, Fr. 28B1, 22), as the gods often are in the context of the mysteries. His other parallel, however, Athena, "für die Athener ... ἡ θεὸς schlechthin" shows that there is no necessary link between this form of anonymity and mysteries. — If any 'initiation' is suggested in B1, we, its readers, are also 'initiated' by reading it (cf. above, n. 29).

<sup>40</sup> See my diss., 3f.

<sup>41</sup> *Ib.*, 227f.; Pfeiffer, *o.c.*, 79ff.

<sup>42</sup> Pfeiffer's argument *contra* (*o.c.*, 79), viz. that if Parmenides knew what his destination was he would also know how to get there is weak, as everyone who has travelled will testify. Parmenides may have been told by his guides where they would go, or he may have inferred this when he recognized them for the daughters of Sun and the chariot as Sun's, too. — The idea that one knows where one is going and still may be needing some help can be paralleled from the gold leaves: the longer texts of Zuntz's B-group and the Hipponion text begin with a little Baedeker of the underworld (no personal escort here).

<sup>43</sup> My former interpretation of Fr. 28B1, 3 (*o.c.*, 227f.) can no longer be upheld, since it has been proved that there is no ms. support for ἀσκη. Pfeiffer's interpretation, *o.c.*, 99ff., is to be rejected for the same reason.

of εἰδὼτα φῶτα must be excluded; the 'Gnostic' aspects of the prooemium should be limited to the possible association with the 'Ruf' and to the little conversation at the Gates.

However, are not revelation and 'Entrückung' fairly universal phenomena in religious or religiously coloured literature? Indeed, if only the prooemium could be taken into account, it would be otiose to consider Parmenides in the present investigation. However, in combination with the other 'Gnostic' aspects of Parmenides' thought, the 'Gnostic' associations evoked by the prooemium become relevant. There are differences, of course, apart from those already spelled out above; if the divinity which permits and favours the poet's journey (the *daimon* of Fr. 28B1, 3? Dike? Moira?) is also responsible for what has gone on and still goes on in the universe, this benevolence is different from the attitude of the Gnostic Demiurge *qua* god of the world, although the dissimilarity partly vanishes if the persuasion-scene is taken seriously: we have noticed that Dike needs to be persuaded, just as a Gnostic Archon needs to be. Furthermore, the 'Ruf', just as in Gnosticism,<sup>44</sup> comes from a divinity other than that which dominates the universe, if indeed we may consider the Daughters of Helios, who have left the House of Night to which they return together with the poet, to be the messengers of the revealing goddess; they are not, of course, themselves 'Erlöser' in the sense that they also instruct the poet about the truth. A sort of special act of grace appears to be necessary in Parmenides' case, just as in Gnosticism; that this is at issue has, in both cases, to be accepted by those less privileged mortals who only have access to their prophets' words.

I am far too ignorant to risk posing as a structuralist. On the other hand, the notion of 'structure' in the sense of a coordinative pattern assembling a variety of elements is a heuristically useful one. The 'Gnostic' elements in Parmenides are perhaps insignificant when viewed in isolation, but the configuration which keeps them together is strikingly evocative. Hence a knowledge of Gnosticism may afford some help to those who try to understand Parmenides' difficult thought, even if, in Parmenides, what is beyond the universe is the only Thing that can be really known, whereas, in Gnosticism, the God beyond

<sup>44</sup> Rudolph, *Die Gnosis*, 136ff.

is cognitively largely inaccessible and *gnosis* is mostly concerned with the drama which resulted in the origin of the universe and in our banishment thereto, and with the way back. [Note, however, that most of the terms used by Parmenides to describe Being (Fr. 28B8) are negative].

### 3. Empedocles

I have argued that Parmenides' explanation of the origin and condition of the universe is not a rationally satisfactory one. Indeed, much of subsequent Presocratic natural philosophy can be explained as a search for better answers to Parmenides cosmological question. This story has often been told,<sup>45</sup> and it need not concern us here; moreover, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus and Archelaus are not cosmological pessimists. However, there is also the strange and fascinating figure of Empedocles, who, like Parmenides, is a man from Western Greece. He, like the others, follows in the footsteps of the great Eleatic; unlike that of the others, however, his solution to Parmenides' puzzle is, in parts, 'Gnostic' (in other parts definitely not).

Empedocles, as will be familiar, introduced the concept of a cosmic cycle forever repeating itself. It used to be believed that this cycle is a double one and that Empedocles' moving principles, Love and Hate, are by turns responsible for a cosmogony and a zoogony; there would be two 'opposite' worlds. The fragments in *Vorsokr.* have been disposed so as to suit this assumption. Today, a majority of scholars (among whom the present writer) is convinced that the cycle is not double, viz. that there is no cosmogony of Love just as there is no zoogony of Hate.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Cf. Guthrie, *o.c.* (subtitled: *The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*).

<sup>46</sup> For the obsolete *communis opinio* see e.g. Kirk-Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, Cambridge 1960, 326ff. *Contra*: F. Solmsen, *Love and Strife in Empedocles' Cosmology*, in *Phron.* 1965, 109ff., repr. in *Kl. Schr.* I, 274ff., and in D.J. Furley-R.E. Allen, *Studies in Greek Philosophy*, II, London 1975, 221ff.; U. Hölscher, *Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklen*, in *Hermes* 1965, 7ff., repr. w. add.; in: *Anfängliches Fragen*, Göttingen 1968, 173ff.; J. Bollack, *Empédocle*, I, Paris 1965, II-III (Paris 1969); and already H. von Arnim, *Die Weltperioden des Empedokles*, in *Festschr. Gomperz*, Wien 1902, 16ff. See further H. Hoffman-Loss, *Die Wiedergabe der empedokleischen Physik durch Aristoteles*, diss. Göttingen 1966; J.C. Luth, *Die Struktur des Wirklichen*

Aristotle is quite peremptory: "he leaves out the [sc. cosmogony] under Love" (παράλειπει τὴν [sc. τοῦ κόσμου γένεσιν] ἐπὶ τῆς Φιλότητος, *Cael.* Γ 2, 301a15f. = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A42). The ancient evidence — verbal fragments, doxography — as distinct from ancient interpretation only allows for one cosmogony, viz. that of Hate.

Empedocles 'corrects' Parmenides by elevating his own (four) elements to the status of Being. In one stage of the cycle, the four have been thoroughly mingled by Love in the great god Sphairos; this god is then destroyed by Hate (Fr. 31B26-B28; Fr. B30-B31). In this way, the great cosmic masses are separated and made to occupy the sections of the universe where they are now. I cite some passages: *Arist., Met.* A, 4, 985a24f. = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A37, I, 290, 18f. — the less suspect in that Aristotle here is criticizing Empedocles for making *Hate perform a task* (sc. agglomeration) which, properly speaking according to Aristotle, *should be that of Love*:<sup>47</sup> "at any rate, ...

in empedokleischen System, Meisenheim/Gl. 1969; J. Mansfeld, *Ambiguity in Empedocles B17, 3-5*, in *Phronesis* 1972, 17ff. Guthrie, *o.c.*, 167ff., ably presents the earlier orthodoxy, which is capably defended also by D. O'Brien, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle*, Cambridge 1969; and now again by J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2, London 1979, 6ff., in an 'ideal' reconstruction not much based on Empedoclean texts. W. Burkert, rev. Bollack II-III, in *Gnom.* 1972, [433ff.], 441, does not defend the theory of opposite worlds but suggests that there may be minor oscillations during the cycle, a view I accept (see below, p. 284). A.A. Long, *Empedocles' Cosmic Cycle in the Sixties*, in Mourelatos, *Presocr.*, 397ff., argues — mainly against O'Brien — in favour of a single cycle.

<sup>47</sup> Aristotle's criticism (also voiced by him elsewhere) that Empedocles is inconsistent in that he makes Hate unite [viz. parts of one and the same element] and Love destroy [viz. the compound beings in the universe when all things become Sphairos] has impressed too many scholars, e.g. still Long, *o.c.*, who tries to account for the agglomeration of parts of one element in terms of Love and so gives Love a share in the cosmogony of Hate. There is no inconsistency in Empedocles, however, as long as one accepts that Love only combines *different* elements and Hate separates from one another *different* elements only (on *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B22 see the end of this n.). At *GC* II 6, 333b12, moreover, Aristotle, because his criticism has for the moment shifted its focus, is quite unambiguous: ... ἡ φιλία καὶ τὸ νεῖκος συγκρίσεως γὰρ μόνον [sc. φιλία], τὸ δὲ [sc. νεῖκος] διακρίσεως αἰτίον. When, a few lines later, he says (b 20f. = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A40) καίτοι τὰ γε στοιχεῖα διακρίνει οὐ τὸ νεῖκος ἀλλ' ἡ φιλία τὰ φύσει πρότερα τοῦ θεοῦ, his critical point is again that also found at *Met.* 985a24f., cited in the text, viz. that it should really be Love which unites each element with itself (less likely e.g. M. Migliori, *ad loc.*, *Aristotele. La Generazione e la Corruzione*, Napoli 1976). — From *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B22 four things follow: (1), lines 1-3: the relation of each separate element to its parts is a spontaneous one, independent of Love; (2), lines 4-5: compounds have been formed by Love, and those which have been



Hate often combines, because whenever *the Whole is separated into the elements by Hate*, fire and each of the other elements are agglomerated into a unity" (cf. also *Cael.* B, 13, 295a29f.). There is a description of this process in Aët. II, 6, 3 = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A49 (cf. also Phil., *De prov.* II, 60 = *Vorsokr.*, ib.) and in ps.-Plut., *Strom.* ap. Euseb., *PE* I, 8, 10 = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A30. From these passages it is clear that during the process of separation also the heavenly bodies [about which Empedocles, by the way, had some curious ideas] are formed (*Vorsokr.* I, 288, 25f., cf. especially what is said there about the moon, consisting of air which has been "left by" fire; 292, 19f., 30f.). From Fr. 31B35, 8-10, where we have the poet's own words, it is clear that even while Love, in the centre, has already begun to combine elemental parts so as to create living beings, the rest of the elements is still kept "aloof" by Hate, who by no means has left the whole of the cosmic mass.<sup>48</sup> Love, on the other hand, is only responsible for the gradual

made rather like one another feel attracted to one another; (3), lines 5-6, compounds which have not been made like one another hate one another, because of (4), lines 7-8: the original aversion of the elements vis-a-vis one another dating from their original separation by Hate. Now, (1) and (2) are both concerned with the attraction of like to like, (1) in the case of uncompounded elemental parts, and (2) in the case of compounds — but only (2) is a case of Love; (3) and (4) are both concerned with the aversion of unlike from unlike, (3) in the case of compounds, and (4) in the case of uncompounded elements. There is a beautiful symmetry of thought in these lines [for a good interpretation in terms of the old orthodoxy see C.W. Müller, *Gleiches zu Gleichem. Ein Prinzip frühgriechischen Denkens*, Wiesbaden 1965, 34ff.]. — For the 'spontaneous' behaviour of the elements cf. Müller, *o.c.*, 29; see also Verdenius, *Parm.* 24, on the fact that in Empedocles all of nature, i.e. also the elements, is sentient (and ib., 27f.), and esp. *Hylozoism in Early Greek Thought*, in *Symposium. Hooykaas and the History of Science*, Utrecht 1977, [25ff.], 32.

<sup>48</sup> Empedocles' cosmogony, i.e. the change from Sphairos to the separation of the elements by the intervention of Hate (inclusive of the distribution of the heavenly bodies!) is sung by 'Orpheus' in Apollonius Rhodius, *Arg.* I 496ff. = *Orph.* Fr. 29 Kern, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 1B16 [air is not mentioned, and the more poetic "earth and heaven and sea" replace the elements, cf. F. Bömer on Ovid, *Met.* I 22 (*P. Ovidius Naso, Metamorphosen*, Komm. I-III, Heidelberg 1969, p. 25)]:

Ἡεῖδεν δ' ὥς γαῖα καὶ οὐρανὸς ἡδὲ θάλασσα  
τὸ πρὶν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι μὴ συναρηρότα μορφή  
νεῖκεος ἐξ ὁλοοῖτο διέκριθεν ἀμφὶς ἕκαστα  
ἡδ' ὥς ἐμπεδον αἰὲν ἐν αἰθέρι τέκμαρ ἔχουσιν  
ἄστρα σελήναίη τε καὶ ἡελίοιο κέλευθοι·

This, again, is followed by what must be the result of a first mingling of elements in the centre; [note that, in Empedocles (Plut., *De pr. frig.* 953 E = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A69) mountains are thrown up by fire in the earth, etc.]:

return of things to the *status quo ante* in Sphairos; this implies that its responsibility for the present condition of things in the *cosmos* is minimal, its only contribution being that parts of other elements (esp. fire) "dive" into the earth (Fr. 31B54; B52; A68). On the one hand, this provides Love with the materials indispensable to zoogony; on the other, and simultaneously, this is a prelude to the final reunion of all things in Sphairos which will destroy the cosmos created by Hate, and also Love's own creatures. Meanwhile, Love's primary occupation is the creation of parts of living beings and then of whole living beings, by combining elemental pieces (Fr. 31B35; B57-B98).

Empedocles' solution to Parmenides' riddle is twofold. For one thing, the distinction between the universe and Being is abolished in as far the elements themselves constitute Being, a Being periodically united

(continued): οὐρεα δ' ὥς ἀνέτειλε καὶ ὥς ποταμοὶ κελεύδοντες  
αὐτῇσι νύμφησι καὶ ἔρπετα πάντ' ἐγένοντο.

This passage has been neglected by recent students of Empedocles (not in Bollack; O'Brien, *o.c.*, 322-3, only adduces it to parallel Empedocles' use of caesurae and the incantatory effect of his poetry!). *Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 1 ('Orpheus') B16 cryptically states that Ap. Rhod. I, 496-502 are "aus Empedokles, nicht aus d. Orphica (Schol.)"; cf. also E. Bignone, *Empedocle* (Torino 1916, Roma <sup>2</sup>1963), 588-9 n., who acknowledges the Empedoclean echo (νεῖκος), but states that I, 496-8 also echoes Eurip. Fr. 488, 2-3 <sup>2</sup>Nauck (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 59 — Anaxagoras — A62), ὥς οὐρανὸς τε γαῖα τ' ἦν μορμὴ μία: / ἐπεὶ δ' ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων δίχα; note, however, that in Euripides not only (θάλασσα and) συναρηρότα are absent, but also, conspicuously, νεῖκος. Kern *ad loc.*, 99f., says: "Vs. 496-502 Empedoclei sunt (v. Schol.)" [presumably, the source of Kranz' remark], but the scholia, which he prints, are confused, that to I, 498 attributing the διάκρισις to both Hate and Love; cf. W. Spoerri, *Späthellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter*, Basel 1959, 49: "bei Apollonios (erfolgt) die διάκρισις der Grundstoffe durch den Neikos. Falsch ist deshalb die Deutung der Scholien". H. Fränkel, *Noten zu den Argonautika des Apollonios*, München 1968, 77, comments: "Der empedokleische Einschlag in dieser Kosmogonie beschränkt sich auf das weltweite Wirken des νεῖκος; die Gegenkraft φιλία fehlt. Wäre hier das Paar vollständig, so würde die Theorie für Orpheus anachronistisch sein". One wonders, however, if Neikos alone is not already sufficiently anachronistic. It should be noticed, moreover, that the sketchy theogony which follows ["unde ... hauserit obscurum", Kern; Fränkel suggests Hesiod as a remote example. For theogony following upon cosmogony cf. Plat., *Tim.* 40d-41a, with in the theogony itself a possible reference to Orpheus and Musaeus: *Vorsokr.* Fr. 1B8 = Orph. Fr. 16 Kern] and which similarly emphasizes the action of disruptive forces (war among the gods), only intimates that the reign of Zeus changes things. This explains why Love is not mentioned at Ap. Rhod. I, 500-1. Orpheus sings because he wants to compose a quarrel. The lack of explicitness as to the influence of love [cosmogony] and law [theogony] in the whole passage is poetically most effective.

For other echoes of Empedocles in Ap. Rhod. see below, n. 62.

in Sphairos, whereas Parmenides' Ball of Being was permanent. For another, the origin of the universe (less perfect than Sphairos!) is explained by the intervention of a pernicious force, Hate (Fr. 31B17, 19 Νεῖκος ... οὐλόμενον), the antagonist of Love. In Parmenides, the origin of the universe is *not* explained in a rationally acceptable way, for human error and divine deception as causes still conflict with the idea that Being is permanently inviolate; in Empedocles, the ball of Sphairos is periodically and understandably violated. Yet there are definite links between Empedocles' moving principles Love and Hate and what can be found in Parmenides. His Love is the direct successor to the coupling goddess of Parm. Fr. 28B12 and to the subordinate Eros of Fr. 28B13. Now Arist., *Met.* A 3-4, 984b 20-985 b 10 (cf. ib., 985 a 29-31), in his comparison of the "moving cause" as formulated by Hesiod and Parmenides on the one hand<sup>49</sup> and by Empedocles on the other, suggests that Empedocles, the first to introduce duality in the moving cause, added Hate to Parmenides' Eros. This is not wholly correct, for (a) — as Plutarch pointed out already<sup>50</sup> — there is, in Parmenides, a 'moving cause' superior to Eros, and (b), according to Cicero, there were, apart from the supreme God of the universe, also gods such as Love and Hate (*Cupiditas* and *Discordia*, which translate φιλία and νεῖκος<sup>51</sup>) in Parmenides' world. In Parmenides, both Love and Hate are subordinate to a superior

<sup>49</sup> Cf. above, n. 15, n. 16, and text thereto.

<sup>50</sup> Cf. Martin, *o.c.*, 64f.

<sup>51</sup> See above, n. 13. For *discordia* = νεῖκος and *cupiditas* = ἔρως cf. A.S. Pease on Cic., *ND* II 28, p. 223f. For *discordia* = νεῖκος and *amicitia* = φιλότης cf. Cic., *Lael.* 24; "Agrigentum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent, quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam" (passage not in *Vorsokr.*, Bollack, O'Brien). For *Discordia* as Empedoclean Νεῖκος in Ennius' *Annales* (266f. + 521f. Vahlen) see E. Norden, *Ennius und Vergilius*, Berlin 1915, Stuttgart <sup>2</sup>1966, 10ff., esp. 12f., and E. Bignone, *Ennio ed Empedocle*, in *RFIC* 1929, 10ff., repr. in *Studi sul pensiero antico*, Napoli 1938, Roma <sup>2</sup>1965. Norden had argued, however, that the body of *Discordia* consists of the four elements in equal portions ("cui par imber et ignis, spiritus et gravis terra"); Bignone points out that this recalls Love, not Hate, and suggests, correctly no doubt [see also Kranz, *Vorsokr.* I, p. 498, 38f.], that *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B17, 18-19 should be compared. L.M. Oostenbroek, *Eris und Discordia. Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der ennianischen Zwietracht*, diss. Leiden 1977, 67, again follows Norden, but does not answer Bignone's arguments. For *Empedocles*, Norden's translation is out of the question.

divinity; in Empedocles, they are themselves supreme. I have argued above that there is, perhaps, a sort of duality in the Parmidean goddess Dike-Ananke-Moira, not only in the sense that she operates both in the sphere of Being and in that of the universe, but also in that her cosmic activity is both favourable and unfavourable;<sup>52</sup> the idea of this duality may have influenced Empedocles as well. Significantly, however, Empedocles demotes Ananke to a lower status, viz. to that of a divinity only operating inside a world: Fr. 31B116, from the *Katharmoi*, opposes Charis and Ananke.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, Empedocles really speaks of a divinity that creates the *physical universe* — a Demiurge, to borrow the later terminus technicus<sup>54</sup> —, and an evil one at that; see Arist., *o.c.*, 985a6f., τὸ δὲ νεῖκος [sc. αἰτίαν] τῶν κακῶν — also in the cosmogonical sense, ib., 985 a 24-27, 29-31. The demiurgic function of Love is restricted to attracting a few parts of the other elements to the earth and to creating the *world of living beings*. This division of labour points ahead, in a striking way, to that in Plato's *Timaeus*, where it is the Demiurge who builds the universe and where lesser gods construct the bodies of living beings (see below, p. 296f., for the tremendous differences between Empedocles and Plato).<sup>55</sup> If we look back to Parmenides, we may state that, in Empedocles as in Parmenides, the world we inhabit is inferior to another, perfect condition of things. There is no longer, however, a puzzling gap between Being and the universe, but a real and only temporary rupture caused by a definite and identifiable force. Empedocles' cosmology, unlike Parmenides', has no need of being deceptive (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B17, 26).<sup>7</sup>

Hate, then, is a 'Gnostic' element in Empedocles' thought. For all that, his world-view is largely un-'Gnostic': there is a cycle, i.e. the

<sup>52</sup> Above, p. 265f., p. 269f.

<sup>53</sup> Χαρίς ... στύγει δὲ στύλητον Ἀνάγκην, "as Neikos is countered by Philia" (Zuntz, *o.c.*, 404). For the oracle of Ananke see below, p. 286.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. U. Bianchi, *Origini*, 338; *Selected Essays* (SHR XXXVIII), Leiden 1978, 52. In a way, the term is not good, because Hate is destructive, not creative: only Love creates, i.e. is a Demiurge. It is the work of Love which is formally compared to that of artists (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B23).

<sup>55</sup> Solmsen, *Kl. Schr.* I, 480, says "the range of activities given to ... [Plato's] Demiurge is large enough to embrace ... the manipulations of Empedocles' Cypris"; but Cypris' (Love's) task is only to a very limited extent that of the Demiurge and much more that of the lesser gods.

process repeats itself in *perpetuum*, and thus there is, in the poem *On Nature* at least, a clear balance between the forces of good and evil. Surprisingly, our bodies, being the work of Love, are good, even if human life in general, just as in Parmenides, is depicted in morose terms (Fr. 31B2; cf. Fr. B15, Fr. B62, 1).

In the *Purifications*<sup>56</sup> (much influenced by Pythagoreanism: metempsychosis, vegetarianism) the emphasis upon man's unhappy lot is much stronger. A *daimon* speaks, who long ago put his trust in mad Hate, killed, and was exiled for thirty thousand seasons during which he was condemned to take on one body after another and to wander from one element to another; all hated him and threw him out (Fr. 31B124; B139). There is a lesson here for humanity, for men themselves have been produced by feuds and laments (Fr. 31B124). Men go on killing, not knowing that human souls have been imprisoned in the animals that are sacrificed (Fr. 31B137, B136). The Golden Age of Love, without bloodshed, lies far back (Fr. 31B128). It looks as if, for the time being, Love's progress towards final reunification (known from the physical poem) has been arrested by Hate, who is assisted by human agency.<sup>57</sup> Men should at once change their ways; there is salvation in vegetarianism and in abstaining from certain plants (Fr. 31B136, B140, B141, B144, B145).

It is perhaps an insoluble question whether Empedocles called the souls of *all* men *daimones*;<sup>58</sup> some, at least, were, for it would be

<sup>56</sup> The basic new edition of the fragments, with commentary, is now that of Zuntz, *o.c.*, 181ff. See also Ch. H. Kahn, *Religion and Natural Philosophy in Empedocles' Doctrine of the Soul*, in *AGPh* 1960, 3ff. (repr. in J. P. Anton-G. L. Kustas, *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, Albany N.Y. 1971, 3ff., and — without the app. — in: Mourelatos, *Pres.*, 426ff.).

<sup>57</sup> This interpretation supports Burkert's hypothesis (above, n. 46), which is argued by him, however, on different grounds.

<sup>58</sup> M. Detienne, *La démonologie d'Empédocle*, in *REG* 1959, 1ff., argues that in Empedocles *daimon* means several things, among which 'soul'; see further Kahn, in: Mourelatos, 434f., and Guthrie, *HGrPh* II, 263, who accept that *daimon* = 'soul'. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Boston 1957, 153, argues that in Empedocles the "occult self" of each human being which persists through metempsychosis is *daimon*, not *psyche*; this cannot be proved: R. Heinze, *Xenokrates*, Leipzig 1892, Hildesheim 1965, 86f., suggests, correctly no doubt, that the *daimones* οἵτε μακραιωνος λελάχασσι βίοτο are the same as the θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B115, 5 ~ B21, 12; B23, 8); cf. also Fr. B146-B147. The first, to my knowledge, to equate the immortal part of the soul persisting through metempsychosis with *daimon* is Plat., *Tim.* 90a (not yet *Rep.*

captious to deny that the "I" who tells us about his adventures during metempsychosis is also the "I" who writes a letter to his friends at Acragas to inform them that he now goes about among men as a god, viz. Empedocles (Fr. 31B112). Fr. 31B129 speaks of a "human being" (ἄνθρωπος), perhaps Pythagoras or Pherecydes, whose memory bears comparison with that of the *daimon*, since he easily remembered what had happened up to twenty lives ago. We also hear about those who, eventually, become "seers, singers, doctors and leaders among men" and that from these come forth gods who live and eat together with the other gods (Fr. 31B146, B147). The capital sin of men, on the other hand, viz. the slaying and eating of relatives, is, as we have seen, similar to the original sin of the *daimon*. Yet, I believe that we should distinguish the *daimones* (some of them also appearing as humans) from the souls of the majority of mankind.<sup>59</sup>

X. 617a: here the souls *choose* their *daimon* = character/destiny before they are reincarnated). Hipp., *Ref.* I, 3 = *Vorsokr.* 31A31 is interesting because apparently distinguishing between a great many *daimones* who administrate things on earth and "all souls" who migrate to all sorts of animals; but (1) at *Ref.* VII, 29, 6, explaining Fr. 31B115, 4-5, 'Hippolytus' says that *daimon* = *psyche* (*Vorsokr.* I, p. 356, 11f.), and (2) in *Ref.* I, 3-4, the theories of Empedocles and Heraclitus have been thoroughly conflated, and the administrating *daimones* attributed to Empedocles may in fact be the φύλακες of Heracl., *Vorsokr.* Fr. 22B63, for which 'Hippolytus', *Ref.* IX, 10, 6, is our only source. — Verdenius, *Parm.* 71, rightly points out that "in the Καθαρμοὶ Empedocles emphasizes the contrast between mortals and himself". Cf. also below, n. 69, and text thereto.

<sup>59</sup> I have refrained from referring to the "unfamiliar place", the "meadow of Ate" and the "roofed-over cave" (Fr. 31B118 + 121, B120) visited by the *daimon* after the fall because, with Zuntz (who follows Wilamowitz), *o.c.*, 199ff., 254f., I believe that it refers not — allegorically! — to our own world, but indeed to the Nether World. For the other view see Dodds, *o.c.* (below), 298, Guthrie, *o.c.*, 254 n. 3, and A. Motte, *Prairies et Jardins de la Grèce Antique*, Bruxelles 1973, 380f. (also for references). Burkert, *rev.* Zuntz, in *Gnom.* 1975, [321ff.], 325, argues that the anonymous scholar [τοῦ ... τῶν σοφῶν, who explains what a μυθολογῶν κόμπος ἄνθρωπος had said] cited Plat., *Gorg.* 493aff., gave an allegorical interpretation of Hades myths, applying them to life on earth, and suggests that this scholar was influenced by Empedocles. This does not convince me. Dodds *ad loc.* (*Plato. Gorgias*, Oxford 1959, 296f.) suggests the scholar interpreted an "old religious poem" written by the μυθολογῶν ... ἄνθρωπος. For such interpretations we now have the parallel of the Derveni papyrus, a commentary of the late 5th cent. on an earlier poem (see Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, Cambridge Mass. 1972, 248 n. 48, and below, n. 74 and text thereto); it seems to me highly doubtful that we should read back such interpretations into the poetry itself — in the present case, into that of Empedocles. Ancient evidence for his underworld as a symbol of the world is late, the earliest example, Clem., *Strom.* III 14, being doubtful (γένεσις here is not "the world of becoming" but "being born"). [Dodds' suggestion



The fate of this *daimon* and, by implication, that of men according to Empedocles has been often compared to the idea of man's earthly exile in Gnostic thought.<sup>60</sup> What has not, to the best of my knowledge, been emphasized sufficiently before is that this fall, this exile, and the continued fate of man, have been caused and continue to be caused by Hate, i.e. by Empedocles' *evil Demiurge*. Hate has special powers over *daimones* and human *souls* and is able to counteract the in the long run a-cosmic activity of Love. Some of this recalls Parmenides' cosmic goddess — who is by no means as evil as Hate is — who likewise has a special psychopompic function. Furthermore, the sinning *daimon* is punished according to an "oracle of Ananke" which is simultaneously an "old law voted by the gods" (Fr. 31B115, 1-2); it is a reasonable assumption that this Ananke derives from that of Parmenides, i.e., if I have argued correctly, from one of the aspects of the latter's cosmic goddess.<sup>61</sup> In Plato, again, it is the (good!) Demiurge who creates the immortal parts of souls and proclaims the laws of

that the σόφος is a Pythagorean is plausible. There is a possible link with Philolaus, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 44B14 — not accepted as authentic by Burkert, *Lore* 247 —, who appeals to οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι καὶ μάντιες for the idea that the body is a tomb. DK, quoting *Gorg.* 493aff. ad Fr. 44B14, suggest that Philolaos is the κόσμος ἄνθρωπος, not the σόφος, *quod non*. Dodds cites Frank for the argument that "the Pythagoreans could not accept the traditional underworld literally, since their astronomy left no room for it". This, again, is valid only for the astronomy of Philolaus, for which see Burkert, *o.c.*, 337ff.; which, again, is definitely later than that of Empedocles, whose earth is at the centre of the universe].

<sup>60</sup> Cf. the literature reviewed by H.J.W. Drijvers, *The Origins of Gnosticism as a Religious and Historical Problem*, NTT 1967/8, [321ff.], 342, transl. in K. Rudolph (ed.), *Gnosis und Gnostizismus* (WdF 262), Darmstadt 1975, 798ff.; ib., 826f.; and by K. Rudolph, *Gnosis und Gnostizismus: Ein Forschungsbericht*, in *TR* 1971, 41ff. (Empedocles, Orphics). — Note, however, that A. Dieterich, *Abraxas*, Leipzig 1891, does not mention Empedocles, and that his 'Orphics' have been influenced by the Stoa (*o.c.*, 83)! A.H. Armstrong, *Gnosis and Greek Philosophy*, in *Gnosis* (Festschr. H. Jonas), Göttingen 1978, 87ff., 94f., speaks of the fallen, "alienated" soul in Empedocles but does not refer to the context in which this idea, in Empedocles, occurs. Burkert, *Keph.*, 143 and n. 55, argues that the *Purifications* anticipate the Gnostic myths about the fall and fate of the soul and refers to a definition of *Gnosis* by C. Colpe which does not include the cosmological aspect. R. Crahay, *o.c.* (above, n. 37), had already set out a whole Greek scenario, assembled from various bits and pieces, in which the Gnostic myth and drama are anticipated; here, too, the cosmological aspect remains outside the picture. See further below, p. 292f.

<sup>61</sup> For Ananke in Parmenides and Empedocles see e.g., Zuntz, *Pers.*, 403f.; see further above, n. 22, n. 53.

metempsychosis that hold for them (*Tim.* 41d-42e). Although Plato develops the idea of human responsibility in a way which is not only more elaborate, but also rather different from what we find in Empedocles, he, too, associates the Demiurge with metempsychosis.

That the fallen *daimon* preaches the gospel of metempsychosis and vegetarianism reminds one of the Gnostic "Erlöser"; with the big distinction, of course, that he is a sinner himself.

In conclusion, I would say that Parmenides' dualism was both attenuated and accentuated by Empedocles, who is somewhat less original than he is sometimes supposed to be. The advantage of the present approach, viz. that from a 'Gnostic' point of view, is that it brings out Empedocles' dependance upon Parmenides in more detail.

As far as we know, Parmenides' fame as a poet was outshone by the much less difficult Empedocles; presumably, he was more of a success with philosophers such as Plato than with the world of literature in general. There are several indications that Empedocles continued to be read and appreciated. In Apollonius Rhodius, there are several passages where arguments and descriptions are clearly imitated, and there are quite a few verbal echoes in the *Argonautica*, some of them even from the *Purifications*;<sup>62</sup> and Ennius must at least have read the poem *On nature*.<sup>63</sup> The longer of these passages should have been printed in the C-section of the Empedocles-chapter in *Vorsokr.* It is not unlikely that the *Purifications* were read in some circles as a source for Pythagorean anthropology and ethics, since Timaeus of Taormina accused him of "having stolen the theories" of Pythagoras,<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Cf. above, n. 48. There is another passage of some length at *Argon.* IV, 672-4, 676, where the poor monstrous fellows inhabiting Circe's island are described in Empedoclean terms (cf. *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B61); ib., 676-80, they are said to have been produced by the earth before the sun was a strong as it is now (cf. Fr. 31A70, I p. 296, 1-2; A75; and the 'doubtful' Fr. 31B154, now accepted by Kranz as genuine, I p. 501, 31f.). Not all of these parallels have been noted by Fränkel, *Noten* 77f., 531f. — Other echoes have been pointed out by G. Boesch, *De Apollonii Rhodii Elocutione*, diss. Berlin 1908, 4; from the *Kath.*: III, 1015-6 ~ B138; III, 298 ~ B136, 2; IV, 1184 ~ B112, 11; from the phys. poem: IV, 676f. [cf. above, n. 48]; III, 1263 ~ B43, 1; E. Livrea, *Ap. Rh. Arg. Lib. IV*, Firenze 1973, 205f. on II, 672f., adds I, 854 ~ B59, 2 and 5; IV, 1024 ~ B100, 11. Burkert, *Keph.* 142-3, gives a number of other references concerned with what was known of Empedocles in Hellenistic times.

<sup>63</sup> Above, n. 51; cf. also below, n. 151.

<sup>64</sup> *FGrH* 566 F 14 ap. D.L. VIII, 54 [for other names of authorities see D.L. VIII, 54-56] = *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A1, I p. 277, 31f.: ἀκοῦσαι δ' αὐτὸν Πυθαγόρου Τιμαίου διὰ

and also Theophrastus, in his influential historical work, appears to have connected him with the Pythagoreans.<sup>65</sup> Note that Parmenides was made the pupil of an otherwise unknown Pythagorean by Sotion (early 3rd cent. B.C.).<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, Empedocles' cosmic Hate became part of the imagery of poetry.<sup>67</sup> The investigation of Parmenides' and Empedocles' 'Nachleben' cannot be pursued here; much of this heritage, of course, had been incorporated into the great Platonic synthesis, i.e. had become tralatitious.

One exception, however, must be made. When the above had been written, I became aware, to my surprise, that an *interpretatio Gnostica* of Empedocles still survives. This, at least, is what is argued by J. Frickel in a splendid paper dealing with *Unerkannte gnostische Schriften in Hippolyts Refutatio*.<sup>68</sup> The passage concerned is *Ref.* VII, 29-31. I

τῆς ἐνάτης ἰστορεῖ, λέγων ὅτι καταγνώσθεις ἐπὶ λογοκλοπία τότε ... τῶν λόγων ἐκωλύθη μετέχειν.

<sup>65</sup> *Phys. op.* fr. 3 Diels ap. Simpl., *In Phys.* 25, 19f. (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 31A6), and similarly ap. D.L. VIII, 55-6 [discount an interpolation: Hermippus Fr. 26 Wehrli, which should stop at συνδιατρίψαι], *Vorsokr.* I, 277, 31f. Cf. also Verdenius, *Parm.* 25. It should, however, be noted that Theophrastus, in his *Opinions of the Physicists*, the fragments of which as collected by Diels are for the most part concerned with a discussion of their *archai*, can only have had the physical poem in mind. The link, then, which he may have suggested between the Pythagoreans and Empedocles must be sought in the analogy between Love : Hate as a pair of opposed principles (good : bad) and similar distinctions in, perhaps, the Pythagorean table of opposites discussed by Arist., *Met.* A 5, 986 a 22ff., and especially that between the (Platonic!) principles Theophrastus attributes to the Pythagoreans at *Met.* 11a26ff., viz. the One and the Indeterminate Dyad [on this passage see Burkert, *Lore*, 62-3]. Remarkably, no fragments from the *Phys. op.* dealing with the Pythagoreans have as yet been identified.

<sup>66</sup> Fr. 27 Wehrli, ap. D.L. IX, 21 (*Vorsokr.* I, p. 217, 24f.). F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Supp. II : *Sotion*, Basel/Stuttgart 1978.

<sup>67</sup> See Bömer, *o.c.*, 17, and on *Ov.*, *Metam.* I, 17. R. Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen*, Strassburg 1901, 66, argues that "die Kosmogonie in der hellenistischen Poesie oft behandelt ist". Spoerri, *o.c.*, 47f., correctly points out that the cosmogony in Ap. Rhod. I, 496f. is significantly different from that to be found with so many Latin poets [but he has missed the (cosmological) passage in Ennius, which, although probably derived from Ennius' own reading of Empedocles and not necessarily dependent upon Hellenistic Greek poets, is itself a Hellenistic example and one which influenced the later Latins].

<sup>68</sup> In: *Gnosis and Gnosticism* (NHS 8), Leiden 1977, [119ff.], 126ff. Apparently, Frickel is not familiar with the new views on Empedocles (see above, n. 46 and text thereto), and he does not refer to the very useful paper by J.P. Hershbelt, *Hippolytus' Elenchus as a Source for Empedocles Re-examined*, in *Phron.* 1972, 97ff., 187ff., or to that of Burkert in *Kephal.* The new facts presented by Frickel, however, render a new investigation of this problem inevitable. [I may perhaps add that my own view

believe, however, that the proofs as offered by Frickel are not yet complete; at any rate, his suggestions prompted me to indulge in a bit of *Quellenforschung* of my own, the results of which I intend to publish elsewhere. Personally, I am fully satisfied that *Ref.* VII, 29-31 is indeed a Gnostic piece (Hippolytus' interpolations, moreover, can be easily distinguished). There are several remarkable features to these chapters. What, in the present paper, is of most interest to us is the fact that, says this anonymous Gnostic, Love has *no* demiurgic function *at all*, since even the living beings (ourselves included) which according to the real Empedocles are the work of Love are here the creations of Hate. Love's only remaining function is that it still brings about non- or postcosmic unity and assists souls [no distinction here between *daimon* and human soul, cf. p. 213, 3 W.]<sup>69</sup> to escape from the cosmos. Love, to our surprise, is assisted by a force intermediate between itself and Hate : (Empedocles') Muse, also called *Dikaïos Logos*, who plays the part of the Gnostic 'Erlöser'/'Offenbarer'. In a typically Gnostic way, not only (Empedoclean) vegetarianism is preached, but marriage and procreation are prohibited as well : to beget children is to assist Hate,<sup>70</sup> and Hate is designated, *expressis verbis*, as τὸν

of Hippolytus' working-methods is a sort of compromise between that of Frickel, *Die "Apophysis Megale" in Hippolyts Refutatio*, Roma 1968, and that of K. Koschorke, *Hippolyts Ketzerbekämpfung und Polemik gegen die Gnostiker. Eine tendenz-kritische Untersuchung*, Wiesbaden 1975].

<sup>69</sup> This lack of discrimination is first found in Plutarch, cf. Hershbelt, *Hipp. Elench.*, 189, 193f.

<sup>70</sup> P. 214, 9f. Wendland. Dodds, *Gr. Irr.*, 154f. and 176f., n. 23, tends to accept this as valid for Empedocles, and so does O'Brien, *o.c.*, 209-10, who needs this passage for a zoogony of Hate in the double cycle. O'Brien adduces some other passages in support; but Gellius' allegorical interpretation of the taboo on beans, *NA* IV, 11, 9-10 (*Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 31B141) is about too much sex, not about no sex at all. Note that Clement, *Strom.* III, 24, 1-2, gives exactly the same interpretation of the bean taboo and that in the larger context, ib. III, 12 and 21-25, where he argues against the Marcionite ban on marriage [and Marcion, says Hippolytus, plagiarized Empedocles], he quotes a number of lines from Greek poetry against having children and no doubt would also have quoted Empedocles if this had been possible [he quotes other lines of Empedocles in this polemic, III, 14, 2-3]; on Plut., *De soll. an.* 964 D-E see Burkert, *Kephal.* 138. On Gnostic abstinence generally see Rudolph, *Die Gnosis*, 263f.; in the chapter preceding those on Empedocles Hippolytus deals with Saturnilus, attributing to him both vegetarianism and the ban on sex (p. 209, 14f. W.) — this has been stolen from Irenaeus : cf. *Adv. Haer.* V, 18, p. 198 Harvey : "*nubere autem et generare a Satana dicunt esse; multi autem ex iis, qui sunt ab eo, et ab animalibus* (cf. Empedocles!) *abstinent*". See also Hershbelt, *Hipp. El.*, 207.

δημιουργὸν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου.<sup>71</sup> Hate, again, is responsible for the fall of the *daimon*, i.e., says this Gnostic, for that of human souls generally (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B115, completely preserved only here, is quoted in support).<sup>72</sup>

#### 4. Early Orphism (and Early Pythagoreanism)

I shall not go deeply into the difficult subject of Orphism, although to Professor Quispel this is a very dear topic.<sup>73</sup> Of course, skepticism towards Early Orphism in general is no longer possible after the discovery and partial publication of the Derveni papyrus.<sup>74</sup> We now have an incontrovertible *terminus ante quem* (c. 330 B.C.) for *Orph.* Fr. 21a Kern, lines 2, 4a, and 7,<sup>75</sup> and the commentary in the papyrus also discusses lines that were new to us. As to the fragment ap. Kern as a whole, judgement must be postponed until all of the papyrus has been published. [This modern 'Orphic mystery' has its own initiated, who are obliged to remain silent]. Even if, provisionally, Fr. 21a Kern as a whole would be accepted as a genuine Early Orphic piece, it still would be irrelevant to our present discussion (though not, perhaps,

<sup>71</sup> VII, 29, p. 212, 17f.; cf. p. 211, 14f. W. — Burkert, *Keph.* 140f., points out that 'Hippolytus' fundamental dualism agrees fairly well with Plutarch's "philosophische Position", but argues that Plutarch himself depends on an earlier source, a point of view to which I would agree (cf. below, n. 152).

<sup>72</sup> It should be noted that Zuntz, in his edition of the fragments, does not deal with the special character of the chapters in Hippolytus.

<sup>73</sup> *The Demiurge in the Apocryphon of John*, in *Nag Hammadi and Gnosis* (NHS 14), Leiden 1978, 10f.; *God is Eros*, in *Early Christian Literature and the Classical Tradition* (Festschr. R.M. Grant), Paris 1979, [189ff.], 200f.

\* <sup>74</sup> S. G. Kapsomenos, *Der Papyrus von Derveni*, in *Gnom.* 1963, 222f.; 'Ο ΟΡΦΙΚΟΣ ΠΑΠΥΡΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΘΕΣΣΑΛΟΝΙΚΗΣ, in *Arch. Delt.* 1964, 17ff.; *The Orphic Papyrus Roll of Thessalonica*, in *Bull. Am. Soc. Pap.* 1964-5, 3ff. See further Ch. Picard, in *Mélanges Carcopino*, Paris 1966, 737ff.; R. Merkelbach, in *ZPE* 1967, 21ff.; W. Burkert, *Orpheus und die Vorsokratiker*, in *Antike und Abendl.* 1968, 93ff., and *La genèse des choses et des mots*, in *EPH.* 1970, 443ff.; P. Boyancé, *Remarques sur le papyrus de Derveni*, in *REG* 1974, 91ff. For another early commentary on an old religious poem see above, n. 59.

<sup>75</sup> Plato, *Lg.* IV, 715c (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 1B6, *Orph.* Fr. 21 Kern) paraphrases line 1. *Orph.* Fr. 168 Kern, which contains some lines from Fr. 21a, shows the unstable character of this literature: additions to the old stock were freely made. R. Reitzenstein, in: Reitzenstein-Schäfer, *Studien zum antiken Synkretismus*, Leipzig-Berlin 1926, repr. Darmstadt 1965, 68ff., believed that the long version — Fr. 168 — is old and drew some fantastic conclusions.

to that of monistic or pantheistic side-currents in Gnosticism): there is no sign of a depreciation of the universe in these lines, for Zeus, the supreme deity (line 7), "is" earth and heaven, breath and fire, the sea, the sun, and the moon.<sup>76</sup> No Phanes/Eros here, let alone an Evil Demiurge, since it is Zeus himself who produces all things out of himself.

It is, as yet, impossible to say whether the poem expounded in the papyrus is older than the 5th cent. B.C.; the commentary appears to be dateable to the end of the 5th cent. (cf. especially Burkert's fundamental exegesis).

As to the Orphic Eros/Phanes, there is — in spite of Aristophanes and of one of the more mysterious gold leaves<sup>77</sup> — as yet no evidence to put him in (let alone before) the Presocratic period. His conspicuous absence from Fr. 21a Kern is not, however, decisive. Orphic literature seems to have been of all sorts.<sup>78</sup> But if Aristophanes' tirade would be accepted as evidence for an Early Orphic Phanes/Eros, the conclusion that this sort of Orphic literature<sup>79</sup> is as irrelevant to the present paper as that represented by Fr. 21a Kern would still follow. In Aristophanes' cosmogony, there is not the slightest hint that the subsequent, i.e. actual, condition of things is inferior to their original condition — quite the reverse.

The only pre-Platonic Orphic (or Orphico-Pythagorean) doctrine

<sup>76</sup> Boyancé, *REG* 1974, 95, calls this pantheism; so also U. Bianchi, *La religione greca*, Torino 1975, 235. K. M. Fischer, *Tendenz und Absicht des Epheserbriefes*, Göttingen 1973, 71f., argues that "die Allgottvorstellung" is a universal phenomenon; *Orph.* Fr. 168 Kern, which he dates to the Hellenistic period, is characterized by him as *not* Gnostic.

<sup>77</sup> See above, n. 16, *in fine*. — *Orph.* Fr. 47 Kern, a text on a gold leaf from Thurii from which Diels reconstructed an Orphic poem (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 1B21; "durchaus hypothetisch") has to be written off as unintelligible, cf. Zuntz, *Pers.*, 344ff.; line three ΤΕΦΑΝΗΣ can be read as τ' ἐφάνης or as τε Φάνης, and those who, backed by D. Comparetti's first accessible report (in *JHS* 1880, 114), read the latter, drew wild conclusions from it.

<sup>78</sup> See P. Boyancé, *Sur l'Orphisme*, *REA* 1938, 163ff.; M. L. West, *Graeco-Oriental Orphism in the Third Cent. B.C.*, in *Trav. VIe Congr. Ét. Class.*, Madrid-București-Paris 1976, [221ff.], 221. — For an up-to-date authoritative survey of Early Orphism and related phenomena see W. Burkert, *Griech. Rel.*, 432-51.

<sup>79</sup> West, *o.c.*, dates this class of Orphic writings to the Hellenistic period. [I cannot enter here into the influences of later Orphic upon Gnostic literature].



which can be — and actually has been<sup>80</sup> — fruitfully compared to a Gnostic doctrine is the belief that incarnation is a punishment;<sup>81</sup> see Plat., *Crat.* 400c = *Orph. Fr.* 8 Kern, *Vorsokr. Fr.* 1B3, and the other texts cited by Kern together with Fr. 8. The suggestion that the crime involved is that committed by the Titans against Dionysus cannot be rejected out of hand.<sup>82</sup> There is nothing cosmological about this crime and punishment, however; the one ‘Gnostic’ parallel in Early Orphism is anthropological only. Of course, if, as the Orphics said, “the body is a prison”, there must be something wrong with bodies. There is no sign, however, that human bodies were ever thought of by the Orphics as natural phenomena or that they inferred that, if these are wrong, all of nature must be wrong, too. As a matter of fact, a pessimistic anthropology is, historically speaking, perfectly compatible with an optimistic cosmology (cf. Fr. 21a Kern).

There is a good parallel for this compatibility. The anthropological doctrine of the Pythagorean Philolaus (2nd half 5th cent. B.C.), viz. that “the body is a tomb”, is even more pessimistic than its Orphic counterpart.<sup>83</sup> A dualistic view of the relation between body and soul with a clearly puritanical colouring is typical for early Pythagoreanism generally. But there is no sign of pessimism in the cosmology of Philolaus; on the contrary, in his world all things are held together by “harmony”.<sup>84</sup> Compare also the Pythagorean theory cited Plat., *Gorg.* 507e-508b:<sup>85</sup> heaven and earth, and gods and men, are held

<sup>80</sup> Cf. Rudolph, *Die Gnosis*, 303, and above, n. 60. Bianchi, *Rel. gr.* 230, admits that Orphic dualism is concerned with body/soul only.

<sup>81</sup> and the body a prison. There is a difference between this view and the σῶμα-σῆμα doctrine [cf. Philol., *Vorsokr.* 44B14] also mentioned by Plato in this passage. The views are, however, related; at *Phaed.* 62b = *Vorsokr. Fr.* 44B15 the idea that the body is a prison is attributed to Philolaus.

<sup>82</sup> See S. Reinach, *Une allusion à Zagreus dans un problème d'Aristote*, in *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, t. 5, Paris 1923, 61ff.; the paper by Boyancé cited above, n. 78; the somewhat skeptical I. M. Linforth, *The Arts of Orpheus*, Berkeley/L.A. 1941, repr. New York 1973, 307ff.; M. Detienne, *Dionysos mis à mort ou le bouilli rôti*, in *ASNPisa* 1974, 1193ff.

<sup>83</sup> Above, n. 81; cf. also n. 59.

<sup>84</sup> *Vorsokr.* 44B1, B2: ἀρμονία binds together the constituents of the universe. The “one in the centre of the sphere” is τὸ πρῶτον ἀμοισθὲν, Fr. 44B7. See Burkert, *Lore*, 251f., 268.

<sup>85</sup> See Dodds *ad loc.*, 337f. Burkert, *Lore*, 77f. and esp. n. 157, argues that all the ideas in this passage, when taken separately, can be paralleled from non-Pythagorean

together by love and orderliness and wise restraint, and this is precisely why the world is called κόσμος; all these relations depend on “geometrical equality”. This is as un-Gnostic as can be, and significantly anticipates the cosmology of the *Timaeus*.<sup>86</sup>

The main lesson to be drawn from this brief overview of Early Orphism and Early Pythagoreanism is, or so I believe, that a dualistic and pessimistic anthropology alone does not yet constitute a ‘Gnostic’ phenomenon. Gnostic anthropology is unthinkable without a very definite and pessimistic view of the universe and its creator. Parmenides may have been influenced by the Pythagorean doctrine of the relation between body and soul, if, that is, *Simpl. In Phys.* p. 39, 20f. is indeed about metempsychosis;<sup>87</sup> but this influence is certainly not the most important strand of his anthropology.<sup>88</sup> His originality, as compared with Orphism and Pythagoreanism, is that this anthropology has been linked up in a consistent way with a pessimistic cosmology — not, as we have noticed, in the sense that the world is evil, but in as far as there is a definite gap between the mistaken universe and a better condition of things. In Empedocles’ anthropology, the Pythagorean strands, in the *Purifications* at least, are flagrant; as we have noticed, however, he has been even more deeply influenced by Parmenides and by his struggle to answer the latter’s unanswered question. This is eminently visible in his physics, where we encounter a distinction between the present condition of things (~ the universe) and their future and past condition (~ Sphairos). Strictly speaking, therefore, Parmenides and Empedocles are far more ‘Gnostic’ than Early Orphism and Early Pythagoreanism<sup>89</sup> can be said to be.

### 5. Plato and Aristotle on the Demiurge and the Universe

The Plato of the early and the mature dialogues is not interested in cosmology as such. He is a Parmenidean — and more of one than

literature (although he admits that it has a “distinctly Pythagorean flavor”). But it is their combination which is decisive.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Burkert, *Lore*, 78.

<sup>87</sup> Above, p. 268f. and n. 19.

<sup>88</sup> Above, n. 4, and text thereto.

<sup>89</sup> For Parmenides and Empedocles as influenced by Pythagoreanism and as ‘Pythagoreans’ see above, p. 287f.; for Theophrastus’ platonizing interpretation of ‘Pythagoreanism’ see above, n. 65.

the Presocratic physicists who make up the Parmenidean tradition<sup>90</sup> — in as far as he posits perfect and really real Things (the Ideas) beyond this world of ours. The ascetic anthropology of the *Phaedo*, to be sure, has been much influenced by Orphic and Pythagorean ideas, and the suggestion, in the myth (*Phaed.* 109bf.), that we live in one of the numerous hollows near the real surface of the earth has a disparaging ring. In the same dialogue, however, Anaxagoras is singled out for special criticism because he had failed to show that things in our world have been arranged in *the best way possible* (97cff.; at 99b-c, this criticism is extended to all physicists). This is cosmological optimism.<sup>91</sup> Plato, after all, is much concerned with bridging the gap between the world and the Ideas: things here reflect, imitate, participate in the Ideas. Plato's pessimism, I would say, is anthropological, not cosmological, and it is mitigated by his conviction that a measure of contact with the higher reality of the Ideas is possible, if not for everybody, then at least for the leaders of a just society. This, of course, is what the argument in the *Republic* is about. Here, too, there are passages which have a pessimistic ring: in the famous allegory of the cave, *Rep.* VII 514aff., the world of ordinary human experience is reduced to a shadowy performance at the dead end of a subterranean hollow [cf. the imagery of the *Phaedo*-myth], with men as prisoners. The latter image, no doubt, echoes the Orphic idea of the body as a prison.<sup>92</sup> In the story of the cave, there is, if I may use the Gnostic term, an 'Erlöser' who *frees* one of the prisoners and not only shows him what really goes on inside the subterranean world, but also takes him up the steep path to the real world outside. Plato explains that this is an image for the journey of the soul away from this world to the true world of the Ideas; the anonymous 'Erlöser' turns out to be education, i.e. philosophy.<sup>93</sup> In this passage, too, the emphasis is

<sup>90</sup> Cf. above, n. 45, and text thereto.

<sup>91</sup> For *Gorg.* 507ef. cf. above, n. 86, and text thereto.

<sup>92</sup> See above, n. 81, and on this idea in the allegory of the cave Guthrie, *Hist. Gr. Phil.*, IV, Cambridge 1975, 517f.

<sup>93</sup> τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνοδὸν: *Rep.* 517c; for the comparison with leaving Hades ib. 521c; for παιδεία as τέχνη ... τῆς περιπαγωγῆς [sc. of the "fettered" soul] ib., 518b-d; for the rôle of μαθήματα and φιλοσοφία ib., 521cff. In *Rep.* X, 614d, Er is to be ἄγγελος (a different concept from that of "Erlöser"); cf. further K.W. Tröger, *Mysterienglaube und Gnosis in Corpus Hermeticum XIII*, Berlin 1971, 162, with references.

on the anthropological and epistemological, not on the cosmological aspect. There is no suggestion whatever that the whole show inside the cave has been arranged, let alone the cave been created, by a malicious power. It is, though, interesting to note in what way Plato uses tralaticious motifs for his own purposes: that of the body as a prison, and that of the underworld interpreted — as by the σόφος in the *Gorgias* — as a symbol for the world of our own experience.

In the masterpiece of his old age, the *Timaeus*, Plato sets out to accomplish what Anaxagoras, as had been argued in the *Phaedo*, had failed to do. He explains how it has come to be that the world and what is contained therein reflect and resemble<sup>94</sup> the Ideas: a supreme divinity, the Demiurge, made the world after an ideal pattern, and caused it to be filled with beings which likewise resemble ideal things. The introduction of the ideal paradigm is an original feature of this cosmology; so is also Plato's invention of the predecessor of Aristotle's matter, viz. the Mother of Becoming, Place, Nurse, Receptacle or Erring Cause, which had been there before the Demiurge began his work and is indispensable to it, but remains a source of inevitable imperfection. The world is good, but only the Ideas are perfect.

After what has been said above,<sup>95</sup> it is not necessary to return to the subject of the division of labour between the Demiurge and the "young gods".<sup>96</sup> At present, I am more concerned with the special emphasis put by Plato on the *goodness* of the Demiurge (*Tim.* 29a, 29d-30a, 37a). He *explicitly* rejects the suggestion that such a Demiurge could be *not* good: "if this world is beautiful and its maker is good, clearly he looked to the eternal [sc. model], but if they are what cannot even be uttered without blasphemy, he looked to a [sc. model] which has come to be" [εἰ μὲν δὴ καλὸς ἐστὶν ὁδε ὁ κόσμος ὃ τε Δημιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ αἰδὶον ἐβλεπεν· εἰ δὲ ὁ μὴδ' εἰπεῖν τινὶ θέμις, πρὸς γεγονός, *Tim.* 29a]. Consequently, in what is perhaps Plato's most widely read and studied work, one finds the *notion of an evil Demiurge*, even if this notion is only in-

<sup>94</sup> Cf. B. Witte, *Der Eikos Logos in Platons Timaios*, in *AGPh* 1961, 63ff. (rather than Guthrie, *Hist. Gr. Phil.* V, 250f.).

<sup>95</sup> P. 271, 272.

<sup>96</sup> νέους ... θεοῖς, *Tim.* 42d. This should not be translated with "new gods": the Demiurge, who has created them, is 'older', and he teaches them how to work.

troduced to be immediately and totally rejected. It is, of course, a tantalizing question what "model which has come to be" Plato's Demiurge could have looked to at all, had he not been good. The only possible candidate (since there is not, as yet, a world or another world) is, I would say, Lady Mother of Becoming, who already is in a condition of sorts *before* the Demiurge begins to build: she is said to contain "traces" (ἵχνη) of the elements which she moves and by which she is moved at random, with a sort of "winnowing" of like to like as a result (*Tim.* 30a; 52c-53b).<sup>97</sup> What sort of world would result if a Demiurge would use this condition of things as a model? A world such as that of Anaxagoras, I suppose, whose cosmic Intellect is a source of movement and of the separation of the constituents of the original agglomeration only (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 59B12, B13),<sup>98</sup> and this, it will be recalled, is the sort of world Plato rejected already in the *Phaedo*.

There is much, in the *Timaeus*, that is implicitly polemical. We should not, however, think only of Anaxagoras in this respect, but also of Empedocles. I believe that the special emphasis put by Plato on the goodness of the Demiurge implies that he rejects Empedocles' use of "accursed Hate" as a cosmological agent, viz. as the entity responsible for the distribution of the great elemental masses and for the installation of the heavenly bodies. He also rejects the idea that the cosmos is periodically destroyed by a Love creating the perfect Sphairos. The world such as it is *here and now* is as perfect as is possible: it is the Demiurge whos has already made *this* world a perfect ball, described by Plato in terms which recall Empedocles' description of the non-

<sup>97</sup> There is already γένεσις before there is a world (*Tim.* 52d).

<sup>98</sup> It should be noted that in Anaxagoras, each thing in the world reflects the original condition of things (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 59B4, the beginning; B6; B11). — For Plato's criticism of Anaxagoras see e.g. Solmsen, *Kl. Schr.* I, 339; for the original mass in *Vorsokr.* Fr. 59B1 as a material principle cf. Arist., *Met.* K 6, 1064b 29f.; A 2, 1069b 21; and H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, Baltimore 1935, repr. New York 1976, 77 n. 313, 236. Aët. I, 7, 5-6 explicitly compares Anaxagoras and Plato: Anaxag. says εἰστήκει κατ' ἀρχὰς τὰ σώματα, νοῦς δὲ αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε θεοῦ κ.τ.λ. [cf. Arist., *Phys.* Θ I, 250b 24f.]; Plato, however, οὐχ ἑστηκότα ὑπέθετο τὰ πρῶτα σώματα, ἀτάκτως δὲ κινούμενα [cf. *Tim.* 30a, κινούμενον ... ἀτάκτως]; διὸ καὶ ὁ θεός, φησὶν, ἐπιστήσας, ὡς τάξιν ἀταξίας ἐστὶ βελτίων [cf. *Tim.* 30a εἰς τάξιν ... ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, ἡγησάμενος ἐκεῖνο ... ἄμεινον], διεκόσμησεν αὐτά.

cosmic God made by Love.<sup>99</sup> The Demiurge, also, reorganizes the confusedly moving mass of the Receptacle by giving specific shapes to the elemental particles and molecules (*Tim.* 53c ff.) and by setting out the elements according to the order of an ἀναλογία (*Tim.* 31b-33b): the *present* distribution of the great elemental masses is not the work of a disruptive, but that of an *organizing* force, and for this reason the condition of things becomes a stable one: the world shall forever remain as it has been organized by the Demiurge *now*. What the Demiurge, ordering the previously only minimally informed (ἵχνη!) elements in this way, brings about among them is φιλία (*Tim.* 32c); the polemical point against Empedocles is unmistakable.<sup>100</sup> The organization and putting into position of the heavenly bodies, too, is the work of the good Demiurge; here, too, the rôle of "harmony" is decisive (*Tim.* 35b ff.). A cosmic cycle such as that taught by Empedocles is no longer possible: the larger rôles of Love and Hate have, so to speak, been telescoped, so that a permanent condition of things results, whereas the zoogonic rôle of Love has been taken over by the Young Gods, as demiurges of a lower order.

There is no Hate in Plato's universe, only Love, and what is not very good there (the fact that we are mortal, for instance, or do not live as long as we could have if our skulls had been thicker)<sup>101</sup> is either inevitable or all for the best.

This reading of the *Timaeus* with Empedocles' cosmology in mind has the additional advantage of bringing out to the full the character

<sup>99</sup> *Tim.* 33a ff. ~ Emp., *Vorsokr.* Fr. B28, B29, cf. B134. There are also echoes of Parmenides' description of the Sphere of Being, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B8, 42f.; also this Sphere is, so to speak, made immanent.

<sup>100</sup> Cf. e.g. Guthrie V, 278 n. 1. The idea is already to be found in the *Symposium*: 186d-e (microcosm), 188a-b (macrocosm). — J. P. Hershbell, in his careful study *Empedoclean Influences on the Timaeus*, in *Phoenix* 1974, 145 ff., argues that such influences are minimal or nonexistent. His criteria for determining influence are: (1) explicit reference by the author of the influenced work; (2) obvious and significant verbal echoes; (3) similar or identical concepts or ideas (*o.c.*, 146). I believe that a fourth criterium should be added: critical reaction or correction (cf. Hershbell, *o.c.*, 153). — I have no wish to deny, of course, that Plato's use of 'analogy' and 'harmony' is inspired by Pythagoreanism (cf. above, n. 84 and text thereto). The point, however, is that the Demiurge in Plato uses the properties of number to shape the body and soul of the Universe, while Empedocles' Love only uses proportion to create the parts of living beings (cf. *Vorsokr.* Fr. B96, B98) and, one may presume, the a-cosmic Sphere.

<sup>101</sup> *Tim.* 75b f., followed by Chrysippus (*SVF* II 1169; cf. II 1176, 1178).



of the pre-cosmic agglomerative mass, which, in Plato's view, was perhaps not even three-dimensional,<sup>102</sup> but at any rate not spherical. Here Love is absent, for this is introduced only later by the Demiurge. Should we say that Hate is present? Plato does *not* say so at *Tim.* 52c-53b; rather, the interactions of the traces of the elements and the receptacle are described as a sort of blind and irrational process, which has gone on for ever and ever: there is no need, as in Empedocles, of a disruptive force to dismember a Sphere, because there never had been such a Sphere. Such separation, however, as does take place in the Receptacle — (the "winnowing") — before the intervention of the Demiurge could be *interpreted* in terms of Empedocles' Hate as the force responsible for the agglomeration of separate elements. Actually, this is how it was interpreted by later authors, who read back Empedocles' Hate into Plato's pre-cosmic mass. One may think, for instance, of the cosmogony at the beginning of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: there is a chaotic mass of disordered elements and no ordered universe; "*frigida pugnabant calidis, umentia siccis*" etc., until "*hanc deus et melior litem natura diremit*" by separating the elements from one another and organizing the physical universe.<sup>103</sup> We also find it in Plut., *Fac.* 926E-927A, who explicitly compares the condition of things under Hate as in Empedocles to that in the *Timaeus* before the Demiurge sets to work.<sup>104</sup> These, however, are

<sup>102</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 31b 4ff.: God gives the universe βάθος and makes it στερεοειδῆ (32a-b); note that *stereos*, in this passage, is ambiguous: both 'three-dimensional' and 'hard', i.e. material.

<sup>103</sup> The lines quoted are *Metam.* I, 19 and 21. On this cosmogony in Ovid and others see the excellent study by Spoerri, *Späthell. Ber.*, I-113, who rightly emphasizes its platonizing colouring. There is, however, also an Epicurean aspect to the war of the elements; cf. Bignone, *o.c.*, 106ff. Note that the expression "god and nature" is Aristotelian (cf. *Cael.* A4, 271a33).

<sup>104</sup> Spoerri, *o.c.*, 75, points out that Plutarch is closer to Plato than Ovid c.s. because he does not speak of the pre-cosmic battle of the elements. But Plutarch refers to Titans and Giants (926 E), i.e. to war, and to the speculative idea of the destruction (διάλυσις, i.e. into its elements) of the cosmic order, and in one and the same breath to τὸ νεῖκος ... τὸ Ἐμπεδοκλέους. — To illustrate the pre-cosmic condition Plutarch (926 E) quotes *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B27, 1-2, which is also quoted by Simplicius, who says it refers to the condition of things in Sphairos, i.e. not, as in Plutarch, to that under the dominion of Hate. Cherniss, in the Loeb-ed., *ad loc.*, p. 82f. n. c, argues that Plutarch's interpretation may be right. But Simplicius had the text before his eyes. Plutarch, as so often, is probably quoting from memory [for a splendid example of ἐπελθόντα τῇ μνήμῃ κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν see the whole of

later developments, and the fact that the pre-cosmic condition as in the *Timaeus* does not, strictly speaking, correspond to that of the physical universe under Hate as in Empedocles<sup>105</sup> should not make us unwilling to accept that Plato's cosmogony *as a whole* is (also!) a critical response to that of Empedocles, and that this, in part, explains why he calls the Demiurge good, and anyhow fully explains why he explicitly rejects the idea that a Demiurge could be not good.

Aristotle believed that Plato, in the *Timaeus*, meant what he said, viz. he assumed that Plato was serious when he spoke of cosmogony.<sup>106</sup> He also accepted Plato's central and novel view that the divine is (1) perfect, or wholly good, and (2) never changes.<sup>107</sup> According to Aristotle, however, the world is eternal,<sup>108</sup> and this rules out cosmogony. The idea of a Demiurge, in consequence, has to be rejected. Aristotle's argument (or rather part of it) against this idea has been preserved

*Vit. Per.*, c. 24], and this is why there is a stopgap variant (ἀγλαὸν εἶδος instead of Simplicius' ὠκέα γυῖα) at the end of line 1. — See also H. Görgemanns, *Unters. zu Plutarchs Dialog De Facie*, Heidelberg 1970, 100f., and my paper *Hesiod and Parmenides in Nag Hammadi*, to be publ. in *VigChr.* 1981.

<sup>105</sup> J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues*, Cambridge 1942, enl. repr. Amsterdam 1967, 59 and 140, compares Empedocles' Hate and Plato's Mother of Becoming, both, in his view, responsible for the movement of like to like. But in Empedocles, Hate (cf. above, n. 47) is not the cause of this movement, but only of the breaking-up of Sphairos and other compounds, while in Plato it derives from the interaction between the "traces" of the elements and the Receptacle. Hershbell, *Emp. Infl.*, 155, following O'Brien (*o.c.*, 312f.), argues against Skemp that 'like to like' is caused by both Love and Hate; see, however, above, n. 47. — For a good discussion of these passages in the *Tim.* see W. Spoerri, *Encore Platon et l'Orient*, in *RPh.* 1957, [209ff.], 212f.

<sup>106</sup> *Cael.* A1, 10-12; this was accepted by Theophr., *Phys. op.* Fr. 10 and Fr. 11 Diels. Xenocrates, Fr. 54 Heinze, and Speusippus, Fr. 54b Lang, argued that Plato did not say what he meant, since what he really meant was that the universe can no more have a beginning than an end. From this it would follow that Plato did not tell his pupils how to interpret the *Timaeus*, i.e. literally (Aristotle) or allegorically (Speusippus-Xenocrates). For the discussion in antiquity see M. Baltes, *Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten*, Leiden 1976; the other Peripatetics generally followed Aristotle (Baltes, *o.c.*, 83ff.). Cf. also Phil., *Aet. mu.* 14-16.

<sup>107</sup> Plato, *Rep.* II, 378eff.; Arist., *De phil.* Fr. 16 Ross ap. Simpl., *In Cael.* p. 288, 28-289, 15 Heiberg. Simplicius points out Aristotle's debt to Plato. On the Demiurge in the *Tim.* as being good see above, p. 295f.

<sup>108</sup> *Cael.* A, 10f., cf. A 3, A 9, 279a 17f., B 1, *Mete.* A 14, 352a 17ff.; *De phil.* fr. 19a-c Ross. *Aët.*, II 5, 1.

by Philo, *Aet. mu.* 39-43 = Arist. Fr. 21 Rose, *De Phil.* Fr. 19c Ross.<sup>109</sup> This is chiefly concerned with a Demiurge's motives for destroying a universe and so Plato is not its only target since according to Plato the world is not destroyed; but it includes Plato in as far as it also deals with the implications of a universe's being constructed by a possible Demiurge. Aristotle argues that, if a universe is constructed, this entails a change, i.e. also a change of the activity of the Demiurge. Such a change, however, is contrary to the perfect and therefore unchanging nature of God (cf. also *Simpl.*, *In Cael.* 288, 28ff. = Arist. Fr. 16 Rose, *De phil.* Fr. 16 Ross). The fashioning of a new universe to replace an old one would entail that the substitute is either (a) worse than or (b) equal to or (c) better than the actual universe. If (a), then God's nature will have changed for the worse, which contradicts the definition of the divine. If (b), God would behave like a foolish child and be a ματαιόπνοος<sup>110</sup> — *quod non*. If (c), also the Demiurge will have become better than before, hence when he made the former universe his art and understanding must have been less good than they are this time: a sacrilegious thought (ὅπερ οὐδὲ θέμις ὑπονοεῖν ἔστιν). This perhaps even echoes *Tim.* 29a, ὁ μὴδ' εἰπεῖν τι θεμῖς.<sup>111</sup> Aristotle, in other words, not only, like Plato, rejects the

<sup>109</sup> The arguments in *De phil.* lean heavily on Plato's arguments that the world cannot be destroyed: Fr. 19a, about internal and external causes of destruction ~ *Tim.* 32c-33b, *Laws* 903b; Fr. 19c, that the Demiurge shall not destroy the universe, depends on the main cosmological argument of the *Tim.* See further J. Mansfeld, *Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought*, in M.J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Studies in Hellenistic Religions* (EPRO 68), Leiden 1979, [129ff.], 140ff.

<sup>110</sup> This may echo an expression of Plato: at *Tim.* 40d, the speaker says that a further exposition of astronomical theory without the help of instruments would be a μάταιος ... πόνος. Echoes of Heraclitus may also be involved: *Vorsokr.* Fr. 22B52, the αἰών as a playing child; Fr. B70, on παίδων ἀθύρματα, cf. Hom., *Il.* XV, 361f. See B. Effe, *Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der aristotelischen Schrift "Über die Philosophie"*, München 1970, 20 n. 68. In its present form in Philo, however, argument (b) is perhaps better understood as being directed against the Stoic theory that each universe made by God is an exact replica of its predecessor (cf. EPRO 68, 169ff.); for anti-Stoic amplifications of Aristotle's arguments see Effe, *o.c.*, 18f., and below, p. 310f. To be sure, the idea can be paralleled in the Epicurean argument against the Demiurge ap. Aët. I, 7, 9, *Dox.* 301a, 6-7: κεναῖς ... πράξεσιν (so Effe, *o.c.*, 23), but 'Aëtius' does not argue against repeated cosmogonies.

<sup>111</sup> See above, p. 295. — The expression itself may have been varied somewhat by Philo; cf. *Op. mund.* 17, λέγειν ἢ ὑπονόειν οὐ θεμιτόν; *Leg. all.* II 3 (on God: if he is greater or smaller, he is perishable, ὅπερ οὐδὲ θέμις νοῆσαι); *Aet. mu.* 32, ὑπνοεῖν οὐκ εὐαγές; 81, ὑπνοεῖν τὸ ἀδύνατον; 84 (God will die), ὁ μὴδὲ θέμις ὑπνοεῖν.

idea that God should ever destroy the world, but in addition to this also refuses to believe that he should have made one, for even this suggestion implies the blasphemous thought that something would have been wrong with the nature of God. Also note that, *if only for argument's sake*, Aristotle studies the possibility that a Demiurge would have made or makes a world which is *not* as good as it could be, just a Plato, though only negatively, had formulated the notion of a bad Demiurge.<sup>112</sup>

It will perhaps be argued that Aristotle's arguments in *De phil.* Fr. 19c Ross cannot have been directed against Plato, because he also argues against the destruction of the universe which is excluded by Plato. I have already said above that Plato is not the only target of the argument: this is confirmed by *Cael.* I 10 (10-12 as a whole are against Plato), which argues against all the physicists (279b12ff.), and singles out Empedocles and (surprisingly) Heraclitus for special mention. Now part of the third argument of *De phil.* Fr. 19c is easily applicable to Plato. Furthermore, we know that Aristotle, in the *De phil.*, also argued against Plato's unique cosmogony; this follows from Cic., *Luc.* 119 = Arist. Fr. 22 Rose, *De phil.* Fr. 20 Ross: "*neque enim ortum esse unquam mundum, quod nulla fuerit novo consilio inito tam praeclari operis inceptio*". Cicero continues with what is a brief recapitulation of *De phil.* Fr. 19a (ap. Phil., *Aet. mu.* 20f.), which shows that the brief version of the other argument just quoted belongs in the same context; and it is anyhow related to *De phil.* Fr. 19c. *Novum consilium*, of course, applies to the *Timaeus*, where the Demiurge decides to plan an order of things. Effe, in his excellent study of the *De phil.*, has argued that this argument against the cosmogony of the *Timaeus* was used and adapted by Epicurus and his followers in their criticism of (not only Plato, but also of) the Stoics.<sup>113</sup> It survives in three versions: (1) Aët. I, 7, 4-10; (2) Lucr. V, 156ff.; (3) Cic., *ND* I, 21f.<sup>114</sup> The sections of this argument which deal with the Stoic idea that the universe would have been made *for the sake of man* cannot, of course, derive from Aristotle, and may be discounted. However, I accept Effe's proof that part of the argument

<sup>112</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> *O.c.*, 23ff.

<sup>114</sup> I shall return to the Epicureans shortly.

was taken over from the *De phil.*<sup>115</sup> I shall concentrate on the version of Aëtius, which explains Cicero's "*novum consilium*" by focussing on the condition of God (= the Demiurge) *before* he decided to create. He must have existed, and cannot have been asleep, for God is eternal, and an eternal sleep equals death. If awake, he was either unhappy or happy; if the first, he would not have been God; if the second, he would not have troubled himself with κέναις ... πράξεσιν, i.e. by creating a world. Effe points out that 'Aëtius' does not argue from unchangeability and perfection, as Arist. *De phil.* Fr. 19c, but from eternal being and eternal bliss<sup>116</sup> as attributes of God. This is not the whole truth. Aët. I, 7, 4ff. argues against both Anaxagoras and Plato<sup>117</sup> because both, says Aëtius, hold that God intervenes in order to build the world from elements: immobile elements in Anaxagoras' case, disorderly moving ones in Plato's case. Both, he says, are wrong to assume (a) that God bothers about men [it should, of course, be noted that Providence is not only an important factor in Stoic theology, but also in that of Plato!] and that (b) for this reason he constructed the universe (τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζοντα, *Dox.* 300a8). For the divinity — described with Epicurean epithets — *is not receptive towards whatever evil* (κακοῦ πάντος ἄδεκτον); if he would shoulder the burden and worry about the construction of the universe (εἰς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου κατασκευὴν) he would be as unhappy (κακοδαίμων) as a labourer or carpenter. From this it would follow, again, that a Demiurge *cannot be good*. Finally, according to Phil., *Aet. mu.* 10 = Arist. Fr. 18 Rose, *De phil.* Fr. 18 Ross, Aristotle accused those who hold that the universe has come to be and will be destroyed of "shocking atheism" (δεῖνῃν ... ἀθεότητα), because they believe that the "visible god" (sc. the world) in no way differs from "things manufactured by hand" (τῶν χειροκμήτων). Now Philo, in the sequel, only dwells

<sup>115</sup> The structure of the argument *Dox.* 300a 17-301a 8 is the same as that of *De phil.* Fr. 19a and c; the idea of an inactive God is an Aristotelian motif; the argument is used by Boethus, ap. Phil., *Aet. mu.* 83f., who depends on *De phil.* fr. 19a-b-c.

<sup>116</sup> Effe, *o.c.*, 25 and n. 95, adds that these epithets are also valid for Aristotle's God.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. above, n. 98, *in fine*; both are again the target at *Dox.* 300a 19f. ὅτε ἦν ἀκίνητα τὰ σώματα ὁ ἀτάκτως ἐκινεῖτο. The suspicion that Aristotle, in the *De phil.*, argued against both Anaxagoras and Plato cannot be avoided.

upon Aristotle's sarcastic rebuttal of those who believe that the world will be destroyed like a house built by men. On the part of a pious person who himself believes in the creation of the universe this is understandable. Aristotle, however, was also concerned with the refutation of cosmogony, and although he will not, presumably, have accused Plato of "terrible atheism" and have preferred to attack others in this harsh way, Plato's theory as in the *Timaeus* is included among the theories attacked.<sup>118</sup> The term χειροκμήτων, after all, refers to what a (human) 'demiurge' would make, and it is used by Aristotle in a related context: *Cael.* II, 5, 287b14f.: the cosmos is a perfect sphere, and nothing "made by hand" stands comparison (σφαιροειδὴς ... ὁ κόσμος ... καὶ ... κατ'ἀκρίβειαν ἔντορνος ὥστε μὴθὲν ... χειρόκμητον ἔχειν παραπλησίως).<sup>119</sup>

To sum up: both Plato and Aristotle argue by using the idea of a bad Demiurge and a bad world. They both believe that the world is good. Plato therefore infers that the Demiurge is good, whereas Aristotle argues that there can be no Demiurge.

Speusippus and Xenocrates and Aristotle and his followers all held that the world is eternal. The Stoics and Epicureans, on the other hand, were of the opposite opinion. The question continued to be debated until the end of the Hellenistic period, and even later. In this debate, the arguments which had been developed by Plato and Aristotle were of constant service. This means that also the position of the Demiurge was argued about again and again.

<sup>118</sup> Effe, *o.c.*, 9, argues that Aristotle's opponents are the Atomists, whom Philo mentions *ib.*, 8f. But Philo says "Democritus with Epicurus and the great mass of Stoic philosophers", and Stoics and Epicureans cannot have been attacked by Aristotle. From *Cael.* I, 10 it follows that he attacked all who had argued that the world has been generated c.q. has been generated and is destructible. When Arist., Fr. 18, speaks about (a) the violent winds or terrific storms and (b) the lapse of time, or neglect on the part of the builder, as causes of the destruction of the house, which in this comparison represents the universe, this clearly alludes to the διτταὶ αἰτίαι, external and internal, of *De phil.* fr. 19a Ross.

<sup>119</sup> See J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, Berlin 1863, Darmstadt <sup>2</sup>1968, 166; at *Phys.* B 1, 192b 29 οἰκία καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν χειροκμήτων ἕκαστον are opposed to what has φύσιν.



6. *The Debate about the Duration of the Universe among the Stoics and their Opponents*

Jonas and others have characterized Gnosticism as a sort of anti-Stoicism. There would be a sharp and fundamental contrast between Stoic optimistic monism and Gnostic pessimistic dualism. As a rough, preliminary description this will do. A closer look, however, reveals the hazards of simplification.

The Stoics (with some exceptions: see below, p. 307) believed that the world is periodically destroyed and periodically reborn. There is a cosmic cycle forever repeating itself in exactly the same way. This theory had to be defended against the well-known arguments of Plato and Aristotle which I have outlined in the previous paragraph. Since I have studied the arguments which were used or may have been used in these contexts by the Stoics at some length elsewhere,<sup>120</sup> I shall here only set out some of their more important features.

The Stoic God, like Plato's and Aristotle's, is good. The ordered world is good; inside it are God and Providence, who penetrate, construct, sustain and eventually destroy it. This destruction by a God who had also made the world could only be defended against the arguments of Plato and Aristotle (a) by arguing that the destruction of the world is inevitable because of its physical constitution and (b) by arguing that this destruction or conversion into fire is not bad but good, inasmuch as the condition of things when all have become fire = God is far superior to the variety of things in the world. The world, in other words, although splendid and as good as can be: rational, administrated by Providence, etc., is inferior to another, metacosmic condition of things. This superior condition, on the other hand, cannot last forever, again because of its physical constitution: when total conflagration has occurred, the fire is gradually extinguished until only a 'seed' of fire survives within the liquid mass that remains. This is the starting-point of a gradual reconstruction, resulting in another world and, in due time, in another supreme moment of total conflagration. Such evil as there is in a world is, as the Stoics somewhat cavalierly argued, inevitable or all for the best of the whole.

<sup>120</sup> *O.c.* (above, n. 109), 144ff.

To an important extent, this amounts to a revival of Presocratic ideas. It has long been recognized (in fact, already by the Stoics themselves) that Zeno and his followers, by choosing fire as their element and principle, also chose a predecessor: Heraclitus. It is even quite probable that they accepted a curious hint of Aristotle, seriously elaborated by Theophrastus, according to which Heraclitus would have held that the world periodically arises from and disappears into fire.<sup>121</sup> [This is not valid for the real Heraclitus].<sup>122</sup> However Aristotle, in the passage in the *Cael.* where he appears to speak in this way, had coupled Heraclitus with Empedocles, for whom this interpretation is indeed valid; for Empedocles argued that there is a cosmic cycle.<sup>123</sup>

The Stoic view, then, actually is a close parent of that of Empedocles; although our information on this point is scanty, there are a few traces of their interest in Empedocles (the theory of the four elements).<sup>124</sup> Although they differ from him in making the same agency responsible for both the construction and the destruction of the world, they agree with him in holding the destruction to be a positive event. They sharply differ from him, though, in assuming that the construction, although less positive than final conflagration, is also positive. In Stoic cosmology, the worst moment in the cycle has come when almost the whole of fire has turned into a liquid mass: the watery world with only a germ of fire in it is *Chaos*.<sup>125</sup> The divine spark of fire confronts these waters in the manner of Plato's Demiurge approaching the precosmic mass of the Mother of Becoming — but this Stoic Demiurge is *inside* matter and contains *in itself* the 'spermatic logoi' of all things to be, whereas Plato's Demiurge is not inside the precosmic mass and has to look to Ideas which are separate from both it and him. It is important to note, moreover, that according to Zeno part of the liquid mass first turns into earth *before* the Demiurge

<sup>121</sup> *Cael.* A 10, 279b 14f.; Theophr., *Phys. op.* Fr. 1 Diels, *Dox.* 475, 14-476, 2, cf. Diog. Laert. IX, 8. See G.S. Kirk, *Heraclitus. The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge 1954, 21962, 22f., 319f.; J. Kerscheneiner, *Der Bericht des Theophrast über Heraklit*, in *Hermes* 1955, 385ff.

<sup>122</sup> Kirk, *o.c.*, 314f.

<sup>123</sup> See above, p. 278f.

<sup>124</sup> See EPRO 78, 171f.

<sup>125</sup> *SVF* I, 104 = Schol. Ap. Rhod. I, 498 ... Ζήνων δὲ τὸ παρ' Ἡσίοδου χάος ὕδωρ εἶναι φησιν. *SVF* I, 103.

sets to work. This is, anyhow, how he interpreted Hesiod's cosmogony: first Chaos, then Earth, then Eros — for Eros is "more fiery".<sup>126</sup> This amounts to an implicit rejection of Empedoclean cosmogonic Hate.

What, in this theory, is comparable to Gnostic views recalls what has been said above concerning Parmenides and Empedocles.<sup>127</sup> Like the Gnostics, the Stoics believed that our world, as compared to a better condition of things, is not perfect; like them, they saw its destruction as a positive event. Unlike them, however, they still saw the world and its Demiurge as good.

Although their theory was consistent and well-argued, it met with much opposition. For one thing, the Stoic theodicy, i.e. their explanation or justification of evil in this world, was felt to be rather unsatisfactory by many people; and it is so indeed.<sup>128</sup> Evil was explained away rather than explained. For another, their view of God and Providence as responsible both for the destruction and the construction of the world was not fully proof against the old arguments of Plato and Aristotle, which were repeated and further refined by later Academics and Peripatetics. There were efforts to make this theory more palatable: Zeno (ap. Alexander of Lycopolis 12; 19, 2f. Brinkmann, not in *SVF*) had said that the universe will be consumed by "fire", and Cleanthes (Phil., *Aet. mu.* 90 = *SVF* I, 511) had said this consummation will be accomplished by "flame". 'Fire' and 'flame' somehow sound grim; Cleanthes, however, attempted to furnish a total conflagration with a more positive colouring by stating that the sun, which at *ekpyrosis* assimilates to itself the other heavenly bodies and the other elements (*SVF* I, 510, 536), is the "torch-bearer" in the μυστήριον which is the cosmos (*SVF* I, 538). Stoic theology is a sort of mystery-religion (*SVF* I, 538)! Chrysippus made *ekpyrosis* sound very harmless when he said that the change is to "brightness" (αὐγή, *SVF* II, 611, Phil., *Aet. mu.* 90), and he stressed the positive aspect by affirming that the cosmos does not die but is completely absorbed

<sup>126</sup> Ib.: τρίτον δὲ Ἐρώτα γεγονέναι καθ' Ἡσίοδον, ἵνα τὸ πῦρ παραστήσῃ πυρωδέστερον γὰρ πάθος Ἐρώς, and *SVF* I, 105 = Schol. Hes., *Th.*, 117 τρίτον δὲ Ἐρώτα γεγονέναι.

<sup>127</sup> P. 270f., 283, 287.

<sup>128</sup> For references see EPRO 78, 131f., 157f., 185.

into the World-Soul (*SVF* II, 604, 605).<sup>129</sup> All things splendidly become God. Chrysippus, following Cleanthes, stated that theology, i.e. the supreme part of physics and philosophy, is to be described in terms of τελεταί (*SVF* II, 22, cf. 1008). Such attempts at bolstering up a cosmological theory are a symptom of the difficulties inherent to it: one is invited to leave the domain of rational and cognitive discussion. No wonder, then, that many thinkers refused to be initiated and stuck to argument.

Much, of course, has been lost; we still, however, have some bits and pieces concerned with what these others said. Carneades' incompletely preserved arguments against the Stoic concept of Providence use the conceptual implications of the notion of the divine in a way reminiscent of the arguments of Plato and Aristotle.<sup>130</sup> The Peripatetic Critolaus, ap. Phil., *Aet. mu.* 74,<sup>131</sup> used at least one of Aristotle's cosmological arguments. Chrysippus' successor, Zeno of Tarsus, suspended judgement as to *ekpyrosis* (*SVF* III, Zeno Tars. 5); so did another pupil of Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon (who went with Critolaus and Carneades to Rome on the famous mission) — but only in his old age (Phil., *Aet. mu.* 77 = *SVF* III, Diog. Bab. 27). Boethus of Sidon, a pupil of Diogenes, went over to the opposition; in one of his arguments, he used the theological argument of Arist., *De phil.* Fr. 19c Ross<sup>132</sup> (Phil., *Aet. mu.* 78-84 = *SVF* III, Boeth. Sid. 7). Panaetius either suspended judgement (Cic. *ND* II, 118 = Fr. 64 van Straaten) or affirmed that the world is eternal (Frs. 65, 66, 68, 69 van Straaten). Other late Hellenistic Stoics, not identified by Philo, tried to escape from the theological dilemma by affirming that the Demiurge only creates the world and that not he, but fire destroys it (*Aet. mu.* 8 = *SVF* II, 620: γενέσεως δὲ αὐτοῦ [sc. τοῦ κόσμου] θεὸν αἰτίον, φθορᾶς δὲ μηκέτι θεὸν κ.τ.λ.).

<sup>129</sup> See EPRO 78, 135f. For the possible rôle of fire in the Eleusinian mysteries see C.-M. Edsman, *Ignis Divinus*, Lund 1949, 224f.; H. Ludin Jansen, *Die Eleusinische Weihe*, in *Ex Orbe Rel.* (Festschr. Widengren), Leiden 1972, I, [287ff.], 293f.; N.J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, Oxford 1974, 231f. In the discussion concerned with *H. Dem.*, 311f. (and with pictorial material showing torch-bearers) the capital testimony of Cleanthes has not yet been exploited.

<sup>130</sup> See EPRO 78, 185f.

<sup>131</sup> Ib., 186.

<sup>132</sup> Effe, *o.c.*, 11f.; cf. ib., 29f., for Boethus' (also originally Aristotelian) argument concerned with God's inactivity during *ekpyrosis*.

Much of our information, as we have noticed, is from Philo's *On the Incorrptibility of the World*. This work as a whole shows that, even in Philo's time, the issue was very much a live one. Philo himself does not just report, in doxographical fashion, the views of others, but emphatically takes part in the discussion himself; he continuously interpolates and adds arguments of his own, and argues at length against the Stoics *Aet. mu.* 85ff. It is Philo who has transmitted *Arist. De phil.* Fr. 19a-c Ross as *anonymous* arguments, which shows how important they were and how much they had been used. Not only used again and again they were, however, but also adapted. Effie points out a clearly anti-Stoic amplification in the body of Fr. 19a,<sup>133</sup> and it is arguable that a similar amplification occurs in Fr. 19c, viz. that concerned with a Demiurge who, by continually building worlds equal to those he destroyed, is labouring in vain.<sup>134</sup> In this context, the statement with which Philo introduces the theological argument concerned with a Demiurge's possible motives (Fr. 19c)<sup>135</sup> is significant: "There is another, absolutely cogent proof, proudly used, as I know, by *innumerable* persons, who consider it to be absolutely pertinent and virtually irrefutable" (*Aet. mu.* 39). <Aristotle's> third argument, it appears, was absolutely famous, and in continuous use.

Philo's treatise is not the only evidence of the continuing actuality of this discussion; large sections of Cicero's *De natura deorum*, for instance, are devoted to it. There is also other evidence. Cicero's contemporary Diodorus of Sicily, in the introductory chapters of his *History*, gives us a cosmogony and zoogony followed by a history of culture (I, 7-8). That this constitutes only a selection from a wide range of consistently arranged material is what he virtually tells us himself, *ib.*, I, 6, 3: There were two schools of thought *παρὰ τοῖς νομιμωτάτοις τῶν τε φυσιολόγων καὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν*: some believed that the universe cannot have been generated and is indestructible and that the human race is eternal, others that the universe has come to be and is perishable and that the human race had first beginnings in time. The argument concerned with the eternity of the human race is traditional and Peripatetic: it was used by Dicaearchus (Fr. 47 and

<sup>133</sup> *O.c.*, 18 (I would not attribute this to Philo).

<sup>134</sup> Above, n. 110.

<sup>135</sup> See above, p. 300.

Fr. 48 Wehrli) and by Critolaus ap. Phil., *Aet. mu.* 55 (= Fr. 13 Wehrli). Unfortunately, Diodorus gives us no arguments on either side; he himself comes down abruptly on the side of those who assume that the world and mankind are *not* eternal.<sup>136</sup> Fragmentary evidence for the opposite option is available in the case of Antiochus of Ascalon, who "*appellabatur Academicus, erat quidem, si perpauca mutavisset, germanissimus Stoicus*" (Cic., *Luc.* 132). A 'Stoic', however, who thought like Boethus of Sidon, for he believed that the universe is eternal,<sup>137</sup> and it can be shown that he used (at least) one of the Aristotelian-Platonic arguments, though not the theological one of *Arist., De phil.* Fr. 19c Ross.<sup>138</sup> The view, then, which continued to be held by the majority of Stoics, infused a new and continuous actuality into the old arguments, although, in the first cent. B.C., there are no dogmatic Platonists or Aristotelians around, and only symptoms of a largely syncretistic revival of interest in the theories of the great classical philosophers are to be discerned.

## 7. The Epicureans

In his prolix and biased, but indispensable study of Epicurus' philosophical development,<sup>139</sup> Bignone argued that the polemical sections of Lucretius' famous exposition of the arguments concerned with the coming to be and perishability of worlds in the *De rerum natura*, bk. V, are directed not against the Stoics, but against Plato, Aristotle,

<sup>136</sup> Spoerri, *Späthell. Ber.*, who splendidly comments on ch. 7-8, has neglected I, 6, 3.

<sup>137</sup> Antiochus' physics has been recently studied by J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists*, London 1977, 81ff.; on his Stoicism see now J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, Göttingen 1978, 27f., and *ib.*, 90f. (no 'school' of Antiochus at Alexandria); *ib.*, 379: no more than a superficial relation between Antiochus and Middle Platonism.

<sup>138</sup> Cic., *Ac. pr.* I, 28-29: "... mundum, (a) *extra quem nulla pars materiae sit nullumque corpus* [cf. Plat., *Tim.* 32c-33b; *Arist., De phil.* Fr. 19a], (b) *partes autem esse mundi omnia quae insint in eo quae natura sentiente teneantur, in qua ratio perfecta insit* [this sounds Stoic, but is also a development of *Tim.* 30bf.] *quae sit eadem sempiterna, nihil enim valentius esse a quo intereat*" [cf. Plat., *loc. cit.*, and *Laws X.* 903bf.; *Arist., loc. cit.*]: the δῖται αἰτίαι — argument.

<sup>139</sup> *O.c.* (above, n. 18), 64ff., 101ff. Bignone's view is to a large extent accepted by P. Boyancé, *Lucretius et l'Épicurisme*, Paris 1963, 214ff., but with important corrections concerned with the anti-Stoic features of the argument. For a similar problem, cf. W. Kullmann, *Die Teleologie in der aristotelischen Biologie* (SBHeidelberg 1979), 29f.



and Theophrastus. "Lucrezio ... rivive, nell'anima sua ardente di poeta e nell'ammirazione di Epicuro, le lotte antiche del maestro".<sup>140</sup>

This is by no means the whole truth. In the previous paragraph, we have noticed that old arguments were kept very much alive, and dominated the discussion down to the first cent. B.C. — which may even have seen a revival of interest in such questions — and later. This is also valid for the Epicurean contribution to the debate. Epicurus and his followers indeed used some of Aristotle's arguments concerned with the assumption of a Demiurge; but they used these not only against Plato, but also against the Stoics. Actually, the Epicurean argument, as it survives in Lucretius, Cicero, and Aëtius,<sup>141</sup> somewhat confusedly shoots away at all possible targets simultaneously. This appears very clearly in Cic., *ND* I, 20f., where the opponents are Plato and the Stoics. In the context of the present inquiry, this conflation is of outstanding interest. Epicurus, or at least his faithful followers, fused the arguments against the assumption of a Demiurge with another one concerned with the actual condition of our world, an argument which is not, of itself, necessarily concerned with a Demiurge. This other argument deals in the first place with the Stoic theodicy.

The Aristotelian argument, adopted by the Epicureans (Aët. I, 7, 5f.; Cic., *ND* I, 21f.; Lucr. V, 168-173, 174-180), according to which a period of laziness before creation contradicts the definition of God, has already been mentioned above.<sup>142</sup> It is aimed at Plato,

<sup>140</sup> *O.c.*, 70.

<sup>141</sup> See Effe, *o.c.*, 23ff.

<sup>142</sup> See previous note. It has been established that Irenaeus used a doxographic handbook of the Aëtius-family (for *Adv. Haer.* II, 14, 1-6; 287ff. Harvey see Diels, *Dox.*, 171f.; for II, 28, 1-2; 349f. Harvey, see R.M. Grant, *After the New Testament*, Philadelphia 1967, 160f., and W.C. van Unnik, *Theological Speculation and its Limits*, in *Festschr. Grant*, 33ff.). What does not seem to have been observed is that in the latter chapter (II, 28, 4; 252-3 Harvey) Irenaeus answers the argument concerned with the activity or inactivity of God before creation to be found at Aët. I, 7 (ps. Plut.): "... si quis interrogat, antequam mundum faceret Deus, quid agebat? dicimus quoniam ista responsio subiacet Deo. Quoniam autem mundus hic factus est apotelesmaticus a Deo, temporale initium accipiens, Scripturae nos docent; quid autem ante hoc Deus sit operatus, nulla Scriptura manifestat. Subiacet ergo haec responsio Deo". This pious answer is similar to the solution to the 'physical problems' enumerated at II, 28, 2: "multa fugerunt nostram scientiam, et Deo haec ipsa committimus ... quod autem verum est et certum et firmum, adiacet Deo"; etc.

but could also be taken to heart by Stoics, as the defection of Boethus of Sidon shows.<sup>143</sup> Another argument, which only occurs in Lucretius (V, 180-194) and for which there are, to my knowledge, no Aristotelian parallels, is hardly applicable to Stoic cosmology. For "the gods", says Lucretius, there can be no other paradigm than what nature herself already has provided (no *exemplum gignundis rebus* (181) ... *si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi* (186)). This stands *Plato's* argument that a good Demiurge cannot have looked to a model that has come to be<sup>144</sup> on its head. We may infer that, according to Lucretius, a Demiurge or a plurality of demiurges are superfluous if nature on her own is already capable of producing anything that can be imagined. But this argument is not pertinent to the Stoic theory, because, in Stoic thought, God and nature are one.<sup>145</sup> Very much anti-Stoic, and hardly pertinent to Plato's view, on the other hand, is the argument (Aët., *loc. cit.*; Lucr. V, 156-167, 174) that the world cannot have been created for the sake of men.<sup>146</sup> It is this latter argument, again, which is closely linked up with the argument against the Stoic theodicy. Providence has to be rejected because the world is evil. Lucretius' lines (V, 198-9) are famous [note that V, 195-199 = II, 177-181]:

*nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam  
naturam rerum: tanta stat praedita culpa*

and so is the passage in which he argues this at length (200-234): most of the world is not inhabitable; men have to till the earth in order to get something to eat, but harvests often are destroyed; the earth is crawling with dangerous animals; the seasons bring diseases; many die before their time; the new-born infant wails;<sup>147</sup> animals, however, breed at their ease and find what they need. Only man is unhappy! — It has occasionally been suggested that this extreme pessimism is not attributable to Epicurus and that, even if Epicurus said something similar, it is Lucretius who is responsible for the

<sup>143</sup> See above, p. 307.

<sup>144</sup> See above, p. 295.

<sup>145</sup> Cf. e.g. *SVF* II, 937, 1024.

<sup>146</sup> Cf. Ernout-Robin and Bailey *ad loc.*

<sup>147</sup> Lucr. V, 222-227; this recalls Empedocles, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B118 (from the *Kath.*).

passage as a whole.<sup>148</sup> What has not, however, been noticed before is that an echo of this idea also occurs in Aët. I, 7. The statement that God made the world for the sake of mankind has been interwoven with the originally Aristotelian argument (I, 7, 5f.) against the assumption of a Demiurge (I, 7, 7), and this is further elaborated ib., I, 7, 10: πῶς δὲ εἶπερ ὁ θεὸς ἔστι καὶ τῇ τούτου φροντίδι τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπον οἰκονομεῖται, τὸ μὲν κίβδηλον εὐτυχεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀστεῖον τὰναντία πάσχει; Agamemnon and Heracles<sup>149</sup> were shamefully murdered!

Even if this argument is not originally one of the master himself, the similar passages in Lucretius and Aëtius show that it was Epicurean in the first cent. B.C. It is original with the Epicureans in the sense that no other Greek philosophers argued that the world is not good. It is noteworthy, however, that for the (later) Epicureans, the argument concerned with theodicy is only one of a number of arguments against the assumption of a Demiurge and of Providence, and that their only inference from their conviction that the world is not good is that the gods do not bother with worlds and do not create (or destroy) them either.<sup>150</sup>

## 8. Conclusion

In the first cent. B.C., a substantial literature was available which was concerned with the question of the duration of the world and with the arguments dealing with the assumption of a Demiurge and with Providence. Part of this literature will have been of a more or less doxographical sort and will have contained abstracts representative of the more important positions. Books of this nature must have been used by Diodorus Siculus and Philo, and presumably also by Cicero. From such literature, each person who was sufficiently interested

<sup>148</sup> Boyancé, *Lucr.*, 219. Bignone, *o.c.*, 94, adduced Polistratus, Π. ἀλ. καταφρ. Col. IVa 8 Wilcken; see however M. Isnardi-Parente, *Opere di Epicuro*, Torino 1974, 577f. n. 4, but also, on the other hand, Armstrong, *o.c.* (above, n. 60), 91 n. 5, on Epicurean *Angst*.

<sup>149</sup> On Heracles as a Stoic Hero see e.g. W.C. Stephens, *Two Stoic Heroes in the Metamorphoses*, in *Ovidiana*, ed. N.I. Herescu, Paris 1958, 273ff.

<sup>150</sup> Cf. also Armstrong, *o.c.* 91f., who, however, treats Epicureanism as an isolated phenomenon and ignores the larger context of *Lucr.* V, 196-199.

could, if he wished, work his way back to the works of the seminal thinkers (Cicero often did).

The most important possible positions which had retained their actuality can be roughly schematized in the following way:

- |                          |  |
|--------------------------|--|
| I the world is good      | ~ (a) there is a good Demiurge (Plato, the Stoics) |
|                          | ~ (b) there is no Demiurge (Aristotle)             |
| II the world is not good | ~ (c) there is no Demiurge (the Epicureans)        |

Note that Aristotle and the Epicureans derive an identical conclusion from contradictory premisses, and that, given the above scheme, a fourth position is equally possible:

- (II the world is not good) ~ (d) there is an evil Demiurge

This fourth position, that of the Gnostics, is not that of any Greek school of thought. Given the discussion among the Greek philosophers themselves, however, and given the fact that some of them, if only to reject it immediately, had toyed with the idea of an evil Demiurge, and also given the fact that the Epicureans, if they had wished to stand the whole Platonic-Stoic position, and not part of it, on its head, could have concluded to an evil Demiurge [which, for obvious reasons, they did not], it is hardly surprising that at a given moment some outsider(s) introduced position II d: the world not good ~ an evil Demiurge. For one thing, the information concerning these problems, as we have seen, was readily available in various forms. For another, the fourth position may have been considered, by its semi-Hellenized author(s), to be not absolutely different from the others. It filled a lacuna in the grid of possible options, and was affiliated, in various ways, to some of these. As we have noticed above, there are dualist aspects to Stoic and Platonic cosmology. Plato's world, however good, is not perfect: the Ideas are better. The Stoic world is inferior to the condition of things during *ekpyrosis*. We have also noticed that, before Plato, there are interesting indications of dualism in Presocratic cosmology, and that a least one of these early thinkers, Empedocles, was rediscovered around the beginning of the Christian Era.<sup>151</sup>

<sup>151</sup> Cf. above, n. 2. Lucretius, as is well known, read and admired Empedocles

In conclusion, I would say that the original Gnostic dualistic impulse cannot be fully derived from Greek antecedents, although, to a certain extent, it may perhaps be explained as a critical response to Greek ideas, which coincided with other ideas that were not at all Greek. Enough resemblances of a partial nature, however, can be indicated to make the fact that the Gnostic religion was capable of flourishing in a Graeco-Roman environment somewhat more understandable. Even the history of the single motif studied in the present paper<sup>152</sup> reveals that the phenomenon of the Hellenization of Gnosticism in a variety of more or less intellectual ways is fully comparable to the Hellenization of another Oriental religion: Christianity. Plotinus' view that Gnostic dualism is nothing but perverted Platonism is far too narrow, but it can be justified to a certain degree, and it may well be symptomatic of an understanding that was by no means restricted to circles outside the Gnostic movement, even if this understanding was only limited and not, of course, as devastatingly critical as that of Plotinus.<sup>153</sup>

(cf. e.g. Boyancé, *Lucr.*, 60; Bollack, *Emp.* I, 306f.); this cannot be only Italian tradition or the influence of Ennius, but is best explained in terms of a contemporary Empedocles-revival.

<sup>152</sup> Important in this context, no doubt, is also Neo-Pythagorean dualism from Eudorus onwards; I intend to investigate this phenomenon (and some of its relations with Gnosticism) elsewhere. Cf. also above, n. 71.

<sup>153</sup> I wish to thank Drs. G. van der Geijn, who impeccably typed my manuscript, and at lightning speed. The ms. itself was completed March 1980.

Larry J. ALDERINK, *Creation and Salvation in Ancient Orphism* (American Classical Studies, 8). Chico, Calif., Scholars Press, 1981. Pp. VIII, 142. Pr. \$ 7.50.

This is an attempt to establish what Early Orphism was about, and what it was not about. Alderink (A.) first discusses earlier literature, both maximalistic and minimalistic, and the incompatibilities of its methodologies. He argues that one should not work either deductively or inductively with a definition of Orphism fully valid for all things Orphic, but rather with one that describes Orphism as a 'mood' or 'motif' common to various members of the Orphic family, however much these may be unlike one another in other respects. There is a reference to Wittgenstein's definition in terms of 'family resemblance' at p. 20. Using this fluid notion as a heuristic device, i.e., in order to establish which members do and which do not belong to a family, however, has its hazards, especially if we don't yet really know the family.

According to A., the Orphic 'religious mood' is characterized by two interconnected themes: (1) the presence of a *cosmogony*—or rather of a family of cosmogonies—involving the idea that the world, as an expression of its divine creator(s), is essentially good, although things and people in the world are dominated by Time (Chronos, a God) and therefore necessarily temporary; (2) the presence of an *anthropology* involving that the soul is of a different



nature than the body which belongs to the world of Time. The soul, surviving the body, exists somewhere *post-mortem*; after death there is judgement and some souls are condemned to a dismal existence in Hades, while others go to a better place. During our lives, the body is the prison of the soul and the gods are our wardens; therefore it is not only good as a part of the world, but also because it is the means through which we are watched by the gods. Such evil as is found in the world was brought there by the Titans who killed, prepared, and consumed Dionysus. However, the Titanic element in our natures, according to A., is not our bodies but our tendencies to follow—unwittingly—the Titanic example. By avoiding bloodshed and the consumption of meat [while in prison, presumably] we become worthy of salvation. There is no evidence, A. argues, that the Orphics accepted metempsychosis.

This not un-attractive picture is, of course, in parts a highly subjective one and the evidence is not scrutinized with consistent rigour or with an in this context indispensable regard for chronology, although ch. 3, on the soul and salvation, is better than ch. 2, on the world. At any rate, A.'s attempt to reconstruct the details of the Orphic cosmogonical and cosmological theme is flawed in two ways: (1) his discussion of the Derveni papyrus is interesting but there is no consistent effort to distinguish between the ideas of the original poem on the one hand and those of the commentary on the other (25 ff.); (2) A. (36 ff.) enlists as 'Orphic' some cosmogonies which are not certainly Orphic and others which are certainly not. There is nothing Orphic about his first item, Eurip. fr. 484 (cf. *Vorsokr.* 59 A 62), and about that of Eudemus (*Vorsokr.* 1 B 12, the beginning) we only know that it put Night (not in Eurip.) at the beginning. That Aristoph., *Av.* 690 f. (*Vorsokr.* 1 A 12) is Orphic is dubious, and an early date for the so-called (cf. *Vorsokr.* 1 B 12) 'Rhapsodic Theogonies' is implausible. To claim that Ap. Rhod. I, 496 f. (*Vorsokr.* 1 B 16) is a piece of (pure) Orphism is preposterous, because the world-masses are separated (not, as A., 38, has it, "separated and united") by Empedoclean Strife<sup>1</sup>); if Ap. Rhod., *loc. cit.*, is 'Orphic', then Empedocles is 'Orphic' (Syrianus, *In Met.* 43, 12 says he is), *quod non*. Finally, the cosmogonies of Hieronymus and Hellanicus (*Vorsokr.* 1 B 13, first text) on the one hand and that of Athenagoras (*ibid.*, second text) on the other are conflated in an inaccurate way (38), and Phanes is introduced into this compound without textual support. What follows upon this muddle, viz. a conceptual and structuralist (?)

analysis of elements common to these cosmogonies cannot, of course, be good.

A.'s method in the anthropological chapter (55 ff.) is better; here, at least, the chronology of the testimonies is taken into account. There is some amount of curious exegesis however. That the body is the prison of the soul is taken to imply, in a very positive way, that it is only "a place whose guard is the gods" (64): the gods care for us. I agree that the body as the soul's prison is a less gruesome idea than the body as the soul's tomb, but it is not a particularly cheerful one either. Possibly, the Orphics formulated an optimistic cosmology; in as far as life in the body is concerned, however, their anthropology, as I have pointed out elsewhere, is certainly pessimistic<sup>2</sup>), even when their cosmology is not. A few other points: (1) the interpretation of Xenocrates, fr. 20 Heinze = 219 Isnardi Parente, is very uncertain, although A.'s guess (69 f.) is perhaps as educated as the others that have been proposed; (2) if Pind., fr. 133 (Schroeder) *ap. Plat., Meno* 81 a, is 'Orphic' (A., 72 f.) no amount of special pleading will be able to dismiss the inference that at least some members of the Orphic family believed in metempsychosis; (3) the omission of Hippas, *Vorsokr.* 86 B 6—and of the inferences it allows for some passages where Orphic lines are cited by Plato and Aristotle—is definitely odd.

1) See my paper *Bad World and Demiurge: A 'Gnostic' Motif from Parmenides and Empedocles to Lucretius and Philo*, in: R. van den Broek-M. J. Vermaseren (eds.), *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions*, EPRO 91, Leiden, Brill 1981, [261 ff.], 281 f. n. 48.

2) *O.c.*, 291-3.

D. PESCE, *La Tavola di Cebete* (Antichità classica e cristiana, 21). Brescia, Paideia, 1982. 106 p. Pr. L 15.000.

J. T. FITZGERALD & L. M. WHITE, *The Tabula of Cebes* (Soc. of Biblical Literature, Texts and Translations 24, Graeco-Roman Religious Series 9). Chico (Calif.), Scholars Press, 1983. x, 225 p. Pr. \$ 14.25.

Fitzgerald and White (henceforth F.-W.) provide Praechter's text (with app. crit.), translation, useful introduction, stimulating commentary in the guise of notes to the transl., supplementary notes to the Greek text, index verborum. Their discussion of the various interpretations to which the *Pinax* has been subjected is informative; their points about the genre involved (11 f.: combination of *ekphrasis*, erotapocritic dialogue, pseudo-Socratic dialogue) are illuminating. Pesce's (henceforth P.) more popular booklet also provides Praechter's text (without app. crit.), translation, brief introduction, some exegetical notes, index verborum. Both F.-W. and P. argue against Joly's interpretation<sup>1)</sup> of the *Pinax* as a Pythagorean allegory and defend the (by now traditional) view that it is an example of the popular and eclectic Cynic philosophy of the early Roman era; successfully, I believe. P. mainly discusses Joly; F.-W. attempt to put the little work in its larger context and deal with other learned literature as well, but they have missed important contributions by Kindstrand and Billerbeck<sup>2)</sup>. P. tends to play down the Stoic elements in the *Pinax* and speaks of a Socratic-Cynic tradition, apparently without realizing that the tradition involved in 'Cebes' was the retroactive creation of the Later Cynics. F.-W., more accurately, speak of an eclectic Cynic-Stoic work.

F.-W. (38 f.) argue that at 4.2 those about to enter Life are "young men on the verge of manhood", but P., 26 f., is surely right in speaking of "uomini che si appressano a nascere". Interestingly, he compares the *Daimōn* [later *daimonion*] with the guardian at Epict., *Diatr.* I 14, 11 f., and Marc. Aur. V 27, to be identified with reason. He also refers to the personal *daimōn* at Plat., *Tim.* 90 a. Now those about to pass the gate to Life imbibe the potion of error and ignorance provided by the lady at the gate, called Deceit; but some drink *more*, some *less* (5.2-6.1, my italics). No satisfactory explanation of this difference is given by F.-W. (140) or Joly (*o.c.*, 36), but there is a parallel. According to the myth of Er, Plat., *Rep.* X, the souls about to be incarnated, each of which has its *δαίμονα* ... φύλακα (620 e), arrive at the hot and dry plain

of Forgetfulness. All drink of the water of *Amelēs*, but τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ σωζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρου, τὸν δὲ αἰεὶ πίνοντα πάντων ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι (621 a-b). Previously, these souls according to Plato had received information of a general nature and each had known about its own future life, just as those warned by the *Daimōn* at 3.1 (cf. 31-32) know about life in general before going in. P. (47) states that the *χάρτης* held by the *Daimōn* cannot be sufficiently explained, although it may be "un simbolo...della parola-ragione", contrasting with the potion of error. F.-W. and P. translate *χάρτης* as "scroll" and "rotola", but one may also think of a "leaf" or "sheet", not necessarily of papyrus; presumably, it represents the information given by the *Daimōn*. But more associations are involved. First, according to the Stoics, the rational part of the soul at the time of birth is a *χάρτην εὐεργον εἰς ἀπογραφὴν* (Aetius, viz. ps. Plut. IV 11 and ps. Gal. 92; = *SVF* II 83. Note that this text also deals with stages of life from an epistemic point of view). Secondly, some of the so-called Orphic grave-tablets begin with a description of the way to be followed in the Nether World, and others advise one how to act down there<sup>3)</sup>. Thus, it would seem that traditional motifs known to us from other sources have been used; Platonic notions concerned with incarnation have been blended with ideas about the instructions for the recently deceased which have been transposed into wise lessons to be imparted to those about to be born. Note that the gifts of Fortune at 8.4 recall what is in the various lives at *Rep.* X 618 a. This does not entail that Joly's Pythagoreanizing interpretation should be accepted, for in the *Pinax* the Cynic view of life on this earth prevails. Other motifs have been transposed in the same way. At 3.3, we are told that those incapable of solving the Sphinx' riddle die a slow death which lasts all life: κατὰ μικρὸν ἐν ὄλῳ τῷ βίῳ καταφθείρεται, καθάπερ οἱ ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ\*) παραδεδομένοι. This echoes the 'living death' known as a Middle Platonist notion which I have studied elsewhere<sup>5)</sup>. For the "Pythagorean and Parmenidean life" at 2.2 one should compare Sotion fr. 27 W. *ap.* Diog. Laert. IX 21 (*Vorsokr.* 28 A 1, p. 217, 24 f.); cf. Joly, *o.c.*, 41 n. 8.

Some more points. On the *Δόξαι* at 6.2 F.-W. are not satisfactory; better P., who points out that opinions can be true as well as false, so may lead to salvation as well as to perdition. The Cynic *shibboleth* συντόμως (three times at 32, also συντομωτέρως, 33.4 (more parallels at *Socratici* VA 136 Giannantoni) is cavalierly treated by F.-W., n. 96 (161), slightly better 163, but it is not true that the *Pinax*

uses this idea in a non-Cynic way<sup>6</sup>). For 16.2 Ἐγκράτεια and καρτερία cf. Diog. Laert. VI 15 and VII 26, 27. The "hopelessly corrupt" 35.3 is sound if one does not assume a lacuna and reads δευτέρῳ with *K*. Finally, P. (following Joly) argues, 60, 92, that some travellers may proceed directly from the first to the third enclosure; F.-W., 145 f., successfully oppose this interpretation. Indeed, in order to "pass by" (παράλλαιττουσιν) the scholars, one has to follow the same track they do. The Greek verb, already at Parm., *Vorsokr.* 28 B 8, 61, derives from the jargon of the race-course.

1) R. Joly, *Le Tableau de Cébès et la vie religieuse*. Coll. Latomus LXI (Bruxelles-Berchem 1961).

2) J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes*. Act. Univ. Ups. Stud. graec. Ups. 11 (Uppsala 1976); M. Billerbeck, *Epiktet: Vom Kynismus*. Philos. ant. 34 (Leiden 1978); M. Billerbeck, *Der Kyniker Demetrius*, Philos. ant. 36 (Leiden 1979).

3) Cf. R. v. d. Broek-M. J. Vermaseren (eds.), *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religion*. EPRO 91 (Leiden 1981), 275 nn. 36, 37.

4) ἐπὶ τιμωρίᾳ reminds one of Philolaus, *Vorsokr.* 44 B 14, but in view of 10.4 this parallel should not be pressed. But note that while at 10.4-11.1 Repentance and Release are possible, these are not mentioned at 3.3.

5) Heraclitus, Empedocles and Others in a Middle Platonist Cento in Philo of Alexandria, Vig. Christ. 39 (1985), 131 ff.

6) At 32.3-4 and 33.3-4, learning for its own sake is rejected, but it may have some use. Cf. Demetrius ap. Sen., *De ben.* VII 1, 7: *reliqua oblectamenta otii sunt; licet enim iam in tutum retracto animo ad haec quoque excurrere cultum, non robur, ingeniis adferentia* (at VII 1, 5, learning has been declared useless for the good life).



## HESIOD AND PARMENIDES IN NAG HAMMADI

J. Doresse<sup>1</sup> and after him A. Böhlig<sup>2</sup> have suggested that the author of NHC II, 5 knew Hesiod's *Theogony*, was influenced by it, and argued against it. At the beginning of the treatise (II, 5, 97, 24f.) we are promised a demonstration that the common view according to which "nothing has existed prior to Chaos" [cf. *Th.* 116] is mistaken. Ib., 102, 27ff. we are told of an attack upon heaven and of the casting down of the "troubler" [no further identification] "to Tartarus" [cf. *Th.* 617-733]. The most interesting section, perhaps, is that on Eros, II, 5, 109, 1-26 [cf. *Th.* 120-2]. Böhlig argues that this section is an interpolation in the original "Szene von der Séduction des Archontes".<sup>3</sup> "His [sc. Eros'] masculine nature is Himeros" (109, 3); Böhlig compares *Th.* 201, where both Eros and Himeros accompany Aphrodite.<sup>4</sup>

That what we have here reminds one of Hesiod cannot, of course, be denied. Are we, however, to believe that the author of NHC II, 5 had read the whole *Theogony*,<sup>5</sup> and that Hesiod constitutes his main source? The cosmological section of the poem (from *Th.* 104 onwards) was widely quoted in antiquity by a variety of authors, beginning, for us, with Plato (*Symp.* 178b; *Th.* 116-7 + 120).<sup>6</sup> In Christian authors such as Theophilus and Hippolytus substantial chunks of poetry are quoted (Theoph., *Ad Aut.* III 5-6, Hipp., *Ref.* I 26).<sup>7</sup> Quotations of this size from *Th.* 617-733, however, are lacking, and even individual lines are only sparsely quoted. *Th.* 201, which has no organic connection either with the cosmogony or with the theomachy in the *Th.* – and which, moreover, is only a partial parallel to the relevant lines in NHC II, 5<sup>8</sup> – is only quoted in the *Et. Gen.* Consequently, such knowledge of Hesiodic items as the author of the present version may have possessed is likely to be not direct, but tralatitious, although he may have read the cosmogonical section in authors such as Theophilus and Hippolytus (or in the sort of sources or anthologies from which these had derived their quotations).

The best approach to this problem is by way of two passages in Plutarch, who provides us with much more pertinent parallels than the original text of Hesiod.

At II, 5, 109, 3ff., Eros is androgynous: "his masculine nature is Himeros", "his feminine nature which is with him is a blood-soul, (and) is derived from the substance of Pronoia". Plut., *Fac.* 926 E – 927 A, says that originally the elements were in a chaotic condition, "until desire came over nature from Providence [ἄχρι οὗ τὸ ἰμερτὸν ἦκεν ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐκ προνοίας], for Love and Aphrodite and Eros are among them as Empedocles says and Parmenides and Hesiod". The androgynous nature of Eros cannot be paralleled from Plutarch (although he mentions two female forces besides male Eros), but the conjoining of τὸ ἰμερτὸν and πρόνοια as brought about by Eros etc. strikingly parallels Himeros-Pronoia as the constituent parts of Eros in NHC II, 5. In the related passage *Amat.* 756 D-F, Plutarch mentions in succession Empedocles' Love (quoting *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B17, 20-21 and B151) and Parmenides' Eros (quoting *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13), and he refers to Hesiod as well. Significantly, he presents Emp. B17, 20-1, καὶ φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν κ.τ.λ. as implying that Eros belongs, as an equal, to the company of the gods; this has been called "extreme misrepresentation (or irony)",<sup>9</sup> but it can be paralleled from NHC II, 5, 109, 8f: "when all the gods and their angels saw Eros, they became enamoured of him. But when he appeared among all of them, he burned them". "Appeared among all of them" – this is not to be found at Hes., *Th.* 120-2, but squares with Plutarch's interpretation of Empedocles' lines. [Note that Empedocles' lines are about Philotes, which Plutarch, *loc. cit.*, interprets as Eros: ταῦτ' οἶεσθαι χρὴ λέγεσθαι περὶ Ἐρωτος].

Furthermore, at *Fac.*, 926 E, Plutarch accuses the Stoics, who distribute the elements according to their natural locations, of destroying the world; if one follows them, one brings upon things the Neikos<sup>10</sup> of Empedocles and "arouses against nature the ancient Titans and Giants" and longs "to look upon that legendary and dreadful disorder and discord <by separating> all that is heavy and <all> that is light". Bignone<sup>11</sup> believed that the reference to the Titans and Giants derives from Aristotle's lost work *On Philosophy*, where it would have served to characterize the Presocratic philosophers who declare the world to be perishable, for (1): in *De phil.* Fr. 18 Ross (Phil., *Aet. mu.* 10) Aristotle speaks of the δεινὴν ... ἀθέοτητα of those who

destroy the world, and (2): the Epicurean arguments concerned with the perishability of the world found in Lucr. V and which, according to Bignone, are directed against Aristotle's lost work, are introduced with the remark that whoever destroys by his theory the *moenia mundi* is not, for that reason, the equal of the Giants and does not deserve to be punished like them (V 114-9).

Bignone's arguments were accepted by Effe and others,<sup>12</sup> who pointed out, however, that the arguments in Lucretius are also directed against the Stoics.<sup>13</sup> This is correct; Plutarch, too, argues also against the Stoics,<sup>14</sup> and he is especially concerned with their theory (taken over from Aristotle) of the natural locations of the elements: below for what is heavy, up for what is light.<sup>15</sup> Although the possibility that Aristotle in the *De phil.* already spoke of Titans and Giants is not to be excluded, it is, I believe, more to the point to adduce a 'fragment' of Zeno, embedded in *Schol. Hes. Th.* 134, p. 30, 6f. di Gregorio<sup>16</sup>: Ζήνων δὲ Τιτᾶνάς φησι εἰρῆσθαι φυσικώτερον, διὰ τὸ διατάττεσθαι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου τὰ στοιχεῖα. According to Zeno, the Titans are to be interpreted as the elements which have been arranged in the cosmos in an orderly way. The scholia *ad loc.* also preserve interpretations of the names of Titans (some of which, no doubt, are Stoic): Iapetos represents what moves upwards because it is without weight, Hyperion the revolving heavens, Kreios the sovereign principle or, alternatively, separation. Zeno anyhow gave the Titans a place in cosmogonical theory; presumably, because the construction of the ordered universe is to be seen in terms of a disaggregation of an original, pre-cosmic unity. If it was indeed Aristotle who compared those who by their theories destroy (and generate!) the universe with the Titans and Giants of old, Zeno retaliated<sup>17</sup> rather nicely by attributing a constructive role to the Titans. Plutarch, again, stands this Stoic theory upon its head by pointing out that in the world not all things are in their 'natural' places: there is fire below the earth and soul in the body (926 C-D). Such elemental combinations as quite normally exist are there because Love and Aphrodite and Eros (as Empedocles says and Parmenides and Hesiod) brought about affection among the elements in a providential way; things are not "in the state in which, according to Plato [*Tim.* 53 b], everything is from which god is absent".

Obviously, the negative function of the Titans and Giants as opposed to the positive function of Eros etc. is, in Plutarch's exposition, part of a consistent cosmological argument. In Lucretius, the

role of the Giants is related, but different: Giants there are said to be (by the opponents!) those who by their theory destroy the *moenia mundi*. At NHC II, 5, 102, 25ff., again, there is an attack against the world itself: "And the heaven and his earth were *overturned* [cf. Lucr. V 119 *disturbant moenia mundi*] by the troubler who was beneath them".

The passage in Plutarch's *Fac.* can be paralleled by a series of fragments, forming one continuous whole, from Celsus' *Alethes Logos*, ap. Orig., *C. Cels.* VI 42 (where the emphasis is not, as in Plutarch, on Love, but on Battle), which help to elucidate the prehistory of the anonymous troubler cast to Tartarus (NHC II 5, 102, 27f.) somewhat further. Celsus criticizes the Christians because they introduce an adversary of God: Satan (σφάλλονται δὲ ἀσεβέστατα ἄττα, cf. Arist. *De Phil.* Fr. 18<sup>18</sup>). He argues that the Christians have misunderstood the real meaning of the ancient Greek authors when these hint at a sort of divine war. He cites Heracl., *Vorsokr.* Fr. 21B80, on universal war, and paraphrases Pherecydes' description of the war between the armies of Cronus and those of Ophioneus (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 7B4, where the part attributed to Pherecydes is too large). Then he says that this is also the meaning behind τὰ περὶ τοὺς Τιτᾶνας καὶ Γίγαντας μυστήρια, θεομαχεῖν ἐπαγγελλομένους, and in those of the Egyptians concerned with Typhon, Horus, and Osiris. [Had he read Plutarch's *De Is.*?]. He adds that Homer agrees with Heraclitus and Pherecydes and "those who introduce the mysteries of the Titans and Giants", as appears from two passages, which he quotes: *Il.* I 590-1, where Hephaestus reminds Hera of what happened to him when he tried to defend her, and *Il.* XV 18-24, where Zeus, speaking to Hera, reminds her how he punished her and how he threw down from heaven to earth whatever god tried to help her. Celsus explains these lines as follows: the words of Zeus to Hera are those of God to Matter, and their hidden meaning is "that at the beginning it (sc. matter) was chaotic and that God took it in hand and bound it in certain proportions and ordered it" [ὥς ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν ὕλην) πλημμελῶς ἔχουσιν διαλαβὼν ἀναλογίαις τισὶ συνέδησε καὶ ἐκόσμησεν ὁ θεός] and that "God cast out all demons round it who were arrogant". Next, he argues that this is how Pherecydes understood Homer, and quotes *Vorsokr.* Fr. 7B5, which speaks of the ταρταρίη<sup>19</sup> μοῖρα which is underneath, and which is where "Zeus casts out any of the gods who become arrogant". The same idea, in his view, is behind the decoration on the Panathenaic *peplos* of Athena (embroidered with scenes from a battle with the Giants).

This fragment calls for some comment. Although Celsus may have added some references on his own account, and although the polemical point of his argument will have influenced his exposition to some extent,<sup>20</sup> the main line of his exposition must derive from an earlier source (not Plutarch, but very much like Plutarch). Celsus' interpretation of Zeus as God and of Hera as Matter is originally Stoic, cf. *SVF* II 1071 (Diog. Laërt. VII 187), 1073 (Theoph., *Ad Aut.* III 8), 1074 (Orig., *C. Cels.* IV 48, not a quotation from Celsus): Chrysippus' cosmology.<sup>21</sup> This Stoic cosmology, however, has been platonized:<sup>22</sup> Celsus' matter in its chaotic condition (πλημμελῶς ἔχουσιν) is that of Plato's *Tim.* 30 a, κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως.<sup>23</sup> Also Plut., *Fac.* 926 E, speaks of ἀκοσμίαν καὶ πλημμέλειαν. God orders this chaos by bonds (συνέδησε) and proportions (ἀναλογίαις); cf. *Tim.* 30 c, δέσμων δὲ κάλλιστος ὅς ἄν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ποιῇ τοῦτο δὲ πέφυκεν ἀναλογία κάλλιστον ἀποτελεῖν (cf. 30 b, συνέδησεν): this is how God creates order among the elements, and φιλία. Likewise, Plut., *Fac.* 927 A, says that after the intervention of God and Love, things were "bound" (ἐνδέθεντα). The parallel between Plato, Plutarch and Celsus is unmistakable. Now God, in the context of Celsus' exposition as a whole, brings about order by casting out the gods and Titans which were "round" matter. Plutarch, as we have noticed,<sup>24</sup> equates chaos with the activities of Titans and Giants, *Fac.* 926 E: ὅρα ... μὴ ... τοὺς παλαιούς κινήσας ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν καὶ Γίγαντας καὶ τὴν μυθικὴν ἐκείνην καὶ φοβερὰν ἀκοσμίαν καὶ πλημμέλειαν ἐπιθεῖν ποθῆς.

Hence Celsus' Titans and Giants belong with a cosmological context, the same as that encountered in Plutarch. In Plutarch, their role is minimal: he emphasizes that of love and order. In Celsus, on the other hand, the role of the Titans and Giants is a major, that of 'order' on the whole a minor one. These divergencies can easily be explained in terms of the respective and divergent aims of these authors. It cannot be denied, however, that the passage in *Fac.* and the Celsus fragment illuminate each other.

In this context, it is important to note that Alexander of Lycopolis, p. 8 Brinkmann, says that the Manichaeans referred to the battle with the Giants as described in Greek poetry, "which to their mind proves that the poets were not ignorant of the insurrection of matter against God".<sup>25</sup> Alexander is a near contemporary of the author of NHC II, 5. It is possible that he turns an earlier anti-Christian argument against the new Manichaean enemy,<sup>26</sup> but it is equally feasible that Greek

Manichaeans at Alexandria justified the doctrines of their sect by referring to Greek parallels. However this may be, Manichaean matter interpreted in terms of Giants certainly provides an excellent parallel with what is found in NHC II, 5. If a plurality of sources is involved here, there was consistency in what they had to offer, and this agreement in its turn can be explained by a descent which, to a considerable degree, is a common one. That Alexander mentions the Giants only is no objection: Hipp., *Ref.* I 26, p. 31, 13f. Wendland (after his quotation of *Th.* 108ff.) says Giants where he should have said Titans.<sup>27</sup>

We have noticed that, in Plutarch, Parmenides' cosmogonic<sup>28</sup> Eros plays an important part and that he also says that Parmenides spoke of a cosmogonic Aphrodite. This is Plutarch's name for the anonymous goddess who in Parmenides creates Eros (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13, quoted *Amat.* 756 F<sup>29</sup>). The activities of this goddess are described in some detail in a fragment of Parmenides preserved by Simplicius only (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B12), and in a non-verbal quotation by the same Simplicius (*In Phys.*, p. 39, 20-1, cf. *Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 28B13).

Surprisingly, a substantial portion of the hymnic description of Eros in NHC II, 5, is strikingly parallel to these Parmenidean passages:

NHC II, 5, 109, 16ff.

*Just as Eros appeared out of  
the mid-point between light and  
darkness, (and) in the midst<sup>1</sup>  
of the angels and men<sup>120</sup>  
the intercourse of Eros was con-  
summated, so too<sup>1</sup> the first sensual  
pleasure sprouted upon the earth.<sup>1</sup>*

*<The man followed> the earth,  
The woman followed <the man>,  
And marriage followed the woman  
And reproduction followed marriage,  
And death<sup>25</sup> followed reproduction.*

Parmenides B12, 1-3; 4-5.

αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι πληντο πυρὸς  
ἀκρήτοιο,  
αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ  
φλογὸς ἵεται αἶσα·  
ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων  
ἦ πάντα κυβερνᾷ·  
πάντων<sup>30</sup> γὰρ συγεροῖο τό-  
κου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει,

πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῆν  
τότ' ἐναντίον αὐτῆς  
ἄρσεν θηλυτέρῳ·  
(Simpl.):

καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν  
ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀει-  
δές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν.

The Parmenidean parallel explains why, at NHC II, 5, 109, 16f., Eros appears out of the mid-point of light and darkness:<sup>31</sup> in Parmenides,



the cosmogonic goddess who created Eros [cf. *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13] and who is called Aphrodite by Plutarch, resides in the midst of rings partly filled with night, partly with bright flame. She holds sway everywhere and reigns over all beings (πάντα in line 3 and πάντων in line 4), i.e. both in heaven and upon earth; this parallels the "just as" – "so too" at NHC II, 5, 109. "Marriage" and "reproduction" are paralleled by "coupling" and "birth". If the additions to the text of II, 5, 109, 22f. are accepted [I cannot pretend to be a judge], the parallel with Parmenides is striking: the goddess sends the female to couple with the male and the male with the female, and at NHC II, 5, 109 the woman follows the man because, of course, Eros is omnipotent. Finally, the words "and death followed reproduction" sit somewhat awkwardly in their context, a hymn upon the productive powers of Eros. One can understand their being where they are, however, if in a source originally followed the life-giving power also was in charge of death.

Both individually and as a body, these parallels are impressive. The same order is roughly followed in both texts, and points which remain difficult in the Gnostic text can be illuminated from the Greek.

Yet I am not going to argue that the author of NHC II, 5 had read Parmenides, any more than he had read Hesiod. Above, I have suggested that the person responsible for the Gnostic treatise in the form in which it has come down to us was influenced by Greek literature comparable as to its contents to passages in Plutarch. I can now add the complementary suggestion that this source not only, just as Plutarch, quoted Parm., *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B13 ["first of all the gods she created Eros" – this, too, is paralleled in NHC II, 5, 109, 1f.: "Out of the first blood, Eros appeared ..."], but also *Vorsokr.* Fr. 28B12 and something corresponding to what we know in the form preserved by Simpl., *In Phys.*, 39, 20f. The background of NHC II, 5, as far as the 'Greek' sections are concerned, is not to be sought in Hesiod, but in the context of late Hellenistic cosmological discussion (and its aftermath), where not only Hesiod, but also other literature was quoted.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

The above had been sent to the editor when the first fasc. of *Vig. Chr.* 34 (1980) arrived in the library of the Theological Institute, containing the paper *On the Origin of the World (CG II,5): A Gnostic*

*Physics*, by Ph. Perkins (p. 37ff.). I was delighted to see that Professor Perkins' argument concerned with Eros in this treatise (p. 38f.) partly coincides with my own: we both cite Plut., *Fac.* 926 Ef. Moreover, her remarks on Stoic cosmological theory as a background to that of the Gnostic treatise supplement and are supplemented by what I have said at p. 178.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Les livres secrets des gnostiques d'Égypte* (Paris 1958) 196. For Eros, he also refers to Aesch. Fr. 44 Nauck.

<sup>2</sup> A. Böhlig-P. Labib, *Die Koptisch-gnostische Schrift ohne Titel* (Berlin 1962) 47f. (Titans), 61f. (Eros); A. Böhlig, *Die griech. Schule* (in: A. Böhlig-F. Wisse, *Zum Hellenismus in den Schriften von NH*, Wiesbaden 1975, 9ff.) 20–1.

<sup>3</sup> 1975, 20.

<sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 21. – For the text of II, 5, I have used the translation in *The NH Library in English* (Leiden 1977).

<sup>5</sup> Böhlig, *ib.* 20, suggests that he had read Hesiod at school; I think this presupposes an anthology.

<sup>6</sup> Presumably, Plato already used a learned anthology, viz. that of Hippias, cf. *Vorsokr.* Fr. 86B6. See B. Snell, *Die Nachrichten über die Lehren des Thales*, Phil. 1944, 170ff., repr. in: C. J. Classen (ed.), *Sophistik* (WdF 187, Darmstadt 1975) 478ff., and W. von Kienle, *Die Berichte über die Sukzessionen der Philosophen* (Diss. Berlin 1962) 40ff.

<sup>7</sup> See further the apparatus in M. L. West, *Hesiod. Theogony* (Oxford 1971). – It is of some importance to note that all except one of Zeno's allegorical interpretations of the *Th.* refer to lines 116–35 (D. E. Hahm, *The Origins of Stoic Cosmology*, Ohio St. Univ. Pr. 1977, 235 n. 26). See also N. Zeegers-Vander Vorst, *Les citations des poètes grecs chez les apologistes chrétiens du I<sup>er</sup> siècle*, Louvain 1972, 38f.; 111f. (on *Ad Aut.* II 5–7).

<sup>8</sup> In Hesiod Himeros is not, moreover, an aspect of Eros.

<sup>9</sup> *Mor.*, Loeb ed. vol. IX, 349 n. c.

<sup>10</sup> At 926 E, Emp., *Vorsokr.* Fr. 31B27 is quoted from memory (weak variant at end of first line) and mistakenly applied to the dominion of Neikos instead of to Sphairos. I have dealt with this question in a paper to appear in the *Festschrift Quispel* (EPRO series, 1981).

<sup>11</sup> E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, II (Firenze 1973) 77ff. See also B. Effe, *Stud. z. Kosmologie u. Theologie d. Arist. Schr. "Üb. d. Phil."* (München 1970) 14f.

<sup>12</sup> E.g. P. Boyancé, *Lucrèce et l'Épicurisme* (Paris 1963) 214f.

<sup>13</sup> The *hominum causa*-argument (Lucr. V 156f., cf. Aët. I 7, 7–10) pertains to the Stoics.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. H. Görgemanns, *Unters. z. Plutarchs Dialog De facie* (Heidelberg 1970) 98f.

<sup>15</sup> See P. W. van der Horst-J. Mansfeld, *An Alexandrian Platonist against Dualism* (Leiden 1974), 24f. A few passages: *SVF* I 99; II 527 and 580; Aët. I 12, 4.

<sup>16</sup> Von Arnim, *SVF* I 100, prints the wrong text, viz. a scholium (T) which sum-

marizes and paraphrases the various pieces of information contained in R2WLZ; cf. *Scholia vetera in Hes. Theog.* rec. L. di Gregorio (Milano 1975) 30. The T scholium attributes everything it gives to Zeno, who however is only cited in R2WLZ for the information I have printed. In R2WLZ, alternative (Stoic, I would say) interpretations of the individual Titans are also listed, and apart from the nominatim reference to Zeno also one to Acusilaus (*FGrH* 2 F 7, *Vorsokr.* Fr. 9B4) is given.

<sup>17</sup> For Zeno against Aristotle see my paper *Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought*, in: M.J. Vermaseren (ed.), *Studies in Hellenistic Religions* (EPRO 78, Leiden 1979, 129ff.) 144ff.

<sup>18</sup> See above, p. 175f.

<sup>19</sup> Pherecydes, of course, echoes Hesiod. On the other hand, the term Tartarus may have become known to our author through a source quoting Pherecydes, not Hesiod.

<sup>20</sup> Strictly speaking, Homer's Zeus does not throw Hephaestus and others into Tartarus, but to the earth: the parallel with Hesiod has been forced.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. EPRO 78, 180f.

<sup>22</sup> Such platonizing cosmologies have been splendidly studied by W. Spoerri, *Spät-hellenistische Berichte über Welt, Kultur und Götter* (Basel 1959) 1–131; for the passage in *Fac.* see p. 75 (and my comments in the paper mentioned above n. 10, viz. n. 104); he has not, however, noticed that the Celsus fragment provides us with a parallel account.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *An Alexandr. Plat.*, 21 and n. 66. H. Chadwick, *Origen: Contra Celsum* (Cambridge 1953), 359 n. 2 and M. Borret, *Origène. Contre Celse*, t. III (Paris 1969) 283 n. 3 wrongly refer to *Tim.* 37 a.

<sup>24</sup> Above, p. 175.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. *An Alexandr. Plat.*, 57 and n. 209.

<sup>26</sup> *Ib.*, 58 n. 212.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin 41976) 575, *ad loc.*

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Arist., *Met.* A 984 b 25, before Fr. B 13: κατασκευάζων τὴν τοῦ παντὸς γένεσιν; Plut., *Amat.* 756 F ἐν τῇ κοσμογονίᾳ γράφων (Fr. B 13 follows). Both passages quoted in *Vorsokr.* ad Fr. 28B13.

<sup>29</sup> The identification is understandable, but not acceptable for *Parmenides*. See further H. Martin Jr., *Plutarch's Citation of Empedocles at Amat. 756 D*, GRBS 1969, 57ff., and the paper mentioned above, n. 10.

<sup>30</sup> For the correct reading see D. Sider, Phoenix 1979, 67f. (*Vorsokr.* has πάντα γὰρ <ῆ>).

<sup>31</sup> Böhlig, 1975, 21, refers to Acusilaus (*Vorsokr.* Fr. 9B3 = *FGrH* 2F6c): "it is not clear whose son he [sc. Theocritus] says Eros is; Hesiod [sc. says that he is the son] of Chaos and Earth, Acusilaus of Night and Aether [Νυκτὸς καὶ Αἰθέρος]". But there is no reference to a "mid-point" here. Note that Plat., *Symp.* 178 b, cites Hesiod, *Acusilaus* and *Parmenides* on Eros; for this passage see above, n. 6.

<sup>32</sup> *NH Libr. in Engl.*, 161.

## ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

### STUDY IV

p. 203 See now W. Theiler, *Poseidonios. Die Fragmente*, Berlin - New York 1982, I: Texte, F 357; II: Erläuterungen, 357 ff.

p. 209 Kleywegt stuck to his guns. See A.J. Kleywegt, *Cleanthes and the 'Vital Heat'*, *Mnemosyne* 37 (1984), 94 ff.

### STUDY VI

p. 61 Today I would say Alcinous. For the definitive proof see J. Whittaker, *Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of the Roman Empire*, ANRW II 36.1, Berlin - New York 1987, 83 ff.

p. 75 Although it is no longer possible to attribute the *Didascalicus* to Albinus, the comparison of its doctrine of the descent of the soul with that of the real Albinus still seems feasible.

### STUDY VII

p. 153 The reference is to Study X.  
For an updated and revised version of this *bibliographie raisonnée* see now R. Radice & D.T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography 1937-1986*, Supplem. Vigiliae Christianae, Leiden 1988.

### STUDY XIII

p. 6 Alexander's treatise is the *Critique of the Doctrines of Manichaeus*, to be dated to the closing years of the third century CE. The only available edition is that by Brinkmann, see p. 47. A new Teubneriana has been announced. See now also the translation and commentary by A. Villey, Alexandre de Lycopolis. *Contre la doctrine de Mani*, Sources Gnostiques et Manichéennes 2, Paris 1985.